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ABSTRACT
The main focus of this thesis is indeterminate identity and its relations to vague
objects and to imprecise designation.
Evans's argument concerning indeterminate-identity statements is often
regarded as a proof that vague objects cannot exist. In chapter 11 try to argue that the 
argument may be refuted by vague objects theorists.
In chapter II I present various accounts of what indeterminate identity 
between objects may consist in and three different characteristics of it. 1 argue that 
there are objects whose identity is indeterminate and that such indeterminacy is ontic 
in the sense that it concerns individuation and spatio-temporal boundaries of objects. I 
also formulate the argument showing that (independently of Evans's argument) terms 
designating indeterminately identical objects cannot be precise designators.
Chapter III is devoted to problems concerning vagueness and identity-over­
time. The indeterminate answer to the questions concerning diachronic identity in 
puzzling cases can be regarded as the correct response by both endurantists and 
perdurantists. However, while for perdurantists the whole vagueness of persistence 
conditions is a conceptual matter, for endurantists it deserves the name of "ontic
vagueness".
Chapter IV focuses on questions concerning vagueness and identity-at-a-time. 
I offer a new solution to the problem of the many, according to which in each case in 
which the problem arises there is - contrary to appearances - only one (vague) object 
present. The problem arises because each such object has many precisifications, which
nevertheless have no ontological significance. 1 also propose a new account of what it
takes for an object to be vague.
Chapter V deals with indeterminate identity in the domain of quanta. The first 
part investigates the various problems concerning identity and individuation of 
quantum particles, whereas the second part is devoted to analysis and critique of E. J.
Lowe's example of alleged indeterminate identity-over-time between electrons.
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INTRODUCTION
1. Nobody questions the fact that our language is vague. Although no
common agreement as to the nature of vagueness as a linguistic phenomenon has 
been reached and theorists quarrel about whether vagueness is semantic or epistemic, 
they at least do not doubt its existence. Vague expressions have been causing trouble 
for hundreds of years. And not only for philosophers but for ordinary people as well. 
For it is not entirely clear how to use those expressions; to which objects they apply.
Is a man who is 1.75m tall or not? Should a man who has 3000 hairs on his head be
called "bald" or "not bald"? Is pudding solid? It seems that such questions have no 
correct answer. There seems to be no sharp boundary between the tall and not tall, 
between the bald and not bald, and between things that may be called "solid" and
those that cannot.
One of the most characteristic features of vague expressions, the feature that 
distinguishes them from all other expressions, is that they admit of borderline cases, 
i.e. cases of which it is doubtful whether a given expression applies to them or not. 
For each vague word there are some positive cases, i.e. cases which clearly possess 
the relevant property, some negative cases, i.e. cases which clearly do not possess the 
relevant property, and some borderline cases. 1 Since it is unclear whether or not *
It is often said that a word is exiensionally vague if it has borderline cases, while it is intensionally 
vague if it could have borderline cases (Cf Fine (1975), p. 266).
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borderline cases should be included in one of the clear extensions, one does not know
which truth-value should be ascribed to statements about those cases.
Imagine a row which consists of men standing in such a way that every man's 
scalp differs from the scalp of his predecessor in the row only by a single hair and
which starts with a man with no hair on his head. The men at one end of the row are
positive cases of "bald", the men at the other end are negative cases of "bald". 
However, we are not able to pinpoint the first negative case. It has not been 
determined how many hairs makes a person non-bald. The apparent lack of sharp 
boundaries between different kinds of cases makes vague expressions susceptible to 
sorites paradoxes . The so called sorites premise; "For every n, if a man with n hairs on
his head is bald, then a man with /?+l hairs on his head is bald" seems to force one to
conclude that even a man with 100,000,000 hairs is bald. Furthermore, it implies the 
existence of the phenomenon of higher-order vagueness. Not only is there no sharp 
boundary between positive and negative cases, but there seem to be no sharp
boundary between positive and borderline cases either. Therefore, borderline cases of
borderline cases must exist.
Semantic theorists argue that vagueness is a semantic phenomenon, due to 
some kind of deficiency in meaning. The most popular conception of this kind is 
supervalua^l^i^r^is^m..2 The superealuation theory claims that borderline cases exist 
because the meaning of vague expressions is under-determined. The meaning of each 
vague word admits of many precisifications. The statements containing vague words 
should be evaluated in admissible precisifications; they should be assigned determinate 
truth (falsity) iff they are true (false) in every admissible precisification of the vague
2
Locus classicus of supervalualionisin is K. Fine (1975). Another important semantic approach is 
the conception of the degrees of truth (see e.g. Edgingion (1996)).
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word they contain. Since statements concerning borderline cases have different truth-
values in different precisifications, they come out truth-valueless (indeterminate).
According to this conception the reasoning leading to the sorites paradox
commits a fallacy. Supervrlualionists argue that the sorites premise "For every //, if a
man with n hairs on his head is bald, then a man with /?+l hairs on his head is bald" is
false, since in each precisification there is an // that falsifies it.
In order to accommodate higher-order vagueness supervaluationists introduce 
the relation of admissibility between precisificrtions. What is a matter of interpretation 
of first-order level is itself a matter of interpretation at the second-order level. Each 
second-order precisification determines for itself which first-order precisifications are 
admissible. In general, an (/ + 1) precisification specifies which /-level precisifications 
are admissible. The admitting relation is reflexive, but non-transitive. It may be thus 
indeterminate whether something is true or false.
The epistemic conception of vagueness may be traced as far back as the times 
of Chrysippus. Recently Timothy Williamson has worked out a modern version of 
epistemicism. . According to the epistemic theory of vagueness borderline statements 
have one of the two classical truth-values. On this view there is something hidden 
from competent speakers of the language. Each vague term in fact has a boundary 
demarcating its extension. The problem is that this boundary is unknown and
moreover unknowable to the speakers. The vagueness of a term consists in our not 
knowing where its boundary lies, not in a lack of any boundary. According to
■’ See Williamson (1994); in particular Chapter 8. A new - different - version of epislemicism has 
recently been offered by C. Wright (2001). Wright also lakes vagueness to be a matter of ignorance, 
but he argues - contrary to Williamson - that we arc not justified in claiming that bivalence holds and 
borderline statements have one of the determinate truth values {NB we are not justified in claiming 
that bivalence docs not hold, either).
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Williamson, vagueness is a case of inexact knowledge. The inexactness of knowledge
is characterized by the holding of margin for error principles, where a margin for 
error principle is a principle of the following form: "W is true in all cases similar to
cases in which 'It is known that /f is tru^^".4 Because of the limited exactness of our
senses, knowledge which we gain by perception is inexact. And
"|wjhat distinguishes vagueness as a source of inexactness is that the margin for error 
principles to which it gives rise advert to small differences in meaning, not to small differences 
in the objects under discussion";
The cause of the existence of borderline cases and of the existence of
borderline cases of borderline cases is simply our ignorance. This ignorance has 
conceptual sources: it is due to the inexactness of our conceptual discriminatory 
powers. Because the extensions of vague words are not "stabilized by natural 
divisions", a slight change in use of these words will result in a small change in their 
meaning. Therefore, the boundaries of vague expressions are "sharp but unstable".6 
Since our powers of conceptual discrimination are limited, we are not able to 
distinguish such small differences in meaning and in consequence we are unable to 
point to the exact boundaries of vague expressions' extensions. Hence, we cannot 
know whether certain objects fall into the positive or the negative extension. Thus, the 
sorites paradox is not a paradox in fact, because one of the sorites premise is false, 
since the statement "There is an //, such that a man with n hairs on his head is bald, 
but a man with n+\ hairs on his head is not bald" is true. Higher-order vagueness 
arises because the KK principle (//' / know somelhing, then I know (hat 1 know it) 3
4 Williamson (1994), pp. 226-7.
3 Williamson (1994). pp. 230-231.
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fails:7 there can be borderline cases of borderline cases, for one may not know that 
one knows whether a given case is a borderline case.
The supervaluationist and the epistemic conceptions sketched above represent 
two main approaches to the phenomenon of linguistic vagueness.8 9 10As we have seen, 
they are completely different approaches, whose explanations of the nature of the
phenomenon are incompatible. However, they agree at least as to the minimal 
conditions that any adequate theory of vagueness should fulfil, namely (a) it ought to 
say which truth-value the borderline statements possess; (b) it should resolve the 
sorites paradox; (c) it should explain the existence of higher-order vagueness. In the 
case of ontic vagueness even such 'basic' agreement has not been reached.
2. On tic vagueness (ontic i nOeterminacyl maguei'ievs de re\ vaguen evs in die 
world2) is a rather perplexing matter. Some people claim that the very thought that 
the world could be vague is unintelligible.ll) Others admit that such an idea is 
comprehensible, but argue that it is trivial or at least iesubstantiee. Moreover, the
question what it would take for a world to be vague remains unanswered. How are 
we to detect ontic vagueness? What are its characteristics? How can we distinguish it
The general reason for the failure of the KK principle arc margin for error principles. See ibid., p. 
228.
8 See however footnotes 1 and 2. 1 count the epistemic conception among the linguistic theories of 
vagueness, since although it claims that vagueness is a matter of our ignorance, it sees the source of
this ignorance (at least partly) in language.
9 *
tn what follows we will be concerned mereiy with vagueness in this world, i.e. so-called modal 
vagueness and issues of transworld indeterminacy of idenlil)• will not be discussed.
10 For instance, M. Dummett once wrote: "the notion that things might actually vague, as well as 
being vaguely described, is not properly intellig^i^L^l^^" (Dummett (1975), p. 111). Howevcr, later on he 
withdrew that remark and suggested that anything that could be described, could be described with 
perfect precision (see Williamson (1994), p. 250). But, in his 1995 paper, Dummett argues again that 
"[vjagueness is not a properly of objects" and he adds: "It is nonsensical to speak of vague objects" 
(Dummett (1995), p. 209).
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from mere linguistic vagueness? Is it material objects, properties, states of affairs, or
all of these, which are vague?
My thesis is an attempt to find answers to some of those questions. In what 
follows we will be concerned almost exclusively with the question of whether there 
exist any vague material objects.” We will focus on spatio-temporally extended 
macro-objects and try to determine whether any of them could be called a "vague
object". If we found some vague objects we would know for sure that the world itself
is vague. In order to start looking we will have first to determine what it would be
like for something to be a vague object.
Usually, a connection is made between vague objects and objects whose 
identity is indeterminate (vague). For instance, the main point of interest for Gareth 
Evans in his famous paper "Can there be vague objects?" is an indeterminate identity 
statement. Moreover Mark Sainsbury, in his article "Why the world cannot be vague", 
tries to make a case for the thesis that a sufficient condition for objects a and h to be 
vague is that they be indeterminately identical.
3. First of ail, onf aas on de^^rnoine what ty pe of indet ermmacy m identUn one 
is talking about. Usually three kinds of indeterminacy are distinguished: epistemic, 
semantic and ontic. The view according to which indeterminacy in identity is epistymic 
is usually defended by theorists who take vagueness to be an epidemic phynnmynnn, 
whereas the semantic conception of indeterminacy in identity is usually put forward by 
the semantic theorists of vagueness. There is an important difference between the
In particular questions concerning vague properties and vague stales of affairs will be ignored. In 
what follows by "vague object" I'll mean "vague material object" or "vague thing" (i.e. vague spatio­
temporal object having causal powers).
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epistemic indeterminacy view on the one hand and the semantic and ontic 
indeterminacy views on the other. The epistemic indeterminacy view does not support 
the claim that there is no determinate answer to some questions about identity.’i On 
the contrary, the claim that it is merely epistemically indeterminate whether an object a
is identical with h means that either it is determinately the case that a and b are
identical or it is determinately the case that they are not identical, yet we have no 
means of knowing which is the case. On the epistemic view in every case the identity 
relation determinately holds or determinately does not hold, only sometimes we do not 
and cannot know which situation occurs. Some identity claims are simply beyond our 
cognition. In fact, all identity questions have determinate answers. Therefore, 
according to epistemicism indeterminacy is not a 'genuine' indeterminacy. In fact 
epistemic theorists talk instead about unclarity. Since our task in this thesis is to 
investigate the relations between indeterminacy and identity, unclarity is of no interest 
for us. The reason is that the epistemicist view amounts in fact to the claim that there is 
no relation between identity and unclarity: identity belongs to the metaphysical realm, 
whereas unclarity has to do with the failure of our cognitional capacities. The fact that 
it is unclear whether a is identical to b has no impact whatsoever on the truth value of
the statement "a is identical to b".
Semantic and ontic indeterminacy are different in this respect. By the claim that 
it is semantically or ontically indeterminate whether a is identical with b we mean that 
neither of the polar claims is correct, for it is neither (determinately) true nor 
(determinately) false that a and b are identical. If it is indeterminate whether a and h
I believe (his sentence is true of the kind of epislemicism advanced by Wright as well as that 
advanced by Williamson. However, the rest of the remarks concerning epistemic indeterminacy apply 
to the latter only. Wright would not agree, for instance, that the epistemicist can assert that in evcry 
case the identity relation determinately holds or determinately does not hold.
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are identical, the statement "a is identical with />" either has some other truth value or
has no truth value at all.
So, both semantic and ontic theorists agree that there are vague identity
statements. The semantic view of indeterminacy has it that in each case of apparent 
indeterminacy of identity the indeterminacy is due to the vagueness of the names of the 
objects between which the identity is supposed to hold. Thus, if a given identity
statement "r/ = b" is indeterminate in truth value it is because either "a" or "/?" is a
vague designator. There are many uecontrntious examples, such as "The first non-bald 
man in the sorites series is Mr Brown" or "Sue is Harry's best friend".k' In the sorites 
series which starts with bald men and ends with non-bald ones, it is indeterminate
which man is the first bald man. If Mr Brown is somewhere on the border between the
bald and the non-bald, it may be indeterminate whether the first non-bald man is Mi- 
Brown, or not. The indeterminacy in question will be due entirely to the indeterminacy 
of the singular term "the first non-bald man". In the "Sue is Harry's best friend" case, 
"is a best friend of' is a vague relation. It is indeterminate whether it is Sue or George 
who stands in this relation to Harry. Since "Harry's best friend" is a semantically 
indeterminate singular term, there is no fact of the matter as to whether it is Sue or 
George who is Harry's best friend and hence "Sue is Harry's best friend" is 
indeterminate. The semantic vagueness theorist claims that an analogous explanation 
referring to the imprecision of singular terms is adequate in each case of indeterminate 
identity. In other words there is no more to the indeterminacy of identity statements 
than the indeterminacy of the designators featuring in those statements..
k' This second example is due lo Slaliuiker (1988). p. 349.
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The ontic vagueness theorist disagrees, of course. His claim is precisely that
there is more to indeterminacy of the identity between objects than imprecision in the
names of those objects. Now, there seem to be two options for the proponent of ontic
indeterminacy. He can either argue that in indeterminate identity statements there is 
always ontic indeterminacy as well as semantic indeterminacy or that ontic 
indeterminacy is sometimes the only indeterminacy present in those cases. The problem 
with the option which says that both semantic and ontic indeterminacy are present is 
that if the given designator, "a", is semantically vague and refers indeterminately to, 
say, two objects, c and <7, then there is no fact of the matter as to whether it is c or d 
which is relevant for the identity statement "a = b",14 If "aa" refers indeterminately to 
objects c and t/, then "a = A" is indeterminate because it is indeterminate which object 
is designated by the term on the left hand side of the identity sign. In order to argue 
that there is also ontic indeterminacy in the example one would have to claim that both 
c and d are onfically indeterminately identical with b. It cannot be only one of c and d 
which is indeterminately identical to A, because since it is indeterminate which one is 
the subject of the identity statement, it would be indeterminate whether ontic 
indeterminacy is involved or not.15
In order to claim that ontic indeterminacy is the only indeterminacy present, 
one would have to argue fhal "a" and "/?" are precise, but that the statement ''a = /?" is 
nevertheless vague. Only when the designators on the left and right hand sides of the 
idyntify sign are precise, can it be determined precisely which objects the identity 
statement is about and only then may it be assessed whether those objects are ontically
14
Compare, however. Chapter II. where a different kind of semantic indeterminacy will be 
considered.
13 And, of course, if refers to more than two objects, than one has more objects to take into 
consideration.
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indeterminately identical or not. The ontic vagueness theorist will argue that objects a
and b are such that it is indeterminate whether they are identical, or, in other words,
that there is no fact of the matter as to whether a = b.
It is thus clear that if one wants to make a connection between vague objects
and indeterminate identity, one has to concentrate on the ontic indeterminacy of 
identity, for it is the only conception that may unequivocally lead one to vague objects.
4. It is somesimes ciaimed t^at in the cash of' semantic vagueness, 
indeterminacy should be consistent with each of the two opposite determinate 
verdicts.16 17a being a borderline case of redness should be consistent with both a being 
red and a not being red. It is argued that since indeterminacy is a matter of having left 
things open, it cannot exclude either of the two determinate verdicts. It seems to me
however that matters are different with ontic vagueness. If ontic indeterminacy is to 
be interpreted as there being no fact of the matter as to whether something is the case, 
then it cannot be consistent with ontic determinacy. Either there is no fact of the 
matter whether something is the case or there is a fact of the matter that something 
(or its negation) is the case.1" These are the only ontological possibilities and 
moreover they seem to be iccocsistect possibilities. If a is ontically indeterminately
16 Cf Wright (1994). p. 138.
17 I will ignore the issue of higher-order vagueness in my thesis. It seems to me that one can 
consistently deny the existence of higher-order ontological vagueness and claim that although it can 
be indeterminate whether or not there is a fact of the matter, this indeterminacy is merely epistemic. 
Of course, anyone who thinks that it can be ontically indeterminate whether something is ontically 
indeterminate has to acknowledge the existence of higher-order ontological vagueness. In such a case 
three-valued logic will be no longer appropriate. Instead of three ontological possibilities, there will 
be many more of them (probably infinitely many).
On the other hand, in my opinion there is no metaphysical difference between the situation in which 
a and b are identical and the situation in which they are determinately identical. If there is a fact of 
the matter as to their identity then they are identical (or distinct) and moreover - determinately 
identical (or determinately distinct).
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identical to /?, then the facts which obtain must leave the matter unsettled, i.e. they can
determine neither that a and b are identical, nor that a and b are not identical. The
world is in a sense incomplete: it is neither determinately the case that a = b nor that
-.(a = b). The indeterminacy in question is a state of suspension, so to speak, between
the two determinate states, a and b cannot become determinately identical or
determinately distinct unless the world changes - unless some new fact comes into
existence.
It is hard to see how ontological indeterminacy could be construed otherwise. 
If we allow that the property of being such that x is F and the property of being such 
that it is indeterminate whether x is F are consistent and can be possessed by the same 
object x at the same time, then it becomes obscure why the indeterminacy involved is 
to be ontic iedeterminace at all. If the difference between indeterminacy-free and 
relevant indeterminacy-involeieg property is to be metaphysically grounded, there 
must be some ontological difference between the state of affairs in which an object 
possesses the former and the state of affairs in which that object possesses the latter. 
Hence, one object cannot have both such properties at the same time.
The apparent plausibility of the situation in which we are inclined to say that a 
is indeterminately identical to b although we do not exclude the possibility that a is in 
fact (determinately) identical to /), is due to our thinking that indeterminacy has 
epistemic sources. We think that it may well be the case that a and b are determinately 
identical or determinately non-identical, but we simply have no idea which is the case, 
and that prompts us to say that it is indeterminate whether they are identical or not.
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If one is to adopt the above account, then it becomes clear that the logic of 
indyferminacy has to be a threy-vrluyd logic of some kind,18 where the truth values ar e: 
(determinate) truth, (determinate) falsehood and indeterminacy.19 20
As Michael Dummett has noticed, such a view of ontic indyfyrminrcy leads to
a kind of anti-realism. Dummett writes that:
"The realist doctrine is that reality ... is determinately constituted, independently of 
our knowledge or means of knowledge, and serves to render our statements about it true or 
false. To say that it is determinately constituted is to say that any well-defined question about 
it has a definite answer, known to God, whether knowablc by us or not".
Someone who accepts what has been said above about ontic indeterminacy, can 
adopt such a view of reality, provided however that the word "determinrlely" is 
crossed out from its chrracfyritfics. The ontic vagueness theorist can be realist in a 
sense that he may hold that the world is the way it is "independently of our knowledge 
or means of knowledge", but he does not believe that it is detyrminately constituted.
18 One may objecl lo ircating indelerminacy as a trulh value on a par with irulh and falsity. It does 
seem that indelerminacy is not of the same 'kind' as both determinate trulh values. Indeterminacy is 
just the lack of determinacy: a matter of things having been left undetermined, and not another 
determinate truth value. However, it seems that if one is to think about indeterminacy as an ontic 
phenomenon, one has no option but lo agree that it is a third ontological possibility. We may not call 
it the third 'truth-value', but it certainly indicates the third ontological 'status'. One might read "'p' is 
indeterminate" as "'p' is neither (determinately) true nor (determinately) false, but it seems to be that 
if "indeterminacy" is to be construed as ontic and not merely epistemic. bivalence has to be denied. 
On the other hand, it appears to me that ontic vagueness theorist may nevertheless maintain that 
indeterminacy consists in there being 'no fact of the matter': "p" is indeterminate, if there is no fact of 
the matter whether it is true and no fact of the matter whether it is false. He docs not have to claim 
that since indeterminacy is the third ontological possibility there must be 'a fact of (he matter' that 'p'
is indeterminate.
19 For semantic theorists the problem with two-valued approach is that it introduces a sharp 
boundary between the two truth-values. whereas the existence of borderline cases seems to imply that 
there is no such boundary. One may argue that adding the third truth value does not solve the 
problem, for now we apparently havc two sharp boundaries: between truth and indeterminacy and 
between indeterminacy and falsity. However. it seems clear that vagueness excludes the existence of 
any sharp boundaries (cf. Edgington (1993). p. 192). One three-valued approach which oxerconics 
that problem has been proposed by M. Tyc (1990). The boundaries between his three truth valucs arc 
not sharp, for the truth value predicates are vaguely vague. This makes it possible for a proponent of 
such a conception to claim, for instance, that in the sorites series there is no last man who is 
(determinately) bald and the first who is non-determinately bald.
20 Dummett (1995). p. 210.
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On the contrar'y, he "must envisage reality as having ... patches of indeterminacy"21 and 
reject bivalence, and therefore he may be called an "anti-realist" at least to a certain
extent.
5. In what follows 1 will t ry to argue t hat there: are hr the wc rth ob-jocls ohae
deserve to be called "vague". Roughly speaking all objects with fuzzy - spatial and 
temporal - boundaries should count as vague objects. The most common example are 
clouds, but mountains, cats and watches are also vague. In most cases that vagueness 
goes unnoticed, or - in any case - it does not matter to us. We know the rough 
boundaries of the objects we are dealing with and usually such knowledge is sufficient 
for our purposes. In some cases, however, it may be crucial that we point to the
precise boundaries of a given object and then we realise all of the sudden that we 
cannot do that, for that object has no such boundaries. Any attempt at delimiting 
precise boundaries of a cloud or a cat is deemed to failure: it is completely arbitrary, 
and moreover it is just one of the many similar possible attempts. The differences 
between such tentative delimitations are very minute and there seem to be no 
principled reason why one should chose one rather than any other. This phenomenon 
gives rise to the so called problem of the many.
The fact that objects are vague becomes most apparent in cases in which 
identity comes into question. And it is mainly in those cases that vagueness of objects 
starts bothering us.
Think of Jimmy the cat, for instance. Now, as the summer is approaching, 
Jimmy leshs his hairs. Some of those hairs have already fallen out, some of them are
ibid.21
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still in the process of falling out. The former are not parts of Jimmy anymore, but the
status of the latter is not so clear. It seems indeterminate whether we should count
them among Jimmy's parts, or not. Since Jimmy has quite a few such questionable
parts, his spatial boundaries become fuzzy. Moreover, one may argue that even if
Jimmy were not shedding, his boundaries would also be vague to some extent. At the 
tip of each of his many hairs there are molecules that neither clearly are parts of the 
given hair nor clearly are parts of the air surrounding Jimmy. The existence of such 
molecules means that the intuitive thought that cats have precise boundaries is a sheer
illusion.
Moreover, it is not only Jimmy's spatial boundaries that are vague, his temporal 
boundaries may be vague as well. Admittedly, in most cases, temporal boundaries of 
cats are quite precise (one may only debate over the precise moment of a cat's coming 
into and out of existence). However, there are many so called thought experiments that 
show that it need not be so. We can imagine, for instance, that the original parts of 
Jimmy are exchanged with bionic replacements. It is pretty clear that although Jimmy 
would survive a few of such replacements (he might not like his new bionic tail, but it 
would not endanger his life), he would not survive the replacement of all his parts. 
Jimmy the bionic entity may look exactly like Jimmy the cat, but it would not he Jimmy 
the cat. What is the precise moment at which Jimmy's life has been disrupted and the 
'life' of the new bionic entity began? It seems obvious that there is no such moment (if 
this sound unconvincing, we may add the provision that the parts that are replaced are 
tiny). And if this is so, then Jimmy's temporal boundaries are not precisely defined.
Temporal vagueness may lead to vagueness in identity. One may ask whether 
Jimmy the cat is identical to the cat that has such-and-such parts replaced with their
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bionic counterparts, and if the parts are sufficiently many (or sufficiently vital) neither
of the answers "Yes" and "No" may seem suitable. In such cases the answer one may
be tempted to give is that it is indeierininaie whether they are identical. It should be
noticed that it is not identity itself which is vague in such cases but rather it is
indeterminate whether (sharp) identity holds between the given objects.
It should be clear that the fact that Jimmy is a cat has no special bearing on the
issues under consideration. Analogous remarks apply to tables, stereos, trees, canaries
and other artefacts and living creatures. The particular cases will only differ as to
which type of vagueness - spatial or temporal - is more robust. For instance, watches
and stereos are quite precise as far as their spatial boundaries are concerned, but their 
temporal boundaries are pretty vague. On the other hand, mountains are spatially 
vague to a considerable extent, but their temporal vagueness may be negligible. In the 
case of trees and rivers both kinds of vagueness may be prominent (e.g. rivers not only 
have undetermined origins, but they also temporally dry out or change their bed).
Vagueness in spatial boundaries (so called compositional vagueness) may also 
result in indeterminacy of identity. Had Marco Polo correctly understood the intentions 
of the natives, he would have probably given the name "Madagascar" to a part of 
Africa's mainland and not to the African (sIhiCI2 If this had been the case, the question 
would have issued: Is Marco Polo's Madagascar identical to the natives' Madagascar? 
Probably neither the former nor the latter would have bothered with a precise 
demarcation of the boundaries of the objects they wanted to name. In such a case the 
answer concerning the identity of the object named by M.arco Polo and the object 
named by the natives could have no determinate answer.
22
See Evans (1973). He cites Isaac Tylor's 1898 book Names and Their History: .1 Handbook of 
Historical Geography and Topographical Nomenclature (Detroit. MI: Gale Research Co., 1969).
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6. Gareth Gvres famausly mrguey that ed e not ion of lndetoymtnatyly inamiyai 
objects is incoherent. If he is right, then any project of locating vagueness in objects 
seems very dubious. As we have seen it is ontic vagueness that may lead to
indeterminacy in identity and the proof of the incneyryncy of the latter throws serious
doubt upon the coherency of the former. Therefore I will start my considerations with 
a discussion of Evans's argument. In tey first chapter I will try to argue that this 
argument is invalid and does not reduce the idea of vague objects to absurdity. In the 
second chapter the general issues concerning indeterminate identity and its relation to 
vague objects will be discussed. The third chapter will be devoted to indeterminate 
identity over time and diachronic identity puzzles, while the fourth will deal with 
indeterminate identity at a time and the problem of the many. In the fifth - final - 
chapter some particular issues concerning indeterminate identity in the quantum 
domain will be addressed. Seven years ago E. J. Lowe argued that electrons were 
obvious candidates for being vague objects and even offered an example of apparently 
indeterminately identical electrons. I will try to evaluate that example, but before doing 
this we will have to spend some time on general questions concerning the identity of 
quantum particles.
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GARETH EVANS’S ARGUMENT
1. GARETH EVANS’S ARGUMENT
1.1. Introduction
Anyone who wishes to investigate the question of vague identity and vague
objects has to face G. Evans's argument. His one-page article entitled "Can There Be
Vague Objects?" is usually regarded as a reductio ad absurdum of the claim that
identity between objects may be a vague matter. If what the argument proves is
indeed that vague identity is an inconsistent notion, then there is not much point in
undertaking the study of it. Therefore, any investigation devoted to vague identity has
to start with the exploration of the meaning and consequences of Evans’s argument. 
Before exposing oneself to the dangers of 'the quicksand' (as M. Tye calls the
intricacies of the issue of vagueness) one ought to make sure that one is not
embarking on a venture that is bound to end in a contradiction.
The above mentioned article is no doubt one of the most discussed papers to
have been published within the last 30 years.’ It has been criticised both for leaving 
too many things unspoken and for saying too much.1 2 In the first place there is no
common agreement as to whether Evans's argument is valid. Moreover, those critics
who accept its validity cannot agree as to whether or not it proves what Evans
1 Analysis 38 (1978). p. 208.
2Cf. Lewis (1988), p. 129.
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intended it to prove. According to some theorists, the argument does not prove
anything interesting, according to others it proves too muchi.3
After presenting Evans's argument, the main problems surrounding this
argument and its interpretations will be discussed. The aim of this chapter is to
investigate how vague objects and vague identity fare after Evans's argument and the 
arguments of his critics. In particular, we will try to examine the connection between 
the existence of vague objects and indeterminate identity statements in the light of 
Evans's proof
Evans's argument goes as follows:
Let "a" and "b" be singular terms such that the sentence "a = b" is of indeterminate 
truth value, and let us allow for the expression of the idea of indeterminacy by the sentential 
operator "V".
Then we have:
(UV (o = 6)
(1) reports a fact about b which we ma> ■ express by ascribing it the property■ "Ax | V (x - #)!":
(2) Ax [V (x = a)jb,
But we have:
(3) -nV (a - a)
and hence:
(4) -I Ax [ V (x = a)ja/.
But by Leibniz's Law, we may derive from (2) and (4):
(5) ~i(a = b)
contradicting the assumption, with which we began, that the identity statement "a = 
6" is of indeterminate truth value.
3 Cf. Rasmussen (1985). p. 82. Some commenlalors have gone so far as lo invoke ihelr personal 
acquaintance with Evans in order lo supporl Ihcir (A7i conlradiclory) inlerprciations of the 
argument See Lewis (1988), p. 130: Burgess (1984). p. 116.
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If "Indefinitely" and its dual, "Definitely" ("A") generate a modal logic as strong as 
S5, (I) - (4) and, presumably, Leibniz's Law, may each be strengthmed with a "Definitely" 
prefix, enabling us to derive:
(5')A -^(a = h)
weice is tlrrigelfnrwrrdly incnntislrnl with (1).
Two different interpretations of what Evans took this argument to prove have 
been offered. According to the first one, and this is apparently the one that Evans
really intended,4 the argument shows that the vague-objects view is untenable.5 It 
allegedly demonstrates that the assumption that there are vague identity statements 
leads to contradiction. It is obvious, however, that there are such statements. Take,
for instance, the identity statement "Princeton = Princeton Borough"6 Most fhynritts 
will agree that it is indeterminate in truth value, for no determinate answer to the 
question of whether Princeton is identical to Princeton Borough is acceptable. 
Teyryfore, the only conclusion one can draw is that Evans's argument, which is a 
rednctio of the existence of such statements, must be fallacious. At least one step of 
fite proof must be illegitimate. The idea is tert Evans intended his argument to fail in 
order to demonstrate something. Namely, he wanted to show that only those theorists 
who take vagueness to be a semantic phenomenon are able to spot the fallacy. The 
view according to which vagueness is linguistic can diagnose the fallacy in the proof' 
the step from (1) to (2) is invalid, because it commits a scope fallacy. One cannot
infer:
(2) Xx [V(x = 6))6
4 See Lewis (1988). p. 129,
5 Where by "vague objects" we mean objects which are indeterminately identical to something. If one 
maintains that vague objects need not be indeterminately identical objects, then Evans's argument 
has no bearing on vague objects whatsoever. For the possible standpoints concerning the relations 
between vague and indeterminately identical objects see chapter II.
6 Lewis (1988), p. 128.
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from
(1)V(a = 6),
unless "/?" is a precise designator.7 If "/?" is vague, it does not single out a 
unique object determinately. In this case, contrary to what Evans has argued (or 
rather has pretended to argue), (I) - in which such a vague designator "7" features -
does not report any facts about b. Moreover the statement (1) can be true, even if (2)
is false. Since "V(a = /?)" does not entail "Ax [V(a = ar)]?", the argument is invalid.
In contrast, the view according to which vagueness is in the world, and not in 
language, cannot explain why the proof is fallacious. According to this theory "a" and 
"6" are precise designators denoting vague objects. So, on this view one cannot block 
the step from (1) to (2). If")?" is precise, the inference (I) - (2) is valid. Moreover, it
has been argued that the vague-objects theorist has no reason to object to the other
steps of Evans's argument, either. From his point of view all the other steps seem
valid. In consequence, vague-objects theorists are forced to accept the evidently false
conclusion that there cannot be vague identity statements. As D. Lewis puts it
"In fact, the vague-objects view does not afford any diagnosis of the fallac) ■ . so it is 
stuck with the unwelcome proof of an absurd conclusion"* 
Thus, the vague-objects view, within the framework of which one is not able 
to refute a clearly absurd claim to the effect that vague identity statements do not 
exist, should better be rejected. The claim is that the vagueness-in-language view is 
the only view which can deal with Evans's argument and therefore it should be 
accepted as the correct theory of vagueness.
7 Sec below, seclion 1.3.
* Lewis (1988), p. 179.
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This is the interpretation proposed by D. Lewis, which has been endorsed by 
Evans as a correct explanation of what he was trying to do in his pEper? B Garrett 
pe(ctc out, however, that the conclusion that the vague-objects view cannot offer any
explanation of the fallacy is unwarranted. The vague-objects theorists do not claim 
that all vagueness is in the world and none in the language. And they do not support 
an implausible claim that all vague identity statements are vague as a result of the 
vagueness in the world. On the contrary, they argue that both the world and language
are vague, and identity sentences can be indeterminate in truth value because of the
vagueness of the designators as well as because of the vagueness of the objects, in 
particular, they do not hold that all designators have to be precise. Hence, the scope 
fallacy diagnosis is as available for them as it is for the vagueness-in-language
theorists.'0
So, if the above interpretation of Evans's argument is correct, then the 
argument is of little significance. It is intended to prove that the vague-objects view is 
untenable, but it wrongly characterises the view it is supposed to refute. Although it 
does indeed show that the view that all vagueness is in the world is committed to the 
absurd claim that there are no indeterminate-identity statements, such a view is in 
general (i.e. independently of Evans's argument) quite implausible. The vague-objects 
theorists are people who think that vagueness afflicts not only language but the world 
as well. By no means do they want to attribute all vagueness to the world. That our
language is vague is a fact accepted probably by any philosopher whatsoever, whether 
he is an ontic-vagueness or a linguistic-vagueness theorist. In particular, saddling the
9 Lewis (1988), p. 130. Lewis quotes Evans's letter in winch Evans replies to Lewis's attempts to 
clarify the intentions behind his argument; "Exactly! Just so! Yes, Yes, Yes! I am covered with relief 
that you see so clearly whal I was doing".
'" Cf. Garrett (1988). p. 131.
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vague-objects theorists with the claim that singular terms such as "Princeton" and
"Princeton Borough" are precise is simply unfair.
According to the other interpretation Evans's argument is not concerned with 
all vague-identity statements but only with those vague-identity ttatemynls whose
vagueness is a result of vagueness in the world. It is obvious that ontic vagueness is
not the only possible source of indeterminacy. The statement "a ~ h" may not have
any determinate truth value as a result of one or both singular terms, "a" and "Z>",
being imprecise designators. The fact that the statement "Princeton = Princeton
Borough" is indeterminate does not indicate that Princeton is a vague object, for its 
indeterminacy is caused by the name "Princeton" not having a precise designation. 
Thus, the assumption that a given identity statement lacks determinate truth value 
does not entitle one to the claim that there are vague objects in the world responsible 
for the indeterminacy of tert statement. In order to interpret the argument as an 
argument which purports to say something about ontic vagueness, the assumption to 
the effect that singular terms flanking the identity sign are precise designators must be 
added. Only by claiming that the statement "a ~ h" is indeterminate and that ”a" and 
"/?" are precise designators can one hope to capture the idea of ontic vagueness.1” On 
this interpretation, Evans's argument seeks to prove that there cannot be vague 
identity statements whose vagueness is due solely to the existence of vague objects; 
i.e. it is supposed to establish that there cannot be indeterminate-identity statements 
"a - b" that contain only precise designators "a?" and "/?" and the identity sign.]2 if 11
11 Garrett points out that precise designators need not be rigid designators. Although rigid 
designators are precise, not all precise designators arc rigid. "The tallest man in the room" may be 
both precise and non-rigid. See (1991), p. 342.
12 Cf. Garrett (1988). p. 130.
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such a statement composed entirely of precise terms existed and nevertheless were 
vague, its vagueness would have to be a result of the vagueness in the world.
Thus, the argument has it that if there are indeterminate-identity statements "a
= /)", where "a" and "/?" are precise, then there is ontic vagueness. The argument
assumes for reductio that there is such a sentence and arrives at a contradiction.
Hence, the conclusion is that the statement consisting of two precise designators and
the identity sign cannot be indeterminate in truth value.13 By proving that there
cannot be such a statement, the argument allegedly proves that there is no vagueness 
in the world - i.e. that all vagueness is linguistic. Whether or not the argument with a 
tacit assumption that "a" and "/?" are precise designators is valid is a contentious 
matter, the main reason being that it is not clear which logic Evans assumes for his
argument.
The differences between the two interpretations can be summarised in the 
following way. On both interpretations the argument attempts to prove that there
cannot be true vague identity-statements "V(a = /?)". Each interpretation assumes that 
Evans has left an important assumption unspoken - an assumption without which the 
proof cannot properly be understood. On the first interpretation the tacit assumption 
is that it is obvious that indeterminate identity-statements statements do exist, so the
proof as a whole is in fact a reductio of an obvious truth - i.e. a reductio that is 
obviously fallacious. People who believe in the existence of vague objects and think in 
addition that every such object is designated by a precise term, cannot diagnose the 
fallacy and are forced to endorse the proof as a bona fide reductio. They have to 
argue - contrary to facts - that there are no indeterminate identity-statements. On this
13 For the relation between vague identity statements and vague objects see chapter 11. section .3.1.
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interpretation Evans succeeds in showing that a vague-objects view combined with
the claim that all singular terms naming vague objects (and all non-vague objects too)
are precise is untenable.
On the second interpretation the tacit assumption is that the singular terms "a"
and "6" are precise designators. This interpretation does not saddle the vague-objects 
theorists with an implausible claim that all vague objects are precisely designated. The
proof is a bona fide rednctio of the claim that "V {a ~ b")", where terms "aa" and "b?"
are precise, can be true. Whether or not it succeeds is an open matter; in any case it is 
not inlended as a clearly fallacious proof. If it works, then also on this interpretation 
Evans succeeds in showing that a vague-objects view combined with the claim that 
singular terms naming vague objects are precise is untenable. Thus, if the proof is 
valid on the second interpretation, on each interpretation one of the aims of the 
argument is to show that vague objects cannot be precisely designated, but the means 
of achieving that aim are interpreted differently. While on the first interpretation 
Evans succeeds by means of an obviously fallacious proof', on the second 
interpretation, if he succeeds, it is in virtue of using a valid proof. The additional 
difference is that the first interpretation requires that we take the vague-objects 
theorists to be the people who put all the vagueness in the world and none in
language. Such a characterisation seems unfaithful to the facts.
Evans precedes his argument by the following introduction.
"It is semetimhc said that the world itself can be vague. Rather than vagueness being 
a deficiency in our mode of describing the world, it would then be a necessary feature of an\■ 
true description of it. It is also said that amongst the statements which may not have a 
determinate truth value as a result of their vagueness are identity statements. Combining these 
two views we would arrive at the idea that the world might contain certain objects about 
which it is a fad that they have fuzzv boundaries. But is this idea coherent'.*"
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This introduction is followed by the proof quoted above, in which Evans from
the assumption that it is indeterminate whether a is identical to h derives a
contradiction. It is then hard to resist the temptation to treat that proof as a negative 
answer to the question he asked in the last sentence of the introduction - i.e. as a 
proof that the idea that there are vague objects is in fact incoherent. Although we 
know from Lewis that this is not the reading Evans had in mind,"" it certainly is the 
interpretation that suggest itself most vividly to the reader of Evans's paper. In other 
words, it is at least a justified interpretation. Moreover, it is not without significance, 
that it is the interpretation that does justice to the vague-objects theorists.
If the first interpretation is the one that is correct, then it is obvious that the 
proof fails as intended (because of the obvious fallacy in the step ( 1) - (2)) and the 
aim of the paper is achieved. There is not much point in investigating other steps of 
the proof. If it is the second interpretation which is adequate, however, then all the 
steps are important. Recall that on this interpretation someone who wants to show 
that the vague-objects view is untenable has to show that the proof is correct. The 
step (1) - (2) is no longer obviously fallacious on that interpretation, because of the 
assumption that "a" and "/?" are precise. Other steps of the proof are interesting in 
their own right and are certainly worth investigating. In what follows we will adopt 
the second interpretation with the aim of examining the possible fallacies of the
argument.
In general, it is far from clear how the argument is supposed to work. First 
of all, although Evans introduces "V" as an operator which expresses the
14 That it is not Evans's intended reading is also suggested by the already quoted sentence "Let "a" 
and "b" be singular terms such that the sentence "a = b" is of indeterminate truth value.. ", it docs 
not say anything about objects: it says let us choose such singular terms that the identity statement 
will be indeterminate.
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indeterminacy of truth value, he also assumes that it generates a modal logic So, the
question arises what the correct interpretation of delta operators, "V" and "A", is. Are
they truth value indicating operators or modal operators? Moreover, doubt has been
cast upon the "Definitely" prefix. It is not clear whether it can be treated as a dual of
"V" and it seems that even if it can, together they cannot generate so strong a logic as
Evans wanted. Secondly, since the steps from (1) to (2) and from (3) to (4) involve 
property abstraction in contexts governed by dyllr operators their validity can be 
questioned. Thirdly, step (3), which is assumed as trivial, in the presence of vague 
objects becomes controversial. Fourthly, it is doubtful whether Leibniz's Law (LL) 
can be used in order to derive (5) from (4). Fifthly, it is by no means obvious that (5) 
contradicts (1). And finally the proposed strengthening of (1) - (4) and LL with "A" is 
a very contentious operation.
These difficulties will be examined in detail in what follows.
1.2. The interpretations oi ’T.ndefnitely” ami "Definitely" ojperators
It is not entirely clear how Evans meant his delta operators to work. On the 
one hand, as we have seen, he begins his proof in the following way: "Let "a" and "A"
be singular terms such that the sentence "a = /?" is of indeterminate truth value, and 
lei us allow for the expression of the idea of indeterminacy by the sentential operator 
"V"" (my emphasis). This quote suggests that "Indefinitely" and "Definitely" should 
be regarded as operators that indicate the truth value of the statement to which they 
are attached.15 On the other hand, Evans's later tentative claim that ’"'Indefinitely" and
15 Cf. Pelletier (1989), p. 482.
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its dual, "Definitely" ("A") generate a modal logic as strong as S5" suggests a reading
according to which "Indefinitely" and "Definitely" are modal operators.
According to the "truth-value indicator•c" reading "A/a" says that "/a" has one
of the determinate truth values, whereas "V/a" says that the truth value of is
indeterminate. On this reading "’Vp"' is true iff /a is neither true nor false. Hence, on
this interpretation "the sentence "ci = b?" is of indeterminate truth value" means that "a
= b" is neither true nor false, but has some third truth value; the operator "V"
expresses that fact. The sentence "V(a = b?)" is taken to be a description of the actual
world, which expresses the fact that the statement "a = /a" has no determinate truth
value in this world.
Two contrary opinions can be found in the literature. On the one hand, it is
often argued16 that in order to express indeterminacy at least three truth values are
needed: one needs some kind of'status' which would reflect the fact that there is no
fact of the matter as to whether a given statement is (definitely) true, or (definitely) 
false (no matter whether it will be another value, truth-value glut or truth-value gap).
This third "status" is marked by "V". On the other hand, it has also been claimed that
indeterminacy should not be expressed by a sentential operator like "V", E. J. Lowe 
argues that if indeterminacy' is regarded as 'there being no fact of the matter' then it is 
wrong to treat (he lack of any objective fact of the matter determining the truth value 
of a sentence "cr = b?" as itself being an objective fact of the matter which can be
reported by a true sentence, "V(7 = ba)".'7
16 Cf. e.g. Tyc (1994).
'2 Lowe (1994). p. 112.
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It seems, however, that if indeterminacy is to be a 'genuine' ontological 
possibility, then one needs some means of expressing it. If there is no fact of the 
matter as to whether a and b are identical, then it is clearly neither (determinately)
true nor (determinately) false that they are identical. It is then tempting to ascribe
some third 'status' to the statement "a = /a". A person who agrees with Lowe that "V"
should not be used as a means of expressing the lack of any objective fact of the
matter, deprives himself of the possibility of talking about worldly indeterminacy.
The "truth value indicators" reading takes only the first of the above-quoted
Evans's claims into account. If one takes the operator "V" to be the operator that
indicates the third truth value that sentences can have and the logic in which Evans's 
argument operates to be a 'common' (i.e. non-modal) three-valued logic, then one is 
forced to ignore the claim concerning the generation of modal logic and regard it as a
slip on Evans's part.
According to the alternative reading "V" and "A" are modal operators. J. F.
Pelletier interprets them as operators attached to statements that already possess 
determinate truth value.'* The statement "/a" is either true or false at any given world
and the statement "A/a" says that it possesses the same truth value in all possible
worlds. The statement "V/a" orders one to look at some related worlds to check
whether "/a" is true or false there, before ascribing "V/a" a truth value at our world.
On such an interpretation "/a" does not follow from "A/a", for "A/a" may be true in
virtue of "/a" being false in all worlds.
This interpretation is not an adequate interpretation for the aim that Evans 
wanted to achieve, however. Evans's argument is supposed to deal with statements
'* Cf. Pelletier (1989). p. 482.
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which may not have a determinate truth value as a result of their vagueness. The
starting point of his reasoning is the assumption that the sentence "a = h" is
indeterminate in truth value and "V" is introduced as a device expressing this
indeterminacy. In contrast, on the modal interpretation presented above each
statement already has a determinate truth value before a modal operator is attached to
it. Although one may not know what the truth values of the statements "Aya" and
"V/a" are, one does know that "ya" has a determinate truth value at each world. And of
course modal operators, interpreted in this way, do not express any indeterminacy.
Moreover, it seems that that modal interpretation does not capture the intuitions
connected with ontic vagueness. As we have seen, Evans's argument can be taken to
prove that "the idea that the world might contain certain objects about which it is a 
fac/ that they have fuzzy boundaries" is incoherent. If we take the "Indefinitely" 
operator to be a modal operator in the above sense, then it may say nothing in 
particular about the real world. The actual world being vague or not being vague 
makes no difference to the truth value of the sentence "Vya". Hence, in particular the
truth or falsity of the sentence "V(c/ = /?)" has nothing to do with vague objects at our 
world and the argument to the effect that that sentence cannot be true, has no bearing 
whatsoever on the answer to the question whether there can be vague objects in our
world.19
Thus, the modal reading presented above is a non-starter for the indeterminate
identity theorist. There is however another modal interpretation of "A" and "V": 
according to it they are modal operators, but instead of ranging over possible worlds 
they range over admissible precisifications. Thus, "Aya" win be true if "ya" is either true
19 Trvrrlerlrtt, such modal logic might be useful in ler analysis of vague cross-world identity.
29
on all admissible precisifications or false on all admissible precisifications, whereas
"Vy?" will be true if "p" is true on some, and false on some admissible 
precisifications.20 Such a reading is reminiscent of the method used by the 
supervaluationists and is much more compatible with intuitions concerning 
indeterminacy.21 Evans's assumption that the sentence "ct = b" is of indeterminate
truth value should, on this reading, be interpreted as saying that "a = b" has opposite
truth values on different admissible precisifications, and that fact we express by the
"V" operator. Since indeterminacy is to be a worldly phenomenon, the relevant
precisifications must be precisifications of the (vague) state of affairs corresponding
to "rz = b", and not of the statement "ct = b" 22 The objects a and b are vague objects,
which can be precisified, and the truth value of the precise statement "tz = /?" changes
depending on the objects-precisification in which it is currently evaluated.23
It is worth noticing that the supervaluationists' reading of "A" and "V" seems
to be compatible with both remarks concerning delta operators made by Evans. As
we have just seen on this reading "A" and "V" are modal operators ranging over
admissible precisifications. However, it is also true that they indicate a truth value of
the sentence to which they are attached. Moreover, I<. Fine, the 'father' of
supervaluationism, claimed that the set of valid formulas in a language with a 
definitely operator was given by the modal system S5. A model for a language with
20 Compare Lewis (1988). p. 128. So. also on this interpretation "A/?" may be true, while "/?" is not.
21 Cf. Introduction.
22 Of course, on the first interpretation of Evans's argument - according lo which thc argument is 
fallacious - the names "a" and "b" may be imprecise. It is exactly because "n" and "b" have different 
precisifications. that neither (2) follows from (1) nor (4) follows from (3), and thc argument is 
invalid.
23 Originally precisifications are always sharpenings of meanings of vague expressions. Cf. 
Introduction. Here the assumption is that one may precisify vague objects (e.g. by precisifying their 
boundaries) and properties, too.
30
"A" and "V" might be thus considered analogous to that for S5,24 which seems to
correspond to Evans's intentions.
However, as T. Williamson has pointed out, a model for S5 is inconsistent
with the possibility of higher-order vagueness. In such a model T schema [A/; —> /;],
S4 schema [A/? —» AA /;] and S5 schema [V/? —» AV/;] are all valid. In order to take
higher-order vagueness into account one should introduce the relation of the 
admissibility between precisifications, allowing for the possibility that it might be 
indeterminate whether something is determinate. Supervaluationists have recognized
this and introduced the relevant relation into their framework. However, now the
analogy with S5 system is inadequate, for neither schema S4 nor schema S5 are valid.
It seems that S5 and even S4 are both too strong to hold in a logic which is to take
into account higher-order indeterminacy.
So far we have ignored Evans's claim that delta operators are duals.
Interpreting "V" and "A" as duals seems to commit one to the following definition:25
(Def V) V/l <-> -i A ~iA.
But this definition is equivalent to "-iV/1 <-> A ->A" and this cannot be a valid
law of indeterminacy.26 It works for the right-to-left reading of biconditional, but the
left-to-right reading amounts to the claim that if it is not the case that V(6z = /?), then
it is determinate that -i(cz = /?). This cannot be true, since in the case in which it is
determinately the case that a = /?, the antecedent is true and the consequent is false.
From the fact that a given statement is not indeterminate it does not follow that its
negation is determinate. Thus, it seems that delta operators cannot be duals after all.
24 Cf. Fine (1975). p. 290; Williamson (1994). p. 149. See also my 4/. /,///. disscrtalion.
25 See Pelletier (1984), pp. 416nn.
26 Cf. Garrett (1991a). p. 346.
is also snnlerr argument against the duality of delta operators.22 If delta
operators are duals and VA =df A —A, then Evans's step
(3) -.V (a = a)
becomes
(3') ——A —(a —c),
which is equivalent to the absurd
(3") A -hr = a).2*
Clearly, on the supervaluationist reading "V" and "A" are not duals. "VA"
cannot be defined as "-lA-i/l", for although in the supervaluationistic logic, if it is
indeterminate whether p (i.e. "p" has different truth values on different
precisificrtions), then it is not the case that drterm.inrtely —p, but not vice versa.
Detyrminately -> may be false, because determinrtyly p is true. We seem to have the
following relations between "V" and "A" in this logic: VA <-> V-4 VA —> -,A/f; VA
—> —IA—\A.
Therefore, it seems that although the supervaluationist logic seems to conform 
to some of the Evans's claims (namely fhy claim that delta operators indicate truth 
value of sentences to which they are rttaceyd and the claim that they generate a 
modal logic), it does not satisfy all Evans's requirements. The logic that "V" and "A" 
generate is not as strong as S5 (and moreover it appears that it should not be so 
strong, because if it were, it would not be an adequate logic for the phenomenon of 
vagueness) and they are not duals. * *
27 Over (1989), p. 97.
2* Over notices that if one wants to hold on to llie duality of delta operators, but does not want to be 
committed to the absurd claim that a is determinately not identical with a, then one is forced to a 
very strange reading of "A" operator. For. if "V" is read as "it is indefinite whether", then "A" has to 
be read as "it is not indefinite whether not", i.e. "it is definite whether not". Cf. ibid.
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1.3. Property Abstraction
The steps (1) - (2) and (3) - (4) involve property abstraction. From the fact
that it is indeterminate whether a = b we infer that b is such that it is indeterminate
whether it is identical with a (i.e. b has the property of being such that it is
indeterminate whether it is identical with a). And from the fact that it is not the case
that it is indeterminate whether a is identical with a we infer that a is such that it is
not indeterminate whether it is identical with a.
One can object to the validity of both steps by appealing to the modal analogy. 
If delta operators are taken to behave like modal operators then property abstraction
becomes questionable?9 First of all, modal operators introduce contexts which are 
notoriously opaque. Quantification into such contexts is not always allowed, for it is 
often fallacious. Lewis compares the inference from step (1) to step (2) with the
following fallacious modal inference:29 30
From the true statement
(A) It is contingent whether the number of planets is 9,
one infers
(B) The number of planets is such that it is contingent whether H is 9, 
which is obviously false.
The inference is not valid because the description "the number of planets" is a 
non-rigid designator in the statement (A). One cannot infer contingency de re from a 
statement which expresses contingency de dicto and which features a non-rigid
29Cf. Pelletier (1989). p. 485.
•""Lewis (1988), pp. 128-9.
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designator. From the fact that it is contingent what the number of planets is, it does
not follow that for a particular number of planets it is contingent that il is that
number.
By the same token one might argue that
(2) Xx [V (x - a)'| /?,
could not be inferred from
(1)V (a = /?),
if at least one of "a" and "/?" were an imprecise designator. Hence, the
additional assumption that "a/" and "/>" are precise designators is crucial if one wants
to run the argument. The distinction between "V[Xx[(x = a)]/?]" and ”Ax[V(a- = a)]/?]"
(i.e. between the statement "it is indeterminate whether / is such that it is identical
with a" on the one hand and "b is such that it is indeterminate whether it is identical
with a" on the other) makes a difference just in case either "a" or "/?" is imprecise. In
the case where both "a" and "/?" are precise designators, the statements "V[Xx[(x =
a)]/]" and *'Xx[V(x = a)]/?]" are equivalent.31 Therefore the property abstraction in
the inferences (1) - (2) and (3) - (4) is not valid unless we assume that "a" and "/)" are
precise designators.
Following the analogy between delta operators and modal operators further it 
can be argued that not every lambda abstract designates a 'genuine' proppety.32 It is 
claimed that not all modalised formulas designate 'genuine' properties. For instance, 
the property of Paul that he might have been a little bit taller, is usually not 
considered as his 'genuine' property on a par with his actual property of being 1,90 m 
tall. So, if delta operators are regarded as modal operators then they also need not
31 Cf. Rasmussen (1985), p. 84.
32 Cf. Pelletier (1989). p. 485.
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designate 'genuine' properties. It is argued that one cannot assume without further 
argument, for instance, that there is a 'genuine' property which the predicate "being 
such that it is indyferminaty whether it is identical to o" designates. There are two
options available now. One option is to claim that lambda abstracts formed with "V"
are ill-formed, in which case both "iU-[V(x = n)]/?]" and "-iAzX [V(x = rr)]r/]" will be
flawed, and claims (2) and (4) should be rejected. Alternatively one can treat such
lambda abstracts as well-formed but excluded from the range of Leibniz's Law,"” and 
therefore regard step (5) as invalid. If a's property of being such iIsI it is not 
indeterminately identical to a, and /a's property of being such that it is indytyrminafyly
identical to a, cannot be used in the substitution of Leibniz's Law, then one has no
grounds to derive the conclusion that a is not identical to h.
The above objections arise from treating delta operators as modal operators. 
As we have already seen, this is not the only possible interpretation of these
operators. One can argue that provided the operators are interpreted as truth value
indicators, the above objections lose their forcy. One could maintain that if the
contexts governed by delta operators are not modal, there is no reason why they 
should not refer to 'genuine' properties. However it might be responded that even if 
we interpret "V" as a truth value indicator, there is no such thing as the property of 
being such that if is indeterminate whether it is identical to a..”” One can hold that it
should not be assumed that the expression of the fact that it is indeterminate whether 
an object has a certain property constitutes itself a (definite!) ascription of another 
property. The fact that it is indeterminate whether a is identical to b amounts to there
"" Exactly in the same way in which modal properties are excluded. LL is usually taken to quantify 
only over 'genuine' properties.
34 See e.g. Keefe (1995). p. 188. Sec also Chapter II. section 3.3.
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being no fad of the mailer as to whether those objects are identical or not. And it
itself does not - or so the argument goes - involve another indeterminacy-involving
property. In general the vague identity theorist should not allow such indeterminacy­
involving 'properties' into his ontology at all. If the phrase "it is indeterminate whether 
Fa" expresses the claim that there is no fact of the matter as to whether a has the
property F, then we should not treat it as ascribing another property to a (and cannot
use it in the contraposition of Leibniz's law).
There is also another line of attack possible. T. Parsons and P Woodruff'
claim that even if delta operators are interpreted as truth value indicators one still
cannot assume without argument that lambda abstracts in contexts governed by delta 
operators automatically stand for properties and also fully satisfy property 
abstraction."" Property abstraction is a principle that "(JJci)" is interchangeable with
the lambda abstract "Xx[<AA)]a’' in all extensional contexts. As is well-known, such a
principle in sufficiently rich languages leads to paradoxes (in particular the Russell 
paradox). So, in order to avoid the paradoxes one should restrict either the 
abstraction principle or the quantification over properties."6 According to Parsons and 
Woodruff', there is also another ("less-familiar") constraint according to which "one 
cannot take for granted that lambda abstracts that bind variables in contexts governed 
by the indeterminacy operator "V" stand for properties and also fully satisfy 
[property] abstraction. ""7 Jointly assuming these two claims simply begs the question 
against the ontic vagueness theorist. In order not to beg the question, one should give 
up one of the claims. One option (call it the conceptual option) is to argue that
35 See Parsons. Woodruff (1995). p. 175n.
36 Parsons, Woodruff (1997). p. 329.
37 Parsons. Woodruff (1997). p. 325. iheir emphasis.
36
although the abstraction principle always holds, there is no guarantee that the
predicates featuring in that principle stand for The option is called
conceptual, because abstracts "are guaranteed to reproduce the conceptual content of
the formulas from which they are generated".39 40So, although we can always substitute
"<Az)" with 'Xy[0(^a'-]]7", it may be the case that there is no property corresponding
to "kv[0(^3))]7". Hence, even though claims (2) and (4) are justified, (5) cannot be
derived from them. For although (2) Xx[V(x = a)]b and (4) —.Lx[V(x = a)]a are both
true, there is no guarantee that there are corresponding properties that could be 
ascribed to a and b. Therefore there might be no properties that could be used in
proving that a and b are not identical. Since it is usually taken that Leibniz's Law
operates on properties, not on predicates,*" (5) -n(a = b) does not follow.
The other option (call it the ontological option) is to
"take for granted that abstracts stand for properties, but reject the principle of 
abstraction as always providing the conditions under which such properties holds of 
objects".41
This option is called ontological, because abstracts are guaranteed to stand for 
something. Thus, one assumes that the predicate "being such that it is indeterminate 
whether it is identical to a" refers to a property, but denies that the principle of 
abstraction gives its application-conditions. Now, the steps (2) and (4) are in need of 
justification. Although we know that there are properties corresponding to the 
abstracts "Xx[V(x = a)]" and "-.Ax [V(a- = a))", we are not entitled to ascribe the
corresponding properties to a and b .
3* ibid.
32 Parsons, Woodruff (1997). p. 331.
40 Compare however Noonan's view (Noonan (1984)). He argues that idenlity should be defined in 
icrms of predicates rather than properties. See also chapter 11. section 3.3.
4* Parsons. Woodruff (1995). p. 177.
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So to sum up this line of attack: There are two ways in which Evans's 
argument may fail. Either it assumes full abstraction principles, but then there is no 
guaranfyy that predicates stand for propyrtiys, or else it assumes that predicates 
always stand for properties, but then the use of full abstraction principles may be
illegitimate. In the former case the argument fails because step (5) is unjustified, in the
latter - it fails because the inference (3) - (4), which uses the contrrpositivy of
abstract elimination,42 is not valid.
This whole reasoning rests upon the claim tert one cannot assume without
argument that lambda abstracts in contexts governed by delta operators stand for
properties and also fully satisfy property abstraction. However, it is not clear what is 
the status of this claim. It seems to be in need of justification itself. It is true that
some lambda abstracts are 'suspect' especially when they appear in opaque, such as
e.g. modal, contexts. But there is no obvious reason to be suspicious about abstracts
containing delta operators as long as they are interpreted as truth value indicators. As
we have seen, Parsons and Woodruff argue that the "joint assumption" that lambda
abstracts containing the indeterminacy operator always stand for properties and that 
these abstracts fully satisfy property abstraction is unjustified, because it begs the 
question against the proponents of indeterminate identity. The question is however 
where the burden of proof lies. Is it the opponents or the proponents of vague identity 
who have to prove their case? Is it the opponents who have to demnnstrrty that the 
joint assumption is justified, or the proponents who have to show why the joint 
assumption fails? The assumption that lambda abstracts in contexts governed by delta 
operators stand for properties and also fully satisfy property abstraction is indeed
42 Sec ibid. p. 183.
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assumed without argumentation, but it might be argued that since there is no reason
to suppose otherwise, the burden of proof rests upon theorists who claim that this
assumption is unmotivated.
1.4. Step ((5), i.e. definite self identity
Probably no reasonable theorist would claim that there are objects that are not
identical to themselves. The retlexivity of identity, the claim that everything is 
identical with itself, is usually considered as a part of the definition of what identity is. 
One could argue, however, that there is a difference between, for instance, a being 
identical with itself and a being identical to a.
Thus, one can claim, for instance, that (3) -V {a = a) is not true in virtue of a
being a vague object. It may seem that if a is a vague object then it may also be vague 
whether it is identical with a. So, although it is determinately true that a is self­
identical, it is indeterminate whether a is identical to a. To this it could be responded 
that even if a is vague, then one still can obtain precise identity by matching a with a. 
a corresponds precisely to a, for "[a]ll their vagueness matches exaady".43 Moreover, 
this reasoning clearly multiplies properties: each object a- will possess two (distinct) 
properties: one of being self-identical and another of being identical to a-.
This last claim is contested by Copeland. He argues against distinguishing 
those two properties and claims moreover that the fact that such properties are not 
distinct makes Evans's argument invalid. Copeland argues that "[i]t is not as though 
there are two different properties that a has, the property of being determinately self
43 Wiggins (1986). p. 175: see also GarrcU (1988). pp. 132-3.
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identical and the property of being determinately identical to o".44 He considers two
formulas:
(2') ^x[A (x = a)]b
and
(4') (x = a)]a,
and argues that because in the case of a, the property of being determinately 
identical to a is the same as the property of being identical to itself, (4') says in fact 
that a has the property of being self-identical. Since h is also self-identical, (4') does
not ascribe to a any property that b does not have. Thus, one may claim that (2') and 
(4') are both true, without maintaining that a has a property which b lacks. Analogous
reasoning can be repeated for Evans's steps:
(2) MV (* = a)]/>
and
(4) —.Xr[V (x == a)]<^a
In this case (4) says that a does not have the property of being indeterminately 
self-identical. However, (2) does not say that b has that property (i.e. the property of 
being indeterminately self-identical). It says instead that b has the property of being 
indeterminately identical to a. Again, one can claim that both (2) and (4), which says 
that a does not have the property of being indeterminately self-identical, are true, 
without holding that b has a property that a lacks. The appearance that it is 
otherwise, arises, according to Copeland, because of an illegitimate substitution into 
lambda abstracts containing unbound singular terms. In his words:
44 Copeland (1994). p. 88.
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"The substitution of a for y and the substitution of h for y in the open sentence -Xv 
[ A (x = a)_|y are not of the same feather. The first substitution produces a statement equivalent 
in meaning to
-iLv [A (x = x)Ja 
but the second does not".4-
Copeland concludes that (2) and (4) cannot be used to derive (5). To say that
Xx [V(x = a)]h and -tAx[V(x = a)]a does not amount to saying that there is a property
F such that h has it and a lacks it. Therefore, (2) and (4) cannot be used in the
contraposition of Leibniz's Law to prove tert a and h are distinct.45 6
Thus, Copeland concentrates on the relation between a's property of being 
sely-’idynfical and a's property of being identical to a and argues that there is nothing
for "-nXr[V(x = a)]a" to mean other than "—Xx[V(x = x)]a", for there is only one 
property at issue, namely the property of being indeterminately self-identical47 Since 
b also does not have that property, one cannot conclude tert b and a are
dytyrminafely dissimilar. The fact that "-iXx[V(x = a)]a" expresses a's property of not 
being indyterminrtely self-identical explains why (4) does not deny i4is1 a has the 
property that (2) attributes to b. For although (2) ascribes to b the property of being 
indeterminately identical to r/, this latter property is not the property that (4) is about.
In Evans's proof one tries to derive the conclusion that -n{a = /)), from the 
premises which say that a is not indeterminately self-identical, while h is 
indetyrminafyly identical to a. Copeland's argument has it however, that these two 
premises together cannot be used as the premise for tey contrapositivy of Leibniz's 
Law (i.e. 3F {Fb & -i Fa)), which would entitle the derivation of "--{a = /?)". Since,
45 Copeland (1994), p. 89.
46 Copeland (1994). p. 90. Copeland (ibid.) writes moreover that "hjo hold that a - b does not 
determinately imply Xx | V (x = n)]a <-> Xv [V (x = a)\b is not to question the determinate truth of the 
proposition that ifa = 6 then a and h have all their properties and relationships in common".
47 Cf. Copeland (1994). p. 89.
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in the case of a, «Xx[V(x = a)]" and "-,5A[V(x = a')]" express one and the same
property, there is only one property to be attributed to a, namely the property of
being determinately self-identical. Although one can express that property in two
ways, it should not mislead one into thinking that there are two properties
corresponding to these ways.
An objection similar to Copeland's has been raised by Lowe. His claim is that 
the inference from (3) to (4) is invvlid.4S Lowe concentrates on two properties: 
"?x[V(x = a)]" and "Xx[V(x = /?)]". Let us agree that "Xx[V(x = a)]" expresses a 
'genuine' property, which b possesses. Then, since our assumption was that a is 
indeterminately identical to b, a must possess the symmetrical property Xx[V(x = /?)].
If, however, there is no objective fact of the matter as to whether or not a is identical
with then the property "Xv[V(x = a)]" is not determinately different from the
property "Xv[V(x = /?)]", because these properrtes diiffi' only by permutation of "a"
and In other words, since a is indeterminately identical to b, the jpoppeiyy of
being indeterminately identical to a is indeterminately identical to the poop^'ty of
being indeterminately identical to b. Thus, the possession by b of the property Xx
[V(x = a)] cannot determinately differentiate b from a, since that property itself is not
determinately different from the property Xx [V(x == /))] possessed by a. Since Xx[V(x 
= /?)] and Xx[V(x = a)] are not determinately different, one cannot (determinately)
deny that a possesses the property Xx [V(.x = a)].48 9
This argument is quite compelling. It seems intuitive that if b is 
indeterminately identical to a, then the property of being indeterminately identical to a
48 Compare Parsons' and Woodruffs considerations concerning ihai step (section 1.3. above).
49 Lowe (1994). p. 114.
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possessed by b cannot be determinately different from the property of being
indeterminately identical to b possessed by a, and therefore if one agrees that a
possesses the latter property, one cannot determinately claim that it does not possess
the former. Anyway, using any of these properties in an argument to the effect that a
and b are determinately different seems unfair.
Lowe argues further that to claim that (3) entails (4) is to make a formal error. 
It is true that a is determinately identical to itself, but since it is also indeterminately 
identical to b, which is in turn indeterminately identical to a, one cannot conclude that
a does not possess the property of being indeterminately identical to a. Therefore, a
formal restriction must be placed on the property abstraction so that from <V(<7 =
a)" only "-iXx[V(x = x)]<a" could be derived.50
To sum up, Lowe argues that even though one can determinately deny that a 
possesses the property of being indeterminately identical to itself, one cannot 
determinately deny that a possesses the property of being indeterminately identical to
a. Since there is no fact of the matter as to whether a is identical to b, there is also no
fact of the matter as to whether the property of being indeterminately identical to a is 
different from the property of being indeterminately identical to b. Thus, although 
"--Lx[V(x = x))a" is determinately true, "-nXr[V(x = a)]a" is not.
30 Compare also Copeland. (1994). p. 88.
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1.5. Ltei^ini^’js Law
Evans appeals to Leibniz's Law (hereafter: LL) in order to derive (5) from (2)
and (4). He does not indicate which form of this law he uses. Clearly tey Principle of
Indisc^r^n^ibility of Identicals in its traditional form
(LL) V.vV>' [{x =.y) ->VF {Fx <-2 A»],
where x and y are variables ranging over individuals, and P' is a variable
ranging over properties,51 * 53is of no use to him, since we are not assuming that a is 
identical to h. Moreover, although LL is taken to be a valid law in (second-order) 
classical logic with identity, no matter which interpretation of delta operators we 
choose we will not get classical logic. Regarding "V", "A" as modal operators leads 
to some kind of modal logic (which at best could be an extension of classical logic) 
and regarding them as truth value indicating operators leads to a logic with at least 
three values. As we remember, one might argue that on the modal interpretation LL 
will not apply to properties involving one of delta operators, for modal properties are 
excluded from the range of F-- For instance, the property Xx [V (x = a)]h will be a 
modal property and as such will not belong to the range of the quantifier featuring in
LL. Hence, the argument will have it that on the modal interpretation of "V" and "A"
LL cannot be used in deriving (5) from (2) and (4).
On the truth valuy-indicalnrs interpretation, LL in the form given above is of 
no help, either. What is needed to derive (5) is its cornrapositive22, namely:
51 The Principle is sometimes formulated in terms of predicates. not properties. Compare Noonan 
(1984), p. 118.
-2 Cf. Pelletier (1989). p. 485. See above. section 1.3.
53 This contrapositive is sometimes called "the law of the diversity of dissimilar".
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(LLl) VxV}' [“W (Fx <-> Fy) — - j)]
In our case, the relevant substitution will take the form:
(LLX) -^{?ov[V(v = a)]b <-> Lr[V(x = a)]<7}-> ~'(a = b).
In classical logic both LL and its contrapoeitive LLl are valid in the classical 
sense of validity, in which an argument is valid itTit is truth-preserving. The notion of 
validity can be extended so as to apply also to three-valued systems. We say that an
inference is valid if it leads from true premises to a true conclusion or from
indeterminate premises to a true or indeterminate conclusion (i.e. if it is truth- and 
indeterminacy-preserving). And it is by no means obvious that in a three-valued logic
LL and LLl will be valid in the sense.
One logic in which LL is not valid is given by Johnsen. He adopts the Kleene 
strong tablles4 out of which the following are relevant for the present purpose:
p •^P P 9 P ~> <1 P <-> q
T F T T T T
F T T 1 I 1
I 1 T F F F
1
I
T
I
T
I
1
I
I F I
1
1
54 Kleene's strong tables arc commonly considered as the most suitable for lhree-valued logics in 
which the third value is "indeterminate". Sec e.g. Korner. Experience and Theory, Routledge and 
Kegan Paul. London 1966. On the other hand, it might be argued that no logic whose connectives 
are truth functional can be adequate for vagueness. For instance, using Kleene's strong tables we end 
up having to ascribe sentences such as "I <£ -..I" and ".1 v -i/1": where .1 is a borderline sentence, 
the value 1. To some theorists it appears inadmissible. Cf. e.g. Williamson (1994). Sec also below .
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where "T" stands for "true", "F" stands for "false" and "I" stands for
"indeterminate". He introduces the following truth tables for "V" and "A":
p Vp Ap
T F T
F F T
1 T F
and proposes the following counterexample to LL: Assume that a has a vague 
property, namely it is indeterminate in colour: it is neither determinately green nor 
determinately blue. Hence, the statement "Xv(GA')(a)", where "G" stands for green, is
indeterminate in truth value. Now, we have got an instance of LL:
(LLf) (a = a) —> (lx'(Gx)(a) <-> Xx (Gx)(a))
which is not true but merely indeterminate according to the truth tables given above. 
The antecedent "a = a" is necessarily true, the consequent is indeterminate (since it is 
indeterminate whether a is such that it is green, and the equivalence of two 
indeterminate statements is also indeterminate). Since we start with a true premise
and arrive at an indeterminate conclusion, the whole conditional must be
indeterminate.
Thus, LL is not a valid law of the three-valued logic which adopts Kleene's 
strong truth tables. If LL is to be a law of three-valued logic it must be reformulated. 
Johnsen goes on to suggest some such reformulations and claims that LL should
become:
(LLv) [A(r/ = b) & AXx(0x)(a) & AXx(fix)(b)] -> [(aa = b) —> (Xx(jx)(a) x-> Xx
W*)C?)))-
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The other reformulations are:
(LLi) [AXr(2A")(c/) v Ahx(-xXb)] —> [(r/ = h) —> (Xx(>x{(a) <-> AaXA'O/?))]]
(LLnv) [AXr(A*)(tf) & AXx{AxXh)] —> [(c7 = h) —> (AXA-X^) <— Xx(AxX6))]
LLnv could be used to prove the ilrcnhyrency of vague identity but neither it
nor LLi can be assumed without argument to be a valid law of a three-valued logic.
LLv seems to be the only version guaranteed by the law of two-valued logic, LL?5 
LLv is obviously of no use for the opponents of indyterminrty identity, because one
of the conjuncts in the antecedent is the claim "A{a = /?)", which one cannot accept
without begging the question against indeterminate identity. So, although LLv is a 
valid law, it cannot be used in Evans's argument. And the status of the law that could 
be used - namely LLnv - is unclear. It is stronger than LLv and thyryfory needs to be 
argued for. It is doubtful that any proponent of vague identity would be willing to 
accept it.
Thus, Johnsen concludes that
"Evans's [...] attempted proof ha|s| at best established that vague identity is 
incnhrrrltt iff something stronger than LLv is a law of lhryy-vrluyd logic. It is not evident, 
though, that anything stronger than LLv is a law of lhrrr-valurd logic: and a vague identit\• 
theorist should be quite prepared to reject an\ • such cnntrrtinr."55 6
It seems however that Johnsen's counterexample to LL may prompt one to 
draw another conclusion than the one envisioned by him. Consider
(LLa) {a = a) —> {Xx(Gx){a) <-> Xx (Gx)(a))
again. What one is claiming here is that although it is (detyrminately) true that 
a is identical to itself,57 it is nevertheless whether a's being such that it
55 See Johnsen (1989). p. 109.
56 Johnsen (1989). p. 112.
57 I ignore here the issues discussed in section 1.4.
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is indeterminate whether it is green is equivalent with a's being such that it is
indeterminate whether it is green. This does not seem right. What else could a's self­
identity consist in, if not in its sharing all, i.e. precise and vague, properties with
itself? As has been mentioned above, all vagueness of a should match exactly that of
a. It seems that a's being (determinately or indeterminately) green should be 
determinately equivalent to a's being (determinately or indeterminately) green.
Moreover, saying that the biconditional "Xx(0x)(a) <-> Xr($x)(a)" is indeterminate in
truth value amounts to the claim that a's possessing the property of being vaguely 
green is only indeterminately equivalent to a's possessing this very same property.
This in turn is tantamount to the claim that indeterminate sentences are not
(determinately) equivalent to themselves. If sentence "p" is vague then sentence "p -w
p" is equally vague. This may be considered hard to swallow. One might argue that
although "'kx(</>x\(a)" is indeterminate, the biconditional ''Xx(jx)(a) <-> Av(^?v)(6?)" 
should be ascribed truth rather than indeterminacy. The statement "p" of 
indeterminate truth value seems to be determinately equivalent with itself. In general, 
there is no reason why the biconditional whose two sides are identical indeterminate 
statements should be treated differently from an analogous biconditional having two 
true (or false) identical statements as its sides.
According to Kleene's strong tables not only does "p <-> p" become 
indeterminate, if "p" is indeterminate, but all classical tautologies share that fate. The 
three-valued logic with Kleene's strong truth tables has no tautologies at all: all 
classical tautologies come out as indeterminate on some substitutions. This might 
suggest that Kleene's strong logic is not an adequate logic for ontic vagueness. The 
tables for indeterminacy do not square with our intuitions concerning vagueness.
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There is nothing in the theory of ontic vagueness that would suggest that the 
indeterminacy of the statement "p" should result, for instance, in the indeterminacy of
the conditional "p —p" or the biconditional "p <->pp".
The above remarks might suggest that no truth-functional logic will be
suitable to capture the phenomenon of vagueness. Any such logic would have to take
into account the so-called petutmbral connecliousp* i.e. the internal and external
connections existing, for instance, between vague properties.58 9 It might seem that in
the case of vagueness, the truth value of complex sentences concerning borderline
cases should depend not only on the truth value of the component clauses but also 
on their content. For instance, a disjunction whose both disjuncts are indeterminate 
may be either true or indeterminate depending on the content of the disjuncts: "either 
a is green or a is not green" might be considered true, but "either a is green or a is 
green" is indeterminate. The situation with the biconditional seems analogous.
Although "Ao-(Gx)(a) <-> Xx (GA-)(i?)" appears to be true, "Xv(G.r)(<tf) <-> Xv(Bx)(a)"
seems false. Clearly, in order to capture these intuitions the connectives cannot be
truth-functional.60
However, even if one decides to hold on to truth-functional logic and adopts 
different truth tables which would assign LLa the value "truth" and preserve Leibniz's 
Law, it does not mean yet that the contrapositive of LL, LLl, would also be valid 
according to those tables. And as has been noted above, Evans's argument uses LLl,
58 See Fine (1975). p. 276 and Williamson (1994). p. 142. Fine defines penumbral connections as 
semantic constraints built into the meaning of a word..
59 Internal connections may be regarded as connections between different borderline cases of the 
same property-: if a is not determinately blue, then b, which is less blue than a. cannot be 
determinately blue. External connections concern common borderline cases of different properties: if 
a is neither determinately green nor determinately blue, then A. which is bluer in colour than a. 
cannot be determinateh' green.
60 An example of such logic applied to linguistic vagueness is supervaluationism. See Introduction.
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not LL. LL and LL1 are equivalent in classical logic, but they need not be equivalent
in three-valued logic. For instance, provided that we assume that "V/l" is true iff "A"
is neither true nor false,61 the following inference is a valid inference for "V":62
A
;.-,V/1
but its contrapositive is not valid:
V/l
-,A
because when "V/l" is true, i/l" is not. Therefore, in particular it cannot be
taken for granted that the inference <-> Lv(^v)(Z?)] —> -,(<:/= /?)]" is valid.
In a three-valued logic there are examples of valid inferences (such as the one given
above) which have invalid contrapositives. LL1 cannot be assumed - its validity has to
be argued for.63
1.6. Step (5)
The problem with the step:
(5) -i(<7 = /?)
is that it becomes ambiguous once we assume that the underlying logic is a 
three-valued logic.64 In three-valued logics there can be two kinds of negation. On the
strong interpretation of negation "-i/l" is true iff "/I" is false and "-./I" is
indeterminate iff "A" is indeterminate. On the weak interpretation i/l" is true iff "A"
is either false or indeterminate. So, on the strong interpretation (1) and (5) do in fact
61 See below the beginning of the next section.
62 Parsons. Woodruff (1995). p. 178.
63 Compare also Broome (1984). p. 8-9.
64 Garrett (1991 a), pp. 345-6.
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contradict each other. If it is true that V{a ~ b) then "-.(aa = /?)" must be false, and if
"-t(a = /?)" is true, then "V^ = b)" has to be false. But it remains yet to be proved
fhrf (5) with a strong negation in it follows from (2) and (4). Simply assuming that it
does, begs the question against indytyrminrte identity. One can insist that it is a weak 
negation tert should be used throughout the argument. And if one interprets (5) as 
containing a weak negation, then we do not arrive at a contradiction - contrary to 
what Evans claimed. On this interpretation, the statement "V(a = b)" is perfectly
consistent with the claim i(ca = /?)". The latter can be true, even if the former is true
(i.e. even if"a = b" is indytyrminrte).
However, it should be noted that the weak reading is not very plausible for 
indeterminacy.6, On this reading M-u4" is true if "/I" is indeterminate, so all negations
of borderline statements, which are themselves borderline statements, are true . Since
borderline statements are ex definilione statements with indetyrminrty truth value, it 
would follow lhal negative borderline statements have two true values: indeterminacy
and truth.
If we regard "V" and "A" as modal operators, then it seems that (5) does not 
contradict (1). (1) says that "a = b" is true on some prycisificrtions of ct and b and
false on some. Clearly, (5) does not say tert " -i (a = bf” is true on all precisificntions.
Thus, it seems that (1) V(a - b) and (5) -^{a = b) can be true together.
If we agree that there is no inconsistency between (1) and (5), then the 
argument - if valid - proves:* 66
(P)V(a = /?)-> ~(a = b).
GarreU notices this bul derives a different conclusion. sec (1991a). p. 3-46.
66 Pelletier (1989). p. 483n.
5!
The problem is that from that by contraposition we can get
(P') (a = /?) ^ V (a = b)
and by duality of delta operators (P') is equivalent to
(P") (a = 6).> A-, (6/ = /))
which is absurd, for it says that if a and b are identical then they are determinately
distinct..
F. J, Pelletier assumes that Evans's argument proves (P). According to him, 
since (P) is equivalent to the absurd (P"), there must be something wrong with 
Evans's proof However, two things are worth noticing.
First of all, the argument in order to derive (P") from (P) essentially uses 
contraposition. As we have seen several times already, the use of contraposition 
becomes dubious in a logic with three truth values. Also if "V" is interpreted as a
modal operator one would have to object to contraposition. For although (P) seems a 
valid inference in a modal logic of indeterminacy, (P') cannot hold in this logic.
Moreover, the equivalence between (P') and (P") depends on the assumption 
that delta operators are duals and - as we have already seen - one might argue that 
this assumption is flawed (see section 1.2.1. "Duality of delta operators").
1,7. Step ((’>
Evans proposes to strengthen (5) so as to obtain
(5') A-*(a = b)
which - as he says - "is straightforwardly inconsistent with (1)". Whether it 
really is inconsistent depends again on the reading of "V" and "A",
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If three-valued-logic reading is presupposed, then (5') is either ineffective or
unnecessary, depending on the reading of the negation used in (5).67 As has been
claimed in the preceding section, if the negation in (5) is a strong negation, then (5) 
already contradicts ( 1) and transition to (5') is unnecessary. If, on the other hand, the
negation in (5) is weak, then moving to (5') does not improve the situation. (5') still
does not contradict (1): if V(n = b) is compatible with -i(a = /?), then there is no
reason why it should not be compatible with A-i(a = b).
On the modal reading, (5') evidently contradicts (1), for while (1) says that a 
and b are indeterminately identical, (5') says that they are determinately not identical. 
However the problem is that we are not entitled to strengthen (5) in this way. Recall 
that Evans writes as follows: "If "Indefinitely" and its dual, "Definitely" [...] generate 
a modal logic as strong as S5, ( 1) - (4) and, presumably, Leibniz's Law,68 may each be 
strengthened with a "Definitely" prefix, enabling us to derive [(5')]". This claim 
indicates a modal interpretation, assumes explicitly that delta operators are duals, and 
argues that (5') can be inferred, provided that "V" and "A" generate a logic which is
as strong as logic S5. As we have already seen however (Cf. section 1.2), even if one 
adopts a modal reading, it is by no means obvious that delta operators are duals and 
moreover they generate a logic as strong as S5. Surely, if one accepts the 
supervaluationiets logic, such a 'strengthening' of (5) is out of the question.
67 GarreU (1991a). p. 347.
68 It has already been argued that il cannot be (he usual form of LL that Evans's wanted to use. 
Johnsen argues that Evans had in mind the following law :
(LLA) AVvVz ((v = z) -^•[Xv(<j).v)(y) okvtdw))/)]), which is not a law of three-valued logic Just as LL 
is not. See Johnsen (1989), p. 109.
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Before summing up the results of our investigations into the validity of
Evans's argument, let us look briefly at the two other arguments against vague
objects: N. Salmon's and D. Wiggins's, both of which are in the same spirit as the
argument of Evans.
2. NATHAN SALMON’S AND DAVID WIGGINS’S AIRGU^MENrTS
2.1. Nathan Salmon's argument
Nathan Salmon's argument is similar to Evans's. It is constructed in the 
mett^languuge.69 The argument starts with the assumption that it is vague whether x is 
identical with y. But then the pair <x,y> will be definitely not the same pair as <x, x>, 
since it is determinately true that x is identical to itself Hence, it follows that x and y 
must be distinct, which contradicts the initial assumption.70
Johnsen argues that Salmon's argument is valid, but is not sufficient to prove 
that vague identity is un^c^lieeeen71 Salmon assumes that metalanguage is two-valued 
(it is always determinate whether an object possesses the property of being an object 
x such that the predicate expressing the property of being identical to x is 
determinately true of x) and assumes that LL is valid in the appropriate metalogic. 
Johnsen objects that one cannot simply assume that LL is valid in metalogic; such a 
claim has to be justified. One might argue that if the metalanguage is to say anything
69 The argument is metalinguistic, because it uses a metalinguistic property of being an object x such 
that a certain predicate (namely the predicate expressing the property of being identical to x) is 
determinately true ofx. See Johnsen (1989), p. 110.
70 See Salmon (1982), p. 243.
71 Johnsen (1989), p. 111.
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about vagueness, its object language should be three-vrluyd and that brings us back
to the question of validity of LL in the object language/, If one holds that teryy truth 
values are needed to express indeterminacy in the object language, then the arguments 
formulated by Johnsen against Evans's argument (see section 1.5), can be applied here
as well. LL will be valid in tey mytrlrngurgy, only if
(LLnv) [AXx(27a-)((s) & AXx(<px){b)] —> [(a = h) —> (kx\<x>){a) <-> Xx{<A')(h)]
is valid in the object language. If it is
(LLv) {A{a = h) & AXxf^a) & AXxjXh}] -> [(at = h) —> (Xx((/)x){a) <-> Xx
(^x)(A))],
which is the only form of LL valid for the object language, then LL is not valid. 
Hence, Salmon's proof establishes that tey indeterminate identity is incoherent, 
provided that something stronger than LLv is a law of three-valued logic. And as has 
been argued this is far from obvious and must be backed up by arguments.
Contrary to Johnsen, T. Parsons takes Salmon's argument to be invvlid/3 He
argues that Salmon's argument can be simplified and reformulated as follows:
1. V (x = y) assumption
2. —iV (x = x) logical truth
3. x 92j/ 1,2 ^^og.tk:i off idem
The crucial move here is, of course, the derivation of (3) from (1) and (2). 
The inference rule called "Logic of identity" clearly appeals to a version of Leibniz's 
Law. The problem is that it does not appeal to LL itself (for it does not proceed from 
the claim that x = y and x has a certain property, to the claim that y must have that 
property as well), but to its contraposition. From the claim that y is indefinitely 
identical to x, and x is not indefinitely identical to x, it derives t-he conclusion that x * *
72 ibid.
73 Parsons (1987). pp. 8-11.
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and;/ must be distinct. Although Parsons has no objections to LL, he does object to 
its contrapositive. According to him, the contrapositive of LL is simply not valid in 
the presence of indeterminacy.74
The above formulation of Salmon's argument is very important, because it can
be regarded as a formulation (and simplification) of Evans's argument as well. By
using variables, it avoids the problems connected with the possibility of indeterminate 
reference of terms flanking the identity sign. It also skips the uses of property 
abstraction, avoiding the questions concerning the validity of property abstraction.
So, one cannot argue that the argument is invalid because the terms used in it are
imprecise designators. Neither can one maintain that it is the use of property 
abstraction which is fallacious and invalidates the whole reasoning. The present 
argument is extremely simple and uses only one rule of inference: the aontrapoeitive 
of LL. We have seen many times now (and most recently in the preceding paragraph) 
that that rule can be questioned in a logic with indeterminacy. The problem is 
however, that quite independently of the general doubts concerning the validity of the 
aontrapoeitive of LL, there seem to be nothing wrong with that particular application 
of that law which features in the above argument. The paradox here is that that 
argument just seems right. It appears that if> is indeterminately identical to a and x is 
not indeterminately identical to x, thenx and}' have to be different objects.
One could reply to this by appealing to Lowe's considerations concerning the 
properties "Xx [V(x = a)]" and "Xx [V(x = /?)]" (see above, section 13). Here we
74 Parsons (1987), pp. 9-10. Parsons accepts a different truth-table for the conditional then the one 
given above. He takes "4 —> B" to be true, if ".4" is false or "B" is true or both are indcterminate, 
false if "/l" is true and "B" is false, and otherwise indeterminate. As an example he gives the 
following valid inference pattern: From: .1 -> IB, and: B — O infer: ->V (.1 -> (’). whose
contraposition is invalid: From: V (.1 -> (."): and: B -> O one cannot infer: -, (.4 -> B), because the
inference fails, when .4 is true and B and (' are indeterminate.
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have two objects x and> of which we assume that they are indeterminately identical.
One can argue that if x and y are indeterminately identical then the property of being 
indeterminately identical to x is not determinately different from the property of being 
indeterminately identical to y. Thus, it can be maintained that even though y has the 
property of being indeterminately identical to x and x does not have that property, x 
has the property of being indeterminately identical to y, which is not determinately 
different from y's property. Thus, such properties cannot be used to determinately 
distinguish x from y. In this case, the argument is even more plausible, since we do 
not have names that feature in the predicates which express the relevant properties.
Alternatively, following Copeland (see section 1.4), one could insist that the
only admissible reading of "-,V(x = x)" is "x is not indeterminately identical to itself'.
Arguably, this reading does not allow to derive the conclusion (3).
2.2. David Wiggins's Argument
There is one more argument which deals with indeterminate identity. It does 
not use indeterminate identity at all, but aims nevertheless at ruling it out altogether. 
D. Wiggins has offered the following proof':75
1. x=y assumption
2. A (x = x) ti'insm
3. A(x=y) 1,2,LL
4. x = y —> A (x = y) cond. proof76
This argument does not use the contrapositive of Leibniz's Law at all. It 
applies Leibniz's Law itself. Thus, it seems that there is no denying that (3) follows
75 See Wiggins (1986). p. 17.3. I use variables ".v" and "y" instead of "a" and "6". in order lo side­
step the possible issue of the vagueness of "a" and "A".
76 Zemach (1991), p. 335.
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from (1) and (2). What the argument (1) - (3) proves is that if two objects are 
identical they must be '61613X111^161) identical. In other words, if we assume that x and
y are identical, we are forced to conclude that it is determinate that they are identical.
This argument does not rule out the possibility of indyterminrtr identity, yet. The
vague identity theorists would agree that, if "x = y" is true, then "A(x =>')” is true too.
Thus if we take LL to be the law of inference which says that if it is true that x is 
whatever is true of x is true of y, and vice versa, then the ontic vagueness theorists
can accept it. The problem arises at step (4). This step says that "A (x = 7)" follows 
from "x = y", and it appears that the teyorists who believe in vague identity have to 
deny the validity of that i.e. they have to reject conditional proof The
vague-objects supporter has to deny that (4) is always true, since it can be the case
that its antecedent may be indeterminate, thus making its consequent false. And if the 
antecedent is indytyrminrte and the consequent false, ley whole conditional will be
indeterminate. /
3. CONCLUSION
There is one interpretation according to which Evans's argument is almost 
unproblematic. It is a sort of'didactic' argument: it purposely fails in order to check 
who will notice and diagnose the fallacy. It pretends to prove an absurd claim that 
there are no indeterminate identity statements, but one of its steps is fallacious. The 
fallacy lies in the imprecision of the singular terms used in the proof Thus, only 
theorists who allow the possibility that such singular terms may be imprecise can
77 Garrett (1988). p. 133.
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diagnose the fallacy. If there were theorists who maintained that indeterminately
identical objects have to be denoted by precise terms, they would not be able to refute
Evans's absurd conclusion.
However, there is also another possible interpretation of Evans's argument. 
According to this interpretations the aim of the argument is twofold: it attempts to 
prove that a certain sort of indeterminate identity statements is incoherent - namely 
statements which contain only precise designators - and by doing this, it allegedly 
shows that the world cannot be vague. In this chapter we focused mainly on the 
former aim. Whether or not the argument achieves this aim is an open question. Every 
single step of this argument has been challenged in many ways. While some of these 
attacks are clearly misguided, some pose a genuine threat to the validity of the 
argument. Anyway, it appears that the vague objects theorists have some room for 
manoeuvre. The crucial thing is the correct interpretation of delta operators. If one 
decides to regard them as modal operators, then one may i.a.:
(i) question the 'genuineness' of the properties described in (2) and (4);
(ii) question the applicability of LL to properties involving "V";
(iii) argue that (5) does not contradict (1) (as a matter of fact, it is hard to understand
how it could contradict (1) on this reading of delta operators);
(iv) claim that delta operators cannot be duals and (5) cannot be strengthened to (5').
On the other hand, if one chooses the truth-value-indicators interpretation,
then one can i.a.:
(i) question the full applicability of abstraction principles to abstracts containing "V";
(ii) question the validity of the step (3) - (4) on the grounds that from (3) only
"-iXx[V(x = can be derived;
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(iii) question the validity of the contrapositive of LL in a three-valued logic;
(iv) argue that (5) does not contradict (I), because it contains a weak negation:
(v) maintain that the strengthening of (5) to (5') is inetfective.
it seems, however, that even if one agrees that Evans's argument is valid (i.e.
it does show the incoherence of the statement "V(a = 6)"), one may still wonder
whether it achieves its second aim. In the next chapter we will try to assess whether 
the argument gives the answer to the title question "Can there be vague objects?".
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Chapter 11
INDETERMINATE IDENTITY AND VAGUE OBJECTS
1. INTRODUCTION
The title of Evans's article "Can There Be Vague Objects?" - discussed in the 
first chapter - clearly suggests that the argument is to have some bearing on the 
existence of vague objects. The problem however is that the relation between vague 
identity statements (with which Evans's argument is concerned) and vague objects is 
not clear. In introducing his argument, Evans hints lert the idea of fuzzy objects is 
ilrcohyrynt, but fuzzy objects are not mentioned explicitly in the argument itself. The 
proof concerns vague identity statements. As Parsons puts it, the argument as it 
stands "is not just an argument against 'vague objects'; it is an argument against 
vagueness (indeterminacy) itself."' It derives a contradiction from the assumption that 
a certain vague identity statement is true. Thus, if the argument were valid, it would 
refute the existence of any indeterminacy in truth value of identity strtymynts.2 
Without the assumption that designators within the identity statement are precise, it is 
an argument against all indeterminate identity statements (and no wonder that it is not
valid).
On the other hand, the property abstraction used in steps:
(2) V(x = a)]b
1 Parsons (1987). p. 14.
2 Cf Parsons (1987). p. 13.
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and
(4) -iXv jV (x = o)|ov
suggests that the argument attempts to say something about objects, not about
statements concerning those objects. In order to make the argument relevant to the
discussion concerning the existence of vague objects, the assumption that the singular 
terms used in the argument are precise has to be added. If all the components of the
identity statement are precise: if the singular terms determinately single out unique 
objects, but the statement is itself indeterminate, the only possible source of this 
indeterminacy seems to be vagueness in the world.
It might be argued, however, that it does not follow that if there cannot be
such statements, there are no vague objects either. It is by no means obvious that the 
argument which shows that the indeterminate identity statements containing only 
precise designators do not exist, shows in this way that vague objects cannot exist. 
For the sake of simplicity so far we have used the expression "vague objects" as a 
synonym of "indeterminately identical objects", i.e. "objects that are indeterminately 
identical to something". However, the claim that vague objects are objects that are 
indeterminately identical is not at all obvious. Indeed it appears that all 
indeterminately identical objects are vague objects, but it is by no means evident that 
the converse holds: i.e. that all vague objects are indeterminately identical objects.3
In the following section we will look at issues pertaining to the connections 
between indeterminate identity, indeterminately identical objects, and precise 
designation, whereas the rest of the chapter will be devoted to the question of what
3 See e.g. Burgess (1984). p. 113.
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indeterminate identity may consist in and in particular to the relation between vague
identity and vague objects.
2. INDETERMINATE IIDEN'IT'FV AND PRECISE IDESi^GN AFI^ON
One could argue that Evans's argument has no bearing on the issue of the
existence of vague objects, for vague objects cannot be precisely designated — In order 
to construct an identity statement "a = h" which would be 'guaranteed' to be ontically 
indeterminate one has to name vague objects first, and then use these names to say 
that the objects designated by those names are indeterminately identical. If precise 
reference is unattainable in the case of vague objects, no such statement may be 
constructed. In other words, unless vague objects can be precisely designated, no 
statement containing precise designators says anything about these objects. Thus, it 
seems that even if one takes Evans's argument to be valid, this argument does not give 
one the answer to the title question. It does not prove that vague objects cannot exist.
Besides, Evans's argument can have any bearing on the existence of vague 
objects only if such objects can be indeterminately identical. If vague objects are never 
indeterminately identical, then it seems that Evans's argument does not pertain to them 
at all. For what the argument shows, if it is valid, is that indeterminately identical 
objects cannot be precisely designated. In order to show that it is vague objects that 
cannot be precisely designated, one would have to show that all vague objects are 
objects that are indeterminately identical to something. Besides, as we have seen, it is 
rather doubtful whether the argument is valid. However, independently of Evans's *
4 This is the view of e.g. Over (1989). p. 98. Cowles (1994). p. 153. Compare also Sainsburv (1989). 
p. 99n.
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proof it can be shown that objects which are iltdylerminrlely identical cannot be 
precisely designated. Let us assume that "c/" and "b" are precise and each of them
denotes exactly one object: "a" denotes a and "h" denotes h. Imagine now that a and
h are vague objects such that it is indeterminate whether a and h are in fact one and 
the same object - i.e. it is ilrdeterminaly whether they are identical. To put it
differently, it will be indeterminate whether ley object denoted by "c/" is identical to
the object denoted by "A". However, it appears that if the objects denoted by "a" and 
”/?” are indeterminately identical, "a" and "//" cannot be precise. For one may ask
whether "a" denotes b. If the answer were "No", then a and b would have to be
(determinately) distinct. Since "a" denotes a and does not' dynotr /?, a has - and b
lacks - the property of being denoted by "a". Therefore, they must be distinct. On the
other hand, if the answer were "Yes", then since "a" denotes both a and /?, and our
assumption was that "aa" is precise and singles out a unique object, a and h would
have to be (detyrminrlely) identical. So, if one does not want to contradict the
assumption that a and b are indeterminately identical, one has to maintain that it is
indeterminate whether "a" denotes b (and vice versa: in order not to contradict the 
assumption that "a" and "b" are precise designators, one has to give up the claim that 
a and b are indeterminately identical). And if it is indylerminrfy whether "a" denotes
b, "a" must be an imprecise designator. If it is indeterminate whether a and b are 
identical, one cannot claim that "a" refers to exactly one object. For if it is 
indeterminat'e whether a and b are identical, then it is indylerminrle whether they are 
one object or two objects..5
5 It is a rather unpalatable consequence of treating indeterminacy as a third option that in such a 
case the number of objects involved will neither (determinately) be 1 nor 2. and yet it will be 
indeterminately 1 or 2.
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Thus, once a and h become indeterminately identical, "c" and "Z?" cease to be
(determinately) precise designators. For if it becomes indeterminate whether a is
identical to 6, then it becomes indeterminate whether "rz" picks out a unique entity If
a is indeterminately identical to /?, it is indeterminate whether b counts as a or not.
Flence, it must be indeterminate whether "a" refers to b. Thus, the assumption that a
and b are indeterminately identical is incompatible with the assumption that "ur" and
"Z?" are determinately precise designators.
One might reply to this that it is enough for a designator to be precise that 
there is an object to which it refers determinately. If this were so, then "a" would
remain precise, even though a and b were indeterminately identical, because "a" does
refer determinately to a.
It should be noticed that if there are vague objects which can be 
indeterminately identical, then we are dealing with a peculiar kind of designator. The 
standard view seems to have it that a designator 'Vz" is precise iff it singles out a 
unique object a. The very same thought is sometimes expressed thus: a designator "aa" 
is precise iff it refers determinately to a. However, in the presence of vague objects 
and indeterminate identity these formulntiene are not equivalent. It might be claimed 
that in the case envisaged above although it is indeterminate whether 'Vz" singles out a 
unique object (since it is indeterminate whether a is identical to Z?) "a" does 
nevertheless refer determinately to a. After all it is neither false nor indeterminate that 
"c?" refers to a. So, "a" determinately refers to a vague object a and also 
indeterminately refers to a vague object b. Since "cz" refers determinately to a and 
indeterminately to b, it is indeterminate whether it refers to one object or two objects. 
Thus, it is indeterminate whether it singles out a unique object. Hence, although 'kf
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satisfies one criterion of being a precise designator, namely it refers determinately to 
a, it does not satisfy the other criterion, namely it does not determinately single out a
unique object.
The question arises whether such a term should be considered vague or 
precise. Is the designator "a" which determinately designates a and indeterminately 
designates b precise? Let us call the view which answers in the negative to this
question the standard (or semantic) view and the view which answers in the positive -
non-standard (or ontico-semantic). Since V(a = /?), it is indeterminate whether "aa"
singles out a unique object. It is not determinately the case that it does and it is not
determinately the case that it does not. Roughly, the standard view says that a 
designator is precise iff it is determinate that it singles out a unique object, whereas 
the non-standard view claims that it may be indeterminate whether a precise 
designator picks out a unique object or not, provided that it refers to that object 
determinately. On the non-standard view one has to insist that since it is not 
determinately the case that there are two objects to which the term purports to refer, 
one is not entitled to conclude that that term is imprecise.
The two senses are different only if indeterminately identical objects exist. If 
there are no indeterminately identical objects then in each case in which a designator 
refers determinately to an object, it determinately singles out that object, and vice 
versa. This is why 1 dubbed the non-standard view ontico-semantic. The view is 
distinguishable from the standard view only if there is ontic indeterminacy of identity.
Now, the question arises whether the non-standard interpretation would allow 
one to run Evans's argument on terms naming vague objects. If one accepts the novel 
understanding of precise designators one may argue that the designators "a" and "/?"
66
in "V(a = b)" are precise. However it seems to me that "a" and "Z?" are just not
precise enough to be used in the proof'. Even if we agree that they refer determinntelc 
to a and b respectively, neither of them determinately singles out a unique object. It is 
indeterminate whether "a" singles out h and it is indeterminate whether "b" singles out 
a. And if we want to attribute any properties to objects designated by "a" and 7?" - 
especially the properties concerning the identity of the objects that has been singled 
out - the 'singling out' must be determinate one way or the other.
Moreover, it seems to nie that the non-standard version seems to be a rather
strange interpretation of what being a precise designator consists in. For according to 
this definition, a designator could be precise even if it referred (both determinntelc and 
indeterminately) to an indeterminate number of objects. Thus, it might be argued that 
calling such a designator "precise" is stretching the meaning of "precise" too far. In 
fact it is more plausible to regard the above definition as a non-standard interpretation 
of what being an imprecise designator consists in and consider designators that refer 
both determiimtely and indeterminately as Z«zprecise in a non-standard sense.
On the other hand, if one accepts the standard understanding and maintains 
that a precise designator must refer determinately to some object and not refer 
indeterminately to any object, then ontic indeterminacy in identity precludes precise 
designation: there are no indeterminate identity statements containing only precise 
designators.
If precision is understood in the standard way, then it is hard to see how 
Evans's argument relates to the issue of the existence of vague objects. As has already 
been mentioned if "a" and 7?" in "V(a = h)" are imprecise, the vagueness of "a = b"
may be due to the semantic indeterminacy of "a" and 7?". In order to make sure that
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the vagueness arises because of the ontic indeterminacy, one has to rule out the
possibility that "cy" and "h" are imprecise, and assume tert they are precise. As we
have just seen however, the assumption tert "a" and "b" are precise (in the standard 
sense) cannot be made consistent with a and b being indeterminately identical. Thus, it 
seems that if we do not assume that Ha" and "b" are precise, we have no guarantee 
terl it is indeterminately idenlicrl objects we are talking about, whereas if we do 
assume that "a" and "b" are precise, then a and b cannot be indeterminately identical. 
^1^, in neither case does Evans's argument succeed in saying anything about vague 
objects..
3. THE NOTION OF INDETERMINATE IDENTITY
We keep talking about indytyrminrfyly identical objects, but so far nothing has 
been said that would explain in virtue of what objects a and b may be indeterminately 
identical. The ontic vagueness theorist argues iIsI some facts concerning identity are 
left unsettled - there is no fact of ley matter as to whether certain objects are identical 
or not. But, what would it take for objects a and b to be omically indetyrmutrfyly
identical?
Commonly it is assumed that identity is reflexive [for each object a, a = a] and
satisfies Leibniz's Law [a = b —> \n<\P'a = b'bCY Thyryfory, thyry seem to be the 
following possible reasons for tey indeterminacy of' identity;
(i) ci and/or a moy b e mag ue ovaects, in wlh ch cwhe h pieeurnalr^^ may y e 
indytyrminrte whether they are identical or not;
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(ii) properties may be vague; i.e. it may be indeterminate whether the property
F possessed by a is the same as the property 7'" possessed by /?, in which case it will
be indeterminate whether \/F{Fa = Fb)\
(iii) having of the properties may be indeterminate; i.e. it may be indeterminate
whether or not a has F, in which case the right hand side of Leibniz's Law will be
indeterminate;
(iv) the range of the variable F may not be determined; i.e. it may be 
undetermined what counts as a property or what counts as a property that is relevant 
for the identity claim (for it is widely accepted that F does not range over all 
properties, for instance intensional properties are excluded).
It appears that if any of these possibilities, (i) - (iv) is realised, one might 
maintain that the identity statement "a = b" will be of indeterminate truth value. Each 
proponent of any of these options has to say something about Evans's argument. As 
we have seen this argument can be understood as an argument about objects which 
are indeterminately identical. In order to understand it in this way one has to make the 
additional assumption that the designators "a" and "/?" in the sentence "V(ci = /?)" are 
precise. The argument allegedly demonstrates that there cannot be such statements. 
Thus, anyone who wants to maintain that it is otherwise, has to disarm that argument 
somehow. One way to do it is to appeal to the arguments discussed in the first chapter 
which show that the Evans's proof does not work, because it contains some errors. 
Another way is to argue that independently of whether Evans's argument with the 
additional assumption in place works, or not, that assumption is not satisfied, since 
indeterminately identical objects cannot be precisely designated (see the preceding 
section).
69
Presently the possibilities (i), (iii) and (iv) will be discussed in greater detail/’
The main stress will be put on the first possibility according to which objects may be
indeterminately identical, if they are vague objects.
3.1. Indeterminate identity and vague objects
First of all, what does it mean to say that a and/or b are vague objects? M. 
Sainsbury devotes the main part of his paper "Why the world cannot be vague" to 
searching for the answer to that question. He tries to find a substantive thesis of ontic 
vagueness and starts this search for vagueness in the world as a search for vague 
objects. According to him a thesis of ontic vagueness counts as substantive, if it does
more than assert that borderline cases exist. Let us assume that Mark is a borderline
case of "tall". Although it is vague whether Mark is tall or not, we do not want him to
count as a vague object for this reason alone. Sainsbury calls borderline cases of
vague expressions - such as Mark - "anodyne vague objects". Clearly, a thesis that
there are anodyne vague objects is not a substantive thesis of ontic vagueness. In 
short, a substantive thesis of ontic vagueness should enable us to separate anodyne 
vague objects from 'genuine' vague objects. To be a 'genuine' vague object, an object 
has to satisfy some more demanding condition - i.e. a condition which would not be
satisfied by common borderline cases. The problem is to define that condition.
Sainsbury does not succeed in finding such a condition and confesses that he
has "drawn a blank in [his] attempts to find an intelligible and controversial thesis of
6 The option (it) is only mentioned here and will not be analysed. As 1 said in the introduction, in 
this thesis I am concerned with the identity of concrete objects only.
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ontic vagueness"? It seems to me however that maybe the goal he set for himself (on
behalf of the ontic theorists) was unrealistic. He argues that the vague objects theorist
is a person who tries to explain vagueness in language by vagueness in the world; who 
thinks that language is vague because the world contains vague objects and our
concepts are fashioned to match that vagueness. Sainsbury claims that such a picture
is unintelligible:
"We cannot think of our world except through our concepts, so there is no intelligible 
notion of our world independently of our concepts. |...j There is thus |...| no sense to the idea 
that, preconceptually, our world contains vague objects"—
One may agree with this, but claim nevertheless that the ontic theorist need 
not think in such terms - that such theorists do not have to be able to think of objects 
independently of language. Even the endorsement of the claim that we can think of 
the world only through our language still leaves some space for the ontic theorists. It 
seems very likely that if someone wants to find a thesis which would be satisfied 
solely by objects which are genuine vague objects and not anodyne vague objects then 
one's attempts are bound to fail. 1 will try to argue, however, that not all anodyne 
vague objects are equally anodyne. On the contrary, there are kinds of allegedly 
anodyne vagueness which are much more 'ontic' than the others.
The first candidate for a substantive ontic-vagueness thesis that Sainsbury 
considers is roughly the following:
(1) Thhee exists a vagtiu oojeec; whhee x i s a vaggu oojeec i ff, lor some (p, x 
satisfies the predicate: Xz (Vcpz) x.
7 Sainsbury (1994). p. 79.
8 Sainsbury (1994). p. 79
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However, it is evident that (1) cannot count as a substantive thesis of ontic
vagueness, for it entails that every borderline case is a vague object., For ^111X6, for
a given tomato / to be regarded as a vague object, it suffices that it satisfies the 
predicate "is such that it is vague whether it is red". And if one agrees tert it is vague
whether tomato I is red, there seem to be no reason why one should withhold from
saying that tomato ( is such that it is vague whether it is red. There is no principled
reason why one should not derive "Xz (Vred z) /" from "Vred /" in this pasy. The same
goes for other borderline cases of vague expressions.
The second thesis that Sainsbury ponsidyrs and immediately rejects is the 
compositional vagueness thesis;
(2) There Th^^ts e (sompo(itianailyf n^ag^yie c^lgeyt; where a- re a
(compositionally) vague object iff it satisfies the predicate; 3yXz (V(y is a part of z))x.
This thesis is no better than the previous one. Since "part off is vague 
semantically, the person who thinks that vagueness is a mere linguistic phennmynon 
can believe in the existence of vague objects in this sense.
According to Sainsbury, the only way to make the ontic vagueness thesis 
inconsistent with the view which takes vagueness to be a mere linguistic phenomynnn 
is to require that the predicate used in this thesis be sharp. If the predicate (p is sharp, 
an object cannot satisfy the abstract "Xz (Vcpz) x" without itself being vague. There 
are some problems with this formulation connepled with the worry whether someone 
who believes in mthc vagueness may avail himself of the notion of a predicate's being 
sharp. It appears tert he might not be able to determine what it is for a predicate to be
5 Sainsbury (1994). p. 66.
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ehane.10 11 2However, instead of defining what is needed for a predicate to count as 
sharp, we may focus on a token sharp predicate: identity. Intuitively at least identity is 
as sharp as any predicate could be, if there are any sharp predicates at all, identity will 
be one of them. So the next attempt at a thesis of ontic vagueness is :
(3) There exist r vague objecte wh^ec x wndj/ ara vayue oejects ifthey sat isfy:
Zw/lz (V(if is identical to z))x, y. 1 1
Thus, (3) is a substantive thesis of ontic vagueness provided that identity is a 
sharp e^laliof.n' Do we have any arguments justifying the claim that identity is sharp,
apart from our intuitions? Sninshury claims that one can prove the shnrpneee of
identity by using Evans's argument. The problem is that he takes that argument to be
both a proof that identity is sharp and a proof that there are no vncud objects. More
exactly, his claim seems to be that Evans has proved that there cannot be vague 
objects by proving that identity is sharp. So, although we are able to formulate a 
substantive thesis of ontic vagueness - namely (3), there is not much use for such a 
theeie' since at the same time we are able to prove that it is false. Although (3) is an 
intelligible thesis, there are no objects that satisfy it.
10 According lo Sainsbury. one of the reasons why it may be impossible for the bclicvcr in ontic 
vagueness to specify which predicate eoimls as vaguc is that wc can have vaguc statements featuring 
sharp predicates and vague singular terms. Hence. wc cannot stipulate that a predicate is vague iff 
when attached lo a singular term it gives rise to an indeterminate statement. Not only vague 
predicates. but some sharp predicates as well would satisfy this definition. The example he gives is 
"Snowdon has an area of 1500 acres". The predicate "has an area of 1500 acres" presumably is sharp 
(though compare (1994). pp. 70-71). but the statement is indeterminate nevertheless. It seems to me 
however that wc can deny that "Snowdon has an area of 1500 acres" is indeterminate. This statement 
can either read "Snowdon has an area of just (exactly) 1500 acres" or "Snowdon has an area of 
roughly 1500 acres". In the former case it is simply false (Snowdon has fuzzy boundaries not precise 
ones). In the latter case it is indeterminate. but the predicate "has an area of roughly■ 1500 acres" is 
no longer sharp.
11 Recall that our aim was to find out when object a and h can be indeterminately identical. One 
option was that they may be indeterminately identical if they are vague objects. Now we say that 
objects arc vague, if they are indeterminately identical. This is not a vicious circle howevcr. because 
vague objects are not defined as indeterminately identical objects. This \■ lew docs not explain what 
vagueness of objects consists in. but mcreb- tells us how wc could detect it.
l2Sainsbury (1994). p. 74.
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Sainsbury admits that "Evans's proof is contentious in a number of ways" —
and that he has taken some of the contentious issues for granted, but claims that he
has done so on behalf of the believers in ontic vagueness. The vague-objects theorists
need Evans's argument to prove that identity is sharp - so, if Evans's proof does not 
work, their situation is not good. Thus, according to Sainsbury, the upshot is the 
following. If Evans's argument does not work, we do not have a proof that identity is 
sharp and (3) cannot count as a substantive thesis of ontic vagueness. Iff on the other 
hand, Evans's argument does work, than we have a proof that identity is sharp, but no 
objects whatsoever satisfy (3).
One could object that vague identity thesis - such as "XtvXz (V(ir is identical to
z))x, - is independent of the thesis of ontic vagueness, i.e. that the existence of a
vague object need not result in a vague identity statement. Even if c/ is a vague object, 
then one still can obtain definite identity by matching a with a. a corresponds 
precisely to a, for "[a]ll their vagueness matches exactly".1— Thus, it can be argued 
that even if a is a vague object, the statement "V (aa = a)" is false. And if there is
nothing else with which a is indeterminately identical, then there will be no true 
indeterminate identity statements concerning a.
This argument - if it is accepted1" - merely points out that thesis (3) gives a 
sufficient, but not a necessary condition for objects to count as vague objects. If we 
find for a an object b such that together they satisfy (3), we may be sure that a and b 
are vague objects. If we do not find such /?, we are not entitled to conclude that a is
not vague. * * *
'■Sainsbury (1994). p. 74.
14 Wiggins (1986). p. 175. Cf. chapter I. See also Garret t (1988), pp. 132-3.
15 For the assumption that there is nothing with which a is indeterminately identical, might be 
contended. See the following section.
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Another objection might appeal to the prevailing interpretation according to
which Evans's argument is an attempt at proving t'luit there cannot be vague identity
strtymynts whose vagueness is due solely to the existence of vague objects. As we
remember one of the important points to notice is that this argument seems to rely on
a tacit assumption that "a” and "/?" are precise designators. Hence, if vague objects
cannot be precisely dysignrlrd, no statement containing precise designators says 
anything about those objects.16
Moreover, one could argue - contrary to Sainsbury - that Evans's argument 
does not prove that identity is sharp. Rather it assumes the sharpness of identity in 
order to prove that identity between objects cannot be indeterminate. If teis is so, then 
Evans's proof cannot be used as a justification of the claim lerl "identity" is a sharp 
prediprty. Again, such argument weakens ley chances of (3) to coum as a substantial 
thesis of nntic vagueness in Sainsbury's sense. The ontic-vrguynyss theorists need 
identity to be sharp, hence they would have to find some other arguments for its 
sharpness.
It appears that as far as Evans's argument is concerned, the ont'ic vagueness 
theorist can insist both that idmity is sharp and that vague objects exist, but cannot 
be precisely designated. He can even take Evans's argument to be the proof that 
identity is sharp and yet believe that this result has no bearing on tey existence of 
vague objects. It is clear however, that such a lhyorist will still owe us an explanation 
of how we are to detyrminy which objects are vague and which are not. It should be 
rymymnyryd that Sainsbury's thesis (3) is mearn as a definition of what it takes for an 
object to be vague. If someone claims lhrl vague objects cannot be precisely
16 Sec section 2 in this chapter.
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designated, he says in fact that theses such as (3) cannot tell us anything about such 
objects. The claim that Evans's proof has no bearing on the existence of vague objects 
is tantamount to the claim that thesis (3) has nothing to do with vague objects, either.
If vague objects cannot be precisely designated and if the property abstraction can be
applied only in cases in which we have a unique singlement, then (3) cannot be a 
substantive thesis of ontic vagueness.1— Therefore, Sainsbury's condition imposed on a 
substantive thesis which would state in what being a vague object consists, has not 
been satisfied. If one wanted nevertheless to be able to predicate of vague objects, 
then the requirements for the correct application of property abstraction would have 
to be loosened. One would have to argue that it is enough that we roughly know to 
which object we are referring.1—
So, what are the options for the ontic theorist? Clearly an option which 
involves acknowledging that Evans's argument proves both that identity is sharp and 
that there are no vague objects is a non-starter for him. So, he can either argue that
(3) is a substantive thesis of ontic vagueness, in which case he will have to find 
arguments that identity is sharp (i.e. arguments other than Evans's argument); or 
alternatively he may claim that (3) is no good as a thesis of ontic vagueness, in which 
case he will have to tell us which thesis is adequate. 19 However, as far as the former 
option is concerned, it should be noticed that there are some independent doubts 
concerning the suitability of (3) as an ontic vagueness thesis. It is instructive, for
'7 Nevertheless, one might objeci lo this by pointing ont that (3) is formulated with the help of 
individual variables and not names, such as "a" and The problems concerning precise 
designation do not arise for variables. However, although individual variablcs do nol designate 
objects, they stand in for them. Therefore one might doubt whether vague (not cnlircb individuated) 
objects can be substituted for such variables, in particular in cases where variables feature in lambda 
abstracts. So. it might be argued that the problems w ith imprecise designation of vague objects are in 
a way analogous to the problems with the substitution of vague objects for individual variables.
18 See below and compare also chapter 111.
19 See chapter IV. section 4.4. for an attempt at such a thesis.
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instance, to compare Sainsbury's 1995 paper, with which we have been concerned 
thus far, with his 1989 Analysis article. There he gives the following definitions.
(i) x is cnmposilionrlly vague iff x is such that for some y it is indeterminate 
whethery is a part of x (this dyfinitinn is equivalent to the thesis (2) above).
(ii) x is temporally vague itf'x is such that for some time y it is lndelyrminrte
whether x exists rl y.m
Moreover, Sainsbury has argued that temporal vagueness may lead to 
individurfive vagueness: x is individnafively vague iff x is such tert for some y it is
indeterminate whether x is identical to y. This latter definition is equivalent to our (3). 
First of all it seems to me terl compositional vagueness as well as temporal
vagueness can lead to individuative vagueness. If for some y it is indelerminrty 
weyfhyr y is a part of x, then x is such that for some z (namely z which consists of all 
of x - y) it is indetyrminaty whether x is identical lo z. To this one may object, 
however, that the assumption that there is a z which is equal to x - y, is unjustified.* 1 2 3' 
On the other hand, one may argue lert if y is iltdylerminrlely a part of x and 
'61611X1111.16.1) not a part of z, then x is '6161x1^1^1) not identical to z. There is also 
another argument showing that compositional vagueness may lead to individuative
20 Sainsbury distinguishes also modal vagueness, which he defines as follows:
(iii) x is modally vague iff x is such (hat for some world v it is vague whether x exists at v.
I'm not sure whether (iii) should be distinguished (or rather I'm not sure what the relation between 
(ii) and (iii) is).Compare e.g. the following definitions of essence::
1. essence is the intersection of its essential attributes, i.e. the attributes it shares w ith all and only its 
counterparts (Lewis (1968). p. 35):
2. an essential property is a property which that individual could not have lacked, or which it 
possesses in all possible worlds in which it exists (Lowe (1989). p. 106):
3. an essential properly is a property which that individual cannot lose without thereby ceasing to be 
(Lowe. ibid.).
If we define essence as in 3. then we're back with vague persistence conditions and (ii). In what 
follows I ignore modal vagueness as a separate kind of ontic vagueness.
21 For instance. van Inwagcn who rejects the doctrine of arbitrary undetachcd parts. would not 
recognise the existence of such a z. Sec (1990). p. 217. Compare also the Exercst/Gaurisanker 
example below.
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vagueness, however. Consider, for instancd' Professor Schrodinger's example of
Everest and Gaurisanker22 A certain mountain can be seen both from Nepal and from
Tibet. When seen from one direction it was called "Gaurisankdr", when seen from
another direction, it was called "Everest". It can be argued that both Everest and 
Gnurisankee are compositienallc vague objects,23 hdcnuse there are objects (namely
bits of ground) such that it is indeterminate whether they are parts of Everest and it is 
inddterminntd whether they are parts of Gaurisanker. One could also argue that 
Everest and Gaurisanker are merely anodyne vague objects, because the sole reason 
for their being compeeitionally vague is the fact that "is a part of' is a vague 
expression. However, it is clear that it is indeterminate whether Everest is the same
object as Gnurisnnker. Since they have vague spatial boundaries (in Sainsbury's 
anodyne sdnse)' determining decisively whether they are identical or not is impossible.
So, we can conclude that indieiduntive vagueness is a consequence of each of 
temporal and compositional vagueness.
In his 1995 paper Sainshury argues effectively that compositional vagueness is 
anodyne and dismisses it as a 'genuine' kind of ontic vagueness right at the start. As 
regards temporal vagueness, he mentions that there is a chance that the life history of 
an object which has vague persistence conditions may not fit exactly into any precise 
stretch of time, but does not count such objects as candidates for 'genuine' vague 
objects. On the other hand, he takes individuative vagueness definition (i.e. thesis (3)) 
to be the most serious candidate for the ontic-engueness thesis. It appears to me 
however that - by Sainsbury's own lights - the indieiduative-vagudnese definition has
22 Kripkc quotes (his example in "Identity and Necessity". There it is used for entirely different 
purposes.
23 Alternatively one could claim that "Evcrest" and "Gaurisanker'' are vague terms which refer 
indirectly to many precise objects.
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no future as the substantive thesis. It is doomed from the beginning just as the
definitions of compositional and temporal vagueness are. Recall that the idea behind
the introduction of a sharp predicate into the ontic-vagueness thesis was to separate
genuine vague objects from anodyne vague objects. If a vague predicate is used 
instead, then a sharp object may satisfy that thesis merely in virtue of being a 
borderline case of that predicate. However, if each of compositional and temporal 
vagueness (i.e. anodyne kinds of vagueness) leads to igdiaiduative vagueness, then it 
is clear that there will be anodyne vague objects satisfying the indiaiduatiax-aaguxnxss 
definition, for such objects can be borderline cases of sharp predicates. Hence, if
compositional and temporal vagueness are anodyne, individuate vagueness must be 
anodyne as well.
ho sum up: according to Sainsbury at least some compositionally vague 
objects are anodyne vague objects (i.e. they count as vague according to the 
compositional vagueness definition, but the sole reason for this is semantic vagueness 
of the predicate "is a part of"); since compositional vagueness can lead to 
individuate vagueness, it is probable that some of those anodyne objects will satisfy 
the individuate vagueness definition (and hence thesis (3)). Therefore thesis (3) 
cannot count as a substantive thesis of ontic vagueness. Even if we find a pair of 
objects that satisfy that thesis, we will not have the guarantee that those objects are 
'genuine' vague objects, and not mere anodyne vague objects, which happen to satisfy 
that thesis in virtue of being borderline cases of the predicate "is a part of', as was the
case with Everest and Gaurisanker. Even though Everest and Gaurisanker are 
anodyne in Sainsbury's sense, they do satisfy:
(3) XwXz (V(w is identical to z))x, y.
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Since there are anodyne vague objects satisfying (3), by Sainsbury's own lights
(3) cannot be a substantive thesis of ontic vagueness.
J. Copeland makes a similar point. In his reply to Sfmtbucy ha argues that (3) 
is no good as a substantive thesis of ontic vagueness, because there are anodyne
vague objects which satisfy (3). He gives the following example: V (New Devon =
Neuedlle Provence), where "New Devon" is the name given by a seednSeenth century
British snnfarer to a natural harbour and indeterminate amount of hinterland on the
coastline of what is now Western Australia; and "Noueelld Provence" is the name
given a yyea enalies bba French mrainnr r o roughly t lth same spot.24
By way of reply, in footnote 6 Saicsbury that he is to
believe that Copeland is right and that' it makes things even harder for ontic theorists, 
for (3) cannot be used as a substantied thesis of onnc vagueness.
So, if one insists sSis the substantive thesis of ectic vagueness should 
formulntn a condition which is uniquely satisfied by 'gdcuind' vague objects, then the 
prospects for the believer in ecsic vagueness are rather dim. All nssnmpte at 
formulating such a condition are futile, since anodyne vague objects are bound to 
satisfy nedry such condition as well. Sainsbury has asked rhetorically "If the prndicnSn 
[used in a thesis of octih vagum-mss] is sharp, how could an objnhS satisfy the 
[eelnennt] abstract without itself being [genuinely] vague?". Now we navd found the 
answer to that question: an object can satisfy sSs relevant abstract (i.e, ZeZz (VCn- is 
identical to z))x y) by being a composisionnlly or temporally vague object - in other 
words, by being an anodyne vague object.
24 Copeland (1995). p. 83.
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However, it seems lo me that the class of so called "anodyne vague objects" is 
not homogenous. Not all "anodyne vague objects" are as 'anodyne' as it may appear.
As we have just seen, "XwXz (V(ir is ^6111^1 lo z))v, yf will nol be true of any
anodyne object whalsoever; if can be true only of compositlonall) and temporally 
vague objects. Some kinds of vagueness - 11X61. the temporal, compositional25 and 
individuative vagueness - seem to be more strictly connected with objyctenod and
individuation than others. Not all kinds of vagueness threaten the intelligibility of our 
nntinns of individuation, objeclhood and identity to the same degree. The fact that a 
certain tomato is such that it is vague whether it is red does not preclude us from 
saying what its identity conditions are, what kind of object if is and how it can be 
individuated. Similarly the fact test Mark is a borderline case of "bald" does not 
threaten his personal ICmlty. On the contrary, 1!^ temporal, compositional and 
individualivy vagueness do jeopardise the notions of Individuation and idenlily-
25 Recall thal Sainsbury counts compositional vagueness as anodyne, because the predicate "is a part 
of1 is vague. It might be worth noticing that two notions of being a part may be distinguished. The 
first one, which seems to be the one Sainsbury has in mind, is (roughly) a notion of being sufficiently 
well attached. Sainsbury justifies his taking for granted that "part of is vague by appealing to two 
facts. First, the mere possibility of borderline cases suffices for a predicate to count as vague. Second, 
the applicability of the predicate "part of to material objects is based on matters of degree, such as 
the strength of cohesive forces. There arc two kinds of borderline cases of "part of in this sense. One 
kind will be objects which are in the process of falling out. So. for instance, there will be an instant 
in the process of breaking a table's leg at which it will be indeterminate whether the leg is still a part 
of the table. The other kind of borderline cases of "part of in this sense will be molecules on the 
surface of our everyday objects. It is indeterminate whether the cohesive forces between these 
molecules and the object are strong enough to justify calling them parts of the object.
The second notion of "part of is geographical part. Here whether something counts as a part of a 
given object is not a matter of how strong the attachment is. It usually depends on our stipulation. So. 
for instance, there are parts about which it is indeterminate whether they arc parts of New Devon. 
The cause of this indeterminacy is not the insufficient strength of the attachment - for there is no 
physical attachment. The forces interacting between the object and the parts in question arc 
unimportant. When we speak about parts in the second sense, wc havc to specify what thev are parts 
of. because something may be a borderline case of "part of New Dcv on". but determinately be a part 
of Australia. Furthermore, "is a part of New Devon" is vague merely because New Devon is vague. 
So in this case it will be the relation "is a New-Dcvon-parl" which is vague and not "is a part of 
itself. Thus, the expression "is a part" in this sense is a syncategofematic expression. It does not 
make sense in itself. And "is a part of x" is not xaguc. unless x itself is vague.
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conditions.—’ In order to individuate an object one does not have to determine its
exact colour, but one has to distinguish it from its environment, its neighbouring
objects, its predecessors and successors, etc. And vagueness in spatial or temporal
boundaries may render it impossible. For instance, if such an object is compositionally
vague, then there are objects such that they are neither determinately parts of the 
object one wants to individuate nor determinately parts of its environment. It is 
obvious that most objects are compositionally and temporally vague (in fact it seems
that all composite objects are vague in this sense). So, precise individuation is usually 
impossible and we have either to acknowledge that we never succeed in individuating 
anything, or else accept that 'rough' individuation is enough - anodyne compositionally 
and temporally vague objects may be individuated without setting precise spatial and 
temporal boundaries. Obviously, how vague the boundaries can be in order for
individuation to succeed, is itself indeterminate. The boundary between objects that 
can be individuated and those that cannot becomes blurred. And we lose our grip on
what individuation itself consists in.—?
The compositional, temporal and individuative vagueness seem to be kinds of 
ontic vagueness at least in a sense that they are intimately connected with the identity 
criteria of objects. So, these three kinds of vagueness seem to constitute a special kind 
of vagueness, and a. more 'dangerous' one at that.
Besides, one could also argue that, if vagueness is so grave that it makes it 
indeterminate whether a and h are one and the same object, then it deserves to be 
called 'genuine'. According to such a view igdividuativx vagueness is genuine
26 E. g. Ifw-e agree thal it is indetenninatc w -hether Brow - n and Smith are the same person - i.e. thal 
they are individuatively vague, then we arc unable lo answer the question "How many persons arc 
there?". So. the criterion of personal identity becomes v -aguc.
28 I come back to the question of individuation later on in Chapter Hi. section 3.2.
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vagueness. It is true that cempositionnlly and temporally vague objects (i.e. anodyne
vague objects) can satisfy the sensenhd "XrrXz (V(w is identical to z)).v, y", but if tnny
do satisfy it, they cease to be anodyne vague. Indnsnrmicncc of identity is n serious
matter and if objects whose identity is indeterminnSn nrs not genuinely vague, then
nothing is. In other words, (3) formulnsrs a condition of being a genuine vagus object.
If an object snsisfide it, it is gncuindly vague, no matter whether it meets this condition 
in virtue of being merely anodyne vague. So, on this eidW' composisionally and
temporally vague objects are anodyne vague as long as they do not satisfy "Zwlz
(V^ is identical to z)).x,}". If they do, they count as genuinely vague.
The aim of this section was to develop the idea that the vagueness of objects a 
nnd/or b can make the statement "a = b" inddSnrminnSn. We were looking at 
Simsbury's attempts to find out what the enguecdss of a and b can consist in. His 
answer seems to be that the notion shns a or b are genuinely vague objects is 
incomprehnnsibld. The closest one can get to n substncsivn thesis of ontic vagueness is 
claim (3), namely the claim thal a and b are vagus objects if sSsc nrn such dint it is 
indnSnriTiinatn whether they are identical or cos. According to Simsbury, the problem 
with such n thesis is that dither co object satisfies it (if one accepts Evans's argument) 
or one has no gunrantnn that it is substantive (if onn rejects Evans's argumnns). As we 
havn snen sherd are also other nltdrnntives that nend considering. On thn one hand, 
onn mny maintain that although Evnne's argument works, it dons nos preclude thn 
existence of objects that make she identity statement inddtdrmicnSd, because Evins's 
proof can only be applied to pencisn designators and designators naming 
rnddSerminntdly identical objects are never peeciss. Then, in order so eubesnnsinsn the 
claim that sheer are vague objects which are indeterminately identical, onn would have
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to provide some other arguments for that claim. On the other hand, one may question 
Sainsbury's idea of what it takes for a thesis to be a substantive thesis of ontic 
vagueness. One could argue that a thesis which is satisfied only by compositionally or
temporally vague objects deserves to be called substantive. Although compositionally 
and temporally vague objects are anodyne vague objects in the sense that they satisfy
thesis (3) in virtue of being borderline cases of vague expressions, one might insist 
that they are 'genuine' vague objects in a sense that their temporal and spatial
boundaries are vague and they cannot be precisely individuated. It is hard to imagine 
what more could be required from the ontic kind of vagueness. And it seems that 
objects which are vague in these sense can make identity statements indeterminate, 
although the identity predicate itself remains sharp.
3.1.1. Vague objects and indeterminately ilcd.enticea objects
In the preceding section [3.1.] we have investigated vague objects and in 
particular the relation between vague objects and indeterminately identical objects. It 
has been argued that vague objects - namely compositionally and temporally vague 
objects - can be indeterminately identical. They seem to be the only (concrete) objects 
that a true vague identity statement can be about. The question now is: Are alt vague 
objects indeterminately identical objects? In other words: Could there be vague 
objects without vague identity? The answer to that question has a bearing on the 
impact and the range of application of Evans's argument. As it has turned out (Cf. 
section 2), vague objects which are indeterminately identical can be precisely 
designated only if we interpret "precise designation" in a rather awkward non-
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standard way. However, one may ask s more general question: Is this the .fate of all
vague objects? Is Il the csse that vague objects In general cannot be precisely
designated in fhe standard sense? For If all vague objects are indytyrmlnately identical 
objects, and if my reasoning poncyrnlng indetyrmina1e1y identical objects and precise 
designation is correct, then we already know the answer. And if there are vague 
objects which are not inde1ermlnatyly identical objects, then a separate argument 
concerning these objects is needed.
Al first glance It might seem that the answer lo the question wheteyr all vague 
objects are indelermlnatyly idenlicsl objects is "No". Although Individuative 
vagueness Is a plausible consyquyncy of compositional and temporal vagueness, there 
is no reason lo think that it is a necessary ponsequenpy of It. However, theorists are 
divided on this issue. This Is nol a place to present in '61111 all the different views on 
thal mailer, bul let me just mention s few standpoints.
If all vague objects were to be objects that are indytermins1ely Identlcsl to 
something, then for each vague objecl leyre would have to exist an object 
indeterminafyly identical lo it. This seems to be ihe view of Parsons and Woodruff, 
who seem to think that all vague objects are objects iIsI are indeterminsly1y identical 
lo something. They argue that there 6x1st vague objecls and each such object has 
many precisifipatlons to which il is indytermlna1ely identical.2*
On the other hand, P. van Inwsgen claims that vague objects may - but do not 
have to - be lndetermlnslyly Identical with each other. He does not believe in the
28 Cf. Parsons. Woodruff (1995). See also chapter IV. It should be noticed that this view is 
incompatible with Sainsbury's claim (3). According to (3). objects which arc indeterminately 
identical arc vague. hence Parsons and Woodruffs pfccisiflcations would haxe to be xaguc. NB 
Parsons and Woodruff do not agree with the claim that indeterminately identical objects cannot be 
precisely designated (sec pp. 186-190).
85
multitude of precisifications which are indeterminately identical to the vague object 
which they precisify, but argues that vague objects may be indeterminately identical 
one with another. The only macro-objects are living organisms and the life of those 
organisms may be suspended or disrupted. Sometimes an adventure may happen that 
neither determinately suspends the life nor determinately disrupts it. In such a case it 
will be indeterminate whether the life that exists after the disruption is the same as the 
life that went on before the disruption. He thinks that vagueness in identity is a 
consequence of any view which assumes that there exists some macro-objects (but 
denies that any collection whatsoever of simple objects composes a macro-object).29
M. hye argues that there are vague objects, but there is no identity statement
of indeterminate truth value. According to him an identity statement can be vague in a
sense that it has a vague meaning, but it cannot be indeterminate in truth value. He 
claims that an identity statement can be vague in meaning if either of the singular 
terms flanking the identity sign is vague. He argues moreover that "the vagueness of 
"a" or "h" in "a = h" does not require that "a = b" might be indefinite in truth value".30 31
Thus, it seems that his claim is that although there are vague objects, there are no 
indeterminately identical objects. Incidentally, Tye - for independent reasons - thinks 
that vague objects cannot be precisely designated.’’
It seems to me that the following standpoint is also plausible. One might argue 
that in every case of a vague object there are bound to be more vague objects that will 
be indeterminately identical to it. Take the example of Everest and Gaurisanker,
28 Cf. van Inwagcn (1990). Ch. 18. See also my chapter IV.
3” Tye (1990). p. 556.
31 He writes (ibid.): "In my view, the slatement "iii ~ Everest" is vague, since H^'vcirc^s^t" is vague (as 
also is "/■//" unless if names on objeci lhal is completely precise)" - my emphasis.
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again.32 Ag ws have seen, is can bn argued shat both EenrnsS' nnd Gnurisacker are 
vngun objects, bncnuse they Save no determicntn spatial boundaries. And is is clear
that it is indetneminats whether Eversst is she snms object as Gauriennksr. Since Shny
hive vagus spatial boundaries, determining decisively whether they are identical or
not is impossible. Arguably such examples can be constructed for each object with no 
dnserminnte spatial houndarise.
Roughly, if an object has fuzzy boundaries, one can always imagine mother 
objncs which is very much like thn previous ons nnd whose boundaries overlap to 
some nxtens. Is will Shen be indnSnemmaSn whether shesn two objects are identical or 
noS. Since Sheir houcdnries nre not determined one cacnoS establish their identity 
nithee way. One can enpsnt a similar reasoning foe objects with fuzzy temporal 
boundaries. If Shis is so, then of course all vague objects nre indeterminately identical 
objects. And if ill vngus objects nrs indnSeeminnSely identical objects, fhnn no vague 
object cnc bs precisely designated.
One of the possible ways of rejecting the list standpoint sesms to bn to insist 
thnf in nenrc such case it is dstnrminatn Shit tiers is just one vague object fhere. it 
might bs argued shns ws know foe icetance that at the place it which Evsrest is Shnrn 
is only onn mountain. That mountain is vagus but is unique. In this casn svsry identity 
etaSnmnct concerning Everest nnd another vague object will have n dnSnrminntn truth 
value, truth or falsity, and dvdey stafemsnf hochsrnlch Eesreef and n precise object 
will be fnlss. It appears this on Shis view Shnrn cnccot bn any indstermicate-idnntiSy
statements it all.
32 Sec above, seclion 3.1.
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Let us now look briefly at 11.16 other two reasons for tlie indetyrmlnscy of 
identity; the lndytermlnate having of properties and 116 urdetyl•mlned range of 
prnpyrtiys that count In the assessment of identity
3.2. The indeterminate having of properties
Instead of looking for vague objects, the onllc vagueness proponent can lake 
the following standpoint.
,,T1y world pnnslt1s of ^1X6 objects, and snmr prnprr1lrt and relations, w 111 the 
objects possessing (or nol possessing) prnprrtirs and s1andine in (or not standing In) relations. 
Call 11^6 tnssrssinet and standings-ln states of affairs. Thm the world '61611x111^ that 
prrtaln of them enld, and that per1aln of ihem do not hold, but leaves 116 rest undetermined."33
In our case the claim will be ihst 11616 are stales of affairs concenting identify 
such that the world leaves Il undetermined whether 116) hold or not. In other words, 
it is left ^'6161X11116' whether two objecls, a and /?, stand In 116 identity relation to 
61^ othyr. On such s view It Is neither t1e objects, a or />, nor 116 identify relation, 
which are vague. In genersl, it Is argued 11st vagueness should nol be ascribed to
objects or properlies and relstlons, but to slstes of affairs instead, for It Is l1e relation 
of properly Inslsnllstlon and of standing-in a relation which are mderermmata.r4 The 
explanation of what exactly this Iitde1erminapy consists In depends on 116 theory of 
properties and rylsllons one takes to be true.
The reason why we should not ascribe indetyrminapy either to objects or to 
properlies and relations Is 1111 - contrary to appearance - lliere is no asymmetry 
between vague slates of affairs such as:
22 Parsons. Woodruff (1995). p. 173.
2" One of the proponenls of such a \ ' iew is Katherine Hawley . lypescripi.
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It is indeterminate whether Fred is bald.
it is indeterminate whether Snowdon has a surface area of exactly 1500 acres.
If we were to blame objects or properties for the vagueness of these states of
affairs we would probably blame the property of being bald and the object Snowdon,
the reason being that if we precisity being bald and Snowdon we get rid of
indeterminacy. However, K. Hawley argues that there is no justification for such a
choice. She claims that instead of precisifying baldness we could equally well precisify 
Fred. Just as we can precisify Snowdon with respect to its surface area, we may 
precisify Fred with respect to his baldness. So, there is no real difference between
Snowdon and Fred,
It seems to me however, that the view described above is not right. There is an
asymmetry between the above states of affairs after all.
First of all, precisification is not an arbitrary change of an object, we cannot 
precisify objects with respect to their precise properties. In particular, we cannot 
precisify Fred with respect to baldness by granting him more or less hair. Changing 
the number of hair on his head would be changing a precise property of his; having
such-and-such a number of hairs on his head.
Besides, even if we allowed precisification of Fred, there still would be a 
difference between the Fred-precisifications and the Snowdon-precisificatiogs. Any 
precisification of Snowdon will do, i.e. any Snowdog-prxcislfication will remove 
indeterminacy from the state of affairs "Snowdon has a surface area of exactly 1500 
acres". Whereas this may not be the case with the Fred-precisifications. We may need 
to add or remove a significant number of hair in order to make the state of affairs
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"Fred is bnld" determinate. Moreover, for ceeSnin Frsd-prscieificntione we would sfill
cot know whether shn resulting state of affairs is dsterminntn or nos.
There is also lnethnr asymmetry between she states described by sentences "It
is indeterminate whether Fred is bald" acd "It is indnteeminntn whether Snowdon has a
surface area of exactly 1500 acres". Clearly there nee ways of prscisifyicg She peopneSy 
of being bald, but it seems to me that ws cncnof precisify Sis propnety of having a 
surface area of exactly 1500 acres (if indsnd it is a precise property).
Thus, having vague stitss of affairs doss cos islp much. At most it adds vngun 
entities So our ontology. It is nof able to explain asymmetries which show up in thn 
above stites of affairs, acd we iavs to posfulits furthee vague enfitins in thn end - 
vngue objects or/and vngue propnrtins icd eelnfions.
As far as indeSnrminaSn identity is conhernsd, it appears Shit tie claim here 
would be ShnS is is indeterminate whether or not a nnd b stand in She idectity-relation
to each other. In order to escape Evans's negumnct ons would have to claim thnf from 
She fact this a deficiSsly stands in tis identity-relation So a, acd b stands ic this 
relation only indefinitely, it doss not follow fhaf b (definitely) stands in n diffnrenS-
from-relaSion to a?5
3.3. Tim range of ’ IF
The last option foe ths octic eaguscess sSsorist, who wants to maintain ShaS 
there nrn identity stitnments which are indetermicnfe ic truth vilue is to negun fiat the 35
35 For inslance, one could use a variant of Lowe's argument (see Chapter 1. section 1.4.) and argue 
that the relation of being identical to a is not essentially different from the relation of being identical 
to h.
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range of the varisble /*' in "a = h —> \/F\F'a <—> /'’/?)" may nol be determined. To pul il
differently, one can claim that il may be undetermined whit counts as i property or 
what counts as a property thal Is relevant for t1e Idenlity claim.
First of all, 116 question Is w1el1er to '61116 Identity In terms of properties or
in terms of pry'lpllys. It has been argued ihst Identify should be defined in terms of
predicates 111161 than properties, for If there are predicsies to which no property 
corresponds, any definition In terms of properties would result in "a kind of relative
identity. a relation which 6^111^ lndispernlbllity of Ils terms in some, but not all
respects - In particular, nol In respects only expressible by pre'lcafes containing
"V"".36 T1e opposite view has It ihst slnpy t1e lest for Idenlity is w1yt1el a and h 
shlly all properties and stand in all the same relations, "[tjests for identity phrased in 
terms of language alone will nol be conclusive for real ^^111) in the world", for 
language may fail to contain vocabulary for fhe 131^611^ or relations in which a and 
b differ7 Hnnce, the latter worry Is exactly opposite to l1e former. While fhe 
adherents of the former view argue thsf predicates may outnumber prnpyrfiys, the 
proponents of t1e Isfter account worry thsf there may be an insufficient number of 
predicates.
The importance of this issue will bypomy apparent, when we investigate the 
proposed dryllillons of ln'etermlnlly Idenlity. There 116 11166 standpoints to be found 
in the 11X6111116. I will phrase them using 116 notion of property raf1er than predicate 
and try io indicate what fhe pontequynces of such 1 presentation consist In.
According to the radical standpoint38 a is in'ytyrmilliyl) ^6111^1 with b iff:
36 See Noonan (1984), p. 118,
37 See Parsons. Woodruff (1995). p. 174.
38 Cf. Noonan (1984). h is worth noticing that this formulation avoids many problems, which 
Evans's argument faces, connected w ' ith the precision of designators.
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(i) there is no property39 which a (definitely) possesses and h (definitely) does
not possess; and
(ii) there is a property which a (definitely) possesses, but it is indeterminate
whether b possesses this property.
It might seem that this definition by itself rules out the possibility of a and b 
being indeterminately identical. hhe conditions (i) and (ii) are never jointly satisfied,
for if "r/ = b" is indeterminate, there will be a property - namely being such lhal it is
indelerminaie whether il is identical lo a - which b (definitely) possesses and a
(definitely) does not possess.
As we have seen in the first chapter this is the very property that was used by 
Evans in an attempt to prove that the assumption that there are indeterminate identity 
statements leads to contradiction. From the assumption that the object a is 
indeterminately identical to the object /?, it follows that b is such that it is
indeterminate whether it is identical to a. Since a is not such that it is indeterminate
whether it is identical to a, using the contraposition of Leibniz's Law [3h (h'h & -Fa)
—> b * a] one can derive the conclusion that a and b are not identical, which seems to
contradict the original assumption.
However, there is a way out for the proponent of the above definition. In 
chapter I we saw some arguments against the existence of such properties as the 
property of being such that It is indelerminaie whether it Is identical to a. The 
argument has it that one cannot assume that the expression of the fact that it is 
indeterminate whether an object has a certain property constitutes itself a definite
39 Since ihis dclinilion is lo specify sufficient as well as necessary coudilions for indeterminate 
identily of a and /). spalio-lemporal properties arc included into the range of (he quantifier. 
Otherwise, e.g.. two distinct spheres which differ only in that one of them is delerminately green, 
whereas the other is indeterminately g teen would eonni as indclcrminately identical.
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ascription of another property. Ths fict Shat it is indeterminate whether a is idecfical 
to b nmoucss to there being no fad of the matter as So whefhnr those objncts are
identical or nof. And it itself doss nof legitimise ascriptions of other indetsrminncy-
ineoleing properties. Tie octic vngunnnss theorist who claims that ths phrasr "it is
icdeterminate wisther Fa" expresses thn claim that Sheen is no fact of fie mnstnr as to
whnSher a has Sis property b\ ought to protest agaicst Sedating is is attributing
another peoperty So a. He should tiec negus tins Evins's argumecf is invalid, since it 
essentially uses 'dubious' properties wiich havs no enfologicll significance.
So, is seems tint ths ontic vlguensse person can accept She nbeee deficition ns
She definition of icdntsrmicnts identity acd still argue that there are objecSs which 
indnnd satisfy SinS definition. The only price tisy Savs So pay is that they nee forced So 
claim shnt the indeSerminacy-icvolving expreesiece do cot denote any properties. This 
is not necessarily a drawback, however, for suci i claim sesms to bs cecsistsct with 
She onsic vngunnnss SSsorisfs's views on indnSeemicncy.
Hence, is long as tis definition is expressed ic terms of propnrfies is might bn 
held So be siSisfiabln. The situation is diffsesnS if ws piriss it ic terms of predicates. 
Then is would sny Sint a is indeterminately idscticil with b iff' (i) it is not she cise Shat 
Sheer is any predihlSs wiici is (dnSnrminaSslc) true of b acd whose negation is 
tdeSerminnSelc) true of a, acd (ii) sieee is a predicate which is (dnSneminnfely) Srus of
b, bus it is icdstsrminate whether or cos it is true of a. Now, is sesms this she 
definition is cever satisfied, foe fhere is co esnsoc why shn predicate is such that il is 
indeierminaie whether it is identical to a should not be constructed. IndependenSly of 
winSher suci a predicate dscofss i property, or cot, if it is indetermicifs whether a
acd b nee idensihll [V(c/ = /?)] (and "a" icd "b" nrs pescise), fhen ws nee ecfitled to
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say thal b satisfies the prydlpl1e is such that if is indeiemtinaie whether if is identical 
to a. Therefore the adherent of iItdeiyrmInaie Identity has no option but to insist thal
116 dyflnlilnn be phrased in terms of properlies and ihst the phrase "VFa" do not
express a properly. On 116 other 111', someone who maintains 611161 that fhe
definition should be expressed in terms of prydipstes or t1at fhe ll'etermlnlpy-
involvlng expressions In question do denote properties Iss lo admit 1111 11616 are no 
iidelermlnately I'mllcal objects. So, lccnrdllg to 116 proponents of vague ideitity 
although a and b 116 not discernible in terms of properlies, 116) are discernible in 
terms of pry'lpatet. Thyrefory, In order not lo reduce I'eitify to some sort of relative 
indisce^^r^iblllt), they have to undermlly the status of fhe indeterminacy-involving
predicates and 11611 them ss mere 'Cambridge prydicalrs' akin, for 1^111X6, lo the
intmslonal onss.40
According to the intermediate standpomt41 on Iidetermliale Identify 
llthnugn 11616 is the property of being such 1111 It Is Indetyrmlna1e w1yiher il is 
^^1^1 with a, It does not dlttlnguls1 between a aid b. If b possesses 116 property 
that il is such that It is indelerminate w1yihyr it Is ^6111^1 with a, i.e. /lv [V(v = a)],
1161 a must possess an analogous property V [V(x = /?)]. However, if a aid b 116
vague objects and there Is io objective fact of 116 mailer whether or not a Is i'mllcal
with b, 1161 l1e properly Ax [V(x = ^^^] Is nol '6161x111161) dlffermt from fhe
property Ax [V(x = /?)], for f1ese properties differ only by fhe occurrence of "a" and
”/?" respectively. Thus, fhe possession by b of fhe properly Ax- [V(x == a)] ^1^1
40 Cf. chapter I and Parsons & Woodruff arguments concerning properly abstraction (section 1.3.).
41 Cf. Lowe (1994). p. 114. This argument was examined in greater detail in chapter 1.
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differentiate h determinately from a, since that property is not determinately different
from the property Xx [V(a- = /;)] possessed by a.
So in the alleged cases of indeterminate identity, the identity-involving
properties cannot be used to definitely distinguish between indeterminately identical 
objects. Hence, the claim is that a is indeterminately identical with b iff
(i) there is no identity-free property which a (definitely) possesses and b
(definitely) does not possess; and
(ii) there is a property which a (definitely) possesses, but it is indeterminate 
whether b possesses it.
In such a case Evans's argument does not work, because it essentially uses an 
identity-involving propeety.42 A fortiori that argument cannot be used against the next 
standpoint, for it dismisses all indeterminacy-involving properties from the definition 
of indeterminate identity.
According to the liberal standpoint43 it can be indeterminate whether a = b 
even though b determinately possesses a property which cf determinately does not 
possess, provided this property is indeterminacy-involving. It is claimed that it would 
beg the question to use a property which merely reflects indeterminacy to show that a
= b cannot be indeterminate.
So on this account a is indeterminately identical with b iff;
(i) there is no indxtxrmigacy-frxx property which a (definitely) possesses and b 
(definitely) does not possess; and
(ii) there is a property which a (definitely) possesses, but it is indeterminate 
whether b possesses it.
42 There are however Evans-type arguments based on ideniiiy-frec properties. See chapters 111 and V.
43 Cf. Broome (1984). pp. 6-12.
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Is may bn negued tins holding ths intermediate position is not' going far
enough. If one is ready to ndmif fhaf some indssermlrahy-invelving properties do cot 
hounS' Sinrn seem to bs co eensoc wiy oce should not go furfier acd claim Sint no
such properties count. In every casn of tie supposedly indeterminate identity She
indefnrminncy in Sie peepertiss is i dienct consequence of Shs indefseminncy in 
identity. If a nnd b undergo a change which results ic tisir icdsterminnte idnntiSy, Shen 
nveryshing a did icd everything Sint inppecsd So a bnfors Shs enlnvnnt hilcge will be 
indnSneminntrly true of b, nnd everysiicg b did acd everything thnf happened to b nffer 
She change will be indeterminntely Srus of a. If using identity-involving prepnrtine begs 
Sie question ignicst thn octic vagueness fieorisf, Shen using properties which follow 
from Shs supposed indetermicnfe identity begs tins question too.
Morsoeer' botS tie inteemedints and Sis libernl standpoints claim fhaf siere is 
something 'fishy' about She properties essentially involving indeterminate identify (She 
intermedinte proposal) or indeSnrminncy in gnneril (the liberal proposal). Thnrn nre of 
coursn indeSerminicy- and lcdntneminlSn-idsnSiSc-ineeleing predicates in our 
language, bus the peopsrtiss Sisy nnmn nrs cot fully-fledged properties tint have So bn 
Snken icfo account whsc fie claims hoccerning identify are nssessnd. If seems to me 
that She person who rejects suci peopnrfiss altogether, ins an easier job Sian somnone 
who believss in octic vngunnnss acd ysf nckcewlsdges ths existence of 
peopertins. While tie foemse simply argues tint tiers are no indeterminacy-involving 
properties icd fiernforn - obviously - suci peopsrfies need cof be taken icfo account, 
She believse in the 'fisiy' properties ins to negus fhaf although there nes such 
propnrtins, they nrs not impoetact for the identity claims.
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4. CONCLUSION
hhe upshot is that the ontic vagueness theorist who believes in indeterminate
identity has some breathing space left. The claim that the identity of objects may be
ontically indeterminate can be made plausible. Two options especially are worth 
pursuing: the 'vague-objects' option and the 'undetermined range of C option. The 
former view distinguishes temporal and compositional vagueness and holds that these
two kinds of vagueness can lead to individuative vagueness, which in turn results in 
the indeterminacy in truth-value of identity statements. The latter conception 
distinguishes three standpoints towards indeterminate identity which differ as to the 
kind of properties which are to be taken into account in the assessment of the truth- 
value of the identity statements. Arguably, each of these views has a way of disarming 
Evans's argument; i.e. on each conception the existence of indeterminately identical 
objects can be made coherent.
In general, leaving the question of the validity of Evans's argument aside, we 
may say that Evans's argument says something about vague objects only if (i) the 
identity between such objects can be indeterminate and (ii) the names of such objects 
are precise designators.
Re (i) The prevailing view between ontic vagueness theorists seems to be that 
there are vague objects that are indeterminately identical. The question remains 
whether all vague objects can be indeterminately identical to something. If it is only 
some vague objects that can be indeterminately identical, then Evans's argument - 
even if it succeeds in proving the inconsistency of indeterminate identity statements -
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does not prove ihst vague objects In general cannot exist. There Is io common 
agreement between theorists dealing with oillc vagueness on this Issue. On 116 one 
side is Salisbury: his best 1iiempf st formulating s subs1snilvy thesis of milc 
vlguenyts is 116 clsim 1111 objects 116 vague If 116) 116 Il'eiy^allaie1y l'ynfipa1. 
Therefore, being ln'yiermlnliel) i'eiflcsl to something Is s sufflclenl condition for
being a vague object. On 116 other side Is Tye, who argues that Identity statements are 
never indefe1mlnale in irulh value. Hence, in particular 116 Identify ^116X611^ 
poncernlng vague objects are never lll'yiyrmlnsiy. Arguably, another slsidpoini Is 
also plausible: One might mslnt1ln that for 61^ vague objecl 11616 will be objecls io 
which Ii Is lndyiermlnsie1y idenllc1l. In gynyrll, In fhe prysynpy of s vague object one 
never knows the ('6161x11116) number of objecls that are present. On such a view,
vagueness Is a sufficient condition for lndeiyrmlnlcy in Identify. On 116 first and the 
third views Evais's argument Is an argument sboul vague objecls (provided fhaf it Is 
Interpreled as an argument about lldyiermlnliely ^6111^1 objecls - cf'. chspter I). For 
lcpoldlng to the first conception objects which 116 lndelyrminltyly l'ynilps.l sre 
vague, whereas spcordllg io 116 third - objects l1ai are vague are lndytyrmlnlfy1y
Idynttpl1.
Re (il) A separate problem Is 1111 Il seems that fhe names of indeie1mln1fely 
^6111^1 objects caiiol be precise in 116 slandsrd seise. And as we have smi the 
non-sian'1rd smse lcpnrdlng to which fhe designator "a" which '6161x111161) 
designates a and lndyielmllliely designates l?, is precise, is a somewhat bizarre 
account of what ii Is like io be a precise designator. If thal synsy Is rejected, then 116 
in'eiermlnliy|y Idenlicsl objects, a aid b, csinot be precisely '6^1116' and Evans's 
argument does not suppeyd In msklng st1iemenls that would be about 11^6 objects.
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Thus, to sum up the issue of the impact of Evans's argument on the second 
interpretation: Recall that according to this interpretation Evans's argument by 
proving that "V(c/ = /?)", where "a" and "/?" are precise, is incoherent, intends to prove
that vague objects cannot exist. 1 do agree with Evans that there can be no vague
identity statements whose vagueness is due solely to the existence of vague objects,
but not for the reasons he gave us. Moreover, I think that the fact that there cannot be
such statements does not show by itself that the world is not vague.
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Chapter III
PERSISTENCE AND VAGUENESS
1. INTRODUCTION
If may ssem somnfimes fhnf philosophers try to surpass encS ofher in inventing 
Sie most biznere puzzls hoccerning identity. Suci puzzles usually Save so do with 
identify over fimn acd a cinngs of some kind. Acd ths more puzzling nnd weird Shn 
example Shs befter. The examples can roughly be divided into two groups. Ths first
group consists of puzzles which involvs chnngs of She kind mnt in She sorites 
paradoxes. An object undergoes a ssriss of small ineignifihnnS chnnges which finally 
ndd up So a significant modificitioc. Wiils it sesms cleie thnf nn object which
undnegons a few minute chncgse is still the same object it was beforn the chncges, if is 
also obvious thnf nn object which ucdnrgoss many such hincges mny cot survive, in 
which cnse what nmneges nffer the changes will bs a diffnennf objncf. Moreovnr' how 
many hhnngne count ns many nnd how many count is fnw is left undnteeminnd. Whnt 
is puzzling ic these eximplss is tie fact thnf, wiils for any tiny icsignificncf cinnge, 
wn nee fempfsd to sny shnt an object that Sis undergone tins change is Shn same 
object ns She ebjshS before tint chnngs, if is cot so clear whether we wins So sny She 
same about the object that his undergone 1000 such chncges acd the object that has 
undergone none. Moreover, the question honcsrnlcg Shn objecf fhaf has ucdsegone co 
chnnges (or onn chnngn) nnd tin object Shnt his ucdergone 999 changes is exactly 
analogous. Similarly the question about Shs identity of ths object Shnt has undergone
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no changes and the object that has undergone 998 changes, and so on for the objects 
that have undergone 997, 996, ... changes. Again, how many numbers of changes are
represented by is not determined. Certainly the more changes the object has
undergone, the less inclined we are to say that it is the same object as the object we
have started with. As a result the transitivity of identity may be endangered; we seem
to be holding both that a] = a? & a2 = a3 & ... ^999 = a 1000 but we are undecided
about the claim "at (a2, a], etc.) = aiooo (&9^9, &>98, etc.)". Probably the most
famous example of this kind is the puzzle of Theseus's ship repaired plank by plank. 
T. Parsons's pile of trash which you swerved around yesterday and which since then 
has been constantly interfered with by the wind may be another example. '
The second type of case involves a serious disruption of an object, or even its 
fission (or else a fusion of two objects which results in coming into existence of a new 
single object). Here the most popular examples are personal identity cases involving 
more or less complicated brain surgeries and transplants. Another well-known 
example is Hobbes' developed Theseus's ship puzzle in which not only is the original 
ship repaired, but also another ship is reconstructed from the old planks, and the 
question might arise whether the original ship is identical to the reconstructed one. 
The puzzles in this group are so designed that there is no apparent answer to the 
question of whether the object before the disruption is the same object as the object 
after the disruption (or respectively; whether any of the objects created by a fission is 
numerically identical to the object that underwent that fission; or whether the object 
which is the result of a fusion is identical to any of the fused objects).
1 T. Parsons (1987), p. 5.
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The two groups of puzzles are nol essentially dilffei'^in./ Each of 116 above 
puzzles presents us with 11 apparently unanswerably ldynlily question: Is the original 
Theseus's ship identical lo fhe completely repaired ship? Is the pile of trash you 
swerved around yesterday Identical io fhe pile of frash thal is by the roadside foday?
Is Brown idynilCl1 io Smith who underwent a serious braiii nperaflnn which reflguryd 
half of his psychological chlraclyiisilps? Is the original ship ^6111^1 io the ship
leponsirupiyd from the old planks? Until recently 116 most common approach lo those 
puzzles was io consider each case syplrafyl) and try io find 1 solution peculiar io the
given case. So, for instance, Il has been argued ihst artefacts have two kinds of
pyrtisiynce conditions atsocll1yd with i1em. According io one set of conditions 
(namely fhe pnnilnulfy-undyr-a-sorisl cnn'lilont) the original ship is the same ship as 
fhe repaired ship, while according to the other sel (nsmely 116 Idenlliy-of-orlgmsl- 
parfs conditions) the original Is the ssme ship as 116 rycnnslruciy' one. The additional 
assumption is fhaf the former condition outweighs the latter where they conflict'" If is 
clear ihst this Is 1 partial solution. First of all Ii concerns oily artefacts. Moreover, it 
does not even solve all puzzles pnncyrnlng fhe Identify of ships, lei alone artefacts. As
we will see the puzzle can be so complicated as to make this solution useless.
However, anothyr approach lo t1e dllphlollp-ldentit) puzzles has rypynfl) 
become popular. This is 1 geiersl approach aid It applies to all the puzzles of this
There are some differences of course. In Ihc first group of cases the additional complication is the 
existence of borderline cases and higher-order vagueness, which arc not at issue in the fission/fusion 
cases. On the other hand, in most cases from the second group (he proper assessment of (he questions 
concerning identity are much more complicated: the number of objects that exist before fission/fusion 
seems to be different than the number of objects existing afterwards.
AT? It seems that all these puzzles could be so re-formulated as to become puzzles of trans-world 
identity instead of diachronic identity. As I have already mentioned. it appears to me that in general 
the questions surrounding temporal vagueness and the problems concerning modal vagueness are 
very similar. See chapter 11. fn. 20.
3 Compare e.g. Garrett (1998). p. 66.
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kind. If snys simply Shnt fhere is no defnrminnte answer to nny of She above identity 
questions. It is not thn case Shat oce of tis answers "Yss" or "No" is She right oce nnd
we inve So discover which one. On tis cocfrii'y, neither of ths polnr answers is
horrecS' for thnrn is no fact of tis matter ns to whether the objects hoccsrnsd nre
identical or cof. In oShne words it is indeterminate wisthee they nrs identical. If is
left undnfnrminnd whether hnrtain identify relations Sold or not.
At first glance Shis answer may ssem attractive because it 'solves' all the
puzzles nf once. And Sie solufion it offers is a 'mastsr-key' solution - it fits all Shn
riddles cencsrning dubious ldenSlfy-evsr-Sime casss. In Shis chnpfnr I will try to nssnss 
wins suci nc nnswnr renlly nmounfs So ncd whether it is indeed ns nttrncfivs ns if mny
senm nt Sie eufsnt'
It is worti nesihing thnf most of Sie nboes examples have Swo common 
prnsuppos^ifions. Namely, n tacif nssumption Shat Siere nee some chncges which n
given objecf is capable of surviving acd also some dinnges which fhaf object cannot 
survive. Whernas She latter claim sssms unhocfenSiouS' Sie former onn - although 
inSuitienly equally hompnlling - his been questioned. It has benn argued this objects 
cnnnot undergo nny intrinsic cinnge whntsoseer' hecnuss nvnn thn smallest cinnge 
must result in the loss of numerical identity of the object undergoing if. Ths chargr 
fhnf infricsic change is incomplSlhln with persistence has given rise So Swo - entirnly 
different - ncceucts of persistence', endurantism nnd pneduennfism.
Tin structure of this chnpfne is ns follows. FireS, we will examine briefly how 
nndurnnfism nnd pnrduractism can handle Sie charge fhnf intrinsic change is 
incohernnt. Of hourse, on ncy account Shnt is unable So make clangs ceierecf three 
can bn co identity over fimn puzzles, foe naci such puzzle essecfinlly involves
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changes. Next, we will consider the diachronic-identity puzzles, and see what the
claims about the lack of determinate answers to these puzzles boils down to. Finally,
we will see how endurantists and perdurantists can accommodate indeterminacy in
their responses to the puzzles of identity-over-time.
2. PERSISTENCE
2.1. Concrete particulars ami intrinsic change
Persistence is a matter of existing through time: an object persists iff it 
continues to exist for a certain period of time. FI ere we will be concerned only with
persisting concrete composite particulars; i.e. things like persons, cats, trees, 
mountains, statues and lumps of clay*
Roughly speaking, a concrete particular is a spatio-temporally extended object 
capable of entering into causal relations. It may have many attributes such as, for
instance, colour, shape, texture. At each time at which such a particular exists it has a 
location in space. If it is a composite object it has spatial parts, each of which also has 
its position in space. A particular has a temporally bounded career* It comes into
4 This is to say that in this chapter \\c will no! be concerned with the problems of the persistence of 
simples (e.g. classical and quantum particles). Chapter V will be devoted to the identity of quantum 
particles. Since in this chapter we are dealing with familiar objects only, we also ignore the issues 
concerning alleged *discrele-conlinuants*; i.e. objects that persist through some period of time, then 
go out of existence and come into existence again at some later time, as well as objects that move 
discontinuously.
!>13 It is usually assumed that abstract objects and properties do not persist, because they do not exist 
in time. Abstract objects are eternal, timeless and unchangeable. For an opposite view see e.g. B. 
Hale,/lAss'/rmc/ Objects. Basil Blackwell, Oxford 1987. According to Hale there are abstract objects 
which exist in time. What we say about properties depends on our metaphysical standpoint towards 
universals. Also events do not persist, because they do not continue to exist through time; they 
happen at a time.
5 Loux (1998). p. 93. This is not to say that its spatial or temporal boundaries are determinate.
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existence at a certain time and ceases lo exist st a certain (11161) time Exlstynpe
through 11x6 often involves chlngy, so persisting objects should be plplbly of 
surviving c1niges. Some of 11^6 changes are intrinsic changys; i.e. phalgys In some 
of the intrinsic attributes of fhe p1rticu1ass.6 Hence, Il may happen fhaf al dlferenl 
times at which a particular exists If has different and even llcompltlbly lltllbufys.
Were particulars nol capable of Intrinsic changes, 1scerfslnlig whyfhyr a 
^11111 particular sllll persists after a period of lime would be yssy. In order lo check 
whether the particular a al a time 1 | and 116 psrticulsr /? si some 11161 11x6 12 are In
fact one persisting particular, It would suffice to check whether 11616 Is a spatlo- 
tympoi'al coitinuily between a and h. TIii re-ldynllflcsllol of a particular a al a 11x6 
li with a particular b at a time 12 would require the spstlo-lemporal coitinulty of the
trajectory between fhe location of a at t| with that of b at 12 . However,
particulars are subject to c1aige, trsplng trajectories is nol enough. TIi cnlflnulty of 
spatio-temporal trajectory between a and b is s necessary bul nol 1 sufficient 
condlllon for a and b being 116 slmy pelsltllng particular. Assume that first a statue is 
made from clay, aid next, the sl1tue Is destroyed and a vase Is made Instesd. Clearly 
11616 is 1 spallo-tempor1l continuity between 116 statue and fhe vase, but we do not 
normally wail to ssy that the statue Is the saxe particular ss fhe vase. The 'lltultlvy' 
view Is that l1e statue does nol persist after Il was xs'e Info ihe visi. Similarly we 
can imagine certain person's psrls being gradually exchanged with synthetic parts.
6 There are notorious problems with defining what an intrinsic property is. Sec. e.g. Lewis and 
Langlon (1998). Roughly. they suggest that a properly is intrinsic iff it never can differ between 
duplicates. Duplicates in turn arc defined as objects that have exactly the same basic intrinsic 
properties. where basic intrinsic properties are such properties of an object that are independent of 
the accompaniment or loneliness of the object and are neither disjunctivc properties nor negations of 
disjunctive properties.
In what follows 1 assume that we have an intuitive understanding of this notion and that shape. 
mass. height all count as intrinsic.
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Eventually ws snd up wifi a new - bionic - nntity. Despite the conticuous spnfio-
fempornl trajectory between Sin person ncd Shs bionic entity we nre inclined so sny
Shnt they are diffsesnS particulars, Intuitivnly, sir psesoc did nof survivs through the
hnnngee. On ths osier hand, fires nrn changes which do not affecf ths psesistsccn of a 
pnrficulnr. A vise cnn confinun to sxisf despite being chipped, n person usually 
survives puffing on weighs, hiving his hair cut, breaking his leg, ntc. Mr Jones of 
today is She snmn particular as he wns I0 years ngo, nvnn though he was a skinny 
child fhen ncd is an ebess adult cow. Tie clams wiicS sny fiat a particular existing at 
one fimn is she same pnrficulnr is i particular existing at some osise time nrn called 
claims of diachronic sameness.7 Hence, a cnrSnin particular persists through period 
Si - t2 iff the relation of diachronic sameness holds between a it t] nnd h at S2- The
questions about persistence cnn be rephrased as questions about diachronic samnnnss. 
Whnf this relation consists in is precissly wSit is it issue Sere. Thnrn nee two
compnfing accounts of whit it is foe an objscf to persist' psrdurnncn and endurance. 
Each of them offers a diametrically different account of diachronic samnness.
As ias alenady been msctionnd' a persisting objecf is cnpnbln of having 
incompatible attributes at different fimns if whici it exists. How can if be Sinn fhnf
one nnd she snms object cnn iavn incompitibls aSSribufes? Ws reject such things ns 
squnrn hirhles from our ontology bncauss we rngnrd them as iccocsistncf. No gncuicn 
objncf cnn hnvs nny incompatible properties it tis snms Sims. We do allow icfo our 
ontology objects wiich hnve ichompatlbls properties at diffnennf times, however.
Lewis in his On the Plurality of Worlds famously asked: "How dons hnvicg firm af
' Loux (1998). p. 203. I use the term 'diachronic saniciiess' and not 'diachronic identity' or 'identity 
over time' in order not to prejudge the question of whether the relation denoted by that term is an 
identity relation or not.
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different times help?". This is the problem of intrinsic change.8 Perdurantists and
endurantists offer entirely different solutions to that problem.
2.2. Enduinntism, perdu mutism and the problem of intrinsic change
In Johnston's terminology "something perdures iff it persists by having 
different temporal parts, or stages, at different times, though no one part of it is 
wholly present at more than one time; whereas it endures iff it persists by being 
wholly present at more than one time".* Endurance is supposed to be our common, 
intuitive view. It tries to make sense of our everyday talk of persisting objects without
departing too far from pedestrian intuitions. It tries to describe and explain the world 
of objects as we see it. Thus, it assumes an ontology of familiar objects of everyday 
experience and does not postulate the existence of any unfamiliar entities. According 
to that view, objects of our everyday experience are three-dimensional objects lasting 
over time. They are wholly present at each time at which they persist. So, for 
instance, Mr Jones is a three-dimensional object which exists through time. He was 
wholly present 10 years ago when he was a skinny child, and he is wholly present now 
when he is a corpulent man. This whole talk about being "wholly present" can be
x This is Lewis's problem of temporary intrinsics. See Lew is (1986). p. 202. ll has been argued that 
two separate problems should be distinguished: the semantic problem and the metaphysical problem. 
The former is "the problem of specifying the logical form of sentences ascribing temporary intrinsic 
properties to persisting objects, in such a way that we do not run into contradiction |...|." (Lowe 
(1998), p. 130). In other words one has to explain how the temporal modifiers work (e.g. what do 
they modify: properties, objects, hav' ing properties?). The latter is the problem of how there can be 
objects for the description of which the semantic problem even arises I..." (Lowe (1998). p. 133). 
Although these two problems arc separate problems they arc not completely independent. One cannot 
answer one of them without thereby influencing the answer to the other. The answer to the semantic 
problem precludes some answers to the metaphysical problem. And the answer to the metaphysical 
problem dictates the answer to the semantic problem. Therefore I'll continue to refer to those 
problems as "the problem of intrinsic change".
9 Lewis (1986). p. 202.
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better understood if one compares Il with Its opposite: not being wholly present; I.e. 
being partially present. Perdursntlttt clslx thsf objects of our everyday experience are 
never wholly present. Al each tlxe at which 116) exist they are oily psrtlslly present; 
this is lo say that at each time al which 116) exist 11616 Is only 1 part of them present -
namely a temporal pari. Pe1'u11ntists iii revisionists ss regards standard ontology. 
According to them objects 116 not three-dlmynslonll things Issllng over fixe. On fhe
contrary, l1ey sre fnur-dlmenslonsl yn1itles; 116) Iiivi l1ree spatial dimensions and
one 1ddllioiisl - temporal - dimension. Ehyy are extended In time as they sre In space. 
Every met1p1yslcl1i, no matter whether perdur1ntlst or en'uranlisf, will agree fhaf 1
spatially extended object is not wholly 9168611 11 any spatial location. It has Ils parls 
and each of Ils parts has its lopstlol. Hence, oily a part of It Is present at each of 
11^6 1opslloits; It Is oily partially present at 61^ of this places, so to speak. 
Perduraillsis add to this ullcnntroversls1 claim a much more coll1rovyrs‘lll one. They 
claim that time should be regarded on 1 par with space. It Is just snot1er dimension 
analogous to fhe three spatls^l ones. And just as an object can be partially present at a 
^1X11 place li s seise of hsvlig one of Its spatial parls at this pIici, it can be 
partially present at s cerl1ii 11x6, in the sense of 1svlng oie of Ils temporal parts at
this time.
The endurantist view of perslttynpe has It lh1t 1 persisting particular at 1 lime 
before 1 change has occurred Is numerically the ssme objecl as the psrticulsr si some
11x6 after the change. On t1ls view 'Ilp1rnltip sameness consists In numerical 
identity. Endurntiists claim, for lnsllnpe, l1st sklniy Mr Jones Is numerically 
identical to fat Mr Jones. Thus, ihe) have to explain how fhe three 1pp1rent1y 
incompatible claims:
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(a) Mr Jonns is skinny at fp
(b) Me Jonss is fal t i.e. tim s kinncy a tt2-
(c) Mr Jonns nt tt is i demicd t o Mr J oncs at t2, 
can bn true fogefhsr.
The obvious strategy is So make much of Sis differencn between she time nf 
which Mr Jonns is skinny and Sie time at which Mr Jonns fat. But endurantists do nof 
wnnf So relasleisn Mr Jocss to fimn - it would nof help solvd tie problem. If would
merely force one to conclude - in ahhordancs with Leibniz's lnw - that Mr Jones-at-fj
is nof numerically idenficnl So Mr Joces-nf-S2, bncnuss Shny differ in fSsir properties.
And this is a resuk which ssi'c^ii^l^nSf^i^^^ir^^^ contradccts the main r^ncil^llcff^eists' 
assumption and lends directly to tins perdurantist vvew of peesisrencr . Tinrefoee, 
endurnnfi.sts usually idopf fir idverbinlisf view and claim fiaf fimn modifies She way 
in which nn object hns n property.10 11Me Jones is not skinny simpliciter and fnt 
simpiiciter, but hn is skinny in She Si way (or is Si^ly skinny11) and fnt ic the S2 way. 
AlSernlSieelc (ncd equivalently) ocs can add sime-indexes So tie ascripfioc of n 
property. Then, "Mr Jones is skinny" should read "Me Jonns is-at-t| skinny". Being
skinny remains, on tiis accoucs, n genuics intrinsic peoperfy, buf tie hiving of tiis 
propnety is relntivissd to (or modified by) time. Hiving n property is hnving-nf-n-fime 
fhaf property,12 or having if ic i Sime-indexsd way. Tius, she predicates are regarded 
ns irrnduhiblc Sensed.
11 See e.g. Hashinger (1989): Johnston (1987): Merricks (I994). The other popular cnduranlisl 
theory takes properties to be relations to times. See e.g. van Inwagcn, (1990). pp. 249-50. Sec also 
Merricks (1994). For a criticism of this view • see Haw- ley (1998b).
11 "a is t-ly such that it As" is tnie-in-L Just in case a satiskcsL-at-t the predicate "such that it As", 
Jolinslon (I987). p. I28.
Lewis ((1988). p. 66) claims that the adverbial theorists are committed lo a three-place 
instantiation relation. Lowe (1998). pp. 131-132) and Haslanger (1989). pp. 120-122) argue against 
this claim. Lowe maintains that Lewis's mistake consists in that he takes the two-place relation of 
having a property to be a disguised thrcc-place relation: between an object, a property and a time. In
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The proposal has its drawbacks, however. "Skinny in the 11 way" and "fat in
the t2 way" are compatible only as long as the time-modifiers are in place. Hence, it
seems that they cannot be analysed in terms of simpler properties of being skinny and 
fat, respectively. For if we could analyse "being skinny in a / way" in terms of "being 
skinny simpliciter" and a time /, then it would follow that Mr Jones can be skinny
simpliciter at one time and fat simpliciter at another time, and Lewis's question of 
how having the incompatible properties at different times helps, would still require an
answer. Furthermore, it is a consequence of this proposal that no genuine change ever 
occurs.1* If Mr Jones is fat in the 11 way, then he will be fat in this way till his last 
days. Moreover, he was fat in this way since birth.14
These consequences can be avoided by adopting a view which ascribes a 
special status to the present time** Preseiitism assumes that only one time is real; 
only one time 'counts' - namely, the present time.*6 The assumption that there is a real 
ontological difference between the present and both the past and the future allows us 
to analyse, e.g., being-at-t skinny in terms of being skinny simpliciter and yet avoid a
fact Ihe holding of a Iwo-place rclalion is related to a time: the two-place relation holds between a 
lime and a two-place relation between an object and its property. Haslanger lakes a different view. 
She sees the danger of the threc-place relation proposed by Lewis in that it suggests that the relation 
between an object and its properties is just another relation on a par with relations in which objects 
stand to each other. And this is precisely what Haslanger opposes: she does not want to treat the 
instantiation of a property A by an object a as a relation.
13 Merricks (1994). p. 169.
14 The analogous objections apply to the "time-indexcd" version.
'* Cf. Loux (1998). p. 206. It is often claimed that relatively theory is at odds with endurantism. The 
physics of relativity theory treats time as another dimension on a par with spatial ones. Hence, 
"present" has no special ontological significance. Here are two responses to this objection:
1. If the interpretation of the Lorentz transformation that generates the block universe argument 
fails, this objection fails as well. If the block universe argument succeeds, endurance is ruled out. 
Merricks (1994). fn. 22. p. 180.
2. It is difficult to extract an ontological theory out of mathematical formalisms of phvsics. Loux 
(1998). p. 217.
16 Merricks argues that there is a parallel between "existing at a time" and a time's being present and 
"existing in a world" and a world's being actual, where possible worlds are understood as maximal 
possible states of affairs. Merricks (1994). p. 177. fn. 15.
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contrl'lptlol. Recall that Mr Jones existing st t) Is numerically the same object as Mr
Jones existing st tg. Moreover, Mr Joies st t| is skinny, while Mr Jones at 12 Is fat. If
1] and 12 counted as equally real - equally present - Mr Jones would be bot1 fat and
skinny. Il Is only because il Is some lime in 116 psst which Is not real any more, fhaf
no contradiction arises.
It has been argued that these two claims, fhe claim thal only 116 present Is real 
and the claim fhaf tense should be 116116' seriously (I.e. that the plydipstes should be 
regarded as irreducibly tensyd) iii still llsufflclynt to solve 116 problem of intrinsic 
change. The problem Is solved - or r1lher il sixply disappears - If we take tense 
seriously, but, as Merrlcks argues, "11st faking tnise seriously can adequately hurdle 
the problem oily when coupled with a syxlltlcs for expressions like 'O al t'"17. 
Understanding such expressions Is crucial for fhe understanding of the statemyntt of 
'iachronlp sameness. Without fhe endur1ntist semntfics of fhe expressions like "O at 
t" one is unable lo explain (aid In this way answer Lewis's provocative question 
quoted above) how having llpomplllble plopyrtles at 'iff'emit fixes helps.
Recall thsf we dismissed 116 relallvisstioi of Mr Jones to a time as a non­
starter for yndulantlsts, because il seemed lo lead straightaway lo 116 pyrdurlnfist 
view of pyrtlstynpy. Il is hard to resist the Impression fhaf "Mr Joies-al-l | " Is s 11x6
of a temporal psrl of Mr Jones, for 11616 seems to be nothing else which Il could 
name. However, It 1as been suggested thsf endur1nllsls are able to provide a 
semantics for the expressions like "Mr Jones si tj ", s texaltips which does not resort
to temporal parts. The solution Is lo regard such expressions as definite descriptions, 
and not as proper names. "Mr Jones at t|" Is 1 definite despliptinn which refers lo 116
' ' Merricks ( 1994). p. 171.
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object such that it is Mr Jones and exists at 1|. "Mr Jones at t] " means something like
"Existing-at-t 1 Mr Jones". So, in fact it is not Mr Jones himself but rather his
existence which is relativised to time. The statement "Mr Jones at tj is identical with
Mr Jones at t2" should be read as "There is one object, Mr Jones, which exists at both
ti and t2". Thus, the claims of diachronic sameness express numerical identity.
Therefore the three claims (a) - (c) are not inconsistent after all. As we have
just seen that statement "Mr Jones at ti is identical to Mr Jones at t2" should be read
as "There is one object such that it is Mr Jones and it exists at ti and it exists at t2".
What the sentence "M.r Jones was skinny at 11" says is that Mr Jones is skinny when
the time t; is present. It does not say that Mr Jones is skinny when t2 is present.
Analogously the sentence "Mr Jones is not skinny at t2" says that Mr Jones is not
skinny when the time t2 is present. Since at any given time only one time is present -
i.e. only one time is real - Mr Jones's being skinny when 11 is present is consistent
with his not being skinny when t2 is present. Thus, no contradiction is involved.
The treatment of the problem of intrinsic change given by perdurantists is 
entirely different. Recall that according to perdurantists a concrete particular persists 
by having different temporal parts (i.e. different stages1** at different times. Our 
everyday objects are in fact "four-dimensional worms" extended in time as well as in 
space. A particular is actually an aggregate of temporal parts. Those parts are not 
abstract, set-theoretic constructions. On the contrary, they are as concrete as we take 
particulars to be. Take Mr Jones. At each time at which he exists there is a temporal 
part of him present . There are lots of parts of his, some of which overlap. A temporal *
18 Following Lewis. I take "temporal parts" and "stages" to be synonyms. See Lewis (1988). p. 66.
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part "Me Jones it noon yesterday" is a part of anofhsr temporal part "Me Jones of 
ceefnrdnc" acd of many ofinr parts as well (e.g. Mr Jocss of tiis week, e/c.). Sincs n 
particular is spread out ic time, it is cof wiolly present at any fimn. At rich fimn there
nre only some temporal parts of if prsssnf. Acd if is fisss parts fiaf really have
properties; particulars have Semporiry propertise only dnrivat-vdy.l9 * 21 *Mr Jonns is fnt if
certain fimss only because at lsnst some of his temporal parts are fas.
A temporal part is a miferial object which can be defined as Shs hontnnS of n 
spnfio-fnmporil region filled with mattei'.)* For any spatio-tempornl region which is 
filled with miStne, sheen is i material object honeieting of fiat master. Mafnrinl pnrfs 
fhnf wn fnkn So censSiSute the objects of our hummen experience nrs not spscinl in any 
sense. Whnf is spncial about our familine objecSs is tie editions tint Sold heSwnec the 
material objects that constitufn fisir stages. Our claims nbouf identity hnfwnnn 
confinunnfs existing at diffnennf fimss should bs translafed into stafements honhernlng 
She eelafion betwssn several singes of i single confinunnf. Lef us call this enlafion She 
I-relnfion. So, questions nbouf identity bnfwnec particulars existing af diffnennf fimns 
nee questions nbouf I-relatedness among temporal parts of those particulars.2' 
Dinhhronih sameness is in fact Shs l-rslation on Shis account. It is idnctify over fimn 
between particulnrs of n certain kind that induces ths I-rnlation22 nnd therefore shn I- 
enlation is rslativised to Sis kind of thn particular ic question. This is to sny Shit what 
this rnlnfiun nmounfs to depends on ths kind of Shs particular it is Sie relntion of. Thn 
I-rnlntion for pnrsons will be She relltien which holds befwnen Shn sfiges of onn
19 On the other hand, there are properties which can be possessed only by sufficiently big aggregates 
of temporal parts. Lewis notices that certain activities take too much time to be performed by stages 
(sec below). Many of our predicates make sense only when applied to continuants: to objects that last 
for some time and have histories (cf Lowe (1995). p. 181). For inslance. Mr Jones could not be a 
person if he were an instantaneous time-slicc. It is a consequence of perdurantism that being a 
person becomes an extrinsic feature of an object, because it depends on the relations in which that 
object stands lo other objects. Moreover it seems that also being a pcrson-stagc is an extrinsic feature 
of a temporal stage. Whether the given temporal stage is a pcrson-stagc. depends on other temporal 
stages that surround it (in space and time). Only if the surrounding temporal parts are of the 
appropriate kind and moreover are appropriately interrelated, is the temporal part in question a part 
of a person.
Loux (1998). p. 213.
21 Lewis (1976). p. 59.
“ ibid.
person. A person is a maximal aggregate of person-stages, each one 1-related to all 
the rest.2" But saying that a continuant object is an l-interrelated aggregate of stages 
is uninformative, and in fact circular. It boils down to the claim that, for instance, a 
person is an aggregate of stages related by the relation induced by identity between 
persons. However, the I-relation can be characterised differently. According to Lewis 
this relation is necessarily coextensive with the so called R-relation, which comprises 
relations of spatio-temporal continuity, similarity and causation. Perdurantists tell us 
that
"the temporal parts of objects we priephiiosophicallv recognise enter into distinctive 
spatio-temporal relations, distinctive relations of similarity.. and distinctive causal relations".23 4 * 26
Familiar concrete particulars are in fact aggregates of temporal parts which are 
interrelated by appropriate relations of continuity, similarity and causation. We say 
that a concrete particular persists as long as it has temporal parts; i.e. as long as it is 
an aggregate of temporal parts related in these ways**
Since the 1-relation is necessarily coextensive with the R-relation and every 
stage is I-related to all and only those stages to which it is R-related, the I-relation is 
in fact the R-relatton.2. Hence, the R-relation as well as the l-relation is relativised to 
the kind of the relevant particular. If we are talking about persons, the relevant 
component relations of the R-relation will be mental continuity, similarity between the 
adjacent mental states, and the relevant causal relations. So, a person can be defined 
as a maximal R-interrelated aggregate of person-stages.27As we have seen, the R- 
relation is defined without direct reference to either the I-relation or continuant
objects, hence a definition in terms of the R-relation is an informative definition. Thus,
23 Lewis (1976). p. 59.
24 Loux (1998). p. 215.
ibid.
26 Lewis (1976). p. 58.
2' Lewis (1976). p. 60.
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fhe claim Is that in general fhe dlsc1lollp sameness relation car be defined In terms of 
116 1el1liois of spslln-tempoi•s1 porlirulty, similarity and csussllon.
According lo fhe present proposal, the claim "Mr Jones-at-ti is Idenllc1l with
Mr Jones 11-12" taken at fapy value Is simply false, for Il ssys fhaf two different
temporal parts - i1mely Mr Jonys-l1-t | 11' Mr Jonys-lt-t2 - are identlcsl. According
to pyr'urlntltm such claims should not be rend 11161111), however. Whal 116) really 
say is that Mr Jones has two temporal parts - Mr Jnnrs-al-1 j and Mr Jonys-lt-t2 - and
11686 parls are 161116' by the relevant R-relstlon. Thus, 'isc1rnnlc sameness Is not
the numerical identity relation, In facl Il is nol sn Identity rylatlnn 11 all. The 
temporal parts are nuxerically different sid have dlfferm properties. Or the other 
111', 116 identity can hold between aggregates of temporal parts iff' t1ey have fhe 
same temporal parls. Of course, this is not 'iaphlnnip ldyntlty: on this view objecls 
wholly existing at diff'erent limes are never identical.
The question arises how long temporal parts 1.16. Lewis claims that he does
not need Ilt1artaneous lexporsl partf.28 For him,
"a person-stagc is a physical object. just as a person is. f .l It docs many of the things 
that a person does: it talks and walks and thinks. it has beliefs and desires. it has a size and 
shape and location. It even has a temporal duration. But only a brief one l ...|. Hence a stage 
cannot do everything that a person can do. for it cannot do those things that a person does 
over a longish interval."29
Il is clear however thal such a notion of temporal psrl will rot solve 116 
problem of Iiitrinsic change. If 1 pyrson-slagy walks, il must chaige its shape and 
lnpltlnn. So, for ilstlnpy, at ore lime of its temporal duration Its leg is straight while 
at 1noi1er it Is bent. Hence, the argument against enduring things can be run against
28 Lewis (1976). p. 76.
29 Lewis (1976). p. 76.
1 15
such temporal pnrfs ns well. A short-livsd tsmporil part is cot good enough A pnef
can last nt most as long ns no ciangss occur. And since fires seems to be no finitn
lowne limit so the period of time esquired for a chncge to occur, Shn possibility of She
existence of instantnneous pnrfs hns to bs acknowledged.
So, if snems shnt if temporal pirts nes to be a solution to Sin problem of 
inSrinsih chnngn, Shs 'proper' or 'bisic' fempornl parts have to be moi-neMany/0 Longer 
Semporal parfs inve to be coneteuttnd out of fiem and regarded is highnr-ordnr 
nnSisine on a par renlly with our everyday objects. 'Mr Jones-yesSnrdnc' - is well ns Mr 
Jones - is in aggregate of momsctary tempornl pirts enlafed by the approprinte
enlafions.
Pneduranfism clearly runs countse to common intuitions regarding tie notion 
of changing obiehfs. Actually, pnedurnnfists do iway with fiat nofioc nlfogetinr. On 
fhnir view, siere is notiing tint is Sie subject of change; nothing that changes. The 
fempornl singes themselvss do nof change (Shis is Sheir raison d'eire, so to speak), 
nnd nnifier do She aggesgitss of stages. Tis aggeegatss do nof persist through 
hnange' fhsy Save instead differect fempornl parfs nt diffnennf times. Tie 'change' 
consist in tin fnct that some of She peopsrfies of tis adjacent fempornl stages are 
diffnennf propsi'tirs.
Perdurantists nrn elernalists; tisy accept ths tsnsslsss ciaeacteeisafion of 
limn." According to them fhere is noshing special about tin presdnS. Tie prnsnnt time
3" Al least for some kinds of objects. If the duration of a temporal part is to be determined b> • the rate 
with which the intrinsic changes occur, then it is bound to be different for different kinds of objects.
“'l For a criticism of perdurantism see e.g.: Howard-Snyder (1997). pp. 291-2: M. C. Rea (1997). p. 
xx.x; J. J. Thomson (198.3). p. 210.
32 Lowe (1998) argues that the tenseless theory of time is committed to a temporal-part ontology.
On the other hand, in his characterisation of endurance. Lewis simply assumes that "le|ndurance 
involves overlap: the content of two different times has the enduring thing as a common part" (Lewis 
(1986), p. 202). This claim presupposes already that time is the mereological sum of temporal 
individuals that exist at it. and hence that each time is equally real as all the others (hence there is
1 16
has no privileged ontological status. All times and all objects existing at those times 
are equally real. Mr Jones-at-t i, Mr Jones-at-t? and Mr Jones-now are three different
objects, each of which is just as real as the others. The ordinary verbs are in fact
tenseless expressions. We say that Mr Jones-at-ti was skinny and Mr Jones-at-tg will
be fat, but there is nothing significant in the fact that we use the past tense in one case
and the future tense in the other. Equally well we could use the tenseless "is".
Eternalism is a natural choice for perdurantists. If perdurantists accepted
presentism - as endurantists do - they would be forced to say that only one part of an 
object is real; that an object consists of one real part, parts which were real in the past
and parts which will come into existence in the future. It would amount to the claim 
that an object can have parts which do not exist.*' Moreover, perdurantists stress the 
analogy between time and space. The claim that there is no ontological distinction 
between different times and objects that exist at those times is prompted by a similar 
spatial claim; namely the uncnntxntinus claim that there is no ontological difference
between "here" and "there"/*
So, to sum up the issue of diachronic sameness and intrinsic change; it seems 
that there is a stalemate between the endurantist and perdurantist views of
nothing spcclnl in the incrcological sum of temporal individuals that cxist a l present). So. it begs the 
question against endurantism assuming that it is committed to eternalism. See Forbes (1987). p. 140. 
33See Loux (1998), p. 209.
31 It is worth noticing that notwithstanding the claim that temporal parts are to be analogous to 
spatial parts, they arc not analogous to spatial parts as we usually conceive of them. When we talk 
about spatial parts of a familiar object what we usualh • have in mind is not any spatial region within 
the spatial boundaries of that object filled with matter. It is rather a component of that object, i.e. a 
chunk such that it is easily detachable and performs some function (Butterfield (1985). p. 35). Each 
spatial part in this sense constitutes an articulated whole, so to speak. If one were to construct 
temporal parts analogous to spatial parts in this sense, then the only temporal parts one would get 
would be such parts as "Mr Jones as a child". "Mr Jones as a student". "Mr Jones as an adult" and so 
on. As I have already argued, postulating the existence of such parts is not going to solve the 
problem of intrinsic change. One needs momentary parts if one is to solve that problem. So, the 
notion of a temporal part of an object has to be constructed as a theoretical entity analogous to the 
theoretical notion of spatial part (and not to the common one).
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persistence. Pyl'urantitts did rot manage to prove ihst the endui'antlst ponpyptlon Is
inconsistent, but fhey will no doubt contliuh to clslx that their account Is better,
more sophisticated aid not so Implausible as Il may seem. Endurniilsls or the other 
hand, will argue that since their account does not depart far from common Iilultlois, 
is consistent and provides answers to some troublesome questions, fhyre is no need 
for ary more foreign accounts.
En'ui1nllsts 116 able to provide a co1yrert lcpoun1 of phlngy provided the
tensed view of 11x6 Is presupposed. And fhe lensed view has not bhhii proved wrong
yet. ‘"7 The temporal-parts view Is committed lo hterislism - thy tylseless view of time.
This may be si a'vlntlgy, nycausy It seems to be s view supported by thy theory of
relativity, but on fhe other hand drawing onto1oglpll consequences from sclyntiflp
theory nerd not always be fhe best thing to do.'"’ The main problem for peidur1ntlsts,
is to justify fhelr far-from-commoi ontology; to show 1111 11611 account squares with
our common, presclenllfip beliefs about 116 world'7 It Is true ihst given this -
admittedly elegant - ontology, wr are able lo solve thy problems concerning
persistence and Identify, but one may ask whether 116 price is worth paying. After all,
yndui1nce is a much less ryvislonsry view operating with objects familiar from our
everyday experience, which also gives answers to 116 puzzles. As Johnston puts it;
"Russell said thal wr csr propcry do without 116 inrtsphysics of fhe story sgr. Just 
so, bul we car also properly do without the tplrrllslip mrt1p1v • sics of our own age. The 
nntolney of 116 ttnrr age Is however 1rot1hi 1X11111-. Il. fnlturl1r^'. Is still with us and well 
drsrivrs Its place.'*
35
36
37
3S
See footnote 15.
Compare Johnston's remarks on scientism. Johnston (1992). p. 104.
Loux (1998). p. 217.
ibid.
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2.3. Persistence and puzzles of i denttiy over tune
As ias been argued, wSstier ws nrs scdurnntisfs or pnrdurnntisfe, we nes able
So provide an account of intrinsic change. Now ws facs anofhnr problm!, iowsvnr.
We inve to decide which changes nre permissihls; tilt is which changes a particulne
object is abln to survive. Wins makes it tis <^1, foe instance' that she lump of clny
buf not the status is able to survive bring made icfo a ball? We want to say nlso fhnf 
the lump of clay survived despise bring mnds icfo the status first, and icfo tie vase 
next. We do nof want So sny this ths sfitue survived being mnds info fin visd, 
Sheught We take it tint Mr Joces has survived putting on weight, but he did cof
survivi hiving ill his parts exchanged with bionic slemecfs. Whit rnnson do we hnvn
for such claims? Tie question Sinn is: Wilt is it fiat decides which changes nrn 
enlnvnnt for a given pirticulir's persistence acd wiici nes no)
A more or less standard answer to this question is tint fieri nre co "birr" 
pnrficulnrs.3* Pnrfihulnre ars of i kind; fhsy nrs only rncognieahle is individuals of a 
kind. For ncy given kind of pnrficulnrs fhere is a criterion of identify for pnrficulnrs of 
fhnf kind. A criterion of identify for a kind /''fills us wSit cenditiecs a- ins to safisfy in 
ordse So be an // Different kinds often hive differnnt criteria of identify. A criterion of 
iddnlify coceecs semantic information wiici cocstitutne part of thn meaning of she 
relnennS sortal seem; widen sortnl Seem is a firm whici nimes n kind of particulass.)" Is 
dons nof specify Shs whole meaning of i given sortal' thougi. This is why diffnennf 
sortnis cnn have She snms criSsrien of identify lssohiafed with finm. Criferii of 
identify determine persistence conditions. Roughly speaking, persietenhe conditions
39 Cf. Lowe (1989) and (1997).
‘1t) Lowe (1989). chapter 1.
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tell us what it takes for a particular to continue to exist; in other words, what it takes
for a particular to 1x131. its sort.
The answer to the question whether a given particular still persists can be
quite tricky and often leads to paradox. The paradoxes arise because the identity
criteria that we intuitively associate with various kinds of particulars permit those 
particulars to change in certain respects while remaining numerically the same objects. 
However, foe instance, a series of small and acceptable changes can add up to a large 
change which is intuitively incompatible with the retention of numerical idenlhy.*' A 
gotorious example of this problem is the riddle of Theseus's ship. Assume one plank in 
Theseus's ship is exchanged every minute. Then, it seems that the original Theseus's 
ship at to is the same ship as Theseus's ship at 11, Theseus's ship at ti is the same ship
as Theseus's ship at t2, and so on. Of every two adjacent ships we would be inclined
to say that they are the same ship. However, Theseus's ship at to and the ship at 11000
(i.e. the completely repaired ship) do not strike us as the same ship . We would rather 
say that they are two different ships. However, the claims "a| = t2 & = 33 & ...
3999 = a 1000" and "aj # ai000" taken together amount to the denial of the
transitivity of identity.
For those who are not convinced that there is a problem conceening the 
identity of Theseus's ship and who wanted to treat the completely repaired ship as 
identical with the original ship, the puzzle has been developed. Let us assume that the 
exchange of planks goes on as above, but now the replaced planks are put together so 
that they compose another ship. So, now we have the original ship, the repaired ship 
and the ship reconstructed from the old planks.
11 Lowe (1997). p. 629.
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ihr rypaired ship *■ 116 recoisfrucfyd ship 
thy original ship ihr rhconttructhd ship
the original ship =? thy rypaired ship
It is clear fhaf 116 repaired and the rycolsfrupted ships 116 different ships (116) 
have different spatln-tymporal location), but what aboul the original aid fhe repaired
ones? And whal about 116 original and fhe reconstructed ones? Are fhey idyntlpal or
not? Nothing has bent chlngy' as regards the repaired ship, so i1osy who have been
11^116' to say lhat It Is idyntical with thy original, have no reasons lo change 11611
view. Il seems thsf fhe fact ihsl 116 rypnnslructyd ship has byyn ^6116' has nothing to 
do with - and In particular should not influency - fhe irulh value of the identify 
slatemynt "the original ship = fhe rypaired ship". However, whsl ryasor do wy Iivi 
to favour the repaired ship over the recnrstrupted one? How 116 t1osy people to 
justify their clslx against someone who holds that il Is the recolstrupted ship which is 
identical with 116 original one?
On the other hand, someone who decides to change his mind and clslx lhat 
whereas in the old puzzle the original was identical lo the repsiry' ship, In the new 
puzzle it is the reponstruptyd ship whlp1 Is Iderllc1l to the orlglnsl, freads on 
dangerous ground. On his view, the repaired ship Is just as it is In the previous 
example, aid yet In this ^6 Il Is not idyilical lo thy original ship. In fact what such a 
person argues can be pul as follows. Had 116 reconstructy' ship rot existed, thy 
original ship would have still been ldhllicll to 116 repaired olty. Since It does exist, the 
original is identlcsl with It, nol with thy repaired ship. This implies thal fhe identity of 
a ship cai be '1161x116' by extrinsic factors - It csi depend on t1e existence of 
anolher pln'i'afe for Idyntity with thy original ship.^ Weyt1yr ihr original ship and
42 Garretl (1998). p. 64.
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She repaired ship ire idscticil depends cot only on intrinsic fsiturns of ths original 
ship and fie espnired ship bus nlso on cnrfnin extrinsic ficls. Therefore, on fiat view
one is commiftsd to tie nxfrinsihnnss of identify' wiich is hard So achnpS■. Worse sfill,
such nxfrinsic fncfers are undnciably honfingenft Thsesfore identify would nof only be
exfrinsiclllc dntsrmined' but coctingenf ns well.
Anofhnr problem concerning diachronic cumerical identity is caused by big
cinngns' suci as disruptions of some kind, fissions ncd fusions. Ac example of this 
kind cnn be another vnesioc of tie Thsssus's ship riddls in which we only pocdnr Shn 
identity of shn original ship nnd Sie ship reconsSruhSed from She old planks 10 years 
nflnr Shn originnl cnnsed So exist' say. Tis puzzls is nlwnys She same: Is an objncs 
which his undergone certain clangs (or svec csised to exist for a certiin lime) Shs 
snmn ns ths objecf bnforn fSif chnngs? Tie examples ars so designed is So make each 
dnfinifivn answer - no miller wSefhsr positive or nsgativs - look implausible. Here Sie 
most popular examples nrn the onss wiich involve personal identity'*3 Compare Shn 
following puzzle:
An alteration machine chinges Brown physically icd psychologically. His 
benin is refigurnd so lint roughly half of his memories, beliefs, desires, icd ^111^11 
11*1^ ire replaced wish new nnd very diffsesnS onss. Call Shs ensulling person Smith. 
Appirnnlly Sheer is co unique decisivs answer to fin question whnther Brown nnd 
Smith nre identical (i.e. in this cisd: wielhsr tSey are psychologically hunf1noous) 4*
Anotinr well-known example lceolees fission. Here is Gaerell'e version:
'13 For a collection of some weird thouglu-experiments performed on persons see Garrett (1998). pp. 
16-17.
"* Garrett (1998), p. 17. The example is due to S. Shoemaker (Self-knowledge and self-identity). A 
more general example has it simply that the machine mixes up precisely those conditions that are 
relevant for personal identity so that determining decisively the occurrence of identity or the lack of 
it becomes impossible.
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"My body is riddled with cancer. The surgeons want to try out a new technique: 
hemisphere transplant. They have two brainless donor bodies available, cloned years ago from 
my body. Each of my two brain hemispheres is removed and placed in its own body. Two 
persons result. Since 1 am one of the few people whose brain hemispheres are functional 1• 
equivalent (...). both resulting persons will think that 111X4 are me. and they will both have my 
character, apparent memories, and all m\• other psychological features."
2.4. Stdlutinns to the puzzles
Notice that the puzzles as presented above are puzzles merely for endurantists.
Pxedueantls1s argue that there is no identity over time at all. Objects existing at 
different times are never identical. The original ship at tj is not identical with the
repaired ship at tioOO, nor is it identical with the reconstructed ship. All three are not
ships at all; they are mere temporal parts of a ship. And all three are different temporal 
parts - hence, different objects. They may be related by various relations, but certainly 
got by identity. The person before the alteration is a different temporal part than the 
person after the alteration - therefore they cannot be identical. Hence, all the puzzling 
identity over time questions should be answered in the negative. In fact all statements
stating occurrence of identity over time are false.
However, the puzzles can be so reformulated as to present difficulty for 
exrdurantlsts as well. Instead of asking about the identity of objects existing at 
different times, one should ask about the identity of aggregates of temporal parts.
" Garretl (1998). p. 17. Another well-known example is J. Broome's story concerning the club 
(which is not a material object, however). ISec Broome (1984). pp. 6-7. Broome attributes this 
example to D. Parfit. | A club is constituted by its rules and society conventions, and these may not 
decide every question concerning the club. Imagine that the club has no meetings for lwcnty years 
and then some of the original members and a few new people start to meet under the same name. If 
the rules and conventions are silent on that matter, it will be unclear whether the reconstituted club 
is the same club as the original. One may know all the relevant facts and still not know whether the 
club existing later is the same as the club that existed twenty years ago.
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Eeely will be very many aggregates coitalning fhe temporal parts of fhe repaired ship, 
very many aggregates pnntllllng thy temporal parts of the original ship, and very 
many aggregates contalilrg both kinds of parts. So, thy question arises which of all
thy very many aggregates should count as 1 ship. For Iistsice the main question of 
fhe simple Theseus's ship puzzle can be reformulated ss follows; Is 116 aggregate
ponflllllg the temporal parls of both 116 rypaired ship and the origirsl ship a ship? To 
put it differently, the question 1ere becomes whythyr the temporal parls of 116 
repalry' ship sre appropriately related lo the original ship's temporal parts, or not. 
And thy answer to such 1 question Is by io means obvious. In fact, il Is just as 
troublesome as fhe answer lo the original question is for yndursntlsts. Just as 
yn'ui1ilists have trouble deciding whether fhe orlglial and 116 repaired ship are one 
and thy same ship or two dlffyiyit ones, perdurarllsts will have problems in deciding 
whether 11616 Is an aggregate of shlp-rhllted psils such that It contslns both fhy 
temporal parts of the original ship sid the lempoial psrls of the repaired ship. So, 
although according lo perduraillsis slrlctly speaking 11616 Is ro Identify over time at 
all, fhe idyntliy over limy questions can be so rephrased as lo constitute puzzles for 
peidui1ntlsts as well.
As I have already mentioned, until recyitly the xosl common strategy for 
solving the 'ilc1lnnic-i'entlty puzzles has Involved ponpyltrlfing on 61^ puzzle 
separately and investigating 116 pylslstelch conditions for the kind of the particular 
involved. Probably fhe Theseus's ship puzzle Is thy ore which has acquired thy 
giyatest number of solutions. So, for instance - as I have alryady meitloned in the 
introduction - It has beei arguyd ihst the Theseus's ship puzzle can be solve' by 
distinguishing two criteria of identily; thy coillnully-under-a-soit1l plithlinn and the
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idenfily-of-originil-pirls crilsrion. According lo tis former ceitsrioc a at ti is She
same ship as b at 12 iff we cnn trace a coclinuous spalio-fempoiatl pill from a lo /?, 
under the sorlal "slip".46 According to lie liffer ceilnrion nilt) is Sin simn slip ns b 
if 12 iff Shsy nrn made of Shs very snms placks. Moesever, ths issumpfioc is this the
formee criterion oufwsighs the liffer; Li. ic tie cnss in which bosh critnrin nes
applicable, the conficuify-ucdsr-i-soi'ta^l ceifsrion is domicict with eespect to the
idnntify-of-origicil-parts crlSeriec. Thus, ic tie Tieseus's slip puzzle tie rnpairnd ship 
hns the better claim to be tie slip of Thsssus Shin the eeconetruhSed slip. 4*
Another trentmsnt of tins puzzls ins bsec offnred (acd striightiway 
dismissed) by C. Hughes. He ins suggested tins H. Field's account of sciectific fnrms 
cnc bn applied So general terms such ns "ship". Tis idea is to Serif such Snems is 
expressions living indnineminile rnferncce. Field ins negued flit before rellSielSy 
fheory wns discovered' She word "miss" wns rnf1rectially indntnrminitn. He did nof 
mnnn by this this it did not livs acy reference. Oc the torsrlrc, there are fwo 
physical quantities (namely rellfivisSlh miss nnd proper mass), nnci of which satisfies 
fie criferii for being she denoSifion of fir Ssem "mass" nnd Siere is co fact of fhn 
matter as to whici of Siess qunnfifins tins term denoSed.*) Field claims further that
neither She claim
(ITP) NewSon's word "miss" decolnd proper miss;
Garrett (1998). p. 66. Garretl writes that we should require that "any exchange of planks (...) occur 
in the normal working life of the ship. (...) the new planks are of roughly the same si/.c and material 
type as the originals." 1 find the expression '"he continuity-undcr-a-sortal criterion" rather 
uiuiluminating. It does not say much, unless we know already what "undcr-a-sortal" means. It seems 
to me however that what Garrett had in mind was the preservation of the form of the ship. So. the 
identity-of-original-parts criterion gives us a "matter-constant ship" whereas the eontinuity-under-a- 
sortal criterion gives a "form-constant ship)". The terminology "matter-constant ship" and "form­
constant ship)" is Hughes's (sec (1997b). p. 56).
' ibid.
•’* Field (1973). pp. 466-467.
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nor the claim
(HR) Newton's word "mass" denoted relativistic mass;
is correct. He introduces the notion of partial reference or partial denotation 
and claims that Newton's word "mass" partially denoted proper mass and partially
denoted relativistic mass; it did not determinately denote any of them.
Hughes suggests that it is possible to apply the same interpretation to terms 
such as "ship". One may regard "ship" as a referentially indeterminate predicate, 
which partially denotes matter-constant and form-constant ships* Neither of the
claims
(HF) "Ship" denotes form-constant ship;
(HM) "Ship" denotes matter-constant ship;
is adequate, for that term refers to each of foem-conslant and matter-constant 
ships only indeterminately. In other words, it is 11^x1X1011316 which of the above 
persistence conditions are the ones that should be associated with the teem "ship". In 
order to determine the truth value of sentences this approach uses the supervaluation
method. A statement about ships will be true (false) iff no matter how we resolve the 
indeterminacy about the extension of ship, it will come out true (ff Ises/” If this 
condition is not satisfied, the statement has no truth value. So, for instance, the 
statement "The original ship is identical with the repaired ship" has no truth value, 
since if we interpret "ship" so as it refers to form-constants ships, the statement will 
come out true, while if we interpret "ship" so that it means "matter-constant ship", the 
very same statement will be false. So it does not have the value true (false) because it
See fii. 46.
Hughes (1997b). p. 56.
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is not thy case that io matter how we resolve fhe Indyfermliscy In 116 referynce It 
comes out true (fslse). T1e lack of truth value Is often interpryfy' ss indylermlitacy.
Notice moreovyr thal even If we stipulated fhat it Is just ore of fhy parlla^l
ryferencys which is fhe correct one, the Thyseus's ship puzzle would nol be
completely resolved. For assume ihst fhe predlpath "ship" '16111)' denotes mattyr-
ponstlnt ships (i.e. 1111 the Ideitity of original parts is fhe proper criterion of idyntity). 
If this piiteilnl Is to be realistic aid apply lo common ships, Il cnriol be a strict 
criterlm forbidding any c1slgh whatsoever. Now we can assume 1111 fhe exchangy of
planks has been interrupted in thy middle sid fhe ship has 50% of the original planks 
and 50% of 116 new ones. Is Il Identical to 116 origirsl ship, or not9 It Is clear t11l the
prifeilol of cnnsflncy of lnstier does rot allow us to answer that quesllon decisively. 
Here again Iitdytyrmln1cy sneaks Into 116 picture. Ard this brings us to snolher
solution lo i'enllty-over-time puzzles.
For some time now 1iolher method of solving such puzzles has byyn gaining 
popularity. This solution appareiitl) solves all the puzzles at once and consists In the 
cIiIx fhaf the identity over time questions which are fhy cenlre of thy puzzles have no 
'6161x11116 answers. For lnstlnpe, It Is nyllher the pash ihst fhe original ship is 
(detyrmliiately) i'enlics.l with thy repaired ore, nor Is Il fhe case thal It is 
('e1ermlii1tyly) I'yntlcsl with the recons1ruplyd one. Rather, It Is Iidefyimin1ty1y 
^6111^1 to fhe former aid Indetyimln1ty1y identlpll to fhe lslter.
The problem of intrinsic change ss such; I.e. thy problem corchrnllg the 
apparynl impossibility of one and fhe ssxe object having lnpompsllblh 1ttrlbules st 
differenl times, has nothing lo do with vagueness. Either Iitrlnslc chngy involves 
ponfrldlctlon, or it does not. Thm is no third option; It cannot by indeterminate
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whether it does. However, once we provide an account of intrinsic changes, then the
issue becomes which intrinsic changes are possible, which criteria of identity and 
persistence are decisive, and indeterminacy may appear in the picture.
3. INDETERMINACY AND DIACHRONIC-IDENTITY PUZZLES
3.1. Indeterminate-identity answer to diachronic-identity puzzles
For endurantists the problem is to decide whether an object which has changed 
is still numerically the same object. Therefore, the question which becomes the crux of
the whole matter is how one is to understand idxntity-oaxr-timx statements. As we 
have seen, solving each of the diachronic-identity puzzles involves answering a 
question of the form "Is a at ti identical with h at t2?"; where ti is a time before the
change (or the series of changes) and t2 is the time after; while "a" and "/?" are names,
which may happen to name the same particular. Perdurantists, on the other hand, 
exclude at the outset the possibility that the object before the change is numerically 
identical to the object existing after the change. For them the 'genuine' question is 
whether there is an R-related aggregate of temporal parts which contains both parts of 
"a" and parts of "Z?". The puzzles illustrate the fact that sometimes neither of the 
definite answers seems plausible. Therefore one may feel tempted to claim that there 
is no definite answer to such questions. It is neither true nor false that a at ti is
(determinately) identical with h at t2 • In fact the right answer is this: It is
indeterminate whether a at t| is identical with b at 12. All puzzles of identity over
time are cases of indeterminate identity over time.
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Buf is this really so? Cnn ws bn satisfied will the answer flat ic rich casn in
wiich no definite answer sssms right' fir icdeferminiSs answer is lngilimaSe9 Is il
rnnlly She cass Shit' She lick of definils nnswnr to the diaclronic-idenlisy questions
which is caused by ths silence of the relsvant psesisfnncs cocdifiocs is SinSimouct to
fie indsferminiss answer?
Moreover, if is cot ns if ths nppnil so indsSermicacy solved evnrything. On fhn
confi'iey, it mny nppnir fhnf if complicites the issue even further. Consider the 
following example of supposedly icdelrrminife idsniiSy•.^,
The wiich 1 sent for repair = Shs wifcl I got back.
One mny know every pirl of ths wiici ons sens for repair ncd rvnry pirl of 
thn walch flat' one gof back acd sfill cos know whefhnr the wiici sect is Shs same
witch is She walch returnsd. Tis wiIcSis sssm lo be nnithnr detnrmicitnly ideclihal 
nor dnfneminnfnlc dislicct. According lo our intuitions' it is indeferminnte whefhnr she
rniurnnd watch wns worn list ysir, winrens is is dsterminntn that ths onn snni was
worn fhen. If Shny wees detseminifely idenficil, it would col be IndeSerminifs winfhnr
lie enlurned wiSci was worn list yenr, foe it would be delermlcatn shns is wns. If - on 
fie ofher hand - Shs wiiclss were dninrminninly distinct, ngain il would col be 
indetermicate wSmfhnr the returned walch wns worn lasi ysir, for il would be
dnferminnSe thit it wns cot. Hsccs, Shs conclusioc sesms lo be lint the wiici ssni nnd
lie wiici returnsd are nnlthsr detsrminatnly idscllcal, nor detsrmicaSsly dlsticcS, buf 
icdetsrmlnitsly idenficil inslnnd.
On the ofisr innd, ocs mny squnlly well negus tins lie above mnniloned ficls 
concnrning tie wilcies support tie cocclusion tint tie wlfchne nre dnterminnfelc
Sainsbury (1994). p. 74.
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distinct after all. The watch returned has the property of being such that it is
indeterminate whether it was worn last year, whereas the watch sent lacks this 
property. So, we could run the following 'Evans-type'32 argument:
(1) V O (it is indeterminate whether the watch returned was worn last year) ass
(2) Aa* [V d(%-)]/? 1, property abstraction
(3) -rV<c7 ass
(4) -gAjr [V Oka*)]./ 3 , property abse-acLon
(5) -g {a = b) 2 , 4, conraaportlive of LL
So, after all, the watches are distinct. But it seems that wx cannot just stop
here and accept the conclusion that the watches are definitely distinct. For one can go
on:
(6) (D ass
(7) & Vz (Oe -yy = z)) ass
(8) -,0/) 5 , <5, 7
(9) —V 0/)) 8 , chatacxeristics (ffV
(10) 1 1,9—lelimin.
Thus, thx very assumption that it is indeterminate whether the watch returned 
was worn last year leads 1o a contradiction. Therefore we are forced to reject that 
assumption. However, if it is not indetxeminatx whether the watch returned was worn
last year, then it must bx either determinate that it was or determinate that it was not.
And neither of these options is plausible..
Similar reasoning may bx applied to each puzzle. Foe instance, it sexms that 
1hx question whether Brown and Smith aex one and the same person has go 
determinate answer. It appaess to bf IndeXerniinaXf whether Brown survived thx 
alteration. Now, if it is indeterminate whether Brown survived 1hx alteration. Smith
52 Recall that Evans's proof goes as follows.
Let "a" and "/)" be singular terms. Then. Evans's proof runs as follows:
( 1)V (a = /j) Assumption
(2) Xx [V (,v = a)\h. 1 , Property Abstraction
(3) -iV (a = o) dclerminatcncss of sclf-idenitly
(4) -iXx |V (x = a)\a 3 . Property Abstraction
(5) -i(a = h) 2 . 4. Leibniz's Law
For further details see chapter I.
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and Brown must be Indetermlnaiely identipll. For If 116) were '6111x111111) identical
Brown would 'efiillrly survive the alteration, aid If they were determli1iely distinct.
Brown would defiiltely not survive fhe al1ei1lloi. On ihr other hand, thy very same
feature - i.e. thy featurr of Il being Indetermliaty whythyr Brown survived thy
alteration - can be used In proving thal Brown and Smith are deterxli1thly distinct.
It might thus shhm that fhe lit'etyrxin1te-idenflty answer Is io answer al all. 
Instead of solving the Idenlity over time puzzles it allows us to coistruct paradoxys. 
Recall, however, our colslderlflnns concerning 11(16161x11111 ideitity from thy 
precy'lig chaplrr. In srclloi 3.3. we distinguished 11166 standpoints towards 
in'elrrmlnste I'nntlty: the 1111^1, ihr iitermr'iste and thr libersl. The radical 
standpoint has it fhat a Is indeterminathly idyilics-l with b iff' (I) there Is no proprrly 
which a (definityly) possesses and b ('61x1161)) does not possess; aid (II) there is a 
proprriy which a (defiiltely) possesses, but It Is indeterminate whythyr b possesses 
this property. The 11111X611111 standpoint rules oul i'yntity-invnlvlng properties from 
consi'rralioi aid claims that a is Irdetermirslely 116111^1 with b Itf (i) thrrr Is no 
i'rilityfrre property which a (definithly) possesses and b (definitely) dors not 
possess; and (Ii) thrrr is a properly which a (definitely) possesses, but It is 
in'rirrmln1ih whythyr b possesses It. Finally, 116 libersl view does not lakh sny 
ln'ytyrmii1cy-invo1vlng pioprrlirs Into sccoum sid has It lhat a Is Irdelermln1tely 
i'yitic1l with b iff' (I) thrrr Is no itidhlhixlrscy-ffeh property which a (dyflillrly) 
possesses and b (dyfinilely) does not possess; aid (il) there Is a properly which a 
(drfiiiihly) possesses, bul it is Iidrtermli1ir whhther b possesses It.
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All ihsss standpoints ire ir a ssnss wsikecings of Shs contrlpoeisiee of
Leibniz's law. Tisy say ic fact slit fhere are peopsrtiss slat do not count winc one
tries So decide She quesfioc of idsnslly or dlffsesrcn of objects ic qunsslon.
On fhn libernl eSandpolnS tie paradoxical rslsening coccerning witches ^1^1
be conducted. The propnrtc of being such tins it wns indsferminifely worn lasi ynir
^11^1 be used So disfinguisi She witch snni for repair from the witch rniurnnd
hehluse Shnt properfc is indesermlnacy-ineolving acd iSerefbre does cot couni in
defnrmining ths identify of tis wifchrs. Oc Sie bnsis of (2) Xx [V Ofx)]/? [i.e. h is
such Shnt it is indeterminite wietier is wns wore list ysir] acd (4) -.Xx [V 0(A-)]ez
[i.n. a is not such this it is indetermicifs whefhnr if wns wore lisl ynir] one cnnnot
concluds Shat (5) -i (n = /?), for boll ihnss peopsrtiee nrs icdetermlcicy-lnvolving,
nnd ns such ire not taken into account.
On She inteemsdiits standpoint Shs esnsoning goes through' for although if 
uses in indsSermiclcy-involelng peoperty, it does cot use in indefsrmicnfs-ldecfilc 
involving property and only Sis litter ars biccnd by tils sfnndpoinf. Sincs oc Sie 
radical slandpoint all properties 'couci'' Sie negumect works there is well. Thus, on 
both littnr lhcounSs onn ends up wifi ic ippirsnt honSradlctlon. From (1) and (3) onn
cnn derive (5), whici Sian can be used to derivs -n(l). Notice howevnr, tint Shn 
hocdisiocs Shnt objects livs So silisfy in order to be indstermicately identical are 
formulnind in terms of propnrtiss. Tils lsivss open one posslblllSy of disnrmicg tie 
above argumnns. Tie indeterminate identity theorist mny insist Shnt lie indeinrminicy- 
icveleing predicates do nof designate peopersirs. If Shnee nee no properties 
corresponding to V-involving predicates, one will bn able to icvilidnin thn pnendoxicil 
ennsoning. On both She endicnl ncd fie intermediate views fie irgument will be
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fallacious, since it uses property abstraction. Step (2) attributes to b thx property of
being such that it is indetxrminatx whether it was worn last year. If thxrx is no such 
property, the argument is blocked.
However, if one insists that indeterminate identity bx formulated in terms of 
predicates instead of properties, one does not need property abstraction at all. Instead 
of saying that e.g. b is such that it is indetxeminatx whether it was worn last year, onx 
may say that while the predicate "is such that it is indetxeminatx whether it was worn 
last year" is true of /), its negation is true of a, which amounts to their being 
(dxtermlnatxly) not identical. In this case thx only way to stop the argument is 1o 
object 1o the con1eapositiae of Leibniz's law in the presence of predicates containing 
V-npxea1ors.2'l
To sum up, the indeterminacy answer to diachronic identity puzzles does not 
lead 1o the paradoxical conclusion that thx objects involved are both indeterminately 
identical and de1erminatxly non-identical simultaneously nor does it force one to
accept two contradicting claims (1) V and (9) -^V 0/>, provided one either (i) 
accepts thx liberal view of indeterminate identity, or else (ii) accepts either the radical 
or 1hx intermediatx view, but at 1hx same time (iia) formulates the conditions foe 
indeterminate identity in terms of properties and believes that indeterminacy-involving 
predicates featuring in 1hx argument do not denote properties, or alternatively (iib) 
fbemulatxs thx indeteeminatx-idxntity conditions in terms of predicates and rejects the 
contraposition of Leibniz's law as invalid foe such predicates.
* Cf. chapter I. sections 1.3. and 1.5.
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3.2. Individuation
It has been clalned 1111 thr Idritily over tixr puzzles do rot ponttituth
genuine cases of In'rtrrmln1tr Identity after all. Take thr wstc1-puzzle as an example.
In order to have vagueness In i'rnlity wr xusl have "thr individuation of a watch, a-,
and individuation of s watch, j, and vaguhnhst porcernilg whether a is >"'.'* Thr
argument has It lhat in this cssr wr do not 1sve such fwo Individuations. It Is not
enough lo polil to a wafc1 in order to delhrminr which watch It is. For an
individuation the origins xust be somehow deterxiied. Salisbury argues as follows.
"Wr think that It Is rasy. by, for rxsxplr, pointing lo 1 wa1c1, to drtrrxlnr which 
watch it Is. Supchh'lre, 1nwrvrr. inquires fhaf whal wr do snxreow drtrrxiirs 11 origin, 
known or unknown, which is as drfiillh ss Is required by thr vagur prrsls1hnpr pon'itlnnt for 
things of ihst kind. |...| To thr rxtrrt 1111 11616 is errulttr doubt 1^111 wIIcI nrlell what er 
1avr tnin1rd to 1ns, our pnlrtlre has not Irdlvlduatrd a wiIcI. Wr xa\■ sa\' 1111 It has 
individuated s watch stagr: aid wr car rrprrsril thr vagueness ss bh1rlng or whlp1 watch, If 
any, ilcnrpnlltrs 116 watch staer".:'
First of all what is 116 phrssr "if any" supposed lo mean? Dors Salisbury want 
to allow watc1-sl1ges which do nol belong to sny watch? W1y are they watch stages 
then? As I have already argued, assuming pyiduraitlsm, whhther ihr given temporal 
stagy Is 1 watch-slagy, depends on of1er temporal stages 1111 surround it (In space 
and time). Only If the surrounding lexporal parts are of the appropriate kind 11' 
xoreovyr are approprlslhly related, Is thr lyxporal psrl in question s part of 1 watch.
Secondly, Sainsbury argues that It follows from the above coisideiatiois fhaf 
fhere arr no objects in this sltustlon which sstisfy
Salisbury (1994). p. 75. 
'''' Sainsbury (1994). p. 75.
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(3) 'kwWx (V(tr in idenlicai to z)).v, y36
The claim is this "Shs wifcl sent" acd "Sis wisci enfurcsd" fail So individuals
nny temporally nxinnded objects, while substituting the enlevact wiici sfiges for "x" 
nnd 'y in (3) results in a fnlss slilemnnl. Tins, it is clene fhaf allSough Simsbury 
ndvociins ths tnmpornl singes solution, hn - unlike ths typical perdurinSists - does not
treil spncs icd Sims on a pnr. Oc Sis one lied ie honfessss Sint hr is inclined So
belinve ShnS the anodyne vngun objects like Nsw Dseoe nnd Nouvslls Peoverce 
silisfy (3) and ihnrnfore make is urhonlrovnrsill, while oc fhn ofher land le argues
this wn1hhss ^111^ even bs substituted in (3). So, in Sie former cise he allows "New
Dnvon" and "Nouvslle Provnnhs" to individuntn objects nvnn though the spatial
houndlrlns of fisss objects ars cof deSermined, wiereas in tie litter he holds fhnf 
witches ^1^1 bs irdividuilsd brcutse their fempornl benndariss nee nos deinrmiced.
As we hive sner Saicsbury's freitmecs of wlShi-fyps puzzles corsisSe mainly
of two claims:
(a) The expressions "fir wiici snni" ncd "the wiici enlurned" fail lo
individuate acy wifchrs; but
(b) These expressions individuals witch sligrs.
This solution has probably beer most welcomed by perdurlntiets. If the 
indntnrminiSn-identiSy puzzles can only be rssolvnd by an nppnil to tnmpornl pnrfs, 
fhnn pnrdurinlism gete a nsw argumecf in its fleour. Salisbury's solutloc mny be 
engirded ns a good solution orly by someone wio bslieess in Sempornl pirfs. Whit 
can ecdurantists do, fisc9 Sincs tSey rsjsct fir very nofion of a tnmpornl pirl, She
claim (b) is of no usn for siem. Therefors, foe thnm, tSess two claims boll down to thn
36 See chapter II. section 3.1.
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thesis that "the watch sent" and "the watch returned" do not individuatx anything at
all. That seems implausible. Let us first investigate whether a person who does not
acknowledge the existence of temporal parts is really forced 1o accept that
unattractive claim. Maybe there are better ways out of this rather uncomfortable
situation that endurantists could adopt. The claim (b) will be dealt with in the section
devoted to eerdurantism and indeterminacy.
3.3, Endurance indeeenninacy
3l3l1l Semantic indeeei’minacy dceignators
The justification foe the claim:
(a) Thx expressions "the watch sent" and "thx watch returned" fail to
individuate any watches;
is that thx origins of thx watches has not been determined. However, the claim 
that in order to individuate something, e.g. a watch, what we do must somehow 
determine its origin, known or unknown, seems to bx too strong a requirement.
Firstly, Sainsbury draws the analogy with a lion and its intrinsic features. Hx 
claims that intrinsic features are not enough for something to bx a lion: an appropriate 
genesis is also eequl6dd.57 But this analogy is not a good one. We may agree that 
something can be a lion only if it has an appropriate origin, and still not agree that the 
same applies to watches. On thx contrary, it sxxms that intrinsic features are enough 
foe something to bx a watch. It might be argued that as long as something shows
Sainsbury (1994), p. 75.
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times acpurs.1ely Il Is a watch, ro natter whythyr It 1as been xade in a watch factory
or pryltyd by God. Its origin seems Iiihlhvsnl.
Moreover, In everyday life wr do not bot1er sboul things' origins■ Polntiig at
a watch or using a dhflnlte description "thr watch I gave you last year" seems good 
enough for fhe purpose of individuatim.** Moreover, it Is unclear what this 
requirement really amounts to. Whal we do xust detyrminr 11 origin, but It may
remain unknown. How do we know then whythyr It has been determinr' or not? How
do we know whether or not wr succeeded in individuating a watch?
Anyway, It Is clear thsf in somr csses t1is requlrexert is not fulfillrd. Now, If
we agree lhat in such cashs wr did not succeed In Individuating s watch, did we 
individuate soxhthlig else or nothing si all? Salisbury snrxs lo think thsf a prison 
who dors not believe in imapm'sl parts has no option bul to argue that In such cssrs 
we do not individuate anything. Il appesrs lo xe that 116 claim that when wr think we 
individuate 1 watch, we In fact individuste nothing at all amounts lo ihe clsix that 
trims such as "the watch sent for repair" are imprecise designators, in fhy sense thal 
they fail to refyr determinslely to anything (In other words they fail lo denote 
dyfermln1tely anything). Slnpe fhe claim ihst "thy watch sril" does not indlvidualr 
anything seems to be anot1yr way of saying 1111 it fails to refer lo an object 
dyfermiit1tely, "the watch srit" Is 11 Imprecise designator. Thus, when one utters "the 
watch sent" one dors not speak of anything in particular. Moreover, slice the 
imprecise 'esignalois do not succyrd in singling out objrplt of which one could 
predicate something, thy properly abstraction bepnmhs doubtful. This has 1 rather 
counteilntultivy pnnp1ution ihst 1 clnnnt even say thsf thr watch which I sent for
*”* Provided of course lhal there is a walch at a place al which one points and that I ga\-e you a w -atch 
last year respectively.
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repair is such lhal I wore it last year. {NB The supxevaluationlst can argue hxex that 
thx watch 1 sent for repair is thx watch 1 wore last year, for on every precisification of
"the watch 1 wore last year" and "thx watch sent for repair", the identity statement 
"Thx watch I sent foe repair is the watch 1 wore last year" comes out true. It seems to 
me however that even hx cannot claim that thx watch which l sent foe expair is such
that I wore it last yxae, because one cannot predicate anything of the watch I sent for
repair, unless that object is singled out determinately.)
However, in order to argue that, x.g., "thx watch returned" does not refer to a
watch determinately, onx has to argue that there are at least two objects, such that it
is indeterminate which one is thx eefxexnt of "the watch returned".
Usually onx considers a designator d imprecise if thxrx exist (at least) two
objects, which aex distinct and such that it is indxtxeminate to which of these objects d 
rxfxrs. In such a case there is nothing to which d rxfxes dxtxeminately. Thus, for 
instance "thx first black pen in the sorites series of black and grey pens" is an example 
of an imprecise designator in such a standard sense, since it fails to refer determinately
to any pxn. No single pen is dxtxeminately singled out by such a term, for there aex 
several pens which are equally good candidates foe the satisfixr of the predicate "is the 
first black pxn in thx sorltxs series". Recall also that the reason why wx have claimed 
that "is Harry's best frixnd" is a semantically indeterminate term was that it was 
indeterminate whether it was Sux oe Geoegx who stand in this relation to Harry. Thx 
expression "Harry's best frixnd" does not exfee determinately to a unique person.
Thus, if "the watch returned" is to bx a semantically indeterminate term, thxrx 
must be at least two distinct watches to which that term purports to exfxe. But it may 
bx aegued that such a view is absurd, foe it leads to spalio-lemporal coincidence. Wx 
know that only onx object has been returned - onx watch with a particular
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hnlrlcSnlfstics. Ws nee absolutely sues flat Shs wnfch-mnker did mt enfurc two
distinct, spifio-fsiTiporilly snpirated wlfhies. Thernfore, if ons is to negue Shat Shs
expression "she wntcS eeturcsd" refdes indefermlnifely to two wifcles, onn hns So
commit onsself to ths claim fSil the Swo wnichns ire spniio-Semporilly coircldnnt.
Hence, coincidence is imminent. At ths time of tis iittericcs Sheen muss bs nt lenst
two distinct, but neverthslsss spniio-Semporilly holchident, enturned wntcins.
One could negus Shit the spnilo-femporilly hoilhidnnt objecSs nrs wnich-
prehlsiflhlSions. However, She prnhisifiClSiuls of oltciss hnvs to be wlShine, so this 
solution is cot of much help?9 Aliernitivelc ors could insist tint for "tin wiici 
eefurned" to be n vngus expression is sufficss flit tisee nre Swo dietilhS objects - col
lehnssarlly witches - which nes tie cnndidntes to be fir witch enlurned. Hownver,
those objncts' ir order to bs (irdefermlniSs) erfeeents of She expression "She witch 
enturned" hive so bn nt least very wnfch-likn. Morsoesr, tiec lave to bs wlthh-llkn to
Shn snmn degese, for if one of Siem wres more wiici-likn linn the ofinr, it would bn
n beffnr candidate for n witci, so the erfseecce of "ths watch eeturcsd" would be
dnterminnd, conirnry to our assumption.
So, She claim fins expressions like "tis witch rnfurned" nee imprecise
deeigllters which fill to refer deinrmiiifnly So inything9° comhllnd wish she rejection
Sec chapter IV.
60 The problem is that such imprecision does not affect merely fictitious examples. On the contrary, it 
affects (almost) all natural-language singular terms (i.e. names, definite descriptions and 
demonstratives). We take the name "Bill Clinton" to be a precise designator. We are convinced that 
it individuates one (and only one) person determinately. However, were he to undergo fission, it 
would become unclear to which of the post-fission persons "Bill Clinton" applies. We cross the river 
and say subsequently "the iw • er we just crossed is such-and-such". We think that when we say this, 
we refer determinately to a certain ri\ • er. It may • be the case howc\-er that the ris • er dis • ides somess • here 
up the stream. When we uttered the words "lie ris -er wc just crossed" wc did not specify w • hich of the 
small divided rivers that description was to refer to. Call these small rivers 'V" and "h". Since it is 
indeterminate whether "the rivcr wc just crossed" refers to a or to h (or to any of them for that 
matter), it is an imprecise designator. ("The river we just crossed" is imprecise as regards river's 
temporal boundaries as well. Wc can assume that 10 years ago there was a river in this place, which
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of temporal stages leads to thx acceptance of the spatio-txmpoeal coincidence view, 
which many people think to bx too high a price to pay.
3.3.2. Temporally vague objects
It sexms to me that endurantists - if they want to avoid thx spatio-temporal 
aoinaidenax view - have to rxjxct Sainsbury's claim (a), i.e. thx claim that the 
expressions llkx "the watch sent" and "thx watch returned" fail to individuate any
watches. Endurantists should insist that, foe instance, "the watch retuenxd" does
individuate a watch - namely the watch that has been returned by the watch-maker.
Admittedly, the watch it individuates is a temporally vague object - for instance, it is
indeterminate whether it satisfies thx predicate "existed a yxae ago", but this does not 
mean that it is not individuated. On thx contrary, it is clear that despite thx fact that 
the origin of such a watch is not determined, it is sufficiently individuated foe 
everyday purposes. As I have already mentioned Sainsbury himself has no qualms 
about individuating objects which do not have precise spatial boundaries, so I cannot 
sxx why onx should not extend this view to temporal boundaries as well. "The watch 
sent" and "the watch returned" arx designators that exfxe determinately to vague
objects.
As it has been argued in chapter II, there are two senses in which a designator 
may bx considered precise. In thx standard sense a designator is precise if it singles 
out a unique object dxtxrminatxly. In thx non-standard sxnsx a designator is precise if
subsequently dried out completely. Later on the bed of a river filled up with water again. It is 
indeterminate whether "the river w’c just crossed" refers to the river w• hich dried up.) And so on. One 
can construct a similar example for most singular terms (at least for terms referring to concrete, 
material objects existing in space and time).
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it rrfyrs 'etermlnately to an objecl, bul Is such 1111 It Is 1116161x11116 whythyr if 
singles out 1 unique object. However, this kind of 'precision' Is rathyr bizarre and 
moreover it is possible only In fhe prhsence of Indylerxiialely identical objects. As 
you may 16X6x^61', in c1sptyr II this kind of designator was ^116' "precise" in 1 
('espyi1te) atirmpi to get Evans's srguxerl running. The I'ra then was lo check 
what happens If soneonr insists on regarding such 1 kind of 'hsigistoi as precisy. We 
wanly' lo yxaxine whelher a designslor thsf refers both delyrxinstely and
lndyteixln1tely can be used lo prove fhy inco1erhice of Iitdeterxli1te identify. As I
have tried to argue, such ion-sl1it'srd sid 'lax' understanding of precision does not
help Evans's argument. Moreover, such 1 kind of designator Is imprecise rsthhi than 
precise. As I have pointed oul fhy striking fealure of such s designator Is l1at it Is 
indyfyrxinate to how many objects Il refers. Il seexs thus much more appropriate to 
call it "imprecise".
Thus, we see fhat in s'dltloi lo fhy slandsrd srish of ixprypite designator 
discussed in thr preceding section, thyry is also siothyr srish of ixpryplslnn possibly. 
An Ixprecish designatoi d may refer delhrxli1thly to ore object a and 
Iiidyteixinately to anothhi object (noir precisely not lo arothhi, but lo an object 
which is Iidelerxinathly I'riflcal lo r/). If a Is 1 vague objecl which Is not 
dyterxiiafely dlfferynt from /?, then It is Ir'eterxii1le whethhi d refers lo a only or lo 
b as well. In this casr Ixpihclslon Is due to objycls, not to expressions. Wr will call
this sense fhe non-standard sense.
Thyryforh In thr presence of Irdhteixlisthly idynticsl objects ihr clalx thal 
"the watch returned" and "thr watch returned" refer dethixii1iely to ^11111 nbjypts 
dors not mean that l1ey air precise designators. According lo the ion-sfsn'1rd sense 
1 designator thsf ryfyrs 'yferxiiatyly to some object Is still imprecise, provided It also
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infers indefsrmlcilsly io some object. So, "ths witch sent" as well as "she oatch
retuennd" nrs impi'sclsd le ills sncsn. "Tts oalci snel" eefees desnrmicisely so sie
witch snit' but it is ildntermliafn whether if erfers to tis watch enfurind. Ie general,
if is iideSrrmlnnfs whether wise ws ulSnr "fie wa1hh ssnf" nnd "thn witci enlurned"
ws refer So one object or io two dlsSlccS ebjsci.e.
So, the wiSch puzzls is i genuine puzzls nffer all. The term "tin witch sent for 
rnpiir" iidlviduiiss i tnmporilly vagus wiici, sir term "she watcS enfurind" nlso
individuates n temporally vigus witch ncd it is iidsferminife whnfhnr she witches nrn
one nnd She same wlShh or col. Thn puzzls remains a puzzls, for the identify of
witches is indriermlcnfe.
The same argument applies to ill dlaciroeih-ldseSlty puzzles of Shis kind.
Considnr, for insSaice she cnss of Brown ned Smith. Recall this Beowc is the min
who has niisred iSe nlierniloc midilis aid Smith is She min who emerged from it. 
This cisd cnn be regirded eitise as a ^1 involving ontic iidnierminicy or ns a caee 
which ileolvns merely snmnniic iidnlermiiicy. Let us holsidnr the littnr option fiesi. 
If there is no ontic indeSermicicy involved in Shs Beown/Smlih ^31, "Browe" and 
"Smith" cne oily bs ledsfsrmleiSs ie tts sliedird sness. So, for iesliecs, for "Brown" 
So be imprecise is for it lo refer iidrfnrmiiitely lo more flan ors object - i.e . thern 
hns So be nt ^^1 Swo objecSs about which it is iedesermieasn whefhnr "Beowc" rnfnrs
to them. Are fhere such objncts' Slough?
It appears Shat only somnone wio brlleves ie temporal pirls car avail himself
of this selullolt The propocect of ths temporil-pneis view cnn claim Shnt it is 
iidnfnrminnts to which of sir hollsctioes of fempornl parts "Beowc" rnfnrs; for 
instincd' it is iidnierminntn whelirr it eefees So i collection wiici hectalns temporal 
pnefs of Browi-before-tis-ilSsriiloc only, oe io a collnciioc which holtails in
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addition temporal parts of Smith. Noonan argues that if wx suppose that Brown is thx
only man who enters thx machine and Smith is thx only man who leaves thx machine,
then if "Brown = Smith" is to be indxtxeminate in truth value, "the man who enters the
machine = the man who leaves thx machine" also has to bx indxt^e^n^^r^ftt^/*1 Now, thx 
definite description "the man who enters the machine" has a denotation only if the 
predicate "x is a man who enters the machine and anything which is a man who enters
the machine is identical with x" is satisfied by just one object. The denotation of this 
description will be indeterminate if some object x satisfies that pexdicatx under some 
seaepenlngs and some object y under other sharpei-ilngs, i.x. if there is more than one 
object which is a candidate foe satisfying the predicate "x is the man who enters thx 
machine". Noonan aeguxs that someone who takes persons to be collections of
temporal parts has no problem with finding thx relevant candidates. For someone who 
does not believe in temporal parts the situation is different, however. According to 
Noonan, such a 'thrxe-dlmxnsionalist' is unable to account for the indeterminacy of the 
description in question. In order to explain thx indeterminacy hx would have to claim
that thxrx arx candidates foe satisfixes of ”x is the man who enters the machine" which
arx distinct, located in exactly thx same place before thx operation, not related by 
part-whole relation and which satisfy thx predicate under some sharpxnings. Such 
spatio-temporal coincidencx sexms absurd. Thus, Noonan's conclusion is that 
endurantists must xithxr deny thx possibility of vague identity statements or reject the 
traditional analysis of definite desc^e^^f^ito^n^/’2
See Noonan (1982). pp. 5-6. Noonan discusses a slightly different case of Brown and Brownson. 
See chapter V.
62 Noonan (1982). pp. 5-6.
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It seems to xe fh1t Noonan's conclusion applies only to those yndurlntitts 
who do not believe in mllc vsguhnhss. Thr situation Is entirely dffyrynt If we
polsi'er thr Brown/Sxith csse as involving oillc vsguhiess. The rn'ui1itllst l1yoilst
can claix, for Iistsnch, fhat there is oir (vague) prison who enlers thr xac1iie aid
one (vague) person who Irsves ihr machine. What Is Indeleixln1le Is whelher this Is
the same pyrson or nol. Wr do nol know whythri the c1sngy that Brown has 
undyrgone counts as a mere chsnge or as the end of his existence and thr beginning of 
the yxistence of another person. Thr predicate "Is thr man who leaves the machiny"
ryfyrs 'etyrminately to one pyrson, I.e. Smith, but It Is indeterxinsty when Smith 'has
coxy into existence' - It Is ilidyleixinale whythyr It 1as been the birlh of Brown or thr
brain-tiaispisni. Brown sid Smith air vsgur objects, whose texpoi1l noundarles ary
fuzzy to a gryat exthil. Thr description "fhy man who enlrrs thr machine" refers 
dyferxln1lely to Brown and indeterminately lo Smith aid "the xar who leaves thr 
machine" refers dhteixinstyly to Smith and indeterminately to Brown. The ststexent
"Thr xan who enters 116 xschiie = thr man who leaves ihr xachlne" Is
indeterminate in trulh value bycaush it Is Ii'ethixinsth whether i1ese dyspriptinnt 
refer to thr saxe man or not. TIIs view does rol commit onr to spatlo-fexpoial 
coincidench, slicr It Is ildhthixinste 1ow many persons (i.e. one or two) there are.
Thus, one may conclude that It Is rot thr csse fhat thr dlaphronlc-idenlity 
puzzles have io delerxiiate answers because t1e naxes sid deflrite descriptions 
which wr use In order lo refer to objects undergoing c1ntges fail lo refer to unique 
things. In facl, it Is Indeteixirate whether t1ey succre' in ryfyrrlig lo unique things, 
beplush those things are temporally vague.
Actually il serins thsf endui'antists ^1^ do without vague iideterxli1fy1y 
l'yntlpal objects. If l1ey do not allow suc1 objects Into 11611 ontology, t1ey sre stuck
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with spatio-temporal coincidencx of familiar objects. In almost every puzzle of 
diachronic identity a question is asked of whether a certain object a is identical with a 
certain object b. In most of those cases either of thx determinate answers, "Yes" and
"No", seems implausible and arbitrary. And if onx wants to answer that it is
indeterminate whether a is identical to /), then one has to explain the source of this
indeterminacy somehow. Thx easiest explanation is to say that "z" and "//' are
imprecise designators which do not rxfxe detxrmlnatxly to anything. However, such an
explanation leads endurantists directly to spatio-temporal coincidence. They must 
maintain that thxrx is more than onx object which deserves thx name of "ci" and more 
than one object which deserves thx name of "A". Thus, in effect they have to argue 
that there are two objects of the same kind located in thx same place at the same time.
Such a spatio-txmpoeal coincidence can bx avoided however, if onx 
acknowledges thx existence of vague objects, if a and b aex vagux objects, then it may 
be indetxrminatx whether they are identical. And it sxems to me that endurantists have 
no problems with explaining how it may bx indetxrminatx whether certain objects arx 
onx and the same object without having to (dxtxeminately) acknowledge spatio- 
txmpoeal coincidencx:.
Recall that endurantism holds that objects existing at different times can be 
identical, in a sense that object a at l| can bx the same object as object a at 12- zt can
xithxr bx a proper name oe a definite description. IF it is a definite description, then it 
conveys in its meaning thx kind of the object it rxfxrs to. Foe instance, "The watch I
sent foe repair" rxfxrs to an object of thx watch-kind and which is such that I sent it 
for repair. "Theseus's ship" is an object of thx kind "ship" and which belongs to 
Theseus. And so on. In such cases the question "Is a at 11 identical with a at tg" (e.g.
"Is the watch I sent for repair thx same as the watch returned/"; "Is the original ship
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ideifical with Shs enpnirnd one?"' esc.) boils down to tie qursfion "Is three a single
object suci shit it is in A and it exists nt S[ nnd nt 12?" (so, e.g. "Is fhere n single
wiici such this it exists at tl and nt 129"; "Is tinre a single ship such sins it exists
boil if il aid 129", etc.) Ie some casns the question will bs "Is a of its kind A nl tj
identical io b of the kind B il 12?". Thnn, whit ocs nsks is whnfhnr tiers exists n
single objncf such tiii it is ie A and is is a B and it sxlsts it tj nnd nt 12. Compil'd for
ileSllce "Tis statue is tis samn ns tis eass". Wiat fils stitnmeit esally means is
"Thnen is ocs object such flit is is i sfitue ncd a visn". For itis stitemeel to be true
thnen tis to bs some Sigiee-ordnr kind wiici comprlsss both ftn sfitue- nnd the vnsn-
kieds.
The cnsn in which "n" is n propnr cams is cot renlly differnnt. Recall thit thn 
eSafnment "Mr Jones nt f] is idscticil wist Mr Joces at 12" his henc iitnrprnSnd ns 
"There is ons objncf, Mr Joins, whici sxlsts il t| aid it 12"9>‘' This lattnr expression 
does rot mly say fiaf tiers is one object flit exists al 11 aid at 12, but if nlso snys
Shil ihni object is Mr Joces. Ie Ste hase involving lie dnsceipfioc "the wiich snel for
repnie" if is clear Shil ws flreS predicate of ie objscf this if is i watch nnd fhen thnf if 
wns snni for rnpiir. Analogously in Sts Mr Jocss cnsn we claim ital fiere is one 
object which is cnlled "Mr Jonss" ned wiici exists nt Si aid nt 12. Now, wins does
Shn nnme "Mr Jonss" add So tts dilhhreeih-ldnniitc stilemect? Tie simplest solutioc 
enems to bn to Kcept Shil rimes suci is "Me Joins" hive some descriptive mennlng 
dniermining ths kind of the object named/’4 A minimal rnquirnmnni is flit their 
meililg consists of some indefinite description. Ie the case of "Mr Jones" it is thn
63 Cf. Mcrricks (1994). p. 176. 
61 Cf. Geach (1977).
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indefinite description "a person". Hence, saying that an object existing at 11 and 12 is
Mr Jones amounts to ascribing it the property of being a person called Mr Jones. 
Moreover, it might be arguxd that in some cases proper names can be replaced with 
definite descriptions. As we have seen, in thx alteration case thx name "Brown" can be
replaced with "the person who entered the alteration machine", and "Smith" can be
replaced with "thx person who emerged from the alteration machine".
Hence, all those puzzles concern in fact meanings of soetal terms. In order foe
the answer to thx question "Is x at tl identical to y at t2?" to be "Yes", there has to be
a single object existing at tj and 12 and such that it falls under some soetal "A"'. We
associate with each soetal teem some persistence conditions, but these conditions are 
got sufficiently determinnd.63 They suffice in most typical cases, but in some 
circumstances it may become indeteeminatx whether they aex satisfied oe not. In such
cases a at 1] and a at t2 will bx temporally vagux and it will be indeterminate whether
thx former is identical with the latter. It is not however as if thx vagueness of a at ti
and a at 12 were merely a semantic vagueness - namely the vagueness of thx
persistence conditions associated with a given soetal term, and the objects themselves 
were precise. Ontic vagueness is inseparable from semantic, but - as 1 have already 
aegued - this does not make it less "ontic". One can think, foe instancx, that thx issue
of whether Mr Jonxs is still a person is a semantic issue, but in some cases it will 
become doubtful whether Mr Jones still exists, and such a problem is clearly not a 
mere semantic peoblxm any more.22 65 66
65 In some cases there are various and mutually inconsistent persistence conditions associated with a 
given term. In such cases an additional indeterminacy may come into the picture - namely it may be 
indeterminate whether a at tl is identical with a at t2. because it is undetermined which persistence 
conditions are relevant (compare the developed Theseus's ship puzzle).
66 Sec chapter IV, section 4.1.
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Admittedly, fhe "iltdhtelxlnapy" answer dors not fit all dl1c1roilc-ldentlty 
plsyt equally well. T1e xosl resistant srr fuslor sid fisslor cases. Recall Gariyft's
example In which fwo brain 1exlspneres are irxovrd from the body of s dying
pyrson and placed 61^ in Its own body. The bodies arr I'eilical clones cloned from
the body of thr patient years ago. As 1 rrsult, after the transplant fherr are two
idenfipal pyrsons. Lefly and Righty, who not only havr thr saxy soil of body as fhy
deceased, but also are completely psychologically continuous with him. Let us call 
fhy poor palleit Brian. Thr common view Is 1111 Lefty and Rlg1ly are dlfferynt 
pyrsons, sincr they occupy dlffyiyit spstlo-texporal 1opsllons. The question is of 
course whyther either of them Is idhnllcsl with Brian. Thr "indytynxiriacy" srswer will 
have If that fhere arr fwo statexyntt of ildelhixirath truth value - namely "Thyi'e Is a 
unique pyrson. Lhfty, who existed before fhe transplart" aid "There Is 1 unique 
pyrson, Righty, who existed before the transplant". Since both ihrse seithichs arr 
iidefyrxliafy, It will also be In'eihrxiiate how many people existed before the 
transplant. T1ls, according lo Garrett, violates common intulllors lcpnrdlng lo which 
brfory thr fission there Is dhthixinslyly one prison who occupies fhy pre-fission 
nndy.67
To this one could reply that such cases violalh coxxor Intuillons anyway. The 
"indytyrminafy" reply dors not clalx that deterxli1lhly thyry is more than one person 
before thr fission, Il says 'merely' thsf Il is Iidethixinsth whether there Is oir. So, It is
less couitei-lilulllve thaii soar other solutions.68
67 Garretl (1998). p. 64.
68 Garrell has also oilier argnmenls against indi^lierininacy in ihc fission cases. See (1998). pp. 64-67. 
Some of those arguments stem from his conviction lhal indeterminacy comes into the picture when 
"something is missing or diminished" (p. 64). Firstly, this com- iction can be challenged; secondly it 
seems to hack up the indeterminacy answer to the Brian/Lcfty/Righty case, contrary to Garrett's 
intentions.
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Coming back to tis witch haes, its oeni•all situifloc is Sie following. Tie
sSitnmset "Ths wntcS sees foe espile is its snms ns tis waid'i 1 goi back", which
should be rend is "Tines is a single witch suci tiii it was snit for espale ned latse 
1*11^1116 to ms", is ildeSeemleiSe ie truth vilus. Bscauss the perslsSeehe hondisions 
for witches nen cot peecisnlc defiend, if is iidetsemiiafs whnfhnr ths chings this 
occurred if Shn walch-mikee's courts is a mere cliege oe ns ie eed of lie old witch
nid a beglieleg of ths new ore. Tlernforn, tie waih1 sent aid lie witch enlurnnd nee 
temporally vagus objects, wtose temporal boundneiss nee fuzzy So a geeaf nxtnit. 
Because of Shit elgueeess thn quesfioc "Is flees 1 single witch such tiii ii wns sens
for enpile aid liter enfurced?" ins eo deteemleiln irswre. This view does 1^
deSnrmlniSnly lend io spilio-inmpoeal holecidnecs, bnhluss ii is indelermlcaln how
miny objecSs - ie our ciss: wiscies - iSses nes. Is is dntnemieaie thit sheen is nl lenst 
one watch nnd no more thin two, but Sheer is no fact of the miftnr is to whether they
nrn one or two. So, Shs moss ors is ecfitled lo claim is flit if is indefermieafe whether
spiflo-tsmpoiiil hoircldslhe occurs, oe rui.
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3.4. PerduiraiiCG and Kndeterliiinacy
As wx eaax seen on thx perdurantist account persistence is defined in terms of
thx I-relations, which are in turn defined in terms of the R-rxlations, which hold
between temporal stages. A given object a persists at a time / iff there is a temporal
stage at I which is R-eelated to a's stages at thx earlier times. Thx question "Is a at t j
the same as a at t2?" is not a question whether a at 11 is numerically identical with a
at t2. Every sentence of thx form "a at ti is numerically identical with a at 12" is false
on this account, for a at tj can only bx numerically identical with itself; i.x. with a at
tl. Thx identlty-over-time questions should bx read "Are two (different) objects, a at
tl and a at t2, R-exlatxd?"
Thx R-relation consists of three relations: spatio-temporal continuity, 
similarity and causality. It is not an equivalence relation, foe transitivity may fall. 
Moreover, it is a relation which - like other similarity relations - admits of dxgrxe. 
Thus, there are different degrees of being an A \ a can bx an to a lower degree than
b.
Both the I-relation and thx R-relation are exflexivx and symmetric. They are 
got transitive, though. Their nontransitivity follows from the fact that one stage can 
be a stage of more than onx particular. Continuants can partially overlap; they can 
merge and have identical parts. They can either stay merged or divide up again. In 
order to avoid overpopulation and multiple counting of what seems just a single stage, 
we have to count persisting particulars by a weaker relation than identity. Assume 
that continuants d and c2 aex ldxntical-at-a-time-/ iff they both exist at t and thxlr
stages are identical. Tensed identity holds between contlnuagts and is a derivative
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relation Induced by nuxeilcal Ideitity bhtwhhn stsgrs. Il Is not idyitily, bul It Is an 
equivalence relation aid Involves partial lldlspernlbillty. It Is an llditphrnlbillty 
relation for fhosh propyrtlrs of a continuant thsf air logically deterxlnyd by ihr
• • 69properties at its stage st Z.
Thr first problem the perdui'antlsts have to dral with Is thal a series of small 
and otherwise lcphp1ab1h chsnges cai add up lo 1 largh aid significant chsnge, as in 
the case of systematic exchangy of planks ir Theseus's ship. Per'uls.nlltls explain this 
pnynoxennl as follows. Each of fhe adjacent ships Is a lempoial stagy of s ship. All
of them are R-Inteirelsted: no xstthr which two stages one picks oul they will be 
sp1fio-tyixpora1ly continuous, similar aid causally relsfed. All of then arr ships to the 
same - maximal - degree. But sone of the stsges sir stages of two diferent ships: the 
original Theseus's ship and fhe repaired ship, csll It "Ship S". So, our series starts with 
stages that are unique to Thysyus's ship aid rids up with stages that are unique to thr 
Ship S. Some slages in thr middle of fhe series sre stages of both T1eteus's ship sid 
Ship S. W1sl Is puzzling In this situation Is thal for some slages Il will be 
indetyrmlnale whelhri they are part of thr aggihgsth csllrd "Thyseus's s1lp", the 
aggregate called "Ship S", or both fhysr sggieg1.lrs.
T1e 1'dltloi of one more ship to thy puzzle - naxely the ship recolslrupty' 
fron the old planks - does not really complicatr thr perdurantlsts' explanation. In the 
developed puzzle of the ship of Theseus, In which we have to do with the original 
ship, the rypaired ship consisting of new planks sid thr ship reconstructr' from the 
old planks, the solution is as above, only one 1ns first to 'hclde which R-rel1lions are
69 Lewis (1976). p. 64. if we coiinl by lensed ideality, spalio-leinporal coincidence ceases lo be a 
problem. Any spalio-lcmporally coincidcnl objecls are one and the same object (connting by leased 
ideality).
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relnellS for ltd eurvienl of slips. Thus, ocs first dsferminns whnf kind of similarity 
(e.g. whnfhnr ii is slmllnelfc in the ngs of plinks, or merely similarity ie its form of 
plinks) and causal relaSedcese between idjicncf stages is needed ie order for n 
Theseus's ship lo tolSilun its existence aid tier checks wnsthee lie enlevinf relniions
hold, or nof. If is cleie this indeSermicicy will appear le the picture just is it did in She
simple Theseus's ship puzzls.
Fissioc ncd fusion ars dealt wilt le a way inilogous So that used ie ltd
Theseus's ship example. In the cnss of fission ws 1^1 so do with two objects which
nee identical up-lo-tSe-cnrlili-inonuni ncd Shen divide; in lie case of fusioc Swo
different objects merge al n certiic time; tSey sties some Semporil singes.
Tin last problem is Shn problem of objects whici lave urdeegoie some
signifihllS charges. Those changes ire of suci i kind thit they Simper will just 11^1 
features this are significnni for lie psreisleecs of tiose objects. Recall this the 
standard eximplss nre tie Brown ncd Smith example, tts example of She pile of 
rubbish 1 swerved io avoid yesterday aid she pile of rubbish wiiti is by she roadside 
lodiy, etc. All those casne ars so set up flit esllhse of lie definitive neswers to the
question wheiher i glvee object survived iSrougi fte chncge seems plausible. For 
pnrduriitists this quesfioc rends "Is fir Srmporil sings which is eirlinr Stic the stage 
nt which the clings ias occurred R-eelitnd to some litre singe?" Ard is seems that in 
some cnsns this maybe i geiuieely uiieswnribln qussliori.
For ilsSiecS' in the brnin surgery example it snems Shit Brown and Smith ire 
neither detnrminnSnlc thn snme person nor delerminilely diffnrnit persocs. Ws ^11^ 
help ourselves to tis solution Shat the R-relalioe between Beowc-slige nnd Smilh- 
stnge holds to some lower degree, for fir example dors not justify lie claim ihni 
either Beowc or SmliS ars persons lo 1 lower degree. Oe tSe cocirnry, is seems shnt
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they arx both persons to the maximum dxgexx. What is unclear is not the degree to
which thx R-relation holds, but rather whether it does hold or not. So, it is
indeterminate whether the R-relatlon holds, and hence it is indeterminate whether
Brown and Smith arx stages of the same continuant person. The puzzle can be
phrased ig terms of aggregates of temporal stages as well. One can ask whether thx 
maximally R- and 1-related aggregate of stages including Brown-stages is the same
aggregate as the maximally R- and 1-related aggregate of stages which includes
Smith-stages.
As wx can see, the questions that perdurantists aex facing aex exactly parallel 
to those encougterxd by endurantists. Theexfoex one may ask what is the gain of 
accepting the whole new ontology of four-dimensional objects, foe the original 
igdxtxrmiggtx identity statements concerning continuants can now be translated into 
statements about stages. Take thx watch-puzzle. Now the puzzle can bx stated in 
terms of watches and watch-stages: There is a four-dimensional watch of which the
watch sent foe repair is a stage such that it is indeterminate whether it is the same as a 
certain foue-dlmensional watch of which thx watch retuenxd is a stage.
Recall that both thx I-relatlon and the R-exlation aex kind-rxlativx. Foe
igstance, identity among continuant persons induces an 1-relation that holds between 
the stages of a single continuant person. In general, the 1-relation holds between 
stages of a single continuant object of a certain kind. And the R-exlation holds 
between just thx same stages. So, continuant objects of a certain kind are defined ig 
terms of R-exlatlons (and 1-relations). The idea here is that temporal stages are 
precise, but continuant objects arx impexcisx, and it is the R- and the 1-eelatlons that
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Introduce the Indeterxlit1cy.7<) Temporal slsges arr fhexselvrs precise, but at fhe 
same tlxe they are stsgrs of contlnu1nf objects, and those objects sir objecls of 
cerlain kinds. So, although 1 stsge is precise, it nay br Irdetermliale whythyr It Is a
stage of the given objecl of 1 cyrta^li kind. The Irde1erxln1cy lies not In the stage
itself but in the pnntinuant objecl; I.y. in ihr relations which define that object.
It should be noticed fhat on this account Iideteinliacy Is no! onfic\ Il Is 1 
purely conceptual natter. The puzzles are not puzzles about objects (e.g. ships), but 
puzzles aboul ponpep1s. First of all, It Is vague exsctly which rylslions sre the rylyvanf
R-rylations for a given kind; secondly thr relevsrl relations sre sex1itlc1lly vague, 
hricr It is indetermlnale which objecls arr related by fhex. Just as Il Is unclear
wnyfhyr it is Sue or George who stnrds in the "Is Hairy's best friend" relation lo 
Harry, hyre It xsy be sexsitlcslly Indethrxiisle which of fhe pos1-phangy slages is
adequately rylafyd lo ihr pre-p1sngy stagr.
G. Forbes writes:
"T1r stagr thnnrlt1 is proposing 1 particular way of rpdhspliblrg crrtsir facts or 
which 1 precise dntprlpllnr of thr world car br given: wc can say exactly whal thlng-s1lens 
havr whal prophrilhs. Sincr this Is thr level of dnsprlptlnr al which nvnry11ire Is precise, wr 
havr to lake ihr nltn1ogy of this Irvrl ss thr natip nlfo1ngy. Thr precisr flpts about thr stages 
ihrn give rise to ihl1tlons of dnernn brierei slages (...). or rrl1lions or stages that admit of 
lldhlnlxlnlpy; In a wholly urmys1prlnus way".
However, It sryxs ihst the temporal stages level is not "thr level of 
description at which everything Is precisr" after all. First of all, Il 'ypyrds on whal 
sort of irmporsl slages we arr talking about. If personal 1expni•sl stages are to be
" Of the counterpart relation Lewis writes that " it is subject to great deal of indeterminacy (1) as to 
which respects of similarity and difference nre to count nt all. (2) as to the relative weights of the 
respects that do count. (3) as to the minimum standard of similarity that is required. ...". (Lewis 
(1968), p. 42) it is obvious that all those remarks apply to the R-relation as well.
71 Forbes (1987), p. 152.
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'pnrson-like' - ns Lewis nppirnitly wieled - i.e. sfiges which walk, Silk ned in general 
nrn vdey like persocs rxcepi from the fnct tint they nrs siort-lleed, iter of coursn 
they ire just as imprecise is persons lhsmselvee nrs. Bui is is not it ill cleae thil even 
iletnnSaneous Semporil stigss nrs precise. Fiestly, il is not cldne whnf justifies Shs
claim this "we cnc sny exactly wint tiicg-stnges iavs wiat peopertins" Thnen nrn
some' probably quits n few, properllse wift which we livs n problem when wn try to
ascribe them io corfiiuiif objects, but whici posit no problem when we ilfempf So
lsheibe them to Shing-stngne. Bui there nrs properties wifi which we still live
problems evnn if the level of tsmporil stages. If if is vague whether n eipncing fomifo
is red, then if will be equally vigue wistier a temporal sings of a ripnrirg temaSo is
red. So, we hnclo1 say exactly whnf propsi-ilss tiis stage hns.
Secondly' ii is trus lint the temporil boundaries (or either sis temporal
locifions) of temporal singes nee peeciss. But Stele spifinl bouidarlss rend col be.
Thai is io sny they ire no mors precise flit fte spifinl boundiries of corsliuaif
objects, nnd Shoss ire in many cisss vsey fuzzy. Il seems, for example, lint Shs spifinl 
boundiriss of i momeclnry stage of Scowdon ars cot moen precise Shil the 
boundiries of Snowdoc itself. Simllirly, if it is vngus whether Nouvelln Peoverce is 
idnnSicil with Nsw Dneol, then it will bs equally vagus wisthee 1 Semporil singe of 
^^1^ Proenncn is idniflcnl wifi lie rnlnvinS inmporal stage of New Deeol. This 
is why Slilehney's claim tnat alliough the terms "ths witch sect for repair" ncd "fin 
witch returned" fail So iidividuile hecSicnac1 objects, fley succnnd le irdleidultilg 
wlSch-stlhes, sssms contnctious. As ws Save seen, it is hSlrlcSnrietic of lie four-
dimnisionilisS view Shnt all four dimensions nes or a pnr. Tie Sdn"^^ dimnisioc is 
considered exactly inalogous lo She tirne spifinl dimensions. Hnlhe, if ore insists on
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thx determination of origin (i.x. temporal boundaries) being a necessary condition of
individuation, one should also insist that determination of spatial boundaries is equally 
essential. Then, as fae as a watch is a compositionally vague object, a watch-stage
cannot be individuated. In so fae as the doubt about temporal boundaries prevents the
individuation of a txmpoeally extended watch, the doubt about spatial boundaries
should prevent thx individuation of a spatially extended watch-stage.
Recall that material objects - on thx pxedueantist account - aex identified with
spatio-temporal regions filled with matter. Such definition may give an impression 
that they must be spatlo-txmpnrally sharp. But they aex not regions defined by spatio­
temporal co-ordinates. They arx regions filled with matter which constitutes a given 
continuant object at a certain time. Hxnce, they aex regions whose boundaeixs are 
circumscribed by this matter. A spatio-temporal region tilled with Snowdon-mattee 
has its spatial boundaeixs just where Snowdon has its boundaries. And these are fuzzy. 
So, it sxems to me that we do not gain much precision by switching to the ontology of 
temporal stages. It is true that temporal stages allow us to avoid vague diachronic- 
idxntity by placing all the vagueness outside ontology. It sxems howxvxr, that one still 
faces vague synchronic-identity statements. Since thx spatial boundaeixs of temporal 
stages may be fuzzy, thx statement "Is temporal part I of an X identical to a temporal 
part / of a T?", wheel ! indicates precisely a temporal duration, may bx indeterminate 
ig truth value. Consider our example of Everest and Gaurisanker, which are allegedly 
indeterminately identical. It seems that the question "Is a temporal part te t2 of 
Everest idxntica^l to a temporal part te l2 of Gaurisanker?" does not have a
determinate answer'.
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It may well be that if we go down to the level of spatio-fxmeoral points, then
we will have a precise ontology. Then thx whole vagueness would be in relations: 
both temporal and spatial. But this is a different story.
4. CONCLUSION
In this chapter we have been concerned with indetxemlnacy involved in the 
questions concerning some puzzling cases of identity over time.
The first problem that one encounters when one begins ones study of the 
issues concerning diachronic identity is that the intuitive account of intrinsic change 
and survival through such change is inadequate. Two conceptions have been 
developed, endurantism and peedurantlsm, which - allegedly - gee free from thx 
inconsistencies of the intuitive view. Each of these views has its own way of dealing 
with thx puzzles.
It seems sometimes that the best answer to diacheogic-identity puzzles is that 
it is indelerminaie whether the objects that the puzzles aex about, are identical oe not. 
Endurantists in order to accommodate indetxemlnacy within thxlr framework may 
aegue that thx objects involved are temporally vagux objects, whose temporal 
boundaries aex indxteeminatx. In some cases it might be igdxtxrmiggtx whether one 
has to do with a unique object oe with more objects that arx spatio-fxmenrally 
coincident. Admittedly, such a view has some counterintuitive consequences - foe 
igstance, we have to grant that indeterminatx spatio-temporal continuity is coherent.
The view is most counterintuitive in thx cases of fusion and fission, for in those cases 
thx temporal boundaeixs of objects involved are vague to a great extent indeed agd as
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n result the cumber of objects tiii hnvs undnegonn fission or fusioc haccos be
dsSnrmlisd.
Pnr6urllSieSs define peesisleics in Seems of ths rnlaSiois holding between 
Semporil sfiges. Since il is vague exactly which relations ire enlevait for She
persistence of a giver object nnd moesoesr lie relations Shsmselvns nee vigue, some
cnses of persisSsche are indetermilits. Il ias io bs admitted sins Shs preduenctists' 
solution So ths dilcheelih-idsl1ity puzzles is much mors refined Shin rrduriirfisis'.
However' She main problem foe slit view is flit the ontology of temporal pirts is fie 
removed from our intuitive, pessclsrllfih beliefs nbouf Shn world.
It should bs coficed flit it is col thn cnss Shat lchor6irg lo pneduraitism ill 
elgunnnes is ic rnlatiois ncd iocs ic sfiges. Fiesi of all, ii might bs vigus whether n 
giesl sings has a cnrtiil properly. Moesoesr, iliSougi tis temporil boundaries of 
singes ire precise, Sheir spifinl boundiriss mny cot be. Ic such a cnsn n Sempornl sings 
will bn n epltially vngus object. Somsonr wio claims Shnt Semporil elguslsss 
prnesn1e its iedividunfioir of irmpoeilly extruded objects, eiould acknowledge that 
spifinl vigurnnss prevents Sis irdividunfior of spatially extended objects (e.g. 
Semporil stages). Howsvre, is I livs fried lo negus spiilnlly ard/or temporally vagus
objects can bn individuated - it leist Shsy cne bn individuated in i wiy fhaf is 
sufficient for our svsrcdiy purposes.
Ths viguensss of ths spifinl houc6arins of objects usunllc dons nof plny nny 
role in diachronic identify puzzles, but if ensults le the problem of (he many - i.s. n 
problem shil irises foe spniiilly vngus objects at nny given time of fisir existence. 
Ths fnci Shnt perdurantists' Sempornl stigss ns well is temporally extended objects ars 
spifinlly vigus mikes she peohlnm of the many a disturbing mitfer for hoth
158
hiduiailisls aid perdursirllsts. Ir the rrxt chapler wr will fry to find s solution lo thal 
problem.
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Chapter IV
VAGUENESS AND THE PROBLEM OF THE MANY
1. THE PROBLEM OF THE MANY AND THE PARADOX OF 1001
CATS
1.1. Examples
Thr problem of ihr many Is due to P. Unger (1980) and runs as follows: 
Imagine a cloud.1 The cloud ponsls1t of xaiy water droplels. In ihr xi'dle of the 
cloud the droplets are quite deisely packr', but the furlhyr wr are from thr xid'lr 
the more f1e 'yisity of thr droplels decreases. T1e cloud has no sharp boundaries. 
The density 'ecrrases gradually - their Is io precise point which would mark 'the end' 
of the cloud aid 'the beginning' of the sky. At the cloud's outskirts thyry will br 
droplets which neither 'yternlislrly belong to thr cloud nor dhleixiisthly belong to 
Its environment. Thus, It serxs thsf 11616 arr nary dlffyiyit collections of water 
droplets which can be the cloud. Some of 11nte po11epllont will include xost of the 
borderline droplets, some will include oily few - aid It seems f1al thyry Is no rrason 
to prefer, say, the former to ihr lattyr. In other words, there will be xaiy co1lycliont 
with equal right to be counted as thr cloud. Since we do not havr any grounds for 
peoosing oir rathyr than siolher, Instead of orr cloud, we havr many of then. 
Altyrn1flvyly, we could deny that any of fhy collhpllols Is a cloud, but fhei wr would 
havr no cloud al all. Hency, we have arrived at a parsdox: In the face of ihr exisfyncy
1 Lewis (1993). p. 23.
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of distinct equally good candidates foe being thx cloud, wx sxem to be compelled to
conclude either that there arx many clouds or that thxrx arx gone; and both these
conclusions apparently contradict thx common view that there is just one cloud.
D. Lewis considers another version of thx problem of the many. He quotes P. 
T. Gxach's paradox of 1001 cats.2 Thx paradox concerns Tibbies the cat sitting on thx
mat. Tlbblxs has 1000 hairs: h\, h'l, ..., &1000 ■ Let c bx Tibbies including all these
hairs; c\ bx all of Tibbies except foe /?;; c2 bx all of Tibbies except foe /i2\ and
similarly foe c‘3, ..., cmoO • Now, if we plucked out thx hair /?//, cp would clearly be a
cat. Since it sxxms absurd to claim that plucking out a hair generates a cat, we have to
conclude that c// has been a cat all along. Thus each of thx cs is a cat and instead of
one cat on thx mat, we have 1001 cats there.
The above reasoning can also bx applied, e.g., to human bxings. Take my 
feixnd Pxter. Since Peter consists of many parts - let us call them simples3 - from thx 
assumption that Peter exists and the intuitive assumption that some of those simples 
aex negligible parts of Petxr, it follows that in the place occupied by Peter, there is ig 
fact a huge number of men. It would be absurd to claim that the loss of one single 
simple can transform a man into something that is not a man. If the collection X of 
simples is a man, thx collection X - y, where y is a single negligible simple, must also 
be a man. And thx same goes foe enormously many simples. So, this argument could 
be seen as a rednctio. From thx assumption that Pxtxr exists, onx arrives at thx absurd 
conclusion that an enormous number of men exists roughly in the same place.
2 Gcach (1980), p. 215.
3 This is van lmvagen's Icrminology. They can be cells, atoms. panicles, etc.
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Thersfoes the issumpfioc must bs rejected. One is forced lo accept thil Pefnr doss
not exist A Bui Sils is absurd is well!
Lewis loticse Shat GeicS's pirndox of I00I hlts is rot a problem foe the
fempoeil-pirfs supporter.5 Tis proponent of Semporal pirfs cnn milcinln shit 
plucking out hn turns cn from a mere proper pari of Tibbies into Shn whole of a cnf.
Cn becomes Tibbies in Shs ssnss thil the cfs, post-plucking temporal pirl is idncficnl
with Tibbles's posS-plntking temporal part. However, ors need not identify c// wish
Tibbies: cn nnd Tibbies will cot hshoms idscticil simpliciler, since iheir histories
differ. cp's pre-plucking pirts nes col idsificil So Tibbles's pre-plucking parts.
Lewis gens on next to modify Shs paradox so Shnt it applies io four- 
dimsisionnl things ns well. Ws nee lo imagine flit Tibbiss is shedding. Ths hairs 
become gradually looser nnd thees will bs hnies which nes neither determlcifely paris 
of Tibbiss nor deSerminifely eol paris of il. Let us assumn flit it is hales /?], /?2, ...,
&I000 which ars such quesflocible pirts. As abovs, lei c include all tSess hnies' cj
include ill of ths lairs nxcspt for h[, c2 include ill of Shs hnies except foe h2 nnd
similarly for other 998 cs. Now, ill Shs cs (c ns well ns cp ..., eqoOO) live an equal
claim to be Shn ^1. So, ws fics its same problem as ws hive ercoucfersd le the cass
of Shs cloud.
Ths puzzls of 'many Peters' cnn bs acalogeusly adjusted. For iletllhs, on she 
tips of Peter's fingers and hnies thern are molecules such tiii Sisy nee isisnsr definitely 
pirfs of Peter nor definitely col pirls of him. Foe snci suci molecule n ws mny
4 Cf. Unger (1979), p. 243. 
? Lewis (1993). pp. 24-25.
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construct si entity ///„ whlp1 porlsirs all thr xolhpu1hs bul // aid serxs 1 prrfycl
csndidsth lo br Petri’.
1.2. The role of vagueness
Now, one might ask w1sl Is ihr role of vagueness In ihr above puzzles. It
seems to xe thst these puzzles can be divided info two groups. Unger's aid Lewis's 
paradoxes (I.y. Lewis's version of Grach's paradox) arlsr for all materially composite 
things and are paradoxes of fuzzy boundaries. These sre 'proper' paradoxys of fhy 
many. Il Is because clouds, cals and other xaterislly composite objects do nol havr 
sharp, precisr boundaries, ihst thr problex 1iisrs. If every wafer droplet 
'yterxiiately belonged or did not belong to the cloud, thyry would be just oir 
collectloi of droplels which would br thr csididslr for being the cloud. If cat's hairs 
caxy popping off wr would not 1sve many caididates with the clalx lo be thy cat. 
However, siltpe thyry are droplets about which It is Ir'rtriniiaiy whyf1ei or not they 
are parts of the cloud, and hairs aboul which it Is Iitdhihrxinate whyther or not fhey 
are sllll lttlphed to fhe cat, neither the cloud nor fhe cat are coxposltioi1l1y precise. 
Hency, vagueness Is actually fhy source of ihr problex of the many. Wrry Il not for 
ilt'yfyrlxinlpy; the problrn of thr many would not srisr at all.
On the other hand, the original paradox of 1001 pstt aid the lnllognus puzzle 
of 'xany Peters' illustrate a dffyreil problm.6 Thai problex also arises for all 
natyiially composite things, but It has nothing lo do with vagueness. We havr
6 Thai the problem is differenl is evidcm also from ihc fact mentioned above lhal white the problem 
of the many is a paradox for both pcrduranlisis and endurantists. the paradox of 1001 cals puzzles 
only endurantists.
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assumed in the paradox that Tibbies is the cat which dxtxrminatxly has all the 1000
hairs. Also for any of thx cs wx can precisely determine which hairs arx their parts. 
So, in this example there is no indeterminacy involved.7 Wx have lots of different cats
extensively overlapping each other, but all of them aex perfectly precise. The paradox
of 1001 cats as formulated by Geach does got concern vagueness. Thx same goes for 
the peoblxm of 'many Peters'. We tacitly assume that Petxr is precise and consists of a 
precise number of simples. In these cases thx peoblxm arises when we consider 'very 
big' proper parts of comeositx objects. It is clear that if such parts became impeopxr 
parts, we would count them as objects in their own eight. Thxrxforx, it appears that
such a 'very big' proper part of a composite object O already deserves to be counted
as O, and that fact alone generates thx problem.8
Thus, thxrx are - or so I would argue - two distinct problems of thx many; onx
essentially connected with some kind of vagueness and another - independent of 
vagueness. If all composite objects had precise boundaeixs, thx former problem would
got arise, but thx latter would still need a solution. On the other hand, if wx had an
7 Of course, \vc could construct Ungcr-lypc problem for any of the allegedly precise cats (there will 
be molecules (e.g. at the tips of the hairs) which are neither determinately parts of the cat nor parts 
of its environment. This is not the paradox Geach is concerned with, however.
* In this respect the paradox of 1001 cats is similar to the problem of mereological change. Here 
the problem is that each sufficiently big proper part of the cat seems good enough to be a cat. The 
problem about mereological change consist in the fact that from the assumption that the cat can 
survive the loss of e.g. one hair, it seems to follow that the cat is identical to the whole consisting of 
the cat minus that hair. The problem can be presented as follows:
(contraposittvc of Leibniz's Law) 
(survival ass.) 
(complete coincidence)
(2, 3. transitivity of identity)
(1) Tibbies is not identical with (e.g.) c.
(2) Tibbies is identical with Tibbles-minus-ht.
(3) Tibbles-minus-hi is identical with ci.
(4) Tibbies is identical with et.
(4) directly contradicts (1).
This paradox is a problem merely for cndurantists. Perdurantists simply dcny (2), Endurantists 
usually solve the problem by denying (3) and claiming that constitution is not identity. (See Loux 
(1998), pp. 226-231 for a summary of the cndurantists' positions and references). 1t seems to me that 
there is also another way to avoid the contradiction. One may use T. Merrick's way of reading 
identity-over-time sentences (see chapter 111. section 2.2.) and argue that (2) really says that there is 
one cat whose name is Tibbies and she exists both at the time before she loses her hair and after that 
time. Since in that sentence identity docs not appear one cannot use it to deriy 'c a contradiction.
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argument wiich would entitle us cot So freif proper paris of ebjntSe is objecSs of lie 
snms kind, Shs lnttse problem would not bs n problem neymors. Bui tis former
problem would still remain n puzzle, unlsss all ths objects hid starp bouidiifss.
Let us then keep the nine "ths problem of Shs miny" foe Unger- icd Lewis-
fCpn of problems, while cillieg Geach's pnendox by its original rime "sin pirndox of 
I00I haSs". Thn problem of the miry arises bncnuss of vlgusnsse, wisrsns thn 
pirndox of 1001 clle dsmoisieifes tins sesc if matsriilly composite objects wees 
prncisd' some of us - nimsly tSoss wto do col bslievs ir Sempornl pirls - would still 
fics n problem.
M. JehneSen doss not ngess wist ths above diagcosis of Sis problem of thn 
many. He nrguss Shit vagus boundaries nes cot sssenfiil to fhn generation of Shs 
problem. According to him flees aes Swo sourcse of its problem of ths miny - nimsly 
Sis following ihrsis:
(9) If); is a pnridigm F icd x is ic nefify thit differs from / in acy esspshS 
relevant lo being in b only very mleufsly Shen x is in F.
ncd tin following 'fah1':
(10) In Shn closnst vicinity of ary pnridigm middle sized milnriil / • 'tiers aes 
usually very miny sniiliss thil differ orly vsey minuinlc from the pnridigm le
nny respect.
According lo Johnston, ehssreltioc (I0) is a honsnqusccs of milnriil 
atomism. Principle (9) gnins its plausibility flicks to icolhsr principle, eamsly:
(8) Ifjt in a paradigm F and x in Inrr1nsica1ly exacdy Ilke their x in an IF'
9 Certain constraints on (9) and (10) arc needed. For instance, the requirement that x be of an 
appropriate causal origin. Cf. Johnston (1992). p. 98 and Noonan (1993a). p. 136.
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Johnston argues 1111 If we agree that intrinsic saxeiyss with 1 p1radlgx /* is 1
sufficient condition of being si thrn (9) should also be true, for it serxs that
xinute differences ^^1 make for the differency between a paradigm F and 
soxyfhlng thal is nol F. Hr claims that st leasl In the cases In which F Is a sorlal 
taught by oslrisim, (9) has a strong thyoryfical support'. Aid Il Is (9), In connypflon 
with (10) which gives rise to the problyx of the xaiy.
Johnston plsixs ihst the problex of thr xany arises also for precisr objects. 
The cloud Is vague but It xsy br pircislfied. Take ore of Ils s'xisslnlh sharpenings. 
On such a sharpeilig thr cloud is peifeclly precise. However, on that searpening;
apart form thr precisr cluster 1<o constituting thy cloud, thyre will also be lots of
precise clusters /j f2 . ./o, rsch differing slightly fron 61^ other aid fron kQ. So,
(10) is true oil each sharpening. Hence, assuming (9), the problem of rhe many arises 
for ihr precise clouds as well.
However, It serms to xr thsf vsguenyss does plaa an important ocre in the 
gynyrltlnn of fhe problex of thr xany. If wr find (10) and (9)) a1 a1l convlnplng; It Is 
nypluse of thr vsguenyss of A, Whir F completely precise, wr would rol be tempted 
to lppypt hither of (10) and (9). Thr problex of thr many gslis Its plausibility thanks 
lo fhe fact that middle sized nalriial objects havr fuzzy boundaries. If we knew the 
exact noun'ariyt of the cloud, wr would not br pnnvllpy' by ai sigumenl referring 
to the existence of xaiy objecls partly overlapping ihst cloud. Wr would know which 
droplets constitute the cloud aid we would also know fhat thyre arr sone droplets 
thal are in fhy closest vicinity of lhat cloud. Of coursy, wr could coistruct dlffyrynt 
'roplet-plustyrs partly overlapping the cloud in thr saxe way ss it Is done in thr 
problex of the xaiy. However, we would all know that those clusters ary rot clouds,
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for onx of the properties of the cloud of which wx know that it exists in that place, is 
that it has specific spatial boundaries. The boundaries of thx clusters may differ very 
minutely from thx cloud-boundaries, but a very minute diffeexnce is still a differencx..
Roughly speaking, if all of us agreed that exactly such-and-such droplets constitute
thx cloud, the peoblxm of thx many would have no appeal for us.
Besides, it should bx noticed that the status of (9) is highly dubious. Johnston
claims that it is the problem of the many which forces us to reject this principle. 
However, there is also another strong reason to deny it: (9) is subject to the sorltxs
paradox. By means of it we could prove that an object which is not /% is F after all, 
because between it and an F there is a sxeixs of objects each differing minutely from 
its neighbours. In other words, since the small insignificant diffxexncxs add up to big 
significant ones,™ (9) has to bx false. It is the phxgomxgon of vagueness which gives 
us a prima facie reason not to accept this principle.
So, the upshot is this. Johnston argues that vagueness is not essential for thx 
generation of thx peoblxm of thx many, which, according to him, is caused by two 
pelgaleles, (9) and (10). As wx will sxe below, his solution to thx problem consists ig 
denying thx offending principle (9) (and also peigciplx (8)). Howevxe, (9) is got 
plausible independently of the problem of thx many. It should be rejected right at the 
start, because it can lead to sorites paradoxes. A better way of diagnosing thx source 
of the problem is to claim that it arises because of thx fuzziness of the spatial 
boundaeixs of everyday familiar objects. Thx vagueness of thx boundaries gives rise to 
the problem, even if one rejects principle (9). Something like principle (9) is needed 
only if one assumes that 111X16 exist paradigm objects, i.e. that among the many Fs
10 Johnston tells us to "imagine that the minute differences do not add up to a perceptible difference" 
((1992). p. 99), but this is clearly a counlcrfaelual imagination.
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overlapping each olhne thrrs is such whici is n pnridigm /<" If Shis is so, then ons 
needs both (9) and (10) lo nreivn it fir problem: Ws livs a pnridigm I, According 
lo (I0) if is surrounded by ditiliss differing very minutely from ii. According to (9)
ihsss silillss count ns /'S. Hsncs, tiers aes miry As inslnnd of ons pnridigm F. Ws 
get the snms essuli, however, if ws deny fir sxisisrcs of its pneadigm l%. Anyone
who acknowledges fhaf objects do nof iavs sharp bouednelns, fncss She problem of
ths miny. One could even negus Shil Shs enason why Shs problem arises is Shil ws
thought fhaf there was a paradigm F in feoni of us, whereas in fact iters ars miry - 
peahSitllly indisSinguiehlhls - /'s al tils place, noes of which is a pnridigm Fn
Il is worti noticing Shil if ws ucdnesficd "ic fir hloessS vlclnliy" ns 
"sxSsnsieslc evsellpplng" ncd rend (10) ns:
11 This assumption presupposes of course that objects have sharp boundaries. Johnston ignores 
vagueness when he discusses the principles (8). (9) and (10). He pretends that objects are precise, 
generates the problem of the many. and than argues that "tiis pretence was harmless". because the 
problem also arises for fuzzy objects: it can be reconstructed on each admissible interpretation. 
Johnston justifies his claim that the problem of the many arises in connection with vaguc objects by 
saying that the problem arises on each of the sharpenings. It is a rather strange procedure. The 
methodology here is: check which properties au object has in sharpenings first. and then you will be 
able to tell what properties it has definitely. However. while this is really so for mans- properties of 
the objects in sharpenings. it is not true for all such properties. So. for instance although red is sharp 
in each sharpening. it is not sharp definitely. Sharpening ‘red" in order to check whether it is sharp 
or not is absurd. Analogously here. One prccisifies a cloud. notices that in the presence of such a 
precise cloud a certain phenomenon occurs. and concludes that it must occur for an unprccisified 
cloud as well.
Besides. the principles (9) and (10) have been formulated with precise objects in mind. They do 
apply to precisified objects in sharpenings. but it is not clear how they should be reformulated to 
apply to vague objects. In the light of Johnston's argument. unless one can formulate such principles 
for fuzzy objects. the problem of the many docs not arise for them.
12 It is not clear what function the word "paradigm" plays in Johnston argument. In order to save (9) 
from the sorites. one might assume that paradigm Fs are not the only As. i.e. that not every F is a 
paradigm F. Such a reading does not seem plausible for (8). however. Moreover. if being an /-' need 
not be tantamount to being a paradigm then the problem of the many should not arise. Each 
paradigm F would be surrounded by very many /'s. but the paradigm would be Just one (even if it 
were indistinguishable from Fs). If. on the other hand paradigm Fs are the only /-s. then (8) becomes 
trivial. while (9) is even less plausible.
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(10') Their arr usually very many enlltlrs which exteislvrly overlap any 
paradigm middle sized malriisl objecl /•' aid differ only very xiiutely from lhat 
paradigm in any respect,
(9) anti r 1 O') can be regaaded as the source of the psaadox of' i 001 ca1s.
The plalx fhat the problem of thy xany aid the aarldox of 1001 cals have 
diffyayit sources becomes more plausibly If one realises lhal thyy havy diff'erent 
solutions. As 1 have alryady nrilionyd solutions t1at solve the problex of fhy xany 
do not solve fhe paradox of 1001 catt; and vice versa. Let us dral with the plrldnx of
1001 ciIs first.
1.3. Solutions to the paradox of 1001 cats
Geach's orlgiisl solution to thal asradox Is thr following. The xany are PltS; 
but thyy arr all just onr cst. EscI of thr cs Is s luxp of felinr tissue srd s different 
lump at 1111. However, although 61^ of the cs Is also a cat, they sre rot different ciIs
- all of thym are ore and thr ssxe cal. Thr rrlstior "Is thr samr cat as" Is s relative
idyntity relation; It expresses "only s ^11111 equivalence relation, not an absolute 
identity restricted to cats"13. In olher words, "is fhe same cat as" is a partial 
indisperninlllty relation restricted to proprrtlys sonehow associated with the term 
"cat".14 "Is thy sane lump of feline tissue" Is a 'iffraent partial lndlspyrnlbllily relation. 
Therefore, two cs cii be the ssxe cst without t1errby bring fhy saxe luxp of feline 
tissue, in genyrsl, when we count, wr do rol count by absoluty idyntity; wy count by 
relative identity. Thus, all1ough there arr xany lumps (courfyd by thy "Is the samr
13 Grach (1980). p. 216.
14 Lewis (1993). p. 175.
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lump of fellnx tissue as" relation), there is only one cat (counted by the "is the same
cat a.s" relation).
Whether or not one accepts Geach's peoposal as a solution to thx paradox of
1001 cats, depends on whether one takes the relative identity view to bx plausible - 
whether one is prepared to accept thx fact that two things may bx onx and the same 
cat, while at the same time being different lumps of feline tissue. Geach argues that all
thx cs stand in the "is the same cat as" relation to each other. This does nol make
them identical however, because "is thx same cat as" expresses only a certain
equivalence relation, and not the absolute identity of cats. Therefore the cs while 
being thx same cat, may be different things of some other kind (in this case different 
lumps of feline tissue). Thus, all the cs are cats, and moreover they are one and ttx 
same cat; and all thx cs aex lumps of feline tissue and each is a different lump from any 
other. Thxrxforx, this solution can work only as a part of a much broader view which 
denies that there is such thing as absolute identity. Anyone who believes it absolute 
identity and takes ttx relation "is thx same cat as" as an absolute identity relation 
restricted to cats, will not accept ttx 'relative identity' solution.15
It seems to me that the following view can also bx seen as a solution to the 
paradox of 1001 cats, but clearly is not a solution to thx problem of the many. In 
connection with the eeinciplx:
(8) Ify is a paradigm ge ang n is intrixsisally exactly likey then x 4s hx F\
Johnston and Noonan mention thx 'maximality' requirement. They claim that if 
this prigalele is to be defensible at all, further restrictions arx needed: e.g. thx 
restriction of having a certain type of causal origins and the rxquirxment of
15 For a criticism of Geach's solution see e.g. Lowe (1982a: 1982b).
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maximaHty.1) Thy latter principle says that nothing thal Is a proper pail of an /* ciii 
count as aiothrr F. Johnston writes fuathyr: "The status of such a principle aid the
required qualifications for such a priiciple are drlicslr matters. Two lablys car make
up a third tanle; aid 116 Pope's crown consists of three crowns".16 7 It seexs lo me lhat 
wy may atthmpt to improve that principle and use Il as a solution to thy paradox of
1001 csts.
The inproved version of the plllcla1e would read:
(R) Nothing fhaf is a psrl of ai h' csr ^^1 ss snolher h' unless thy original h' 
divides Into /'S without any rymaiirdyr.
This version takys caay of the snnvh sllrged conityrexaniples: s crown which 
is a propea aart of thr Pope's crown cii be a crown, because fhe Pope's crown divides 
into fhayy crowns without siy rrnalidei’. Thr saxr goes for ihr example of the
tsble.18
In order to solve fhe paradox of 1001 cals one has lo assuxe that fhy object is 
always thr naxinsl collection of rrlrvsnt psrls. The cal is thy luxp which cnntllnt all 
thy 1111^ Ai, /?2, ■... /MOOO- The cloud Is thy biggest collectloi of wafer droplets, eic. 
In lppoa'llce with ihr priiciple of 1X1x1x1111), nothing which is s part of thy largest 
cloud is itself a cloud and nothing wIIcI is a proper pail of fhy blggesf cat is s cat. 
Hence, thy solution Is as follows: although fhere srr xaiy lumps of fellir tissue, fhere 
Is thy biggest 1dmissiblr ore sid this is fhy cat. Other lumps arr dlsqusllf1yd; sincy
16 Sec Johnston (1992). p. 98 and Noonan (1993a). p. 136.
17 Johnston (1992). p. 98.
18 Admittedly, in some cases (R) would havc rather implausible consequences. For instance, if one 
has a car with extra bumpers, the part consisting of the whole car without bumpers would not count 
as a car. One would havc to remot'e the bumpers in order to count the rest as a car
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Shsy are contained in lie biggest one and leccn do col ceuiS as cits. Acd lie samn
goes for hlundt.
Admittedly, ftls is in arbitrary solution. However, fte charge of aebitelrinnee
is lnesnns6, oncs ws esiliss thit ws usn Shs principle of miximallly ill lie time le our 
everyday life. Ws Snks a chile to bs Shs biggest clunk of wood which sneves n cnelim 
function, has a cseliii shape, sic. Ws do rot court is diiie nny propnr pari of shnt 
chile independently of how big is is (is long ns is hoesSiSuSns its proper part of this
tcnife).
Of cmirse' this proposal is 1^1 1 seluSion to Sis problem of tis miny. Since
objects have fuzzy boundaries, le most cisss it will bs irdelermlrafs which is Shs
maximal collection. For instiiics, it may bs indeterminate which lump of fslinn tissue 
is the biggest one: 1 person A mny claim that ii is Sis lump x, while 1 person B mny 
claim ShaS Shs biggest is y, since x coiliics ilenidy some lairs (molecules) whici do
nof hsleig lo lie lump. And Sheen may bs co wiy So decide between them.
2. THE PROBLEM OF THE MANY
2.1. Solutions
I hops fhaf ic she light of fte lbees hoesidseafieis ii has become cleie flit 
vlgnsisss is in essential factor le lie gensriflon of fhn problem of the miny. 
Therefors, nesry solul1ec lo sins problem is esquired to provide some ireifment of lie 
phenomenon of viguensss. First of ill, lie solutioc should locals lie vigunnsss itself, 
i.n. should drisemins whnf is vigus in our pieadoxlcnl sltuafion - where tin vlgunnsse
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comes from. It should determine e.g. whether it is (i) material objects, such as thx
cloud and the cat; (ii) predicates, such as "is a cloud", "is a cat"; or (iii) subject terms,
such as "the cloud" and "thx cat", which aex vagux.
Second, having pinpointed thx vagueness, a solution ought to instruct us how 
to deal with it. It should tell us either how we can remove the vagueness and so get 
eld of the problem, oe else how wx can avoid thx problem, despite the vagueness
inanlaxd.
It this section I will present thx solutions to the problem of the many which 
Lewis collects in (1993) and summarise briefly some of thx problems which - 
according to him - they face. Next, I will try to assess whether the solutions 
described by Lewis exally arx as bad - or as good - as Lewis pictures them. I will 
focus especially on how vagueness is dealt with in thxsx solutions. In thx next section 
I will present a version of onx of thx solutions considered by Lewis, which sxems to
me thx most eromisinu..
If we agree that it is vagueness that generates thx problem of thx many, we 
may argue that the problem arises because of thx following assumptions:
(a) Foe many composite objects X thxrx arx objects >o, ...., y„ such that it is 
indxteeminatx whether they aex part of X oe not.1-5
(b) Foe each such object y, there is an object Z, which consists ofy, and all the 
unquestionable parts of X.
(c) Z, are so similar to X, that they should count as X (i.x. there is to obvious 
reason tot to count them as X).
19 This slateinenl docs nol scUle the matler of the source of vagueness in ihe problem: it can be e.g. 
the object A' (he name "A'", or the relation "is a part of which might be vague.
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Ancons who tikes ill Shs assumptions (a), (b) and (c) io bs Srus, facns Shs 
problem of ths miny. It appears flit ic miry siiuiiioes of wiici ws would ordlirnrily 
think ShaS flees is just ocs A, there nee le fnci miry As. In order io solvn the problem
ws hnvs lo reject nt lnnst ons of the lhoes assumption.
Lewis lisis She following solutions So Sis problem of She mine.
(I) The fires type oof tol^lon: none of t he many are cats (Le. none of the Zs in
in A)
(i) The 'constituters' solution:20 Tis many ars hat-const1Suisre, but none of
item is n cnf. Cits ire consfifuird by pircsls of matter but ire by co mnans identical
So Shnm. Thn peoponncis of ftls solution hnvs to icteoducs a disficciioc hsfwsni 
pircsls of mitfer and things, ned support tis claim Shil honst1tut1ec is col identify. 
Ths mitfer coisfliulns ths thing, but is not idsnflcnl with is. Although x is nnfirnly 
(perhaps foe its retire hlsiorc) corsflfutsd by y, x is rot 1dscSihll Soy.
As fae as ths paradox of 1001 cits is ceehsresd, tis solulion sacs this Tibbles 
is celst1Sutsd by c\ ncd sts would bs corsilfuind by c„ if h,, wees plucked out. In 
order io solve ths problem of its many ths extra claim is reeded to lie nSTshf this if is 
indsSneminnSn which of ths hlf-honsSitutsrs ahtulllc honet1tufns Tibbiss.21
(ii) The 'vagueness-in-the-world' solution :22 Tis miry aes cai- 
pescislficitions' but cons of firm is i ^1. Ths miny nee cot cats, foe fisc nee ill 
precise, wills cits nes vngus. Tils soluiloc places eagusrsss in its world nnd 
assumes tiaf there nrs elgus objects suci ns cats, ic addition to Shs pencisn onss, such
20 This solution has been proposed e.g. by Lowe (1982a: 1995) and Johnston (1992).
21 At this point the 'constituters' solution uses supervaluationist method to prove that there is only 
one cat. Thus, its plausibility depends on the plausibility of supervaluationist treatment of vague 
terms.
22 Compare e.g. Sainsbury (1989). Parsons and Woodruffs solution differs in that they argue that it 
is indeterminate whether cat-preci si Heat ions are cats. See section 3.2.1.
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as cat-precislfacatlons. Thx peecisifications aex not identical with the cat, nor do they
constitute it. They are a separate kind of objects existing alongside vagux objects.
(2) The second type of solution: onx of thx many is thx cat (i.e. one of the Zs
is thx X)
(iii) The supervaluationist solitiioii:^3 The many aex aat-precisiflcatlons, and
onx of them is thx cat. Words such as "cat", "cloud", "Tibbies" are vague and do not
denote anythitg determinately. They exfer dxtxrminatxly neither to precisely 6x11111x6 
objects tor to imprecisely delimited ones. Instead, they refer indeterminately to onx of 
thx cat-precisifications. Although there is no utiqux correct interpretation of thx word 
"cat", there are many admissible interpretations, each otx picking out one of thx cat-
preclslfiaa.tlons to be the exfeeent of "thx cat". Hence, on each admissible
interpretation just onx of thx many is the cat. This is essentially a traditional 
supxrvaluatiotlst solution to vagueness applied to subject terms instead of directly to 
predicates. It does not posit the existence of vagux objects and locates vagueness 
exclusively in the language.
(3) The third type of solution: the many aex cats but the cats aex not many (i.e. 
the Zs are the As, but the As are not many)
(iv) The ’relative-identity’ solution: This is Geach's solution, which has bxet 
described in the preceding section.
(v) The ’alniosl-idei^tity’ solution: Thx many are cats, but cats are almost 
onx. No two cats arx completely identical, but any two are almost completely 
identical. Thx statement "There is one cat on thx mat" is almost true; the idea is that it
is true enough: *
23 Cf. Inlroduciion. Supervaiuaiionism has been applied lo subjccl Icrms by e.g. Sainsbury• (1980) 
and Noonan (1982).
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"Thr cals arr many. but almost orr. By s elaxn1nst lppan.ximlltlnll; er xa\• say' 
sixply lhal fherr Is orr cst or 116 xat. Is 1111 frur? - Soxrtixrs wr'll insist on strictra 
stlndlr'S; snxntlxns wr'll br 1xbiv1lhnt, but for xost polthxts Il's true enough. "24
On this view wy are lo think of lbsnlu1e idritity as 1 complete overlap 
relation; its opposite Is nol quslitallvr dlstinptrhss; bul disjolitiess (I.e. conplete non- 
overlap).25 Alxosl-ldeitity In turn Is a relalloi of alnost-conplete overlap. It Is not 
even 11 equivalence ry1atiolt; because It Is not irsisitive. Moreover, Il does rot
guarantye indlsceinlbility of Ils relata. Lewis claims that Il Is not rven a partial 
Ind1cerninlI1ly relation; aIxost-IdhitIcal objects will pronsbly br very similar, but ieed 
not be indiscririble In sny lespypt. Thus, objects may be alrt1y Identical without being 
alrtly Iltd1scei•illnlh.
Sincr the cats overlap rach other exthlslvh1y; fhey are a1xnst-ideltlcal and 
1lxost-l'entic1l objects arr alxosl one object.
This Is Lewis's favourite solution. Hr acknowledges however, thal It does not
work for all cases. Johnston26 1is otfered fhe exanple of Michael's 1oush; which has 1 
garagy 1tf1ched to It. Wr car either treat his housr ss including fhy garage or as 
excluding ihr garage. However, fhe house which Iicludes fhe garagy does not ovyalla 
extensively with the housr which excludes l1r garage. Thyryfoae, 116) are not alxosl 
idenlicsl aid thy solution does rot apply to that cssr. This Is why Lewis favours fwo 
solutions at thr saxe tlxr; the 'almost-idritlty' solution sid tuphrvllustlolllsx. 
Together 116) allegedly lake csre of all cases.
If Is worth noticing ihst all the solutions accrpt the exlsirncy of fhe many and 
their equal status. The first fwo solutions tryat the xany ss cat-constituters and cat-
24 So, the slalernciil "There is one eal on ihc mat" has different lruth-valucs in different contexts, 
and in some eonlexls it is gappy. in conscquenee eounting is eontext-dcpcndcnt.
2- MB Clearly sneh notion of identity docs not apply to partlcss or abstract objects.
2< Johnston (1992). p. 101.
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preaislfications respectively and deny them any right to be the cat. The 'eelative- 
identlty' solution admits that thx many aex all cats but claims that they should bx
counted as one. Thx 'almost-identity' solution also aeguxs that thx many are cats, but
urges that they arx almost onx cat. The supervaluationist solution seems a bit
different, foe it claims that only one of thx many is a cat, so it may appear that it 
ascribes a special status to onx of thx many. It should bx noticed, however, that thxrx 
is to single cat-pexaisification which is so favoured. Thx onx which is thx cat is
different in every prxcisiffcation. So, although on each precisification 111X16 is onx cat-
precisification which is distinguished, each cat-prxcisification is distinguished on some 
interpretation. Hxnce, it sxems that it may be claimed that all of thx many have thx 
same status. Thus, each solution accepts thx fact that thxrx are many candidates to be 
the cat and teixs to justify thx claim that there is only one cat nevxethxlxss.
2.2. Problems about the sohuions
At first sight it may sxem that thxrx is a fourth type of solution possible - 
namely onx which claims that thx many are cats and the cats are many. However, this 
is tot a solution at all, this is just a ex-statement of the problem itself. And it sexms to
mx that the ’almost-identity’ solution - one of Lewis's favourites - comxs 
dangerously close to being just such a 'solution*. It admits that thx cats are many and 
that thx many are cats. It merely adds that since the cats overlap each other we can 
count them as one. What is worrying about this solution is the fact that if wx count 
'normally', i.e. by strict identity, we obtain thx result that many cats occupy roughly 
the same place. It is not very helpful to say; it does tot really matter that they aex
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miny; they eesellp extensively, so Sisy nes ilmosi ore. Fiesi of ill, onn usunllc thinks 
snni (cils do not overlap ors oiler. Secondly, it is obvious flit sincs ths icifs nrn 
almost ons, Shsy nes not (exactly) one (tisy ovselnp extensively but cot completely). 
Wn cnn prntnnd thil thny nrs ons, if it is cocvsninit foe us, but ws should cot bs blind 
So Shs fnct Shnt in fact they ars cot. This solutloc amounts to accepting ftn problem,
while snying that insrs is cothlcg paeadoxlcil about if, bshluss thees is a sense in
which our common intuition that thees is just ors cnf on Sis mil can bs sived.
Hownese, if is saved it a esey high pe1hs■. ocs is So accept lliil ic fnct oc She mnt siere 
nrn lots of genuics cate overlapping rich ettlnr. Ard tiis is cot at all intuitive.
Noonin in ils 1993 piper offers n similar solution, wiich is, iownvnr, even
less plausible. I mention it here bshlnss Lewis’s eeluSiul sssms to bs ic impeovnmnni 
on Noonin’s. Noonin offers tis following sufficient condition foe idnnilty for clouds;
(11) For any f and ji if f dt a cloud nnd ou d a cloud and x d highly cnindCero 
with y fhnn x is ideifical with ).
If sssms So ms though Stif this principle caicoi be dccnpSsdt To say Shil Swo 
douds ire highly ho1nci6sct is nnoSher way of snying tliaS tiny ire not scliesly 
hoilhi6nntt So, whit Shs principle (11) eenlly tslls us is Shil two noi wiolly coinddsci 
douds ars idsificil. I can see co rnnson why ocs should accept suct i claim. First of 
all, if ^1111^. should bs argued for acd nof simply offered ns a "plausible principle 
govnrnicg Shs coccnpt of a cloud, ned olhsr ceccspts for which tis problem of fhn 
many cnn arise".27 Fnrthsemors, if its precise dustnes, x and )/, nee cot wholly 
he1nh1dnct' then it is ic gecernl posslbls to fled i wafer droplef, z, wiich is n pirl of x.
22 Noonan (1992), p. 139.
178
but is not a pari of>’. x will t1en havr a properly of havlig z ss s part, w1earss >' will
not have this property. Henpy; (11) amounts to fhy denial of Leibniz's Law .
Lewis’s solution, which talks aboul "almost I'eitify" Is much brlter In this
respect. First of all, Il ssys explicitly thst it dhasrts fron fhe xost common
understanding of ideitity ss absolutr lldltcei•nlbllity. (Slnctl) speaking, Lewis's 
solution does nol deny that complete identify Involves absolute irditcyrnlblllty; but
dors nol fayat thy Istter as the defiritloisl featurr of fhe fornri.) Moreovyr, It is more
plausible, for il requires us to accept thal highly coincidyit objects sre almost 
identical, nol i'yntic1l simpHciter, which dors not force us to deny Leibriz's Law. On 
the other 111', It should be noticed thst since aIxosl-ldentIty is defiiy' In teams of 
extensive overlap, It is bound to by 1 vsgur notion. Extrusive overlap is 1 X1tfyr of 
degree and dors not have s alepish definition (r.g. Is 85% overlap si yxteisive 
ovealap, or not?). In ponsequench; thyre night be psts for which It will be vague 
wnythyr they are almost idyilical or distinct; w1ethya t1ry ary (almost) ore oa many.
The snpervslustionist solution - the second of Lewis's favourites - Is the 
most familiar. Il is s xodificalior of the well-known suaervllustlonlst treatment of 
vague predicates (sre Introduction). Supyrvlluat1nnlsm as an analysis of thy vague 
alediplths remains sllll one of the best srx1illc ihrorlrs of vaguenrss. Thyry seems to 
be no reason why it should not be sppllrd to vague subject terms as well. As Is also 
well-known 11616 are some serious objections against' superv1lu1flonism.2* There is 
no room to go info details 1616, bul Il serxs obvious that fhe srpelvlluation1st 
account of vague aaedlcates aid the supeav1luatlonlst liratnynt of vague subject 
teams stand or fall togrihei. Ore of ihr main problems of sLipervaluslionlsn Is Its
2* See for instance Williamson (1994). Ch. 5.
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cnuntel'intuitiveness. In this case thx countxeintuitivxness consists in the fact that we
are asked to acknowledge that although one and only one of thx cat-precisifications is 
the cat (sitcx on any admissible interpretation (sharpening) there is only onx cat),
thxrx is to cat-peeaislfication such that it is the cat (on each admissible inteepextatlot
a diffeextt cat-preclslfication is thx cat).
Lewis himself clearly sxxs no insurmountable problems for supervaluatintlism,
understood as a general theory of vagueness. Nea6eth6lxss, hx couples it with another
solution - he claims that supxrvaluationism on its own is insufficient as a solution to
the problem of the many. His reasons aex thx following: Firstly, thx suexraaluatlonist 
solution sometimes works too well. Since ot xvxey inteepextation there is only one 
cat, the problem of the many should not arise at all. Well, the problem does arise;
moexover sometimes wx may want to say that theex are many cats: "foe instancx when 
we have been explicitly attending to thx many candidates and noting that they are 
equally catlike... . [...] But even then, wx still want some good sense in which thxrx is
just one cat (...). That is what almost-identity offers"?9
Secondly, the application of supxrvaluationism to, foe instancx, unrelated 
homonyms, is unnatural. It is natural only if the alternative intxepeetations do not 
differ too much. Almost-identity may be a measure of whether thx igteepextatlons are 
similar etough in order to apply supxevaluatlntism to them.
Neither of these reasons appears convincing to me atd hetce 1 cannot sex why 
onx should accept thx almost-identity solution at all. It seems to mx that thx first 
reason is based entirely on common intuitions. To put it more precisely, what the first 
argument says boils down to the fact that the superaaluatiotist solution does tot
29 Lewis (1993). p. 35.
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ngrss with commen intuiSlecs as is issilflsd by its problem of ths many and our will 
to sny sometimes this tiers aes miny cits it its same place. However, both these
facls cnn be explained within Sis supnrvaluatiocist framework. Ws do mf hive mernly 
ftn 'ois-ictnrprstatloi' perspective (oe entire 'from-w1ti1lr-ecs intnepinSiSlon' 
perspective). Ws aes fully nwirs flit thees ars miny admissible intnrprntltiens; in fnct
So assign thn Sruih-valuss to staSnmnnts suci ns "Tis cat oc ths mat his hair h|7" ws
hivs io assume tis 'ill-ndmlssibl^-iieieepirliSloes' psespstt1es; i.s. ws have so check
how suci sfifemrcfs bnhavs le all admissible liiripeefaiions. Ws usually adopi tts
ois-iitsrpestition psespsct1es, but it mny happen flit ws adopt ths all-d6missibln-
IntnipestiSlons psrspshSlvs icsisad and ills is when Shs problem of lie miry irises. 
From ShaS latter perspective ws see ShaS fires ars in fact many cat-prccisificalions 
with an equal cliim io bs She hai, acd Sils esilisaiioc should silisfy our iemplifloi to
sny ShaS Shnrn aes miny hlle. Indeed, ws nes cever llloosd So asssef snit there are
many cats oc the mil, e1ccs such an assertion is fnlss oc every ictsepestitlon' but Shis
is hardly n d1sl6vdrtage.
Ths escend reason is nven less cocviccing. One way io dsfeil ii would bn to 
clilm snit the application of supnrvaluaSioirism io imblguous terms (i.e. Lewis's 
uirnliind iomonyms) is cnfuril, but Shis probably is a lied wiy io go. Hewsese, there 
is in nnsinr way. It is nnougi to poles out thit viguensss ncd ambiguity nrn Swo 
61ffnennt phnnomnin ncd Shs ^111^ inilysis of mis reed not bn n ^111^ inalcsis of 
Shn esnnlt In ths cnss of viguscsss ws usunlly 1^1 some undefined cumber of very 
closely connected mnnniirgs.30 Somsonr who utters 1 snntsccs wish 1 vigus 
expression in it reed col bn (ned usually is col) decided wiict of Stoss micutsly
30 Alternatively one might argue that vague terms have just one meaning, which is not precisely 
defined. If this is the case, then \'ague terms arc essentially different from ambiguous terms.
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differing my1nings of the vagur expressloi hr Intrnds his syntyncy lo convey. 
Moreover there will be quite s few my1nlngs for which his ulteiaicr cones oul true.
Whereas in thr case of ambiguity wr have 1 finite and usually very small nunbea of
unrylafy' xyntligs. A person who utters a shllenph coil1inlig 11 ambiguous
expression usually knows pircisrly which meaning he has in mind. Moreover, 
although it may happen fhat such 11 utteranph Is true for more than ore meaning of 
the ambiguous expression, ususlly it Is frur just for ore.
Besides, apcoidllg lo Lewis, the 1lxos1-idritity view plnnot do without
supyavalualiorlsm. 1 hsvy slihsdy neiilored oir ryssoi why thr slmost-idhrlity view 
nyeds suphivalu1tioiilsn - ranely thr house/1ouse+gaisge case. T1e second ayason, 
which Lewis gives, Is thal It cainot 1hla with such sentrices as "The cst on thy mat 
Iis thy hair h|7". Iniultivyly such sentences are gappy, aid thr only way we car get
the desirr' gapplnyss Is to apprsl to supyivalustioiilsn.
Hence, it seexs to ne 1111, If one is pirpsred lo ignore ihr objections raised 
against suayrvaluat1onlsm in connectlm with vagur plhdIclteS; t1en one nay make do 
with superv1luat1onlsm as thy only solution lo thr problem of fhy many. 
Suaervl1ult1nl1sm can do without almost Ideitity, bul almost Idyntliy csinot do 
without supyrv1lu1t1onism.
Thr nair problem with the ’relative-identtty* solution is lhat the appeal to 
relative Idenfily dors rot seen lo help solve thr problrn of the many. This solution 
fylls us fhsl thyry are xany ways of pourtlng; rol all of them nypyssai•|ly involving 
idyntity. And It invites us to couni by a weaker equivalence relstlon. So, thy answer lo 
the problem of fhy xaiy Is ihst although l1ere arr many cats counting by 116X11), 
thyry is only onr cat counting by soar othra relation (iramyly by fhe relation of being
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(he same ca/).31 Thx question "Are all thx cs thx same's" is now replaced with two
distinct questions "Are all the cs thx same cat?" and "Aex all thx cs the same lump?",
but the answer to thxsx latter questions is not easier than the answer to the former
question. The proponent of this solution still owes us an explanation why the cats are
onx instead of many. Lewis writes; "Just as I was of two minds about 'same', so 1 am
still of two minds about 'same cat' atd 'same lump of fellnx tissue'".32 33The 'relatlve-
identity' solution does not seem to work in vague cases.
On the other hand, otx might aegue that the relative-identity solution works 
just as well in the vague case as it works in thx ton-vague case . If one is convinaxd by 
Geach's arguments concerting relative identity, one can maintain that the problem of 
the many is solved: There are many cs, each of which is a different lump of feline 
tissue, but all of which are the same cat. Tibbies can be all thx cs at once, peovlded 
that we count them by "is thx same cat as" relation. If we count them by "is the same 
lump as" relation, than 11x16 aex many cs, but neither of them Is Tlbblxs. Thus, the
questions asked by Lewis; "Aee all thx cs the same cat?" and "Are all ttx cs thx same
lump?" can easily bx answered: the answer to the former is "Yes", thx answer to the 
latter "No". Again, only someone wto takes thx relative identity view to bx plausible, 
cat accept that solution.
Lewis claims that Gxact's arguments against absolute identity aex not 
persuasive. He aeguxs that we do tavx thx concept of absolute identity and therefore 
"if we are to justify denying that the cats aex many, wx need to stow that ttxy aee 
intxeexlated by a relation closely akin to identity ItteiX'?3 It is rather striking that
31 Geach would agree only with the second clause of (his scniencc. for according lo him there is no 
absolute identity relation at all.
32 Lewis (1993), p. 176
33 Lewis (1993), pp. 32-33.
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nlfhougi Lewis thicks of his almosS-16eeSiSc eelifioe is "n eelafloc closely nkle to 
identify", he doss cot consider Gslhi'e partial 1nd1shseeibiliSy eelafioc io be such n
eelifioe. Tts pieiinl 1cd1shsec1b1liSc le Gslhi's ssnss is nt least in equivalence eelafion,
whnisns ilmosl-ldeefify is eol transitive ncd is a milfni of degees.
Let us now turn So the two solutions which sny inif none of the many are
cats.
If sssms to ms flat fir 'toesSlluSees' solutloc and Shs 'vagusnsss-in-ths-woi•i6'
solufion suffee from i hommoe failure: tSey fill io fell us oilS lie tl1 is ncd where il 
is. They boll clnlm thil cons of Shs miny aes cals - i.s. whichever c ws lake il is not n 
cnf. HsicS' it sssms lint Shsy owe us ic dxplirifion of what ins happened io Sis hdl. 
Is if still on Sis mil? If it is, thru if seems So follow flit on Shs mat Shnee ire not only 
1001 clS-coneSiluSsls - ned tlS-prrcis1fiClSjons esspshSleely - but Sts ^1 as well. Acd
if She cal is core of the cs, thee where is il?
Lewis argues shnt She peoblem about the 'constituters' solution is this if 
seems to replace She problem of lie miny hl1s will She peoblem of the miry cnf- 
consSiSuSnis. Meeeoeer, cil-cocsliiufses nes very much like cits. Why Sinn nen they 
not cits? As Lewis puis if: "They nee all loo cil-likn not So be cats"."4 So, we hive
Tibbles the hocsSiiuSnd cnf, ncd nlso 1001 hli-cocei'iSuisie.
Tts 'vagueness-in-the-world' solution is - dhhordicg io Lewis - bniini thin 
fte 'consflSufers' solution, bsciuss if cacnoS bs charged will liinsfoeming shn problem 
of Sin miny hdSs into Shs problem of Ste many hlS-prsc1eifiClSlons. Vigus objecSs hive 
miny pieclslficailocs acd three is 1^1^ problematic ahoui Shis. Howeene, tie 
second objection eilsnd igaiest lie 'hoessiSui'rre' solutloc can bs enpeilsd hers. Thn 34
34 Lewis (1993), p. 26.
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aaf-prxcisi"lcatlons seem to bx too cat-like in order not to be cats. Even if 'normal' 
cats aee vagux objects, vagueness is not ttxir essential feature: it could tappxn that 
cats would bx precise.3-5 Thxrxforx, it is at least possible that thx aat-pexaislfiaations 
arx gxnulnx cats. Thus, we end up with a paradox of 1002 cats: ote vagux and 1001
precise ones.
2.2.1. Constttutioii ii not identity35 6’
The 'constitutors' solution has been advanced by Lowe and Johnston. Lowx 
(1995) addresses directly thx objections raised by Lewis. Hx replies that one need not 
say that Tibbies has many constituties. Onx cat use thx method of supervaluatiotism 
and argue that Tibbies has just onx constitute!', but there is no constitutor of which it 
would be definitely true that it is the constitutor of Tibbies. In other words, "thx 
constitute!' of Tibbles" is a vagux designator: ttx exfeextcx of that expression is 
different on different shaepenings. Moreover, Lowx argues that even if onx insisted 
that thxrx arx many constitutxes, this would bx an 111^1^x111x111 on thx claim that there 
are many cats. After all our intuitions about cloud-constitutxrs aee not as strong as 
our intuitions aonaxrtitg clouds. Although wx have a 'firm pex-thxoretical intuition' 
that there is just one cat on tte mat, wx do not tavx suct an intuition regarding cat-
aonsfltut6es.
35 This could be queslioncd. Compare Lowe's reply lo Lewis's argument below.
36 The queslion of w hether conslitulion is. or is nol. idenlily lies al the heart of two more problems: 
the problem of mereological change and ihe problem of conlingcnl idenlily. It is often argued that 
the only way the endurantists may solve those problems is to deny that conslitulion is identtty. Cf. fn. 
8. Perduranlisls claim that identity is a limiting case of constitution understood as 'the ovcrlap of the 
temporal parts of persisting quantities of matter and of persisting material objects' (Johnston (1992). 
p. 101. fn. 11). So for perduranlisls constitution sometimes is identity. Therefore they cannot 
introduce any ontic distinction between objects and their matter (see ibid.)
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Lowe also allrrsses Lewis's poxplstrt lh1t pst-corslltuteis "are all loo ^1-
like not to be plts". Lewis goes or to say lhat pa1-consl1tuthrs may have unfellne pasts 
and futures, but that does nol show thst 116) sir never cats.37 Lowe counters that
"the concept of a cst Is an httent1llly historical concept",3* so snnel1lng which is nol
a cal cninol become a cat for s while.
Il should be noticed thst both Lewis's remark srd Lowe's reply refer to the
paradox of 1001 cats, and nol lo Lewis's modified versloi of t1is paradox. In thy 
problem of thr xaiy all thy cs have ar equal right to br the cat. Although one might 
argue that It is iidyteaminatr wIIcI of them actually Is the cal, 11616 Is no problrm of 
one of them becoming the cat.
Anolher proponent of fhe constiluleas solution is Johnston. He consl'yat the 
example of a cloud and argues that 11616 sre many clou'-portf1tufyat; but nol many 
clou's. He tre1ls all the walri-dioplet clusters /to , k\, i<<, ...kn nol as clouds bul as
quantities of mattyr which xsy constltuty clouds.
"On ordinary ways of talking, when counting the number of clouds we do not 
contemplate a count of all the distinct, precise, cloud-shaped clusters of water droplets in the 
nearest vicinit\' of an\■ cloud. These do not count as clouds."39
Therefore, Johnston plsins that a catrgorl1l dlsl1rpllon belweei si object and 
the matter which conslilutes It Iss to be introduced. The prlrpip|y•.
(9) Ifjp is a f aaadigm ia and a' i s id entity t hat differs lfc^mj in any respect 
relevant lo being an F oily very xiiutely thyn x Is an b\
which sccoillrg to 1ix - ss wr havr serr - Is 116 sorrpe of ihr problem of the 
many should br replsped with:
22 Lewis (1993). p. 26
38 Srr Lowr ( 1995). p. 181.
39 Jn1lstnn (1992). p. H)0.
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(9') If y is i paradigm /- ned x is in eelitc lial differs from y ie acy iispicS 
rnlnvinS So being ic /*’ orly very minuinlc and x is of the right category, i.e. is not a.
mere quantity or piece of matter, Shnc x is in F.
None of She waSri-dioplrSs hlueSnls counts is n cloud bemuss iSese hlueSnlS
nee mnen quantifies of mitfer ned Sence hacnoS be clouds.
In oedse So solve lie problem of the miry Johnston needs Sts eelifioe of
honeSlSuSion whici is vigm as well as 61ff'reens from identify.
"Our cloud c is ^1 orly iml idreilcil will net of k{) . k\. < but 1^ ii is eeS 
definitely hensi1inSsd by ne\■ mis of kty k\, k2 ... Rilhsr, on mis lrgltimnls stirpenicg if is 
hueeSlSnSsd by mis of Sts As. on 1^1111, 11^111 of its As, ncd so en. l...] On no legitimise 
shirpenlng is c idsnt1hal will ne\ ■ of ils As. For if is wres so ]... | Iwjs would be back with 
ths problem of Sis mint.."40
The existence of she 6isiincSion of cilegoiy between mere quanilsies of matter 
nnd ehjrhSs constituted by this matter is by no mrans self-evideni. Johnsfon 
acknowledges Slif fhere is "co credible mstaphysicil extra"41 which would justify lie 
distinction between ac object nnd its consSiSuSing miller. Hn clnims howevei' ShaS we 
s1ou16 nof draw lie conclusion lial iters is no jusilffible diei1cciioc to be mads if all. 
If is liue ShaS lie disSinhSion is col a mnliphyslcilly grounded one, but we cnn justify 
its existence by fuming So our pencllcs. The fici is Stif ws do dlstleguish between in 
object F nnd its /'"-shaped coesllfuflng miller. Ws do cot' foe irstaece, ^^1 /'- 
shaped coesllfufieg mitfre ns ic F. A pldhSlce-dependnnS jussifimlion coeslsts in fiesi 
nssnifing that wn do observe the dislieclior le our peicllce, acd linn giving "an
40 Jolmslon. ibid. NB The remark lhal we do noi count F-shapcd consliluling mailer as an F is 
reminiscent of the 'relalive-idcnlily' solution.
41 Johnston (1992). p. 103.
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internal and pragmatic justification of this in terms of tow practice which marks this
dlstlgction serves our purposes".42
Johnston, concludes that :
"fOJue practice and ttx distinction it embodies is acceptable as it stands and what is 
bogus is ttx cnnc6etinn of justifying our practice which requires that, for ttx' distinction to bx 
justif'ixd, ttx diffxexncx bxtwxxn an F and its constituting matter must bx a dxxp metaphysical 
diffxexncx secured by an extra 11^1x61x111 of ttx A’."43
Hence, the claim is that the cloud - cioud-constitutxr distinction is practice- 
depxndxnt. The only justification of thx existence of such a distinction is an appeal to 
our practice of distinguishing between an object A and its /‘'-shapxd constituting 
matter. Do we make suct a distinction, however? It might seem plausible as regards 
all living creatures. Wx do not ttink that a donkey is just thx donkey's body. A dead 
donkey is tot so much of a donkxy as an alive onx. For something to count as a 
donkey it is important that it is alive, that it walks and runs, sometimes is hungry and 
thirsty, atd so ot. A donkey is constituted by its body, but is not identical to it. 
Howxvxr, the consequence of this view sxxms to bx that a dead donkey is not a 
donkxy at all. It used to constitute a donkey, but never was (identical to) one.
Moreover, the distinction fades complxtxly when we consider such things as 
clouds and lakes. It seems that a cloud not only consists of a cluster of water droplets, 
but just Is such a cluster. There is nothing more to tte cloud than thx collection of 
water droplets. To repeat Lewis's point: ttx clusters of water droplets arx too similar 
to clouds not to count as clouds. And, as 1 tavx said above, if the cloud is tot any of 
the constltuters, then it is utterly unclear wtat it is and where it is.
"2 Johnston (1992). p. 102.
"2 Johnston (1992). p. 1)3. This is Johnston's Minimalism.
188
Johnston claims that we do not count cloud-shapy' constilufirg mattri as
clou's. This very clalx yn1bles him to solve thr problem of thy xaiy. We cai agiey
to thal. Grneaally wr lo not court all clusters loplted roughly al one plscy as
differenl clouds. However, we do rot count then as ploud-polsf1tuters r1l1yr. Il Is not
our normal arlct1cy lo realise that thyre sir many he1enslvely ovyallaailg clusters at 
the same a1ach; distinguish thym fron ihr cloud ail cIiIx 1111 although fhy cloud Is
ony, me clustyrt are many. Il serxs to me thal commonly we lo not realise at all that
fhyre are many objecls al oir plsce, no msttrr whether t1ey are clou's or cloud-
constltufyi's. We do think that there Is just oir cloud piesent; but we also think fhat 
thyry is just one clusler of w1fer-dioplrts. Presented with thy pronlym of the many we 
ary equally bafflr' by the sppaiyit presence of xaiy clouds as by the sppaient 
aretence of many cloud-polstltutei's.
Thus, It Is iot at all apparent 1111 such 1 prlPlice-'ependylt llsllicllon yelsls. 
Wray It fhe casr thst fhe coistiluteis solution to thy problex of fhy mana were thy 
only 1v1il1b1r one, thyn aei1aps we should acknowledge thy distinction. Bul we have 
seen alryada fhat fhere are xaiy tolullols lo this paoblym, sid It Is not even thy case 
thal this solution Is the Irasf problenstlp one.
For Iisinicr, Noonan claims t1st If wr lake the word "cloud" to br vague, 
then Johnston's solution dors not work. According to supyava1uat1onltm - which for 
both Noonan and Johnston Is the lefsult theory of vagueness - If thy word "cloud" Is 
vague, thyn on each sdmlsslblr shsrpyrlng It irfers to slightly different' clusters of 
water-droplets. In of1ri words, on eac1 s1arpenlig of the word "cloud", a slightly 
dffeaynt object Is 1 cloud. If orr lppep1t Johnston's confrntlon fhat none of fhe 
dustyas Ao, < k'l. • • Is of 116 right c1fygory to br s cloud, 1161 thy Ir1hleamlnapa of
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thx word "cloud" can only bx explained by postulating in addition to < k\, k2, ...
atothxe class of entitles, co, cf, c'2, ... which are of thx eight category to bx a cloud,
atd which are suct that each is a cloud on some admissible sharpening.44 It is
obvious, however, that if we admit those other entitles cq, c|, c'2, ..., ttx problem of
thx maty will ee-emergx. In order to avoid tte peoblxm of thx many, Jotnston can
reject thx litguistlc theory of vagueness and claim that it is tte object cloud which is
vague, so that tte indeterminacy in thx situation is dux to the vagueness of thx object
c and not to that of the word "cloud". Noonan concludes that "Johnston's solution
can work, but only if it is a part of a package deal, including an acceptance of an 
ontology of (anmposltinrlally) vague objects,"45 which - in his opitiot - is at
unacceptably high price to pay.
It seems that Nootan is right in claiming that if Johnston's account is to work
the word "cloud" cannot be vague in ttx standard sense. For a word "cloud" to bx
vague there would have to bx various clouds present and it would tavx to be
indxtermltate to which of these clouds thx word refers. It is essential for this solution
towxvxr, that there aee not many clouds. Thx cloud is one. Moreover, onx cannot
claim that thx word "cloud" is vagux because it refers to different aloud-cnnstltutxes
on different shaepenings, foe "cloud" does not exfer to cloud-constitutees at all. If the
word "cloud" referred to clour-constituters, ttxn cloud-constitutees should be clouds 
(only as cat belong to tte denotation of "x"). On the otter hand, it is hard to imagine 
how "cloud" can exfxe to a cloud without referring to any of its anltstltut6rs. But 
"cloud" can only exfxe to a cloud-constitutxe if the cloud-constitutee is not only a
44 Noonan ( 1993a). pp. 137-138.
45 Noonan (1993a). p. 138.
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clon6-coneSlSuSrr, but nlso a cloud. And tils seems So bs excluded by JohneSon'e
dieSiect1en.
Ocs might negus - is Noonin suggests - Slit since lie cloud is honsSlSuSe6 by
dlffeinni clusters oc diffeinnS staepsclegs, if is She cloud itsslf, i.s. lie object cloud,
which is vdgne. And if sesms lial tils is Shn picture flit ^1^1^ ins in mind. When
in honsi6nrs Shn role pliyrd by elgunness ie lie problem of the miny, hn honcenSeaSes 
explicitly on shirpeeiegs of lie boundaries of fir hlendt He likes Shn slirpenlegs io 
be ways of fixing oe i sharply defined 6ropleSs-hlusSre to corsflluin sir cloud. Suci a 
view is finfamount So introducing vngue objects into one's ontologc. And while She
existence of elgne objects as such need cot bs wortyieg,46 lie existence of 1000 
precise hloud-honsSlSuSnls icd oce vague cloud le the eame place is a bit too much. 
Although on nnci ehdlpnning Sir vague object is torsSiSuSrd by one peeh1sr cluster, if 
is nevre 1denSlhdl So ShaS cluster. If is something 'more' thin its ceeeSiSuter, but tnat 
'morn' is nothing mnsap1^ceitllt Since there is co "meSap1ysihll nxiri" to vngue 
objects, it is not cleie wint would bs the use of suci objecSs. Thus, lie ontology to 
wiich tiis view hommiSs us is pertly abundant.47
Johnston llmsrlf tlaime tiii is is its erlifioc of hocsSiiuiioc which is vngue. 
Recall flit his plcturo of fir siluilion is fir following. Oc nnci shirpecing there ire 
miny peeciss dusters /iQ, /j k2, ... . Or ocs admissible slaepnning, ths cloud is
coneSiSuSe6 by /eo, on inolhee by A) nnd so oc. Hercs, his cliim is 1111 "our cloud c is
1^1 onlc noi identicil will icy oce of ko, k\, 1(2 but nlso // is not definitely
46 See chapter HI.
47 It is worth pointing out that this \• iew has to assume that the vague object cloud is determinately 
denoted by the singular term "she clouds. spy, one docs not have to hold that "the cloud" is precise, 
provided that the cloud is indeterminately identical to something. If this is the case, then it is 
indeterminate whether "the cloud" singles out the cloud uniquely, or not; i.e. it is imprecise in the 
non-standard sense (cf. chapter 11 and Hi).
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constituted by any one of k(), k, k2 ..."A* Now, Is Johnston's argument 1111 il is
ponsf1fut1nn which Is vagur In this sliiislion a Irglflxafr ory?
It srems to me that It is nol. Take fhe senleicr "The cloud c Is (corslitufyd by)
kf". This senfyncy is 1ndeteanln1te In tauth-value; because on diffeaynl shaapenlngs
the cloud Is coistltutel by llfferrnl /rs. The usual eep1lnatlol would have It that the 
1ndefeamln1ca in questloi Is due lo thy vagurirss of the cloud. Sincr thr cloud Is nol 
definityly corsfifuled by any orr of Ag, f 1, k< ..., Il Is drfirilely nol coislituled by any
paycise cluster aid thhahfoay has to be vsguy. In fscl, the various thlapynlngt we are 
talking about, are thlapyn1ngs of the cloud. On Johnston's account, however, thy 
selapynlngt cannot be clnu'-s1alpenlngs unless a sh1ipyning cai changy fhe oillc
catygoi'a of an objecl. As we have seei, a sharpening of s cloud results not In a telap 
plou'; but Ii s shaia cloul-cottslllulhi'. On dlfeaeit shlipel1ngt fhe cloud Is 
constituted by a 'Iffyaynt /r, but on no sharpening Is thy cloud I'eilical with a k. 
Thyayfoay, It appears that s shaapyning of a cloud charges its ontic clthgni'y: one 
begins with a vague cloud, sh1iprns It and gets precisr p1ou'-cons1l1u1ers - I.e. objects 
of a diffeaent category fron ihr original vague object. This Is a aathea striking feature, 
but Johnston would paobably have answered iIiI this is just the lessor l11t the 
problem of the many teaphes us.48 9 To solve 1111 problem, we ^^1 assume thal on 
dlffyaynt shaaprilngs of a cloud we get diffriril preclsy clouds.
Johnston claims, however, that the In1htermlllpy does not arise on accouit t of 
the vagueness of the noun1siiet; but or account of thy vsguynyss of ponst1tut1ol. He 
syyms to think thsf rvri If thy cloud were pi-rcisy, It would not havy s dyfinlie
48 Johnston (1992). p. 100 (my emphasis).
49 If by sharpening the cloud wc obtain objects of a different category, then Johnston's procedure of 
examining the vague object by examining its sharpenings is even more suspect.
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constituter. But, if it is thx relation of constitution wtict is vague, then it should be
possible to sharpen that eelation, and tte shaepenings wx tavx been talking should bx 
peecisifications neither of the cloud, toe of ttx word "cloud", but of the eelation
"aogsfitufion": What does sharpening of a relation consist it, however9 Take our 
relation of being tte best feixnd of Hany, foe instance. Recall that this relation is taken
to be vague, foe it may bx ltdeterminatx whether it is Sux oe George wto is thx best
frixnd of Harry, although there is no doubt as to the identity of Harry, Sue and 
Gxorgx. The relation of friendship that Harry tas to Sux is slightly different from the
relation that Harry has to Geoegx and it is indxteeminatx wtict of these relations 
counts as 'better' friendship. According to tow wx precisify tte relation of being thx 
best frixnd, either Sue or Geoegx will appear to bx thx best feixnd of Harry. Thx
situation of thx cloud atd ttx constituters is diffeextt, towxvxr. Here, tte cloud
stands it exactly the same relation to each of tte constltuters. Each antstltutxe has thx
same eight to constitute tte cloud as any other. Therefore, tte shaepetings do not 
sharpen tte relation of constitution. It is not the case that if we sharpen that eelatlon it 
otx way it will pick out k\ to constitute thx cloud, and if we sharpen it differently it
will favour Z<3. Besides, we aee not xvxn told wtat thx relation of constitution consists
it. How could we sharpen it, ttxn?
Hxnce, a better option is to reject ttx claim that constitution is vagux atd 
claim that tte cloud is an object with fuzzy boutraelxs, which accounts for the 
ltdxtxrmitacy of the sentence "Tte cloud c is (aotstitufxd by) /q".
So, to sum up the issue of vagueness: There aee ttexx objects which could it 
prigaiplx bx vagux: the word "cloud", tte object cloud, atd ttx relation of constitution 
(recall that it has been explicitly assumed that ttx clusters are precise). Noonan shows
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shit tin coisfliufsis eoluSloc cinnot amps lie view flit lie word "cloud" is vngue, 
because finer are co clndidlSee io (icdesrimieiirly) bs clouds oc Shis dhceuns.
Jo1neSec's chosse answer, Slit if is its relation of censSiSuSion wiich is vague, dons
noi seems eight: if is cot She rnliiloc wiici we prrclsify when ws pick out different 
hlusSels So hocsSlSuSe She cloud. Tis fact lial Sheer is co cluster tiii defiiilnlc
honsSiSuSes lie cloud does noi in tiis cnss bear witness So She claim flat coceSiSuSion is
vague. If is either She objecf cloud which is fuzzy. The cloud is n vigus object' whici 
cnn be e1alpeled ie diffninnS ways nnd therefore dlffnrnif precise clueSees constitute if
on different sSlepsn1ngt,
3. THE "FOR WANT OF SSOVUETHISBETTER'’ ON
3.1. The ujisln!
Thus' She upshot of our considerations up So Stls point is ills.
As 1 hnvs mrefioied, fir problem of fir many aelsns because of the
lssumpSione:
(n) For many composite objects X tiers nrn objects _c>, ...., >’» suci tiii if is 
in6dSeim1caid wleflsr iley air pirl of X or not.
(b) For ench such obteet >’, tiers is in objshi Z, wiici hocs1sss of y, nnd all tin 
nnqnesSiolllhle pirfs ofX
(c) Z, ire so similar io X, this fisc should couni ns A'.
All bus mre eoluSioe So she problem nssumn flit what we oedieaifly flick is 
eight' i.e. A is just onn. Since Siere sssms So be nothing wrong in fhn honsSluctiel of
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fhy Zs, li oadri to solve the problex onr has to provide ressons why the Zs do not
court as thr As. In other words ore 1ss lo explain why assumption (c) is false.
The 'contt1tuthas' solution argues that ihr Zs (thy wafya-dioplyf clusters) do
not count, byc1usr they are xeae corslifufras of thy X (ihr cloud). The weakest point 
of this solution Is thst It relies or 1 'Istirctioi whose existence Is highly dubious. And 
ever if the 1lstllptlol dors exist, fhe solution la1nsfoams thy proWem of the xaiy 
clouds Into 1 problem of onr cloud aid xaiy plor1-cons1llu1hi's. Besides, sincy fhe
cloud is not identical to any of fhy c1ou1-corstIlulel•S; Il Is unclear whal srd whyre thy
cloud is on this account. Moreover, although fhe solution acknowledges fhy existence 
of 1ndy1yamlnapy in ihr problem, il lncltes It In s wrong plscr. Nothing of whal we 
have been told justifies fhe clalx f1sf coislilullon Is s vsgur relation.
The suphivaluatloilsl solution claims that each of fhe Zs (l1e cat-
aaec1s1f1pations) is fhe X (thy cst) or oir of thy ldxlst1bly shaaprilngs of fhe X This 
solution to the problem of fhe many fscrs similar problems lo l1osr laced by the 
suayrvllull1ollst tayafment of vague pre'lc1lrs. Orr of Ils nain liswbscks Is thal It 
assumes fhat the cal is an absolutely precisr object - i. r. there Is only oir payplse 
object, among many olheas which differ only nlnu1hly; which Is thy cat. Still, ss I 
have 1lryady myntlonyd, there Is no pahplse object such fhaf Il Is fhy cat. And this 
solution Is committy' lo thy existence of plf-prycltiflca1loils: for or evyry sharpening 
if Is true ihst there are mary csl-precltlftpstioilt. These preclslylclliols cannot be 
myay pnnstaupt1ons, for ysch of them Is thr cst on some s1sipyiilitg. In fact fhyre 
^^1 be any xytaphyslpal '1ffyrencyt betweyi ihr csf and Ils paecislflpstions. So on 
this solution we still 1avr quite s lot of objects lo leal wilh.
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The 'e6lafia6-id6ntlty' solution says that thx Zs (the lumps of felitx tissue) arx 
differxgt Zs (lumps) but thx same X (the same cat). According to this view tte cat can 
bx diffxeett lumps of fellnx tissue at thx same time. The problems with this solution
arx that (i) it says that if we count by "is tte same cat as" - and not by "is the same
lump of fellnx tissue as" - relation wx will get tte eight result, but it does not explain
why tils is tte case; and (ii) it is acceptable only foe someone who is prepared to
forget about absolute 16x111.4.
The 'almosf-ldenfify' solution is thx only solution that throws some doubt upon 
thx intuitive assumption ttat thx X (thx cloud) is ote. It is committed to tte existence
of many clouds at the same place, and the only relief it offers is that wx may count 
them as one since they aee almost entirely overlapping. It is anugtxeinfuitlax and does 
not really solve thx problem. It tells us mxrxly how we can try to live with it.
Moreover, according to its own proponent it works only if paired with the 
suexrvaluatiotlsf solution. However, if we appeal to supxrvaluatlntlsm at all, we may 
as well let it do thx whole job. This solution is a semantic-theorist solution, so 
vagueness is explicitly located in tte language.
3.2. A new interpretation of the ’old' soliHicoi
Now, it might sexm that tht 'vagutntss-in-tht-world' solution is not
essentially different from that version of tte 'constitutxes' solution, wtict claims that
the object cloud is vague. According to tte version that I have favouexr over 
Johnston's accoum, the X (the cloud) is a vague object and is distinct from any precise 
objects (the Zs, wtict aee cloud-constitutees). Ttx 'aagu6n6ss-in-thx9w'ni■id' solution
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mikes She vsey sime assumptions. So, on top of 1001 hloLld-piscieiflhdSiolle Steen is
ors vigus cloud.
This is not lie orly ietrrprnfafioc of lial solution, towsvei. Ic what follows I
will ley So mikn fhn cise foe She 'viguersss-ir-lle-worid' solutioc nc6 cliim Shnt linen
is n sensn in which if mny bn coisi6ees6 a sliisfatloiy solufloe to She peoblem of tin
mniiy.
3.2.1. The p-catss solution
Lst us fiesi taes i look nt i solution ldelrhsd by Parsons ncd Woodruff
wiici nlso appeals io ils elgnseeee in ils world. Pii-smis nnd Woudrnlf' hsl1see le
vagueness in the world acd negue Shil hdSs hivn impiecise boundaries. Thny ask us So
"|s]upposc ihai given any reasonable way of making she cat's boundaries precise 
throughout its life is is indeterminate whether she cat has exactly those boundaries. Bui those 
boundaries are filled with matter. So suppose that each such continuous matter-filled 
boundary determines a physical object - one that has precisely those boundaries. Call such an 
object a p-cat"50
Now, Shs quesfioc neisss whnthni lie p-cils ars 16111^11 So lie cal, oe rot. As 
fileS gliccn, thnin nee tiers possibilities: fhsy ire idscticil' iley ire non-idenSihal, oe 
else if is IndeleimiraSs whsther Sisy ire idncflcil. Tis first possibility is cot in option' 
foe if fhn p-cnis were idensicil io sir haS, lie cnf would livs pencisn houc6di1eS'
whici cocfi-idlcfs our nssumption. Tis second reee1b1liiy
"leads to a kind of ontological explosion; in addition to there being a physical object 
corresponding to every filled region of space-time, there are additional physical objects.
50 Parsons. Woodruff (1995). p. 332.
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objects that are contained in tht region exhausted by tht others, vet distinct from all the 
others".51 52
Parsons atd Woodruff admit that they cannot prove that suct a view is
ltanhxexgf, but invite us to consider tte third possibility, which is much more 
economical. Ot this view the p-cats arx igdxtxrminatxly identical to thx cat; it other 
words each of them is itdxlxrminatxly a cat. Thx p-cats (dxfinitxly) aex distinct from 
ote another, because they (definitely) have difteextt precise bouit6arixs. But for each
p-cgf, if is indeteemitatx whether if is identical to thx cat. This account, according to 
its proponents, allows us not to multiply xntitixs beyond necessity. Thxrx aee very 
maty p-cats, but only onx cat. Strictly speaking, ttxrx aee very maty itdxfxemigafx
cats (i.e. objects r such that V(x is a cat)), but only otx 6x0111.6 cat (i.e. x such that x
is a cat and -rV(x is a cat)).55
It seems to mx that Parsons and Woodruff decide tte issue at tte very oufsef 
whet they say that "given any reasonable way of making the cat's boundaeixs precise 
... if is itdefxemlnate whether thx cat has exactly those bout6arixs". If if is 
indxtxrmlggtx whether ttx cat tas certain pexcisx boundaeixs, fhxt it becomes 
plausible that tte cat and tte object with those boundaries aee indeterminately
identical. However, it such a case wx cannot assert - as Parsons and Woodruff do -
fhaf thx cat has imprxalsx boundaries. On tte other hand, if we acknowledge that fhx 
cat's boundaries aee imprecise, fhxt "given any reasonable way of making thx cat's 
boundaries precise" it is determinate that the cat does not have exactly those
-1 Parsons. Woodruff (1995). p. 3.33. U is just such an "ontological explosion" that I protested 
against in connection with the vagueness-in-ihe-world solution and the constituters solution.
52 Parsons and Woodruff offer a modelling on which the above claims come true. See (1995). The 
modelling is meant to be classical and is formulated in neutral terms. For instance, on this modelling 
each object is a set of onions, which are logical constituents of objects. It is clear however that, 
strictly speaking, a cat is not a set of ontons. but at most a fuzzy set.
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boundaries. Il appears lhal In order for Parsons and Woodruffs solution lo work, one 
1ss to think of thr cal rol ss s genuiir vagur object - i.e. object with no pryp1sh
noun'liiys; but as ai objecl such f1st Il Is Irlrfyaninafr whythyr Il has parcisy 
boun'ai'ies. If fhe cst Is s genuine vague object, 1161 thr cst Is (dyfinilrly) not
i1nltlpsl lo 1i) of ihr precise a-clls.
3.2.2. ’Genuine* vague objects and precise precisifications
Let us comr back now lo fhy 'vagurness-ir-fhe-world' solution. It may be 
argued fhaf fhe world to which lhat solution commits us need nol be as overpopulated 
as Lewis has claimed. One might nslntsii fhaf fhe poaaypt plctury of l1e situation 
involving y.g. ihr cloud Is l1ls. Lots of wslrr droplels sir poncyl1rated in ore placy- 
Thy noun'llles of this aggregation ary fuzzy, but fhyy arr precise enough for most of 
our purposes. (We lyarn lo live with fuzziness of our yvyaydaa objects.) There Is no 
non-1ab1ta1ay unique way of drllnltlng its surface. Various ways of paycltlf)lng It are 
equally l'x1sslnle, however. Such payclt1flcstlons arr merely our cont1aupt1ons: each 
aayc1slylcat1on Is an arbllrsay way of s11ipening 116 isluaslly vague boun'sales of the 
cloud. Hyncy, thr paeplslflpltlons lo not count ss objects In the same sense as thy 
cloud does; I.e. they lo not count as objects thst belong to our evyaydsy ontology. 
And thyre Is no mastery in fhe facl fhaf 116) sre roughly Ir fhe ssxr plscy. They are 
after all prec1slfic1llois of ihr same mattya.53 So, ihr aiswrr lo fhy problem of thy 
xany is thal thyry Is just oir cloud which Is vague ir s seise IIiI Il has fuzzy 
boundaries. Thr lapylaanpe of fhyre bring xany clouds is a nrae illusion caused by
53 Ii is as if someone was puzzled by ihe faci ihai ihe mcrcological sei of 100 peanuis, ihe sei of 101 
peanuis and Ihc sei of 102 peanuis are all siiuaied roughly in ihe same place.
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fhn fict lhal the cloud may bs pietieifisd (ippeoxlmatsd) in valioue diffeidci ways.
For any wiy of delimiting Sir surfacd of fir cloud' the cloud dons col hnvn lhal
suif:ace. Il is noi iderflcil So acy object will 1 preciss suefacs. This view doss not lsa6
So 'onSologlcil explosion' becauss the 'proper' object is just one. Thn nsseiliil fnaSurn 
of our familine objects such as clouds is its fuzziness of ihsie henc6liies. Only 
somniniig will fuzzy bouidieins cnc court is 1 cloud. Tie things wish prnclse
bonnddl1es Shnt cnn be corsfiuctnd out of fhn cloud nnd its surroundings mny nt leist 
be cnlled "clou6-pretisiflcatioes". Ore can thick of them ns mein cirvings on the 
suifncn of tie cloud. Tiny hivn no olSoleg1tll signlficiccs for us.
3.2.3. Van Inwagen's fuzzy Ili^iing organisms
A solulion slightly similar to fir ibovs hns brer offered by Peine vac Icwngen 
in his book Material Beings. Hr fries lo iiswer wins hr cnlls tin spstill compoeision 
quesSlor, namnly - Wien is ii irun Slit fiere is a > such this She xs compose >'? The 
dnewei he gives and defends le thlpSdlS 1 -16 is fir following:
She xs compose y iff the iclivliy of lie xs cocsflfuiss a life.
If follows from this this lie only composite objects are inimain objects - living 
oigiirisms. Fimilinr objects from our environment' such ns fibles, eSondS' clouds ntc.' 
nrs in fahS hollecSlone of miry small simple objects - simples ir vin Iwigen's 
Sdeminelogy - Shnt aee areicgsd le piilicular ways. So, foe icstdnhe, there nee no 
Sabirs' but only slmplss ireinged liblewise acd eo clouds but only simples ireiignd 
hloudw1ee. His irgumrnf So fir effect tiii living oegieisms aid unlike fibles ac6
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chairs it fhaf they exist, rests on his antalatlnr^54 that he exists. Tte problem of thx
many foecxs him to defend that conviction and to modify his answer to the special
co m po sit ion question.
Vat Itwaget argues that behind the peoblxm of the maty applied to human
beings ttxrx arx ttx following three crucial assumptions:55
(1) If he (e.g. Petxr van Itwagxt) exists, thxrx is a man.
(2) It every situation of which wx would ordinarily say that there is just ote 
man, there arx maty sxfs of simples wtict aex equally good candidates to compose a
man.
(3) The members of each of thxsx sets compose something.
Anyone who wants to hold on to ftosx fhrex assumptions and does tof believe 
it spatio-temporal coital6xgce must find a suitable selection principle - i.e. it this case 
a principle which would allow to claim that onx (atd only ote) of fhx huge number of 
overlapping met is Petxr vat Itwaget. Either ttx others aee met but aex not vat
Itwagxt or else they aee not mxn, but merely mxit-catdidates. Since tte riffeextcxs 
between the overlapping composite objecfs aee negligible, the principle has to bx 
"intolerably arbitrary”56. Vat Itwagxt avoids this peoblxm by rejecting assumption 
(3). He claims that he exists, and fhaf it ttx relevant situation fhxrx are many sets of 
simples whose members aex suitably arranged to compose met, buf te denies fhaf thx 
members of those sets compose anything. Hx denies that it suct situations there aee 
many flings which are baexly distinguishable atd which arx candidates to be himself.. 
On the contrary, te argues that although he is present in such cases, none of the other
54 For reasons for holding that com ■ id ion sec \ ’an inwagen (1990). Ch. 12.
53 Cf. van Inwagen (1990). p. 216
56 van Inwagen (1990). p. 216.
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things paesynt In those cases Is even similar to him. In plal1cu1aa; according lo him a 
col1epf1nil consisting of simples l1sl pnxposh 11m minus one simple, does not
compose anything al all.
As 1as beei sail thr xs coxpose y Iff the activity of fhe xs coltlllr1es a llfy,
srd constituting s life is obviously 1 vagur rolioii. Bnlre plrget up Ir ihe life of 11
organism Is not 1 precise condition, and Il nay br indytyamlnafy of sone simples 
whetnyr they satisfy fhaf condition or nof. Thhrhyorh; composition and parfhood are
also vague notions: for some simples Il can be vague whether thyy ary parts of a living 
organism; Il can be vague whelhra they compose something. In paa1lculla; thyry ary 
simples such thst if Is vagur whythyr they ponpote van Inwsgei; whyfhya 116) are 
parts of hlx. Thus, he argues ihst no set Is 116 sel l1at confalns just thr simples ihst
compose him. Sets have pryclsy myxbers1lp-pondlllors; rsch objecl must yithya be oa 
not by a menbea of 1 giver set. So thr slxplht thst compose hlx do nol constltuty 1 
set. No mattya which of fhy compeflig sets of sixalhs we 1116, it will nol be thy set of 
simples that conposy van Iiwagen. Hencr, although 11616 sre xany distinct syts of 
simples, thyrr Is no prnnlym of 116 xany: none of thr nary sets is van Inwagyn. What 
Is van Inwagyn, thyn? Thr simples 1111 coxpose vsi Inwagyn cnnslltule & fuzzy set. 
Membership in 1 fuzzy srf Is 1 natter of legarr. For 61^ fuzzy sel thyry are objecls 
that definityly ary membyas of that set, objecls 1111 Irfiiitely are not membeas of thal 
set and objects ihst arr neither Irfiilfyla membrrs nor definllely non-members of fhat 
set. These lasf objects aay mymners of ihr fuzzy set oily lo 1 cyaisii degaey. It Is 
usually assumed ihst thyry air ss xaiy degrees of nexneas1lp as the aral nuxbeas 
from 0 to 1. Specifying a fuzzy srf amounts lo specifying for each object fhe 'egrey 
lo which it Is a xrmber of thal srf. Objects ihst arr membyas to the degayy 1 are
202
definite members, objects tiii nrs msmbees io She drgien 0 aee definite loi-mnmbnrs,
while objects tnat are msmbnes to lie degrss &, wired 0<J<l, air 1n6nfiniin members 
of She fuzzy set in question. Now if can be explaiced wint is menct by fir phenss "1
nm hompossd by n fuzzy set of slmplss". Ic general:
Tie fuzzy set of simples whose members compose (oe nqulvilecily: ain parts
of) x =<• The fuzzy sst y of simples such flit Vz n simple is a member of y to the
6ngiee z iff thit simple is a pari of a- io tin degees zX7
Vin Inwagne assumss tiii eict simple (nt any giver lime) is a pirl of x to
some epeh1fiahle degree c/ wines 0< d <1. Is follows from ilis issumpiloi and fhn 
above definition thil (at acy given tins) ths msmbees of sxictly ore fuzzy set of 
simples will compose x, nnd in palSihulll - vac Iewigei. The dngiee of msmbership is 
She degree of pnelhood: She degrss to wiich x is a 1X11x111 of X is fin degese to which 
z is n pirl ofy. Thsesfore its plohlem of lie miry disappears: Sheer is mily one fuzzy 
set whose members composs elc Iiwigec.
Thus, in Sin situifion eivisagd6 in fir problem of the many linen nen miny 
(hldssihal) sets' noir of wiich is n suiSlhls hacdidlSs to be fhn onn whose memhnrs
compose van Iiwignn, nnd ^1 frizzy sri, wioss members do compose him. The 
enfinnd vdeeion of the inswee to lie special composition quesfioc looks like Stls:
3y the members of fir fuzzy set of slmplss x composs y iff' its lctie1ty of lie
members of x coisflSulss a life.
Thus, She problrm of lie miry is col a problem inymore. As vin Iiwignn 
1imeelf notices' She soluSim hinges oc lie assumptloni this sheie is only one life 
pineeeS ic lie case in qussliori. Tie cruclil issumpiloi foe 11m is shil every situation
-7 van Inwagen (1990). p. 223.
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of which wx should usually say that it contained just onx mat, cotfaits just ote life. 
He does not try to justify that claim: hx takes it to be a common sense assumption and 
argues fhaf we have no reason whatsoever to bxlievx that "tterx arx very many more
human lives that the census-takers say there aex human beings"5'.
So, to sum up: Since for van Itwaget the only complex objects are atimafx
objects, the problem of the maty consflfufes a puzzle only it fhe case in which living 
organisms arx involved. And te solves thx puzzle by rejecting thx very idea fhaf 
motivates thx problem: namely, tte idea that in fact thxrx are maty complex objects - 
many disfltcf sxfs of simples, the diffxeetces between wtict aee gxgligible - in thx 
place we thought was just one object. The object is just onx: fhx fuzzy set whose 
members aee parts of the complex object in question. Such a set is fuzzy because 
parthood is a vagux eelation and is just ote because it every such situation there is
only ote life present.
3.3. Conclusion
Thus, it appears fhaf thx peoblxm of thx maty cat be solved if otx 
acknowledges that there is vagueness it the world atd that it is at important feature 
of fhls world. Vat Itwagxn's solution cotcxens only animate objects, but it sexms to 
mx that it cat be generalised to cover all macro-objects, foe wtict the problem of fhe 
maty arises. Thx solution 1 have proposed pertains to all objects, not only living 
organisms. Roughly speaking, it consists in ttx realisation that objects from our 
everyday experience are vague objecfs devoid of precise spatial boundaries. I have 58
58 van Imvagcn (1990). p. 227.
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said thst fhe solutions aay 1 bit similar, for while vsi Inwsgen deiles classical sets thy 
right to court as nbjnc1S; 1 deny precise ob)hpts ihr right lo count as objects of our
common everyday nll1ologa.
One might think of objects fron our daily rxpeaiyncr as fuzzy seis, bul It 
seems lo me fhat Il Is better to aygaad then as rough sets?) For Il might be objected
that fuzzy sets arr nol vague enough. Since yach object can be 1scalbrd s saecly|y' 
dygary to which It Is a membyr of 1 given fuzzy set, oir might argur that vagueness 
disappears. For insflnpy; theae will be a clear boundary between objects thal aay 
membyas to thy degiyr 1 and objects 1111 sir members to fhy degaey lesser ihai 1. If
one assumes that composite objects sre rough sets aathya ihai fuzzy sets, thyn there is 
no dangya fhat vagueness will go swsy. Such sets say deframlnyd by ar indlsphrnlblllfy 
relation and their bouit'ariys cairot be precisyl) dyferxlnrl. T1e brsf ore cai lo is 
lo specify fhelr upper sid lower s.pproxixltlons; which dyfeamliy fhe region within 
which the 'aanpea bouit'ariys' are confiir^d.59 60
The problem of fhe nary arose because in rvery situation of whlp1 we would 
usually say that It coit1lned just ory complex object (thy X), there seemed to by many 
equally good caidld1les (116 Zs) for constituting 1111 object. However, fhy common 
feature of all these 'pln1ldaths' Is that l1ey havr precise bouil1rlys; 1 defiilty salt1ll 
location, wheaeas the Xs bouil1airs aay fuzzy. If ore thinks lhat thr Zs are 
sufficiently similar to the X to court ss 11 X, onr nerds lo find s disllngulshlng 
pa1np|plh - somelhlig ihst would allow lo shlert thy 'genuine' X fron fhe rest.
59 The iheory of rough seis have been developed by Pawlak (198.3). Orlowska (1983) has applied his 
iheory io vague expressions.
60 See Orlowska (1983). p. 469. I deal wiih rough seis in ihe fourth chapter of Odrowaz-Sypniewska 
(2000).
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Howxvxr, somxonx wto maintains that vagueness is a significant feature of'genuine'
objects cat avoid that peoblxm. Ttx solution consists in tte eejection of
(3) Z, are. ss ssmilar to sX that they shodd count as X.
The Zs are not sufficiently similar to ttx X to count as Vs. Tte dlffxextce
consists jusf it the fact that thx former see precise, while tte latter is vagux.
4. VAGUE EXISTENCE
4.1, Proxy borderllne objects
Vst Itwsget's answer to the special composition question commits him fo the 
thesis fhaf identity std existence are vague, wtict is tantamount to ttx claim that 
vagueness exsides in ttx real world. Recall fhaf composition, parthood, and being 
caught up it llfx aee vagux relations. In a cssx in wtict it is it6e1xemltste whether the
activity of certsin simples constitutes s llfx, it is also indetermitatx whether these 
simples compose anything. And if it is indxfxrminstx whether the simples compose 
atyfhlng, it is indeterminate whether s composite object exists. Moreover, it cat also
bx ttx case fhaf it is itdxfxrminsfx whether s life going on at ( is fhx same event ss 
was going ot at an earlier time It such a cssx it will be indeterminate whether fhe
composite object existing at /] is identical to ttx composite object existing st /. Van 
Itwaget is well swsrx of this. Hx segues in effect fhaf to linguistic theory of 
vagueness is correct, foe vagueness is not s mere linguistic phenomenon. It exsides in 
thx extralinguisflc world as well. According to vst Itwsgxt one tss to resign oneself 
fo fhx claim that vsguxtxss is s phxtometon existing in ttx real world.
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First of all, he clnims flit acyons wio bel1rvre ic Sir existence of heips, chilis
nnd clouds has no clolcn but io amps Shil exlstmcd nnd idsnllty ire vigue. Anyone
wliiessicg i eyetemlSlc soiiSee-Sypr drsSiuci1en of i trap FI, hns two questions io
answer: (1) Does H still exist? acd (2) Is FI still a heap? The secord question cnn be
inswnied without invoking viguncess de re. Ons mny nigun lhal because of She
viguennss of the prdd1haSr "is n heip" ii is icdeisemiciss nt some singes whnthei H
edSlsnlee thil pisdlcife or not. Suci ac inswee car easily be dhcommodlSed by n
linguistic 11^1. of viguncr^ss. Tie first mss is differect, Sowsvee. Ic ills hdse we nsk 
whethne if is liue of FS ShaS if exists nnd lie inswei flit if is neither deficiSsly true cor
definitely not liue, sesms So commit min lo borderline objecSs lhal "dwnll[...j in She 
twilight bniweei Shs full daylight of Being icd lie eight of Noihdiig"61. As fir ns 
only ininimiln objects, such is heaps, nen hoehernsd' She adlerdnS of elc Inwigni's 
enSologc is le a he1iee situifion. He does not hive lo icswee Shs fiesi question it ill,
bemise foe him shnrn ire co such things is heips le lie first placs. Acd in ordnr So 
dnewdi Ste sehoid qursfion il euff1cds for 11m io idopf some suilible l1cgu1sSlh fisoey 
of vigueiess. Theiefore, as fie ns trips ire coecercsd, octic vigueress does noi 
cmne into lie picture. However, as we hivs seeC' ic van Icwigec's oniology Shnee nen 
some composite objects - nimsly living oeginlsms. Acd lchoid1ng so 11m their 
exisincce is bound So insult in rsal-wei'ld vdgudieee, for "bning caught up le lie snmn 
life ns" (whici holds between slmplss) is a vague enlision. Tlere aee two sources of 
She vigueiess of stls lelilioii: fileslc, Shs rnliiioi of being ciughl up le - just ns the 
reldSlei of being a pirl of - is vagus; icd sscoedly Shs rollon of a life is a edgue 
ieSloit There nrs evncfs such lhal Shsy are cnifier definitely lives nor definitely not
van Inwagen (1990). p. 274.
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lives; fhyay are simples of whlcl Il Is 1611161 definitely true nor dyfinityly fslse fhaf the
activity of flose simples ponstltulhs a life. Thr first sourcy of vagueness can by dyalt
with by a linguistic fhyory of vagueness, ihr second panno1; for this latter source has 
significant consequences for mtlologa. If Il Is vague whether the activity of fly 
simples consilfufes a lify, tier - accor'ing lo ihr proposed answer to lie special 
composition question (see section 3.2.3) - It is vague whythyr they coxpose mathlng, 
in which csse It Is vague whyflea tie composite thing exists. Saying list "compose 
something" Is a vague predlpsth; which some objects xsy ssflsfy only Il'ef1lltely; 
does not solve anything. For even if wr ssll 1h1s; wr would sllll have lo ssy somethlig 
about fir object of whlcl It Is oily Inlefiiltrly taur ilsf It Is composed by the simples; 
i.e. fie objecls such liat It Is oily Indefiiilrly true that It rxisls. Hence, ss far as living 
organisms are ponpeane' van Iiwagyn's ontology faces lie same problem as the 
believer In composite 1n1ilmsle objecls facrs in pnnnyptlon wifi heaps and clouds. If
seems that one has to
"accepf die existence of vagueness which is real, inherenf feafure of objecis and which 
does nof derive from ihe indcterminacv of ihe rules governing ialk aboui ihese objecfs^".62 63
The only liffyrence Is lhat for a 'laalltlora^l' oitologlst real vagueness Is s 
much moay widespread pleioxrion ilsr for vsi Inwagyit.
Furthyaxoi^y, just as vagueness in ex1s1hrph is a ponseqrenpe of his answer to 
the saep1ll pompos1l1ol question, vagueness In ideitity follows from his prlnplple 
Lif) which describes fhe perslsteice pon'lt1nns of composite objects. For nof only Is 
the notion of life vague in s seise thst ilear sre objects such ilsf It is Ir'eteamlnsle
62 van Imvagcn (1990), p. 235.
63 The principle Life is formulated ihus: "...|.Ijf ihe aclivily of ihe .vs ai it consiiiuies a life, and ihe 
aciiviiy of ihe ys ai i: consiiiuies a life, ihen ihe organism ihai ihe .vs compose ai i, is ihe organism 
ihai ihe vs compose ai i; if and only if ihe life consiiiuied by ihe aciiviiy of ihe .vs ai l, is ihe life 
consiiiuied by ihe aciiviiy of ihe ys ai l;". Van imvagcn (1990), p. 145.
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whether ttxy satisfy thx predicate "constitutes s life", but it is also vagux in a sxnsx
fhaf for some objects it msy be indeterminate whether they constitufx the ssme life It
is obvious that there see various ways it which one's life may be disrupted, std some 
of fhosx diseupflots aex suct that it is nxifter true nor fslsx ttsf one would survive
them. It other words, there sex "indeteeminste adventures" which neither
determigately suspend the life, not defermlnatxly disrupt it. Atd if it is indeterminate
whether fhx life that is going on sftxr an itdxfxrminsfx adventure is thx same life fhaf
was going ote before that event, it will also bx indeterminate wtxfhxe ttx object
existing before fhx adventure is ttx ssme ss tte object existing afterwards.6*
Vsn Inwsgxt concludes that tx tss no option but to find s suitable theory
which would be able to account for xxtesliggulsfic vagueness. He faces two ctallxnges 
it parflculse: Evans's argument sn6 tte intuitive thought ttsf ttxrx see no objects
suspended bxfwexn existence snd non-existencx. I will not go into details of his 
soluflot here, but lxt mx just mention that te meets boft ftesx challenges by 
constructing a formal semantics (foe monadic first-order logic with identity std 
property abstraction) in which cxefsit troublesome itfeexnces are itvslid. Hx xscapes 
Evans's argument by invslidstitg ote of ttx abstraction opeestions used in this
argument, tamely thx sfxp from (3) -)V(cz = a) fo (4) -nXx [V(.v = <7)]<7.64 5 Thx second
itfxeetce that tss to bx invalidated if one thinks of statements like "Then is such that if
is neither dxfltifely true nor dxfinitxly false that it exists" ss absurd, is ttx following; 
V Fx I- 3x V/Ov. His semantics does itvalidsfx fhst itfxexnax by introducing so-
64 Van Inwagen notices a I this point dial this situation need not trouble perdurantists. They can hold 
on to the view that all vagucness is linguistic. They treat the spread in time as endurantists treat the 
spread in space. "Is a persisting object" is a vague predicate on a par with predicates like "is a 
spatially continuous object" and its vague ness does not havc any consequences for ontology. See van 
Inwagen (1990), p. 243. Cf. also my chapter III. section 3.4.
65 See van Inwagen (1990). pp. 246-270.
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cnlled "proxy bordselics objects" which nes fuzzy ssls of which is is neither deficllnly 
true nor definltnlc fnlss thil ihsie msmbses composs iiyfilcg.*'
If is ictnrne11ng flit vin Irwignn ins co general objections io fir iifnesccn: 
V3x Fx I- 3x Vh'x, If is viguensss le composliloc wiich forces him io iiivilidiie if, 
becdnsn it insults ic ilis1lnhrs which lend lo 'enil boedriilcn objects' - i.n. objects Shnt 
neither definitely exist cor definitely do not exist. If ii wnie mt foe thil kind of 
vagunnnss vin Inwigen would probably want us So accept inif 1nfereihe. Foe 
1ieSancn, he has co qualms ibmiS She icfninnce: V3v x is wise I- 3.v V% is wisr. In tils 
mss Sir Siuih of lie cocclusloc mrins Shnt slnee is nr object suct lial is is n
boi6eil1nn cass of Shn prsd1haSs "is wise". Ths viguscsss of composition prnsecSs us 
with morn Siouhlesomr haers. Suppose this lie icflviiy of ^11111 inn slmplss, nnci of 
which weighs nxioflc one ouncn, is such flit if is ceither dnfiiifslc true noi 6dfiiiielc 
fdlee Shnt il coisfifuins a life.66 7 Therefors, le ills situation if is vigus winSher Shesn
simples cocslifule iicihiig. Now, like shs sscSenhs "3x x weigis more thin four
ounces". Il ippeies this lhal esn1sche is indnieimleiie, hecce She sncfsece "V 3.x x
weighs more Shin four ounces" should be feus. However, even if ills is so' its
il6eSn^nildhy is not due lo shs fnct this Sieee is in object such Shil if is a boi6nelinn 
hdee of Shn predicate "weigis morn tiii four ounces". Rather, She ied1ldim1nicy 
dliens bemuse ii is indntsemlnise wtefiee ihsie exists ic object tomposnd by Shn 
simples le question. If if rxisfsd, il would cnifainly cot be n hoiderlicn cise of "weighs 
lmre Shnc four eurhes", for ii would weigh exactly ten ounces. If if did cot exist' lie 
pie6ihlSe "weighs morn Shan feui ouncss" would bs deficiSnIy fllee of if. Hncce' while
66 See van Inwagen (1990). pp. 277-278.
67 See van Inwagen (1990). pp. 271-272.
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In the former casr If tie senfencr "V 3x x Is wise" Is frue, It Is true In virtue of flyae
being an objecl such ilsf It Is rrltlya definitely wish, nor definityly nof wlsy, In the
lattyr case fir ten1ency "V 3x x weights noir flair four ouices" Is frur in virtue of the
fact fhat it Is 1116161x11116 fhat x exists. Terarfory lie right land side of fly lnfyaynpe 
"V3x Fx I- 3x VFx" Is not defirllely taur aid fir Iifriencr las to be rejected.
Tie facl thst flyae are fwo dlffriynt reasons for tie Ii'efyaxiisca of tie
senfence "V 3x Fx" car br 6^11) overlooked. In ihr general case In whlcl we move
from de dido ascription of Ii'hthrnli1cy to de re lspalp1lol: I.y. fron Vcpx to Xz
(V(pz) x, wr do not havr sny ayason to question the lnpoatstlnn of "V".68 69Thyayfory,
It might seem thsf also lie move fron "V3x Fv" to "3xV T'x" is lyglilmsfe. And, of
course, nad onr assumed thal the senfencr "V 3x Fv" is true In virtue of lie fact ihst
the oily objecl flat satisfies "X" dors so oily in'etyaminsfyly (I.e. fhyre exists a 
noa'er1lne casr of "F"' ail fhyay arr no objects lint dyfinityly aay F), flat move
would lave nhnn valid.
4.2. A subbsantive thesss of ontic vagueness
As we aenymbea,66 Salisbury has rejectrl lie thesis:
(1) x is a vague object iff, for sone (p, It safisfirs tie predicate Xz (Vipz) x 
as a suns1antlvh thesis of oilic vsgueirss on fir grounds that il eitslls that every 
boadyallne cssr Is a vsguy object. Recall thal 11s argument Is fhsl If a tom1to is a 
nna'ya11ny case of "red" [VRi], lien il xusl also sstisfy fly prndlpste "is such that if Is
68 Cf. Sainsbury ( 1994). See also chapier 11 seciion 3.1.
69 See chapier II. seciion 3.1. The mosi notorious excepiion is ihe case where "ip" coniains ideniiiy. 
Cf. chapier 1. seciion 13.
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vague whether it is red" [Zz (VRz) t)]. It seems that if there exists a borderline case h
of the given predicate (p, then the statement "/? is such that it is indeterminate whether
it is (p" is true. There seem to be no reason why we should not predicate of h that [it is
such that] it is a borderline case of (p (for this is in fact what the statement H[Zz
(V(pz)]F" amounts to). Thus (I) does not sieve out 'real' vague objects from 'common'
borderline cases of vague expressions;.
Sainsbury tries to obtain a better formulation of the thesis of real vagueness by
imposing some restrictions on "tp". Eventually he requires that "(p" be sharp and 
focuses on identity, which he takes to be the most certain candidate for a sharp 
predicate. As we have seen, even that restriction does not work in Sainsbury's opinion 
- it does not help formulating the thesis that Sainsbury was after. Van Inwagen's 
analysis throws a new light on this quest. It seems to me that one may try 
concentrating on existence instead of identity and formulate the following thesis;
(V) There is vagueness in the world if, for some although the sentence
"V3x Fx" is true, the sentence "3xV Fx" is not true; where positive and borderline
cases of F are excluded from the range ofx.
The idea here is this. Take the predicate "weighs exactly ten ounces". Ignore
all its positive cases (I assume that it is precise and does not have any borderline 
cases). Now, if we consider the remaining objects, we will see of course that neither
the sentence "VBx Fv" is true nor the sentence "3xV Fx" is false. However, when we
think of "the remaining objects", we think of objects that (definitely) exist. If the 
possibility that there might be objects such that they neither definitely exist nor 
definitely do not exist, is allowed, the conjunction on the right hand side of (V) may
be true.
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Without Shs eesliiciioc impossd oe Shs range ofx, fiesis (V) would sny le fdhS 
Shnt Simin is elguecess ic ths world if F is i shiep empty predicate - i.e. a peedlcile
which hns no positive and no boednilins hlses. Tike for instancd Shn pled1tdSe "is
Sill". This is one of lie fokni vagus predicates ncd 1ns positive' ceglSles nnd
boidnriiie cnses. If we substitute tils predicate foe "F\ fir senSnchn "V3x /fx" will be
filse (6un io Ste existence of posis1es hlses of lillcsss), while the secieihs "3x VFx"
will be liue (6un So Shs existence of borderline casss of lillcsss). The same result can
be obiiiied for any 'lypicil' vague plnd1hlSn. So Shs ucersliicled (V) does not get us 
icy closse So vigus objecSs: foe every 'lyplnl' vigue pesdlcaie ths light hied side of
She hicon6isioill is filse. Thn ensfilcird (V) is a different miller, Sowevne. Wilt tin
rdsfilciioi, positive and hoi6eeliie hasss ire noi taker icfo lchoun1 in the evnluifion
of lie lelneaiS eecSnihns. In plelihulli' lie situation ic which lie senSeirce "V3x Fx" is
made Seue by ic object such thil if is indeterminate wheiher if is T\ is excluded (for if
holdeil1ie cisss were fakni into iccounf, nlso fir sentencs "3x VFx" would be Seue).
If if is noi a boedeillne hlse of F'fhif mikes "V3x FX" feus, lien if must be its fdh1
tiii if is 1i61l1im1iife whsther flmre exists in object which is F6 In othne words, fhere 
must bn ac object wioss nx1eSnncn is icdsfeemlcifs; which nslther deficllely exists noi 
ddfiniinlc does not exist. This object - if if 1x^116 - would livs So be either F’ or 
mdnnm1Selc F If if wrre deficiSsly not its ex1sssche or nen-ex1sSnnhe would have no
impict on She SruSh-vilue of sir sseSeccee under dishuss1oit Thninforn in order io
mike "V3x /fx" Sme nnd "3x VFx" filse Sheer must be n borderllnn case of fhn
pe161ciis "exlsis" such Stif if if existed if would bs F' or nt lenst VF.
Thees remiiks nre in plicn:
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Firstly the condition that a borderline case of the predicate "exists" has to be
such lhal if it existed it would he F or at least V F does not really add anything.
Thesis (V) says that there is vagueness in the world iff there is an F such that V3x Fx
and -i3x VFx. It seems however that for every object which neither definitely exists
nor definitely does not exist there are bound to be some Fs such that if that object
existed it would he F.
Secondly, and more importantly, we must remember that the phrase "a 
borderline case of the predicate 'exists'" is a sort of metaphor. We certainly do not
want to say that there is an object which is a borderline case of "exist", for this would
amount to the claim that there exists an object which indeterminately exists, which 
sounds ridiculous. In fact the whole talk of an object that neither definitely exists nor 
definitely does not exist is just a figure of speech and should not be read literally. It is 
short for the following situation: it is indeterminate whether certain .vs compose 
anything. And since it is indeterminate whether they compose any object, we cannot 
predicate anything of that object. In particular we cannot attribute to it the property 
of indeterminately existing; i.e. of being a borderline case of "exists". While it is true 
that it is indeterminate whether there exists an object composed by the simples, it is 
not true that the object composed by the simples is such that it indeterminately exists, 
just because it is indeterminate whether there exists any object composed by the 
simples. What exists is a set (or rather a fuzzy set) of .vs of which it is not definitely 
true and not definitely false that its members compose anything. Such a set is called a 
"proxy borderline object"."70
70 The exact definition accommodates the possibility of mereological change and defines a prox>• 
borderline object as a function from moments of time to sets of simples (sec van Inwagen (1990). p. 
277).
Van Inwagen claims that the role of proxy borderline objects is similar to the role that merely
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Thirdly, It should be noticed fist fhysls (V) dors not reducy vaguenrss In fhe 
world to vagueness In existence. Il gives oily 1 suficirit poldltlon of being s vague 
object. In this way e.g. tie possibility of counting vsgueness In Idyntliy as a kind of
vagueness of thr real world Is not excluded?'
Thesis (V) las an 1lvarfagy over thr attempts consideryd by Salisbury, for It
does nol foacr us to regard 'common' borderline cssrs ss vague objects. In fact It does
not give us vague objects al all. All if speaks about is vagueness in thy world. We
ynpounfea vagueness in the world when we havr to lo will 1 situation In which It Is
indyfyamlnafy whyther a pollyp1lol of nlprnnbjecfs composes a conposify object,
because in yacl such situslloi Il Is vsgur whyther fhe composite objecl in question
exists. It ^1^ br sail ihst ihst conposlle object Is s vague object, for Il Is nol clyar 
whyfhya thyrr is ary object to speak about in thr first place. This picture fils well with
van Inwagyn's ontology, In which ihr simples compose bigger objects just in lie cases 
In whlcl fhelr activity consiliums a life. Sincy "lify" Is 1 vague notion, somytlmes It 
may be indytyrmlnafr whhther flyy constitufy sr objecl oa not.
It seems to me ihst this account can be 1ppliyd lo our 'common' ontology as
well.
Following van Inwagyn we can divide metaphysicians Info un1vyasl1lttt; 
nieilists sid tie moderate ours. Unlveasallsts clalx roughly list for aiy 
lonovyalappirg %s, flose xs coxpose somethlnm.71 2 Nlhllists argur llaf ro composite
possible objecis pbiy in modal logic. He argues ihai someone who does noi believe in mcreh possible 
objecis, bui wanis io use a Kripkc-siylc semaniics for quaniified modal logic may "Ircai ihe so-called 
possible objecis as objecis which arc noi liierally non-exisieni bui which mimic in some semaniically 
useful way some of ihe behaviour ihai, on ihe iniuiiive lc\ 'ci, one expecis of non-exisieni objecis" (p. 
276). Analogously, proxy borderline objecis can mimic some of ihe behaviour ihai. on ihe iniuiiive 
level, we expeci of borderline objecis. Sec pp. 276-277.
71 Compare chapier II, seciion 3.1.
72 Cf. van Inwagen (1990). e.g. p. 234.
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object whatsoever exists. It is clear that for universalists and nihilists vagueness in 
existence does not exist. For them composition is a precise notion and has no
borderline cases. For universalists the claim that certain xs compose something is
always true, whereas for nihilists such a sentence is never true. The sentence can be
indeterminate for neither of them. Since composition is precise, existence has to be
precise as well.77 The situation is different with moderate metaphysicians. For them
the existence of composite objects depends on whether or not certain conditions are
satisfied, and at least in some cases the question of whether or not those conditions 
are satisfied will have an indeterminate answer. Our common 'pedestrian' ontology, as 
well as van Inwagen's, is an ontology of a moderate metaphysician. The vast majority
of our familiar objects are composite objects but it is not the case that no matter
which xs we pick out, they compose an object. We take it, for instance, that although
my mug, van Inwagen's pen and the Eiffel Tower are composed by some .vs, the 
totality of the xs that compose these three objects do not compose any further 
composite object. So, although we agree that there is a set consisting of the xs that 
compose my mug, van Inwagen's pen and the Eiffel Tower, we do not think that that
set composes any 'ontologically significant' object. Moreover, it seems clear that our 
composite objects are not (classical) sets of xs, but rather fuzzy (or better: rough73 4) 
sets of xs: macro-objects from our ontology have fuzzy spatial and temporal 
boundaries. The conditions that we lay down for fuzzy (rough) sets to count as 
objects are hard to state.75 First of all, van Inwagen's condition of constituting a life,
73 I have already pointed out that the idea of vagueness in o^it^t^tcncc makes sense only as far as 
composite objects are concerned. The notion of a simple object that indeterminately exists is absurd.
74 See section 3.3. above.
75 It should be noticed that we do not define objects as collections of simples. In particular, we do not 
want to identify objects with parcels of matter that constitute them, for the persistence conditions for 
objects are different from the persistence conditions for matter. The persistence of a macroobject
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altheuhh ^1 necessary, is a sufficient condiiloc: if somefileg is a composlts thing le
vin Inwigni's eclelogy, if will nlso be in object of our eciology. Howeeni' slccn in
our oniology three nee composite inorgiiic things ns well, Sir mere fnct flit lie 
actlvitc of the xs doss not deficllely corsflluin a lifs, doss col justify feeifleg She xs as
if iley 6id noi compose acclilcg - they can still composs seme1ting lifnless. And ns 
fir ns IianimiSs objects are coccnrisd, ws usunlly require tiii iley bs spnllo- 
tnmpoially cocllcuous and cipnbln of cluell 1ntnrdhSlei with ofher flings. So the xs 
(whainvei we Sake firm to be: helle' iloms' plll1hles, etc.) in order io compose 
'onSologicnllc e1gn1ficdc1' objects - let us cnll them things for simplicity - hnvs So be 
spillo-inmpoiaillc hocSinuous acd causally inla1s6. (1 am sues lhal Sheee nre some 
counSeeexamples So thil thesis' but if ippeies to be feus tor moss fimilinr objects of 
eeely6lc expee1sihe.) Clearly bolt spillo-fempoeil cocliculiy ncd cnusil lellSndnnes 
are vague relillocs. Hence, finer nes bound So bs such sets of xs Slit if will bs 
1cd1ldim1iiie wtelhsi they nes suff1h1snily iiteerelilnd le ordee lo cecs11Snls a thing. 
In some osier hases if mny be ledeleimleiSs wlnther Sheee ire ecougS xs io compose
n thing of n ceililr kind. Ic some of fiose cisss if will be IcdstnemlcnSn wtnitee lie xs
compose a thing of she kind le question or somsfilcg slsn (if wn, say, break a chile ic 
half if cnn be icdrleimlciie whsther Sts xs flit compose one hilf of a chili temposn 
n chair oe merely a piece of wood). In oiler hlsse however, if will be iednlnimlciie
whether Shn xs compose incthicg if ill (if wn inks fhn xs So be grilns of sard, ihni if 
might be 1ndnSnimiiaSe whsthne fires is enough of thrm lo compose n heip).
usually does uol consist in possessing the same simples. An object x that exists at t\ and is composed 
by a set of simples z may stilt exist at M but be composed by a set z-ir. which is what is left after the 
set z was destroyed.
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The question "How many ponaoslty things air there in ihr giver situation?" 
laaylas to be 1 rysl, metaphaslpsl problex. Hyncy, It seems fhat the situation In which 
Il Is indyfyrminale whyflea fhyay exists s fling coistitulrd by fir simples should be
rygaady' as a 'serious' case of vagueness in fir world.
4.3. €0^1^1)11
Any modyaafy siswyr to thy question "Wirr Is It frue 1111 fherr is s y such 
that the xs composey'?" comnlls one to vaguhlest Ir tie world; namely lo vaguenrss
in composition, identify and yxlsfeicr. We have slresly dealt with conposlfloial and 
iir'ivlduative vagueness In ihr previous phapthrs and we have seen that these notions 
aay coherent sid compi•ehnnslnle. At first glancy, It night seems ihst fiery Is no way 
of making vagueness in yxlstnlph cohererf aid comprehensibly. Van Inwagyn claims, 
however, lhat vagueness in existence Is no more laoublesomy thm vagueness in 
idyntity or pnxaot1t1nn. Hy argues llaf vague exls1erph Is Inevitable for sny theoalsls 
who thinks fhsl some (but not all) collepllons of sixply objects compose compositr 
objects and thyayfory wr should better lyarn how lo live will Il. Tie ialk about
objects thal "dwell ... between Bring snd ... Nonbelrig" sounds weird, but we lo not 
have lo think about objects wiosr existence Is Irlefrrxlrafy Ir such terns. Wy are 
not forcy' to clslx ihst thyrr sre objects which are such that It Is Inlefriminafr 
whythyr they rxlst. If wy accept that the inferyncr "V3x h'x I- 3x Vfx" is not valid, 
wy will nol lave objects of whlcl Il Is frue that they Iiidetermlialely exist. Although in 
soxy cases Il Is indeterminate whether some object rxisls, it Is never the casr that an 
object is such fhat It Is Iiiletyrxinste whyther /7 exists.
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One can make use of van Inwagen's remarks in formulating a thesis of ontic
vagueness. The thesis
(V) There is vagueness in the world iff for some Af although the sentence
"V3x Fx" is true, the sentence "3xV fa-" is not true; where positive and borderline
cases of F are excluded from the range of a;
seems to satisfy the requirements imposed on any substantive thesis of ontic
vagueness. If we suitably restrict the range of a* the sentence "V3a Fx" can be true
and the sentence "3aV Fx" can be not true only if it is indeterminate whether a- exists.
And it being indeterminate whether something exists amounts to there being 
vagueness in the world.
Vagueness in existence as well as vagueness in identity is a consequence of 
vagueness in composition.76’ As I have tried to argue compositional vagueness is not 
as anodyne as it has been argued by some theorists. It is quite 'serious' kind of 
vagueness with very grave consequences for the criteria of identity and individuation 
of objects. It has been stressed that a particularly striking feature of compositional 
vagueness is that it may lead to individuative vagueness. Now, we have to resign 
ourselves to the fact that it may also lead to vagueness in existence.
76 Vagueness in identity may also result from temporal vagueness. Cf. chapter 11, section 3.1.
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Chapter V
A QUANTUM MECHANICS EXAMPLE
1. QUANTUM MECHANICS AND INDIVIDUALITY
1.1. Introduction
In this hhdpSnl we will nxnmiie in example of ic61f1immiie i6eiSlSy given by 
E. J. Lown? Lowe snicks Shil Evans's iigumnnt1 2 is invalid, becdnse ii mnkns some 
illngitimntn moves. According So him, iiyone who thinks tnat Evins's proof does not 
work gets some support from quinium mehhdll1ce. Lown clnims this quanium themy
provides examples of identify stifemeiis which nee iiddieemicite in Siuih vilue 
despite hiving Swo precise designators as Sheie components. If Lown is right' Sinn 
quantum pnificlns nes vngus objects, in a secsn this Shey cnn bn IcddlnimliiSnlc 
identlcil with each ollnr? Tts existence of such examples suggests this Eedns'e 
iegumecS must haes gone wrong nt some plncs.
As is well-known' quits generally identify acd individuation pose problems foe 
quinium pdiSltlss - especially for Stoss in 1i1ingled stiles. The fundimeilil question 
is whnSher quictn can conslsSnnSic be regieded ns individuals. Tims' benoee 
icensSlgdSing Lowe's example in6 examlclcg whether She quinium pnrficlns aen vngun 
objects, we shall live n look at she nitues of lie nntinglsd stain nnd She 1ndivi6ndSion 
of She pniticlns.
1 See Lowe (1994).
2 See chapter I.
1 On the relation between vague objects and indeterminate identity see chapter II.
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1.2. What does individuality consist in?
A physical individual is usually taken to be an object which exists in the 
physical world, is distinct from other physical objects and is a continuant; i.e. persists 
through time.4 There are at least three theories explaining what it is that individuates 
physical objects (i.e. what makes each object distinct from every other)?5
(Tl) a substratum;
(T2) a spatio-temporal location;
(T3) a bundle of properties.
There are problems connected with each of these theories. The first one is the
most mysterious. The substratum theory is a sort of 'metaphysical chimera',6 *for it 
commits us to the existence of enigmatic substrata. In this theory individuality 
becomes in fact 'transcendental individuality'/ i.e. something that transcends 
observable properties and describable histories of objects.
On theory (T2) to individuate an object it suffices to define its spatio-temporal 
location.8 Thus, for continuants, the re-identification of an individual a at a time ti
4 Thus. e.g. cvenis are not individuals in this sense. Compare also the discussion of continuants in 
chapter III and a weak notion of individuality below. MB The following considerations are conducted 
from the cndurantists' point of v icw. but they can be quite easily translated into pcrdurantists' 
language.
5 French (1987). p. 5.
6 French (1989), p. 142.
5 Terminology of Heinz Post. See below [section 1.-1.1|.
® Someone who accepts this theory has two options;: he may accept either the rclativ-e or the absolute 
account of space and time. The former option leads to circularity (for the individuation of a given 
object involves specifying its location in space, and this location involves its relation with other 
objects), the latter option lacks the explanation what confers individuality on points of space and 
instances of lime. French. Redhead (1988). p. 235.
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with an individual b at a time t2 requires the spatio-temporal continuity of the 
trajectory between the location of a at ti with that of b at t2. (T2) assumes 
impenetrability - i.e. it holds that no two individuals can be in the same place at the
same time.
In theory (T3) if bundles of properties are to be capable of individuating, the 
possibility of there existing indistinguishable but nevertheless distinct objects must be 
eliminated. It must be guaranteed that indistinguishable objects (i.e. objects having all 
their properties in common) are identical (i.e. are one and the same individual).
Leibniz's law, the so-called Principle of the Identity of Indiscernibles (PII):
\fx\fy [VF (Fv <-» Fy) —> x = j]
is supposed to do the job. Two versions of PlI may be distinguished 
depending on the kind of properties included into the range of F.9 The weaker PII(l) 
says that there cannot be two distinct individuals having all their non-relational and
relational properties in common. This is a weaker version in a sense that it allows the 
relational properties of .v and >’ - including spatio-temporal properties - into the range 
of F. Hence it says in fact that if two objects have all their non-spatiotemporal 
properties in common and are at the same time at the same place, then they are 
numerically identical. PI1(2) is a stronger version and it does not quantify over spatio­
temporal properties of x and y. It excludes the possibility of there being two distinct 
individuals sharing all their non-spatiotemporal properties and relations.
I will not go here into the issue of whether the weak version of PH is sufficient
for the bundle theorist. As we shall see neither version is necessarily true, moreover it
9 French distinguishes three versions of PII. The strongest PII(3) quantifies over monadic properties 
of particles only. However, the distinction between monadic and relational properties is unclear. See 
French (1989), pp. 144 and 151.
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sesms this - al lsnst foe a certiic interprsSiSlon of quacium particles - ceither esis1on
is eenn conSicgncSiy true. Let us just poles out Slit if ths sfeongse Pll(2) wsre feuS'
Sinn wn would only nned So consider hun6lss of infricsic properties in oi6ni to
ic6iei6ndSn an object. On She olhee hind, if if were only She wnikee vels1en PIl(l) Shil
held, Shnc ws would have to include splSle-Sempol•al properties into She bundles and
SinnS 6ifnnlences ic spiSio-fnmpoial locifions ns d1ffsrenhes in peopeilins' which mny
senm henSioveis1alt10 *
1.3. Classical physics and PI I
In clnssical physics if is only She wenkse vnesioc of PH this holds. In gninril, 
fin piopelSlee of classical pail1hlss nee divided into intrinsic nnd sfif1-d1pdideil ones.
Tie nofion of intrinsic property as used by cldesicl.l physicists is col n sfiidie6
notion, for Shn intrinsic piopeelles (e.g. rest miss' chaegn) nee floss this 6o 1^ 
depend upon She lociSlon or ths stile of motion fhaf She particles ire in 116 a fortiori 
nen not epaSlo-lempoidl. Ths extrinsic peopeetlss' suci as position or momentum, 
depend on She stnls n paillcls is in.11 All pail1hlss of She snmn kind always hive she 
snme 1nSl1nsih properties. Hsnce, PH(2) is col valid bncdnse two part1hlns living ill 
their intrinsic properties in rommon may still have different spilio-tempoial properties 
nnd so be distinct individuals. Threefold' PH(2) is of no use le icdlvlduiflcg.
10 Cf. Armslrong (1989), p. 65.
' 1 Whether or not properties which arc intrinsic in the sense given above arc non-relational depends 
on the accepted physical theory. Sec French (1989). p. 15Inn. This issue is not essential from our 
point of view, because our versions of PII differ by spatio-temporal properties (not by all relational 
properties).
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The Impenetrability Assumption to the effect that no two distinct atoms can
exist in the same place, is a fundamental assumption of classical physics.12 Thus, 
PII(l) is valid, for if two particles have the same spatio-temporal characteristics they 
are in fact one and the same particle. Hence, what allows us in classical physics to
individuate two otherwise indistinguishable particles is their spatio-temporal
characteristics. So it seems that the two theories (T2) and (T3) boil down to the same
thing. Starting off with theory (T2) one has to assume the Impenetrability 
Assumption. If one wants to individuate in theory (T3) one has to appeal to Pll(l) 
which also presupposes the Impenetrability Assumption. Spatio-temporal trajectory 
together with the Impenetrability Assumption does the job of individuating.
So if we were to distribute two particles having all their intrinsic properties in 
common among two distinct states we would get the following four possibilities:
(1)
a 13
(2)
a [3
(3)
a (3
(4)
(3 a
A B A B A B A B
where the boxes represent the two states and labels "a" and "|3" refer to the two
particles. It is an assumption employed in Maxwell-Bolzman statistics used in classical 
physics that each of the above arrangements is assigned an equal probability.
Although a and (3 share all their intrinsic properties, the arrangements (3) and 
(4) count as distinct, a and (3 are different individuals (we can distinguish a from (3 by 
appealing to their spatio-temporal properties and their histories) and so the
arrangement in which a is in the state A and (3 is in the state B is different from the
arrangement in which a is in the state B and (3 is in the state A.
" See e.g. French, Redhead (1988). p. 2.35: French (1987), p. 5.
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1.4. Quantum physics and PII
1.4.1. Indistinguishahility Postulate and Transcendental
In quantum physics the situation Is diffyirnt. In quantum tieory not only do 
distinct particles laving all their intrinsic properties In common exist - In fact all 
alat1p1yt of fhe same kind si1ar their 1nfa1nt1c paopertIhS; but moreover fhyay are no 
individuating saltlo-1hmporr^l trajectories, and lie Impenetrability Assumption is not 
frur. Trajectories are not well-defined and moreover they may overlap/" hence 
dlffyaynt objects can by in tir same place at tie sane lime. Sincy quaiita nay shary all
thylr qus1lt1l1vh (I.e. non-ry1atlonal); iylat1on1l and spltlo-tempni■ll properties, none 
of fhesy properties can do the lltdividualtng..''1 Tius, neltlea iheory (T2) [saat1o-
fympoial location] nor ihroiy (T3) [bundles of properties] Is of any usr hyry.
It might seen at first glancy thal for fwo quantum particles of fly same kind 
distributed among two purr quantum sl1ths wr still have thy four possibilities
(dynoflng ihr quantum stairs in fhe tald1tlnnal manner by vectors |...>):
" "...if there arc two particles wiih fairly spread out wave packets. cpi and <po respectively. we can 
consider the case in which ihe packets move through each oilier as two waves in the ocean. As they 
pass they cannot be distinguished spatially, and there are no distinct trajectories by which to track 
either particle through time." Huggctt (1997). p. 119. On the other hand. French and Krause claim 
that it is not the lack of distinct trajectories which results in non-individuality of quantum particles. 
but rather the Indistiuguishability Postulate (see below). See Krause. French (1995). pp. 198-199.
14 There is an interpretation of QM which treats particles as individuals differing in their state- 
dependent properties. Bohm claims that every particle has a classical location as its hidden state. On 
this interpretation individual particles have classical trajectories and hence can be distinguished. The 
non-locality is provided for by a holistic dynamics. See Hugged (1997). p. 127. Hence. in such a 
hidden-variable interpretation of QM individuality is conferred by spatio-temporal location. This 
interpretation is a non-starter for ontic vagueness theorists. however. The claim that particles have 
sharp trajectories and that we can follow their history. excludes the possibility of vague diachronic 
identity between particles. Since each particle has a precise individual location. the identity between 
two particles is always a determinate matter.
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(1) Both particles are in the state |r>
(2) Both particles are in the state Js>
(3) Particle a is in the state |r> and particle P is iii the state |s>
(4) Particle a is in the state |s> and particle p is ii! the state |r>.
However, one of the fundamental assumptions of quantum physics is the
Indistinguishability Postulate, according to which it is not possible by measuring
the expectation value of any observable to distinguish between two physical states
when one i s represented by a vector |ip> and the other by any pe^mitUtitio n with
respect to particles |P(p>, of |(>.15 Io our case the lndisSingsishabilitb Postulate says 
that two states that differ only by permutation of the two indistinguishable particles of 
which they consist, cannot be distinguished. Io general the Indistinguishability 
Postulate entails that quantum statistics must count states which differ solely by 
permutation of indistinguishable particles as one and the same state. Hence, it forbids 
counting (3) and (4) as distinct and there are only three distinguishable arrangements;:
(1') Both particles are in the state |r>,
(2') Both particles are in the state |s>,
(3') One particle is in the state |r> and the other is in the state |s>.
(!’)
• •
|r> |s>
(2')
♦ •
|r> |s>
(3’)
• •
lr> ls>
" Redhead and Teller claim lhat Indistinguishability Postulate [IP] should be formulated in terms of 
vectors and not in terms of states those vectors represent. The reason is that a formulation of IP such 
as the above implies that the only states that saliffy IP are symmetric and anti-symmetric states, 
whereas the group theoretic considerations show that there can be many-parliele (i.e. more than two 
particles) states with higher symmetry properties (states of so called 'paraparticles'). which arc 
particle-permutation invariant. Redhead, Teller (1992). pp. 343n.
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This hns been Sikec So show this palSlclse n and (3 be iegiids6 as
ild1eidndle. Foe if Shny wres icd1v16uils, Shey would hive libels and iiiingnmeifs (3)
nnd (4) would hivn io be ^^116 ns distinct (for She iiiingnmenf of libelled
in61viduils iftee She p1imufifion is always different from inif iieiigemsif bnfors She
pdimufifloi). Slice quiclum statistics houl1 them as ons and Shn same iieicgemeif if
snems So follow Shil libels "n" ac6 1(3" cnn no longse be used.
In quiclum physics 61ff'erenS plyslcil dsenmpSlecs geneiaSe diffnrncS sfaflsfics
for bosele (such as pholois) in6 foe fnimlons (sucS ns electrons). According lo Shn
Bose-EliisSnli sSaSlsSlhs Shnrn nee fliee possible areaegsmenis for besoie:
(1") |e> (g |e>, coerespoirdirg to diagram (F),
(2") |s> ® |s>' coreespoedleg So dligrim (2'),
(3") 1/ v/2 (|e> ® |s> + |s> ® |e>), toerespolld1rg So dligrim (3').
According So tin Fniml-Dlrac statistics ihsie is only ons stile avillible foe
two fnemiors since fnimlons obey She Pauli Exclusion Principle' dhhoeding lo whlcn
fwo fnimlons of Shn snms kind clrneS be in lie same stile:
(4") 1/ V2 (|r> 0> |s> - js> 0 |r>), coerespon61cg only So (3').
(3") nnd (4") repinsniS so cnlled 'eciangisd' or 'superposed' stairs. (3") is n
pnlmuSdliol-symmsSr1h stair. wiereas (4") is anti-symmeSric,16 but shny both 
rnprnseil Shn airiignmnnS pihSuesd by Sir rightmost boxes; i.e. Shny 6o noi distinguish 
hnSween (3) and (4). The IndisSicgulsiabllily Postulate says Shnt stiles like (3) and (4)
cnn be rnpeesnnind ns dither symmsfric or anSi-symmeSlic stiles, nnd neither of those 
^1 disflcguisn between permutations of icdlsflngulsnable piriicles. On Shn oShnr
16 For two panicles there is only one non-trivial permutalion which replaces |r> ® js> with |s> ® |r>. 
Let () be the original vector and F its replacement by this non-trivial permutation. Then t is a 
symmetric vector iff F’ = (). while is an anti-symmetric vector iff «]“ = - t(). See van Fraasscn (1991), 
& 383.
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lan', if onr accepts that particles sir individuals snd can brar llbels; then one xust 
also accept lhat redistributing properties among fwo 1abel1ble ynilfles constitutes a 
changy in ihr actual staty of sff'slis. Accepting tils clalx commits one lo fhe ex1s1enpy 
of two-alat1cle stairs speciyirl by vectors which air non-samnyfalc (I.y. neither 
symmetric nor anti-symmetalc). So, In ihr casy of the superposition stales fhyay seems 
to be a dear frislon between individusllty (which requires non-tymmyfr1c stsfys) and 
the In'1sflngulshanlllty Postulate (which allows only symmetric and aitl-symnytaic
st1fys).
It has been argued thsi if one waits to clalx fhaf quantum aslllp1es are
nevyrfheless individuals, theory (Tl) becomes fir last resort.17 18On this theory
individuality is conferred by 1 tlalsphn1erta1 substratum. This might seem to be a 
"dark piecr of metaphysics",® bul It appears to br thr only sense In which ore can
retain individuality (in the sense given above) for quantum alat1cles.
The notion of transcendental individuality was first intaoduced to fils
dyb1fe by H. Post. Hy writes [1963, p. 534];
"I'WJr nrai ba Irdlviduallfy snnnthllg that 1rsrspnl1s neshrvleln difyrieicrs - whal 
I will call 'trlrspnl1nrtl1 Irdlviduallfy1. If snxnendy took away xy ^1x111 frox xy 
rmbrn1ll-stlnd; and srbst1trtnd his own |...| 1i1lstirgu1sh1elr from xinr, wr would hardly 
clalx lhat thrar lad errn no changr...".
17 There is also anolhcr view which claims lhal allhough panicles arc absolutely iudislinguishable. 
they are nevertheless individuals. Teller tries to save individuality• by appealing to inherent non­
supervenient relations. According to his relational holism objects which in at least some 
circumstances can be identified as distinct individuals in superposition states have inherent relations.
i.e. relations that do not supervene on the intainsie and nou-iutaiusic properties of those objects. Due 
to the existence of nolt-supervenient relations two individuals may be indistinguishable. Recall that 
distinguishability requirement is essential for individuality. On Teller's view individuality is saved by 
new entities which one has to introduce into one's ontology. It is inherent lton-supcrvenient relations 
that make it impossible to distinguish between particles in superposed states. So. particles are 
individuals for if it were not for such relations. they would be distinguishable. Thus. one keeps 
'ordinary' individual particles in one's ontology at the price of introducing some additional and much 
less 'ordinary' entities to this ontology as well. Cf. Teller (1986). p. 77. 1 ignore this possibility in my 
work.
18 Copeland (1994). p. 83. He uses this phrase in a different context.
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It is worth noticing that from this quote alone it does not follow that
transcendental identity is a 'metaphysical' identity, i.e. identity based on some non­
qualitative and non-relational properties. It could equally well be identity based on the
histories of objects;.
However, after defining transcendental individuality, Post goes on to claim 
that quantum particles do not have any individuality and in particular they do not have
transcendental individuality. He argues that the way the quantum statistics works
demonstrates that modern physics does not allow transcendental individuality.
It is probably an argument like the one described above which drove Post to
claim that individuality is inconsistent with modern quantum physics. Redhead, Teller 
and French have picked up Post's terminology, but they have arrived at a completely
different conclusion. They claim that transcendental individuality is consistent with
QM and there is nothing wrong with treating particles as transcendental individuals - 
in fact this is the only way to retain individuality for quantum particles.
French & Redhead and Redhead & Teller claim that if one does not want to
reduce individuals to bundles of properties, one may argue that individuals involve
something over and above their properties - "Lockean substratum, the unknowable 
'something' that attributes 'attach' to".19 They make the following terminological 
proposal: "if an individual acquires its individuality by something that transcends its 
attributes we shall say that it exhibits transcendental individuality"2° Redhead and 
Teller add that transcendental individuality is not another property of an object, but
" Armstrong claims that this Lockean version of substratum theory has "a rather unlovely form" and 
argues that a substratum theorist need not take a Lockean line. He claims that one may take 
substratum to be actually given in experience and proposes to individuate it with a spatio-temporal 
position of an object. Cf. Armstrong (1989). p. 61. This is a substratum-version of our theory (2) 
(for one can hold a bundle-version of this theory as well) and we have already seen that it will not 
work: positions do not individuate quantum particles.
20 French, Redhead (1988), p. 235.
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"tint by which an enSlSy allegedly ncquless its identify; ihai is its hapdc1ly to hede ac in 
pilccipls 1idiv16uiSing libsl; and this io wiici its properties iffachi or ... in eilSne of 
which if is ac object of peedihlSloi".21 They distinguish within lie ielioi of
Sidlstell6sllSll 1id1e1dudl1lc two mors specific notions: libel leinscnndniital
lidivldunlifc nnd piopnifc SelceceldsnSll individuality^ and clnlm tiii only libel 
Sldnehnn6elSal individuality coeceens Shnm. Tisy negus explicitly: "The wlole point of 
libel Siiiiscni6sii1al individuality is flit redistributing propeilles lmeng libelabln 
nnSlSies houlSe as a chinge in Sie aciunl slits of affairs'^-. At nireS glance such n cliim
hentld61cSs ths Ic61sf1igu1shibil1fy Posfulifs.
However' ns Redhead nnd Teller poles out, Swo inadlcgs of the
IldieSlcgniehah1liSy Posfulifs nee possible. Oc She strong eeidlng noc-symmefilc
veciois do not rnpeesnil physically meaningful stairs nnd noc-symmefrlc snlf- 
ddje1iit24 opriifois (observables) do cot represses any physical properties?. This view
is sliilghifoiwiedly 1ncocs1sfsnf will particles bring icdlvlduils.
21 Redhead. Teller (1992). p. .3-41.
22 In virlnc of having label iransccndcnial individuality (LTl) an object can bear a label, can be 
thought of as persisting through time as one individual. Property transcendental individuality (PTl) 
supports individual's properties: it is in virtue of it that an individual can be an object of predication. 
The connection between LTI and PTl seems not entirely clear. It seems that there can be objects 
(such as. for instance events) that have PTl without having LTl. whereas there cannot be objects 
having LTI without having PTl. In what follows by "transcendental individuality" I will mean both 
LTl and PTl.
Loux in his 1998 introduces an analogous distinction. ‘Bare substrata’ play two different roles 
according to him: first makes them the underlying substances of attributes, the second makes them 
the principles of the numerical diversity of concrete objects (p. 113).
23 Redhead, Teller (1992). p. 342.
24 An operator.')/with the following properly: (x-//v) = (Mx ■ v) is self-adjoint. Sec van Fraasscn 
(1991), p. 147.
23 A restriction on states and observables is always correlative. Cf. Redhead. Teller (1992). p. 206. 
Van Fraasscn gives the following formulation of the indistinguishability Postulate, which he calls 
Permutation Invariance (PI): If C is the state of a composite system whose components arc identical 
particles, then the expectation value of any observable A is the same for all permutations of j. Next 
he claims that it has two aspects: PI 1 which says that if some observable A docs not have the same 
expectation value in () and its permutation (>'. then j) does not represent a (physically possible) pure 
state of an aggregate of identical particles: and PI 2 which says that if some state ( is such that [self­
adjoint] operator A docs not have the same expectation value in state (j as in its permutation <)>’. then 
A does not represent a (real, measurable) observable, van Fraassen (1991), pp. 381-382. This
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Nevertheless, there is a weak reading of the Indistinguishability Postulate
which is consistent with particles being individuals. In order to treat particles as 
having label transcendental individuality we need to regard the Indistinguishability 
Postulate as imposing a restriction on actual states and observables: the 
Indistinguishability Postulate implies that all physical states must be represented by 
symmetric or anti-symmetric vectors, but on the weak reading it says merely that non­
symmetric vectors do not represent states which ever physically occur and that non­
symmetric self-adjoint operators do not represent observable properties. On this
reading particles are subject to dynamical restrictions as to the set of possible states 
they can occupy. Thus, on the weak reading of the Indistinguishability Postulate there
are states such as (3) and (4), but they never occur* 26 27Individuality is saved at the
price of postulating states which are never actualised.
The way in which quantum statistics work can be explained now. In order to
remove the tension between label transcendental individuality and the 
Indistinguishability Postulate, it has to be assumed that non-symmetric states are not 
available to particles. We have to assume that particles never start in a state with the 
'wrong' symmetry. The only states which are available for two particles are symmetric 
and anti-symmetric. Temporal evolution is governed by the Hamiltonian which is the 
operator for the energy observable. Since it is the observable for energy, it itself is 
subject to restriction imposed by the Indistinguishability Postulate and hence, has to 
be symmetric in particle permutations.22 The particle-permutation symmetric operator
formulation makes the correlative character of the restriction explicit. We get Redhead & Teller's 
strong reading of IP if we ignore w'hat is written in parentheses.
26 Hence non-symmetric vectors represent meaningful - though never actualised stales. Therefore, 
the correlathe non-symmetric self-adjoint operators represent meaningful physical states. Redhead. 
Teller (1992). p. 209.
27 Redhead. Teller (1992). p. 207.
23 1
parserves symmetry, i.e. under tymaoall evolution a symmetric bosonic stale must 
remain symmetric and an lnti-symmytr1p feamionlc stale must remain 1nt1-symmytaic. 
This is the ayason why quantum statistics distinguish three 1rr1ngemynts only: "states
with fhe wrong symmetry get rllmlnafel because thry are not accessible lo the joint
quantum tystyln";28 29nol because their air no such states. For bosons, slales are
aytfa1cfyd to tyxmyfaip ones and llaf is wiy (4") does not count. For fyamlons In turn, 
only nnfl-symmetric statys are accessibly and that is why (1"), (2") and (3") get
yliminafy'.
Hence, label ta1nscendenfa1 individuality can be aytalnyd: it Is consistent with a 
weak reading of the In'istingulshablllly Postulate and so with quantum statistics. 
Llny1 1a1nscen1rnfal individuality Ima11hs thst fhere ary distinct stales such as (3) and 
(4). Such states have to be Ilenilfiyd with each other to gyf fhe quantum statistics 
right. The problem is solved by the weak Iilistinguislsbility Postulate which says teat 
statys such as (3) and (4), i.e. states with fhe wrong symmetry, aay possible but never 
actually occur; thry sre not accessibly for quantum aaatiplys.20
It seems to me that orcy onr sscaines transcendental iitdiv1'u1llly to alat1plys 
one may also claim fhat ilyy have some other distinguishing paoayrlies. For if one 
claims fhat flyae are fwo distinct physically inlistinguishable particles which possess 
trlnspen'enfll individuality then one may ascribr fhrm different histories.30 If a given 
alrtiple las ti'lnspen1entll individuality tien there is no reason why it should not lave 
a distinguishing history. We lo nol snd cannot know which paal1p1e is which but, as 
Redhead puts if, "only an extreme positivism would hold teal bepluty we cannot fell
2® French. Redhead (1988). p. 237.
29 Redhead. Teller (1992). p. 206.
3° See the discussion between Cortes. Barnette and Ginsberg in connection with the Principle of 
Identity of Indiscernibles. Barnette (1978): Cortes (1976): Ginsberg (1981).
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which label attaches to which particle, therefore we are compelled to give up a
description which does ascribe labels to particles" ?'
1.4.2. ,HlIggeeiis attack on haecceitism
N. Huggett agrees that quantum particles can count as individuals but he is
strongly opposed to regarding particles as transcendental individuals in a sense given
to this term by French, Redhead and Teller, He takes transcendental individuality to
either entail haecceitism or be synonymous with it.31 2 Haecceitism is the view that
there are at least some cases of haecceistic difference between worlds, where the
difference between two worlds is haecceistic if they "differ in what they represent de 
re concerning some individual, but do not differ qualitatively in any way."33 Hence, 
according to hapcceitism1 it is possible that there is a world which is qualitatively 
identical to the world in which particle a is in a state (j and particle (3 in a state (p and
in which the particles have swap their states: i.e. particle a is in a state <p and particle
(3 is in a state (). Huggett's attack on transcendental individuality is an attack on
haecceitism.
The main argument against any theory which posits the existence of 
transcendental substrata is a thesis that one should not postulate any entities which 
transcend experience. This argument seems quite powerful: any successful account of 
individuals which does not refer to undetectable entities intuitively seems better than 
any one which does. The proponents of substratum theories reply to this argument by
31 Redhead (1982). p. 85, his emphasis.
32 Huggell (1994). p. 70.
33 Lewis (1986). p. 221.
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pointing out Shil fhere is co theory of individuals whose success would bs somnihing 
Shil ill pnlleeepnnls ngiee upon. As a posillve iigumnnf foe shn bare eubsSld1um
ineorc34 Shey give in irgumnif which lelifes So fir fnlsilc of Pdl(2y35 They Sake for 
^'111116 lie existence of quallfiilvslc identical but numee1hallc diffninnl objects - 116 
hnccn Shn fdleilc of PI1(2) - nnd clnlm thil' unlike, foe insfincdi Sin bundle theoiisisi 
tiny nee able lo dhcoun1 foe Shis ndh1. The bundle tnsoeisis who 6o not acknowledge
inctnicg but quiliSiflvs piopsilles ^1^1 ezxpliic how il is lhal two absolutely
idensicil buidlss (ic ths secee of PXI(2)) aie not ideiilcil cLlmer1hllly.36 Ic hontldsl'
She subsSenfum theorists negue thit quillfiflvnlc idreilcil objecSs mny bn liumeritdlly 
different' bnhause Shey may hive diffnrens eubslrdll is fhnli constituents. Thn bnee- 
snbetrald theorists do not couci hiving a certain substratum ns a qudlillSlen property, 
so fhn fict lhal dhsolu1ely 1nd1shninihle objects possess dlffninci hlie substiiti dons 
nof mikn PIl feus. PII says roughly thil two substrati lo which lie same d1lr1bu1ee 
nen 1111^16 nre ic fict fhn same substenfum' which of courss mny be false. Slice 
hiving n snbetrd1nm dons not couni ns a property which would falsify fhn iiSncedeif:
VF (Fan <-> Fb), tin prichipln VF (Fa <-> Fb) —> a = b, mny live n liue 111^16111
ncd a fnlss consequent. Huggeff seems to hive missed tiis, for ie weltns ShaS in
quinium mechdi1ce le wiici single pirticle stiles nee Sikec to be 116^16 eSdSes 
"[P]II is maximally e1old1edl so... iletcn1lism is frlvlnlly false",37 To lepeif: 
hnnccnifism does cot guaianine Shn Siuih of PII, hrecs hoevsrsnly from the falsity of
32 A bare subslralum has no attributes in itself: none of the attributes which are attached to 
substratum is essential to it. Cf. Loux (1998). pp. 115-116.
35 Loux (1998), pp. 111-113.
32 They cannot appeal to properties such as Vs property of being identical with x. because such
properties already presuppose the notion of an individual. And bundle theorists treat the concept of 
individual as built from more basic entities, namely from attributes, See Loux (1998). pp. 109-110. 
MB substrata theorists, who want to claim that PII is false have to deny that substrata could be 
regarded as some such strange properties. Cf. below'. As has been mentioned Redhead and Teller 
explicitly deny lhat transcendental individuality is a kind of property.
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Plt it does not follow fhsl haeppeitism is false. So, il Is clyaa ilsf thy commitmynl lo
fhe yxistence of llanspel'ertsl substaata nerd not be a commitment to fhe trulh of any
version of PH
Huggrtf cls'ims 1111 1lepphllism iss no support from eitler classical or
quantum physics. Hr writes tlat in classical physics tlmay Is a gynya1lis1tion of lie
four stafy atom state space [the full pnlth spacy] (atom 1 Is in a stale (j; atom 2 is In a
state (p; atom 1 is in a state (p; atom 2 is in a statr <i) and s generalisation of the thayy
staty atom state spacr [wiich is plllh' "the reduced pease saape"] (one atom in a stale
(j and one in a state (p; bolh In a state cp both in a state (j). Thr former does
distinguish between states which differ solely in fhe way the aaoayr1ies are d1stainuled 
over ltomS; and hence can be seen as supporting haypce1tltm; whereas ihr latter 
gynyr1lis1tioi dors not dlsllnguish stales dlffeaiig meryly by a rys.ii1ngenent of 
properties among the atoms, aid thus gives no support to n1ecceitism.39 Huggyil 
shows fuathyr that these two spaces are hxpilipllly equivalent: theay are no physical
aroayrtiys which depend on thr arrangymynl of properties over particular atoms.* 39 40 
Hyiice, in alr1ipu1la, tnyay air no ympirical differences which would slow up in 
statistics ("one obtains tie sane statistics whelhra onr counts pyimut1lions as distinct
•37 Huggell (1997). p. 125.
3® Incidentally. it seems lhat Huggell is right in thinking lhal the commitment to substrata does 
amount to the commitment to haecceitism. Let's assume again that in our world the particle a is in a 
Stale () and the particle f is in a state (,p. Granting that particles have substrata. a possible world 
qualitatively identical with ours in which the particles swap their stales will be a different world form 
ours. It does not differ in any quality. but it docs differ in its 'transcendental' or 'metaphysical' 
features. In our world the particle a. which possesses a substratum F unique to it. is in a state <(>, 
while in the possible world the very same particle (i.e. the particle possessing unique substratum F) 
is in a state cp.
39 Huggett (1994). p. 70.
40 Ibid.. p. 71. Huggett assumes that in classical gases all atoms arc in distinct individual states and 
shows that the frequency of a given distribution in the two representations is the same.
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or not"’11). Thus, "statistical physics is ... captured by either space".41 2 Huggett
concludes that classical physics does not support haecceitism.
And we have already seen that there are such interpretations of quantum
mechanics which speak against haecceetism.43 Hence, according to Huggett we would 
be much better off if we reject haecceitism. He does not advise us to discard the
individuality of quantum particles, however. Roughly, his argument is this: in classical
gas particles have distinct continuous trajectories and yet haecceitism is not true for 
them. They are individuals without being haecceistic. Hence, it should be also possible
to treat quantum particles as individuals without being thereby committed to
haecceitism. In his own words (1997, p. 121):
"[I]n a classical gas we do have particles with distinct, continuous trajectories, and 
hence particles which are distinct from one another, and which common sense says persist 
through time. ... [Hjaecceitism is not entailed by these aspects of identi^^-. 7his means of 
course, that neither the lack of sharp trajectories, nor the failure of Vacuucitism in QM entail 
that quantum particles aren't individuals in the robust sense of being distinct and persistent" 
Imy emphasis j.
So, the reasoning can be re-stated explicitly as follows:
1. Classical gas particles have distinct trajectories and are distinct and persist through
time. (premise)
2. Classical physics docs not support Vacuucitism. (premise)
3. Haecceitism is not entailed by distinctness and persistence. 1 , 2
4. Neethhe tlth 1 ack of fhhrp t rajectooics nor 61iv faUurc of 1^00^118111 cntaHs t haa 
particles are not distinct and persistent. 3
It seems to me that this argument does not work, however. All we can have is:
1. as above
2. as above
41 Huggett (1997). p. 121.
" Huggell (1994), p. 72.
43 Cf. the strong reading of the Indistinguishabiliiy Postulate.
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5. Haecceieisrn is not; e ntailed b y the e idtinctness and peie^iste^ticcc o f f bje etc h aving 
sharp trajectories. 1,2
6. The failure of haceecietsm does not entail that particles having sharp trajectories
are not Siseinet and persistent. 5
Even if we igree lhal haehce1t1em falls foe clnsslcnl gns piiflclesi Shen She
honclnsiol ws ain eil1tls6 io drilvs is the following: Tie nd1lule of hneccelflsm does
nos entnil Shil objects wircl hive hoclinuous fiijecfoiles nee not individuals. Ic other 
words, She fnlluie of nieccnlsism is coisisfeni with pieflcles being 6isSllhS and 
peleieSnnS, whnin this dislinctnsss nnd pnrsis1snts is geoun6ed in the spiSlo-fempoiil 
Sl‘djnhSories. If ssems lo me Shit we air erflilSd lo draw nny honclus1ons about She 
1nd1eidudl1ly of objects which have no dislicct SeljshSoeiss or about objects whici hivn 
no Siijecfoilss and foe which hinccelfism doss not hold. Wineens conclusioc 4. sics 
in ndh1 Shit we cnn have distinct nnd persistent objects which do nof have 61sSlncf 
SlljecSeeies and for which liecceillsm does col told (in parSlhnlle if his not bnni 
irgun6 nt all this objecSs licking continuous feijncioeles cnc bs distinct nnd 
pnislsfenf). This is a veey strong claim nnd is ceeiilily does lot follow from wins has
henl sn16 before. The meeS importnif pe1nS to rollce, hownvnei is this nlfhough 
Huggntf s iegumnif snows fhaf classical physics does cot support hdehce1s1sml if does
col slow flit haeccellism fails?4 Ard failure and lick of support nee two diffninnS 
things. Huggeff llmsrlf cld1me thil whelhei or not we count pnimuSiflois ns 6ist1ch1 
we get thn snms s1llislicst He concludns this. Sils mrans flit Stein is no support foe 
hinccnltism. But ocs can equally well derive a diffninnl cocclusloi: hdehce1lism is nt 
lenst coisisfeii will class1hll plysics. And flit is just whit She Slanshei6ei1dl
44 Later on in the paper Huggett seems to acknowlcdgc this himself, for he writes that Bolimian 
mechanics, just like ordinary classical mechanics, "carries no commitment cither way to the 
metaphysics of haecceitism".
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individuality theorist needs. All he has to maintain is that transcendental individuality 
(and so haecceitism) is not inconsistent with classical physics and QM, And it seems
to me that Huggett's argument does nothing which would force one to reject that 
claim. At most Huggett weakens the motivation to endorse haecceitism.
Having dismissed haeccpitism1 Huggett goes on to claim that "[a'nyone who 
believes in metaphysically persistent and diverse classical atoms is quite free to carry
her beliefs over to QM, for they are logically independent of qualitative behaviour".45
Furthermore he argues that the ontology of individuals is consistent with QM, for one 
might maintain that diversity and persistence are "non-qualitative metaphysical 
properties"46 *which confer individuality.
Now, the kind of properties he seems to have in mind might at first blush seem
similar to what Lewis calls haecceilies*1. Lewis claims that the existence of
haecceities does not follow from haecceitism (one can be a prnpprty-nnminalist1 for
instance). He also claims that believing in haecceities does not commit one to
haecceitism. He himself is not a haecceitist (i.e. does not support haecceitism), but 
nonetheless believes in haecceities. He holds that there is a non-qualitative property 
for any set whatever of possible individuals - namely the set itself. This is not the kind
45 Huggell (1997). p. 128.
46 Huggell (1997). p. 127. It seems lhal Huggell understands "qualitics" more broadly lhal il is 
usually done. For inslancc, on the one hand he claims lhal haecceitism is a view described by Lewis 
in the quote given above, while on the other hand he uVarauicrises hceccciiism as a position 
according to which identity of objects goes beyond their qualitative uharcuters (cf (1997). p. 120). 
However, if only ofn-rclaiional properties count as qualities, then the latier chapauterisation is 
insufficient. For it is not the case that coy view which uses nelriiooal, spatio-temporal properties for 
the purpose of individuation is committed to Vaeucciiism. In particular, if Huggett really meant 
hcnuccitism to be any view according to which identity of objects goes beyond their non-relational 
characteristics, straightforwardly’ his own view would be an example of haeuccitism and clearly this 
is just what he wants to avoid. Thus, it seems to me that by "qualitative properties" Huggett must 
mean both ofo-rclriiooal and relational properties. Such an understanding is suggested even more 
strongly by his taking persistence of quantum particles to be a particular "non-qualitative" property. 
If qualities are understood narrowly - i.e. as non-rclatifoal properties - then persistence is always a 
"non-qualitative" property. We do not appeal merely to such qualities in order to establish whether 
an object persists or not - we do that by checking the uoniinuiiy of its spatio-temporal trajectory.
"2 Lewis (1986). p. 225.
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of property with which wy arr colcerlh1; iowrvya. If is not 'mel1physic1l' (i.y. 
1a1nscyndynfal) In our sense - It panno1 lo lle ildividusllig for us. it will not lo to 
say that quantum paaticIhs are inlivilusls because flry havr a property; 'tie unit set 
of individual'48. Suci a srf ^^1 make a p1alic1r an individual. One might agree lhat 
if a alrt1ple is an individual then il las this property, but it is not fhe casr thst because 
of having this paopeaty it is 11 individual49 Whereas in our case noi-qualitafivy 
diversity and peasltfency are to confer individuality.
So, It seems to me thal alfhougl we can lavr 'Lewis's' laeccyities without
nlycpyifism; there is no way of laving metaphysical laeccyilies without 1lepceltism. 
Wnat makes 1 aaatlcle's dlvrisify and persislrnce nor-quslit1llve and metaphysical 
aaopyaties must surely be fir fact fhat flyy air lie 1ivyatlty and pyatitfynpy of thal
very platiple (I.y. of fhe individual laving 1 cerl1lr substratum F).
Besides, French & Redhead and Redhead & Trller would probably sgree that
it does not lave to by a substiatun which confers individuality. Any tllnspen'ynta1
chlalPteaisl1cs would do?" Thus, thyy would probably br quite content will non- 
qullitativh; mytlphytips1 diversity and aelsistynpe as tie individuating principles. For 
1 theorlsf who wnils to regsrd psi'llcles as Individuals lie crucial polit is this: it has 
to make sense to say 1h1f peamutallois are distirpt; since It is 6x111161 In our notion
of 1abyl1b1e individual. It does not mattyr then whyther It is 1 fr1iiscyii'yirtal
substratum or a metaphysical property as long as by means of it we can conceptually 
distinguish aylyvani peanutations. And lie i'ns of having ror-qualit1live metaphysical
48 ibid.
49 ibid. Lewis writes further; "Also. for any individual and am counterpart relation. there is the set 
of that individual together with all its counterparts". It is clear that it is not the existence of such set 
that mokes certain objects individuals and counterparts.
5"To deny that thisnesses are purely qualitative is not necessarily to postulate "bare particulars*. 
substrata without qualities of their own...". Adams (1979). p. 7.
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piopeilles whici leveilhnisss do col dlsllcguisi between p1imu1if1oirs is a eSlange
nnd hnedly iifelllglble ocs.
Thus, tie upshot is Sils. Huggntf lakes quacium paeilclns So be 1c6iv1dndle, but 
he dons not wins lo scdorss hanthniSlem, e1chn is claims this alihougi clisslcil 
pirtlcles aee iidlvidunlsi i.s. ars persistent nnd divsisn, hdehcn1Slsm is col true for 
Shnm. Cldseicl.l pieticles are perslstnci nnd d1enlse thicks to Sheir well-6snlnn6 spillo-
Semporal Srijecfoiies. Since Sheie ire no such SldjecSol1ss for quiitum piellclns' 
someone who wills So argus Shil in spile of flit fict iley are persistent nnd d1eelsel
mny appeal So prislstecce ncd diversify ucderslood as lon-qualiSallve mefipitcslcal 
properties. So. iccoi6ing to Huggnti, ocs mny hive dislicct nnd persistent quiclum
pnificlns' without being Shnesby ^1x11116 lo ianccsillsm.
What I hivs tiled So negus is - nirs1ly - Shit by Huggnll's own lights
hneccnlSlsm is coisisfeii will classical plysics, ncd - sshondly - fhaf from thn fact this 
one cnn clnlm flit objecSs wiici have dislicct wsll-defined spifio-tempoial
fiijncforlns nre distinct nnd peisisienS without being ^1^7 commilSn6 So 
hdehhe1l1sml if does nof follow lhal ths snme is lie case foe objects which do not nive
such 1ldjec1olfeSt Moieovrii if seems So me lhal if is hied So uc6eleSacd wins non-
0nll1tl11ve meSdpiys1hal dlveeslfc nnd preslsfencs aes, unless onn likes Shnm to entnil 
hdehte1s1smt If would bs i laSise sfiacge view wiici would hive ii Shil 
io1wisns1ii61cg fhs fnct Shil piriicles nee 1l61e1dudls in virtue of hiving 'noi- 
quilitnilvn metiphysicnl' properties of diversify ncd pses1slenhel fhnli p1emufifioi
dons noS imouni So nny ciaige nt ill.
So, if I am right, their is no esseillil difference between the view which
Huggeff ^^11^ nnd Sie view supported by Frecchi Redhead ncd Teller. Tis main
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diffyiyrcn is tisl French, Rndhesl snd Tnller pot1u1ste tin hxistenph of laaiisceiideiital
substrata, wieryas Huggell talks in firms of ta1iscnndeit1l paopyifies. Alilougl 
metlahys1clI1y this '1ffyrynpe nay well be very slgrlflcln1; It is not inpoal1nt from 
our anin1 of view.
1.4.3. Interpretations of state-dependent properties
As we lave snen, the lrsrtcerderta1-i1erllly view allows us lo regard asrtiplhs 
as individuals. Sincr distinct parllp1hs of the same kind have all their intrinsic
propyrtiys in common, Pll(l) is fslsn. In order to check lie validity of PII(2) we xust 
considya fhe extrinsic, ttlte-depyn1elt; propeilies of particles in the entangled stateS; 
for if Is infuifivnly plausible that suci stales involve psalicles wiich shsay all fhelr 
aroaerlies - i.n. both intrinsic and extrinsic ones. Thyry seem to be fwo gyiryial 
options:
(4) The st1ly-'ephn1erl paopnailes of p1rlic1ys in yrtanglyd stsles may be 
identified witl the sphpiyiclliol of fhe pure quantum mechanical statr In wiich the 
particle is; oa
(4 4) The stale-depenlert paopnafies of plllip1es in ynfanglyd stales may be 
identified with somethirg else in the formalism ihst is taken to bn 'thr stafy' of an
1111x^1^11 psil'ide. (*)
(*) The problem with fils 1dhntiyic1tion is fhat for an ynfanglyd state thyre are 
no pure stales thal can be ascribed to lie individual p1iliclys. A given sisln Is pure if it 
is nol a mixture of other ststes. Tie irfoinstloi about lie quantum xecisnical slain
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which the particle is in is given in terms of state vectors. State vectors are linked to 
observational results in terms of probabilities: a system characterised by a given state
vector will reveal a given observational characteristic with a given probability
provided by the state, observable algorithm of quantum mechanics. In special cases 
these probabilities equal 1. One state vector will give an object a probability 1 for 
having exact position X|, a second state vector will give an object a probability I for
having exact position 62, a third state vector will give an object a probability I for
having exact momentum px and so on. These special state vectors are called
eigenvectors for the properties assigned the probability I. The key assumption is that
a system has a given property if and only if it is in a relevant eigenstate, i.e. in the 
state described by a relevant eigenvector.51
If there were pure states that could be ascribed to the component particles, 
then the state for the combined system would be the tensor product of these states, 
such as (1") or (2"). But neither (3") nor (4") are tensor products; they are 
superpositions of tensor products. Thus, the component particles cannot be ascribed
any pure states and so cannot be ascribed any state-dependent properties either.
It follows that if one identifies the state-dependent properties of particles with 
the pure states they are in, then in the entangled states there are no state-dependent 
properties which particles that are in those states have individually. Hence, the only 
properties that we can ascribe them are intrinsic properties and those they have in
common, so PI I is violated.
This interpretation leads to holism. According to the holistic theory some 
individuals have features that cannot be reduced to features of their component parts
51 Teller (1986). p. 77-8. This is a strong assumpiion and rules out e.g. Bohiu's thcoiy of quantum 
mechanics.
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ncd inlniions holding between 11^1 parts. Ths whole mny hnvn prepnllins this do not 
enpeeencn upon the intrinsic pice1cal piopsifins acd reliliois of their bisic physical
pirls.
(**) Nick Huggett52 53 54 55 56llsis different objects will wiici onn mny identify stiles 
of individual properties. Let us mnilion by wiy of an example two of the peee1b1lil1ne.
(n) French & Redhead5- mnifloi the proposal according lo wiich one cnn 
idrciliy She stains of She snpieile pall1hlss will Sis 'joins slilns'. Ic an nilnrglnd stile 
nicn particle pnifakes of boil eilSes in the eupslpos1l1oi of peoduct stiles. Tius, two 
pdrtihles in She eupnrpoeision stnls live She same hoSS inirlcslc and siiln-depeiiderl 
piopeilles. Thus, again bolt eels1oes of PII irn vlolalsd.
(b) Freccn & Redhead5- and Redhead & Teller-- propose to idnrllfC She s1aSne 
of She sepaiale particles wish fhn 'mixed slilns'. The stile of n pneiicln ic She
snpelposiSlen stain is a 'reduced' stile cortespondlcg So an improper’-— 'mixture' of the
plrticlee. Tie lelevnit (improper) mixed stiles air the snms foe lie Swo pll11hles -
flec nee equlpiobable mixtures of She statss |s> nnd |e>. So, also on Shis iit1ipidfifioii 
one ends up with particles havlcg lie same intrinsic and sSa1e-6epeiidenS propse-tins. 
PII is violated in Shs snms wiy as on the pervious 1lltelpee1dl1ec of sie sSite- 
depnndeil pi•opnrt1ee.
Huggeff clnims Shnt in both those cisss, (a) and (b). "hdeche1l1sm is trivially 
fnlsn". His inasoi for such a conclusion is lhat both pirtlcles nee in the snmn joint (or 
mixed lnspec11eely) stile and hdics its psimufitloc of pirtlcles does not chncge
52 Hugged (1997). p. 125nn.
53 French, Redhead (1988). p. 240.
54 French, Redhead (1988). p. 241.
55 Redhead, Teller (1992). p. 216,
56 Redhead, Teller (1992). p. 216.
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anything; or as he puts it '"swapping states' in [these] case[s] leaves everything just as
it was". This conclusion is simply unjustified. "Leaves everything just at it was" in this 
context may only mean "makes no qualitative difference". However, haecceitism is a
metaphysical standpoint and whether 'swapping states' makes any qualitative
difference, or not, has no bearing on its being a correct or incorrect view. The states
of the transcendental individuals have been swapped, and although there is no 
qualitative difference, there is a metaphysical one. One cannot argue from the failure
of PII to the failure of haecceitism.57
1.5. Quantum individuality revisited
One may distinguish two senses of the term "individual". Wp started off with a 
definition according to which a spatio-temporal object to be an individual has to be 
mdividuatable and reidentifiablp. The former condition amounts to the requirement 
that an individual at any given time must be distinguishable from every other spatio­
temporal object. The latter is tantamount to the claim that individual must be a 
continuant; it must persist through time. Let us call an object that satisfies both 
conditions an individual in the strong sense. For wa/r individuality only the first
condition must be fulfilled. So an object need not be a continuant in order to be an
individual in the weak sense. Io this sense PII states that every object is an individual, 
for if two objects are indistinguishable then they are in fact one and the same object.58
57 Other possibilities listed by Huggett arc: "expectation values" (Lcvinc; Redhead & Teller), wave- 
paekets with (approximately) disjoint support from any other individual stale (Dicks), a modally- 
assigned set of definite properties (van Fraassen). hidden variables and the joint state (Buiiepficld; 
French & Redhead). On the last two proposals PII may not be violated. Here again Huggett makes a 
faulty uonneuiion between PII and Vceuueiiism. Sec (1997). p. 127.
5* Cones (1976). p. 493.
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Hyncy, every 'genuine' objecl is dlsliigulsh1ble frox every other object and so is an
individual in s weak senth. So, or this account the violation of Pll amounts to the
claim list firry ary objects which sir nol indivi'ual7.59
We have just snen fhaf PII is violated by quantum alaticles. Tie obvious 
conclusion is fhaf they are nof individuals. One can avoid this conclusion by bringing
in metaphysical substrata and ascribing tisnsceileifal individuality to particles.59 60 61
Tl•lnspyll'ental individuality is Individuality in the strong sense. It Is consistent with
quantum mec1lnipS; but does nof vindicate PII. Thus, PII must bn rejected as not
even contingeitly true. One ends up witl irdisliigulshsble indivi'uslt whose
individuality is conferred by mysfyalous ta1iscendhr1sl subsiraf1. I will call individuals
for which PII Is nol valid transcendental individuals:.
It can be arguyd fhat the paicn of saving individuality of quantum partiplyt is 
too high. If is true that one can loll on to tin view thal psaliples are individuals but in 
order to do this one must lpceal fa1iiscen'yiita1 individuality. Moaeover, the claim 
inat particles are ti1nscen'eitsl Individuals Is polsls1ell will quantum statistics only 
if one admits also the existence of never-occurring non-syxmetlip ststes and 
propyrtiys. The alteinaflve is lo intioducy noi-lndiviluslity ’’right at the start".6’ It is 
dony by xost formulations of quantum mechanics. Tley do not talk in trims of 
individuals at all aid do not intioducy labels and transpendelta^l individuality. They 
refer to 'isliigulshsble fields and non-iillvidusl 'particles'. In such tieoaies tie 
paonlyms with getting statistics aighf lo nol arise. Howevna, fhy quesfion fhyir Is whal 
exactly this 'ltnn-lldlvl1uality' of the 'particles' amounts lo.
59 Of course objects which do not obey the weak individuality constraint are not individuals in the 
strong sense. either.
60 See however footnotes 14 and 17 for other options.
61 Post (1963), p. 536.
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There is also an intermediate view. Redhead proposes to give up particles in
favour of "ephemerals".6. Ephemerals constitute a new category of entities. The key 
assumption is that the collection of ephemerals is itself a single ephemeral. 
Ephemerals can be distinguished from one another at any given time, but they do not 
possess label transcendental individuality and hence cannot be reidentified. Redhead 
does not want his ephemerals to be just waves. Teller pushes Redhead's idea a bit
furl^h^^i^?53 He claims that they are waves with certain very unexpected features, but
nevertheless waves. He takes the notion of transcendental identity to be essential for
our concept of a particle and the notion of superposition to be central for waves. 
Ephemerals are not continuants, they cannot be reindividuated and moreover they 
obey some kind of superposition principle: if we add two ephemerals we will obtain a
new single one.
French claims that ephemerals do not possess self-identity, because in the 
'entangled' state "the self-identity of particles becomes submerged in that of the global 
collective'..*54 This seems to be too strong a claim, however. The claim that 
ephemerals are not continuants, that they "pop in and out of existence" is different 
from the claim that ephemerals are not Identical with themselves. It seems that as long 
as we can speak of two ephemerals we can speak of two self-identical ephemerals. 
And when one deals with superposition one deals with one (for the explicit 
assumption has it that a collection of ephemerals is itself a. single ephemeral), again 
self-identical, ephemeral. It appears that as long as we are able to refer determinately 
to something or count it, that something must possess self-identity. No object can 62 63 64
62 Redhead (1982). p. 88-89.
63 Teller, p. 106-108.
64 French, Krause (1995), p. 200,
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possess ciileili of idnefifc without bring self-ldscllcil ic fhn first place. So, ns long ns 
lie cliim is lhal we know She number of fir objects lIieolvsdl 1heee objncts have lo be
sslf-ldrcSlcnl sitifl^^.
Since ephemeeils nes col coillnuaiils' they nee rot 1nd1v16uils le our strong 
sense but fine can be engirded as icd1eiduale in ths wsnk sense.
Lei us now lave a look nt the alleged example of vague idnnSitc effeend by E.
J. Lowe nnd see whelhsi our geceeal hocs1deeaSlols cencern1ng 1nd1v16uilily of
quinium pnificlns will allow us lo dsfeemlee whether she situifion 6nsciibed in fhn
example is ens of 'genuine' onllc iiidsleemliiacy.
2. E. J. LOWE’S
2.1, The construction of the example
2.1.1. Evans's argument and the tdcntity-tnvflvidg properties
Recall lhal She radical sldndpe1lS has if fhaf fhn sentence "a = /?", where "n"
nnd "/?" nre precise designaloesi is 1edrf1rm1eife ic fruit vilus iff:
(1) Sheee is no peopnely wiici h (definitely) possessss and a (definlinlc) done 
col possess: and
(ii) Sheen is a properfc which h (definitely) possesses, but il is icdeteemicaln 
whnther a possnssee tiis property.65
65 Cf. chapter 11. section 3,3, The intermediate standpoint has it that the sentence "a = b", where "a" 
and "b" are precise designators, is indeterminate in iriilli value iff: (i) there is no identity-free 
property which b (definitely) possesses and a (definitely) docs not possess: and (ii) there is a property 
which b (definitely) possesses, but it is indeterminate whether a possesses it.: whereas the liberal 
standpoint says that that sentence is indeterminate in truth value iff: (i) there is no iddetcrminaey- 
free property which b (definitely) possesses and a (definitely) does not possess: and (ii) there is a 
property which b (definitely) possesses, but it is indeterminate whether a possesses it.
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Evans's argument can bn regarded as an aiiyxpi al refuting fhe possibility of 
fhy existence of such siaienents. It purports io 1emoisfi1in lhat this drflnltion itself
rules out tin possibilily of tin Inlrferminafn identity slatymynls containing only
prycisy designators. The conditions (i) and (ii) are never jointly satisfied, for if "a = /?"
is 1111161x11116, thyrr will bn s property whicl b possesses and which a dyfinilely
does not possess; namyly the property of being such ilsf It is Iilytyrmliate whether it
is idyntical lo a. For it seems fist if V {a = b) and "a" snd "/?" are precisy, fhei wy are
infilled io predicate ofb llai It is such tisl ii is Inlnteixinsle whether it is idyilicsl io
a (xx [V (x = a)]b). Such ascription is nol justified If "a" or "/?" is imprecise. Hynpy;
ily only 1n1eieimin1lh Idrnfify slslyxyiis, If aiy, are those thal contain Impiyclsy 
desigrsloas.
Lowe claims teal quantum ihyoay provides pourtyayxamples to Evans's
ponclusion.66 According io him there rxlst ideitity ststements which aay iidefermln1fy
'ysplfe having fwo alhcish designators as ihria pomaonenfs. He considers idyntliy 
over limn and claims llul their ary idyitily statements whose in'yteamillpy is due 
solely lo tie existence of vagur objecls. His example goes as follows: Suppose that In 
an ionisation claineer a free eleclron a is capiuryd by sn slom lo foam a negativy ion. 
Thy ylyciron a and oiler electrons In lie outer shrll of tin atom enter a superposition 
stale. Later on fhy atom releases an ylyction b aid reveals to Its previous slaty. It is 
claimy' thal - because of ihe nature of superposed states - fhere is no objective fact of 
thy mattyr as io whyfhya oa not tin captury' electron a is identical wilh the ryleasy' 
elycfron b. According lo Lowe this example counts as an example of in'ytyamin1fe
66 See Lowe (1994).
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identity. The property is such lhat it is cmiUed_ from the atom is true of b but it is
indeterminate whether it is true of a.
The existence of indeterminate identity statements "a - b" containing only
precise singular terms shows that Evans's proof must be incorrect; that it must commit 
a fallacy. As we have seen in the first chapter, according to Lowe the most compelling 
explanation^ of what has gone wrong in the proof is the one which says that the
inference from
(3) -iV (0 = 0)
to
(4) -nAx [V (x = a)]a
is invalid. If there is no objective fact of the matter as to whether or not a is identical
with b then the property "Xx [V(x = o)]" that b possesses is not determinately
different from the property "Ax [V(x = b)]" that a possesses, because these properties
differ only by permutation of "aa" and "b". Since Ax [V(x = b)] and Ax [V(x = a)] are 
not dptprmioately different, one cannot (determinately) deny that a possesses the
property Ax [V(x = a)]. Hence, to claim that (3) entails (4) is to make a formal error.
A formal restriction must be placed on the property abstraction so that from "-,V(0 =
a)" only "-Ax [V(x = x)]a/" could be derived.
Thus, conditions (i) and (ii) are satisfied. There is no property which b 
possesses and a does not possess (for - as we have just seen - we cannot say that b 
possesses and a does not possess the property of being indeterminately identical to ca), 
and yet there is a property which b possesses, but it is indeterminate whether a 
possesses this property (namely the property of being emitted from the atom).6*
66 He considers five dinercm cxplanalions altogethcr. See Lowe (1994). p. 112. See also chapter 1.
68 Thus. Lowe argues in fact that the ^^^a^^iurl standpoint on intermediate identity should be replaced
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Noonin po1cle out Shit Lows is assuming this Evans's argumeci eseeelinllc
rnou1lns an appeal lo properties orly expressible using lie concnpf of identitf.6<t Onn
may impf flit properties wiici iceolvs identify ars suspect in She clsee cenheln1ng 
IndnSeimlnnSn idrififyi but if seems flat shey aee cot she orly properties to which one 
mny append in such cises. In ordsi to disarm Lowe's aigumsnS ene must ban idnnslly- 
ineolv1ng piopnrties from coesldeiilloe acd focus on 16nnt1tc-frne ones iisfeid. 
Eenns's argumnns will still work preeided fhaf sir objscls which She irdesneminnln- 
idnnlilc stilnmnnl is nbouf livn some propnilins wiich ire nof based on 16nnliSc aid 
which (dnineminilely) diff’ersntiale fhnse objects.
2.1.2. Identtty-free properties
Noonin rncenslrut1e Eviiis's nigumeel foe Sis hasn of Brown nnd Brownson'
in which Brown's briin is Seinsplinled icfo Rebinsoc's body (whnin "Browneon" is n 
nnmn introduced lo name a persel coceieling of Brown's benin nnd Robinson's body) 
nn6 it is ippnieeflc indeleiminale whether Beowc = Browrnoo.t0 Is snems Shil we
mny apply Eeans's nrgumeci heee nn6 - on Shs basis ShaS Brownson is such this if is
indelniminnle whether hn is idsnlical will Brown, wieieas Beowc is cot such this if is
in6n1neminaSn whether ie is idscticil will Brown - ws can conclude this either Brown
nnd Brownson ars nof indniniminnsn iffni ill or else "Beowc" oe "Brewneec" is an
imprecise desigcn1ei't Lowe, hewnenr, car reply lhal in deriving
(4) --Ay [57 (( = Brownt)Brown
with whal we have called I be intcrmediate slandpoiiit.
69 Noonan ( 1995). p. 16.
70 Noonan (1995). p. 16. This example is a version of the example of Brown and Siuilh from chapter 
III.
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from
(3) -iV (Brown = Br^o^n)
we have 1llegitln1lhly assumed llaf being such ihsl it is indytyaminaiy whythyr
le Is 111111^^1 with Brown Is dittilpt frox bring such th1t it Is Ii'etiixlratn wlrihei
in is identical will Brownson. Such a supposition simply begs the question lglinti 
ihe aaoaonent of vague identity. If Brown and Baownson are vague objects, ihen ihe 
aroaertiys eased on flyia identify (namely bring such th1t il is iiidyieaminaiy whether
in is idyntical with Brown (or Baownson)) are not drlnimlisfely distinct and lyncy
flyy cninot diffyayniialy between Brown and Baownson.
Brown and Baownson xay lave ofiea distinguishing aaoaeaties flaf do noi 
involve any lapeal to thylr identify, however.71 Suppose thal before lie tlansallli 
Brown was fat and Robinson thin. Brownson, who has Robinson's no'y; is thin. Yet ii
is in'etyanin1ie wieihea Brown is fhin affia tin trlnsp1lni; for ii is iileiyininaiy
whitnir he is Brownson or not. Thus, Brown possessns the paopirfy flaf li is
indefyaminafe whethyi he is 1111, bul Baownson does nof possess this property.
Hynpy; by ten con1alaosltive of Leibniz's Law, -.(Brown = Baownson) which
lpalrynily conta1licts ihr inlilsl assumption lhat "Brown = Brownson" is 
1n'yieamin1lh. Lowe's aiasming cannot bn lpa1ied 1611, beplute being such ihai il is 
indeiyrminate wnethea hi is thin affni fhe laansplarl is 1 properly that does noi Involve 
idenlity. Moreover, ii seexs plausible ilsf such liffhaenlisliiig ilyntiiy-fieh properties 
exist for any pair of supposedly vague objects.72
2' Noonan (1995). p. 16.
22 Recall our consideralions concerning Ihc watches and the property of being worn last year (cf. 
chapter II). Noonan remarks that one could argue that electrons do not have any identity-free 
properties which would determinateh- distinguish them. But since Lowe stresses that outside 
superposition states electrons do have determinate identity. it is unlikely lhat he will use this 
argument. If one is to give an informative answer to the question whether or not the electrons a and 
A. which are not in a superposition state. are determinately distinct. one cannot refer merely to
25!
So, to sum up; Lowe's argument, if accepted, shows that Evans's argument 
fails, because it assumes what it was supposed to prove. It uses as distinguishing, 
properties which essentially involve identity and as such are suspect and should not be
used in the proof. Noonan rejoins that Evans's reasoning can be conducted without 
the use of identity-involving properties. For every pair of objects a distinguishing 
identity-free property can be found.73 Hence the indeterminacy in question should not 
be explained by an appeal to indeterminately identical objects (for they are
determinately non-identical in fact), but rather - by an appeal to the imprecision of the
names of these objects. He claims that every alleged case of ontic vagueness, as a
matter of fact, is a case of semantic vagueness.74
According to Noonan the Brown/Brownson case is analogous to the electron
a/electron h case. Both are cases of identity over time and the character of
indeterminacy involved seems similar. In the former case the indeterminacy of the
statement "Brown = Brownson" can be explained by an appeal to the imprecision of
(at least) one of the flanking names; for instance "Brown". It is indeterminate whether
"Brown = Brownson", but it is not the case that there is an object which is Brown and
is such that it is indeterminate whether or not it is identical with Brownson. Hence, in
order to regard the electron case as an example of ontic vagueness, one should
establish first that neither "c" nor "/?" are imprecise designators (unlike "Brown").75
identity-involving properties such as "is identical to o" and "is identical to A".
22 Thus, even if the intermediate charactcristiu of indeierminaic identity is accepted, one can prove 
that the alleged indeterminate identity is in fact nfo-identity.
24 Incidentally, as we have seen in chapter HI the above solution is easily available to purduraolisis. 
However, enduramists may also argue that such terms are imprecise, but only if they admit that the 
objects themselves are vague as well. Fop endurantists wlio do not believe in vague objects, but still 
want to apply this solution, are forced to accept the spaiif-icmporal coincidence. Thus, we do not 
agree with Noonan that if terms are imprecise, then the whole vagueness is semantic. On the 
nnduraoiisi view both terms and objects arc vague.
25 Noonan (1995). p. 19.
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2.1.3. Tense-involving properties
Ic Sis "Reply io Nooeie oe elhns idsctlty" Lows, nflnr adjusting Sis
reneoning which ^^111 uss6 in lie Browc/Beownson (^1 So 11s elecleons example, 
gone on So argue snni elshSeons ire vngus objects and lie indntnlmindhc under 
distnseion is onl1h iffri all. He admits fhnf le tin Blown/Blowlsen example 
ensologitally iitdeleemicile identify is not nt issue,76 but clnims this fils is noi so in
lie cnsn of She nlehSeoes.
Noocin's iigumeci applied lo nlncfions is as follows: Lei's nesumn Shil if is
IndnSdimlnaSn whsinse a is idenl1hal will b. b is fir electron that wns nmltlnd from tin
ilom. Thereforei b possesses Sir piopnifc of being emitted from lie niom. Now, if il
is indeSniminnSs wldther a is identical will A, tiec if is also indntnimlnatn whetnni a
wns emitted from She ilom, nnd a possesses Sis peopeify lhal il is such Shit il is 
1n6e1eem1nnSe wldthse il wns emitted from Shs ilom. So, Sheie is n peopeify {viz. tin 
piopnifc of bning suci Shil il is indnSnrmlnaSn wielhei if wns emitted from fhn ilom) 
which a possnsses buf b does not possess. Hencei a is nof 1dnnl1hnl will 6, whlchi 
honSla61h1s Shs inlllnl nssumption. Moieovnii She distinguishing propnilc appended to 
is in idenllly-free propnilyi so Lown's rnneol1ng from (1994) cnnnoS be applied So if.
Howeeell Lowe replies this She propsefy of being suci lial if is icdeleiminnsn 
whdfhni it was emitled from fir ilom caccoi disliegulsi bniwenn pirtlcles. Tie 
renson is fhaf "we cinnof legitimately ignore [feesns] whnrn pin61ciSlois are 
hmnherned"t77 Lnl 1, bs She Sims of snSnngInmnnS ncd S? She time iftee elsciion b wns
76 Stnec Lowe docs not believe in temporal-parts it is not clear what his solution is to this case.
77 Lowe (1997), p. 90. It is clear that Lowe does not want to give up the intermediate standpoint on 
indeterminate identity and replace it with the liberal one. According to this latter view• the property 
of being indeterminately emitted from the atom, which a possesses and b docs not. cannot be used as 
a proof that a and b are not indeterminately distinct. A liberal theorist can hold on to the v icw that o
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emitted. Now, at t- a possesses the property that it is indeterminate whether it is such
that it was emitted from the atom. However, Lowe claims that h possesses the
symmetrical property that it is such that at t, it was indeterminate whether it was
going to be emitted. And there is no reason to suppose that the property that is 
assignable to a in virtue of the fact that at t. it was indeterminate whether it had been
emitted is determinately distinct from the property that is assignable to h in virtue of
the fact that at t, it was indeterminate whether b was going to be emitted. Lowe
concludes that "the coherence of ontically indeterminate identity has not been
successfully challenged".78
2.1.4. The analysis of the e1ecUrons example
Lowe wants to argue that although the predicate "it was emitted from the 
atom" is true of /?, and it is indeterminate of a, and consequently another predicate "it
is indeterminate whether it was emitted from the atom" is true of aa, it does not follow
that "it is indeterminate whether it was emitted from the atom" is false of b. He claims
that at t; it was indeterminate whether a was emitted, and at t, it was indeterminate
whether b was going to be emitted, so the properties which a and b have in virtue of
those facts are not determinately distinct.
The way in which Lowe intends his example to work is not entirely clear.
There are two interpretations which seem to be equally justified:
and b are indeturminalcty identical as long as the only properties that determinately distinguish the 
objects in question are indeterminacy-involving. A separate problem is that he should provide us 
with reasons fop thinking that V {a= b).
2* Lowe (1997). p. 90.
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(IntA) He waifis flat a las been Introduced ss the captured electron and b as 
ihi emitted elhp1ann. This suggest tie following inteipieiallon: Tiiri Is an elicHon
approaching an alom; we call this 111^^1 "cr"; a is captury' and becomes a pari of
fhy eni1ngled ^111 with another electron; latia on 11 111^^1 is emitted, wr call fhe
elictaon whicl was exilin' "b". The question is wheinra b is suci thst It is
indeterminate wirfher ii is i'eilical wiih a.
C)V (a = A)
at f,, c1ptuand st t7,emitted
at f^Vniniited at tHVemitind
On the oiler hsrl,
(IniB) Lowe claims fhat whal (among oiler features) nskes fhe eleclront case
dlfferynt from the Baown/Baownson case is ihe fact 1l1f "two electrons, a and A, both
exist throughout s period of time which begins eyyorh ihr capture of one of them and 
ends after fhe emission of one of fiim".79 gg , hrre wr have one elyciroi sparolching 
11 alom; we call if "a"; and aioilnr elyptrnn within lie afom's outer shill; we call ii
"A". If should bn noliced ihsl ihr e1ypirnn within tie atom had io be csllrd "A" nol
later fhan a was captured, because If is clslxed that (i) both electrors a and A exist 
throughout fhe ayr1od in quesfion; and (il) "ihise two ylyptaons exist in an 'infangled' 
stale". So, a is capture' and becomes a part of thy rnfangled si1te. Laiir on an
111^^1 is imitfed and "thery is no faci of the matter as to which of fhim is
emitted"*"
Il seems fhat in this cssr calling the nxltfnd electron "A" begs thr question. 
For we havr no more reasons to ilerllty ihr emitted e1ypirnn with A, then we havi to
29 Lowe (1997). p. 90 (my emphasis). 
80 ibid.
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identify it with a. So, in this case the emitted electron could be called, for instaocp1 
"c". Now we have got two questions concerning indeterminate identity: whether c is
such that it is indeterminate whether it is identical with a
(?)V (a = c)
at ^captured at t., emitted
at HVemitted at t^Vernmed
and whether c is such that it is indeterminate whether it is identical with h.
At first glance it seems that (IntB) is more complex than (IntA), because it
refers to two indeterminate-identity questions, whereas only one such question is
mentioned in (IntA). However, in (IntA) we may ask whether h is indeterminately 
identical with dee eIl^t^t.Ierll which was in the oto m ^om the beginning a s well as
whether b is h^c^ettermhatelhs identical wtth a. It ss ncT the complexity winch is 
important here. Neither are the two interpretations essentially different. What is
important is the fact that they bring out that the way the example has been described 
is incoherent. Two cases can be distinguished here and those cases are incompatible. 
Io the first case the question whether a and b are indeterminately identical is entirely 
justified, but we have no right to claim that (wo electrons, a and A, exist through the 
whole period of superposition. We perform the act of giving a name "A" to the 
emitted particle at some time after it was emitted and we have no guarantee at all that 
we are not naming a, i.e. the electron which had been captured. If this were the case,
then a and A would be one and the same electron - not two. In the second case the
question of indeterminate identity of a and A does not arise at all. This interpretation 
gives priority to that of Lowe's claims which the previous interpretation discarded. 
Since the claim that two electrons, a and A, exist through the whole period of 
superposition is taken at face value, the identity of a and A is not an issue: they are
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Swo, ndncn obviously Shey air not idecfical. One cni still ask whether lie nmitSs6 
elncSion is identlcil will She caplursd ^1, but saying flit lie emitted ons is h is 
homple1elc ad hoc nnd iibifiiiflc inswres Sie quesfioc of a acd As ieddldiminife 
identify in She nngnlivs. Thus, if ons warts fhnf question lo be ac ictnensfieg one, one
ins lo find i new cams foe its smiiisd slscieoii.
So Sheee nes Swo nlleeniSivss here. Elfini we stick So the clnlm siying inif a 
nn6 b nen Swo elecSrocs existing ShrougS superposition' or else we ignore if. In sin
former cise She stainmnei "V(n = /)" is simply fnlsn (nllhough 1^1111 sfilnmeci'
nimnly, "V{a = c)" (ns well ns “V(A = c)"), wieee c is the emitted nlncfroii becomes n
puzzle), wheesns le lie lnttse case if mny indeed Sure oul fhaf its truth enlue is
indessemicale.
Ie wins follows I will huchsctrats oc its ietrepieliiloe (IclA) since ii allows
us lo entalii Lowe's original clnlm flit its frufS vilun of "V(o = /)" is icdnieemiciie.
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2.1.5. Number and identity
Lown argues thst sllhnug1 ir s trperpnsh1 ttste tin number of thr electrons is
Ihierniiste, thern is no deterxinste fscl of the nutter ss lo tin ilerllty of fin
eliclaons in such siaie. He claims flat a sistenent of tie form "x is ihe saxy ilecfron
as y" may not have a diiiaminafi truth value If x and y arr in thy infanglid stale. It is 
hard io ixaglne, hnwyvyr, how this could be so. Suppose fhat fwo ylypiroits, x and y, 
enter a supirposnl st1te. In suci a statr fliy arr absolutely Iidiscinribli; wr cannot 
till them apart. Moreover, ihe clsix Is thal not only we ^^1 tell fhex 1p1rf, but 
fhyy plnnoi be fold 1.parf in principle. Ryxymnya, however, thal Lown assumes tint
ihe number of electrons in fhe ynfanglyd stale Is leihrxinate. Hince, there sre Iwo
e1ypirons in fils state and they lo not aeletrlte each olher nor do they exchange iheir
propyriiys in any ofher way."1 Because there arr no means of distinguishing tnim, we 
cannot fill which one is x and whicl one Is y.
Ii seixs to follow 1111, lespile lie faci ihst wr do not know which of ihi
electrons In fhe inf1ng1ed stain is x, and which is y, we lo know flat thyre ari iwo
electrons in flis staie; eaci of which Is i'eitical wiih itself and diffyaeit from tie
ofher. Moreover, before thy eii1iglemei1 fhey must lavr beer iithir 'iffirini or 
i'infical. If x were not idiiticsl with y before ihe 11111.11X111, lien Ii could noi 
brcami Ideiilcs.l wifi Ii in fhe eliaiglymeit. Similarly, If they wiry 1dyniipll, ihiy 
could noi cease to be idylilpl1. Hence, In iicI cssr "x is the saxe 111^^1 as y" las a 
dileaminaie truth value (which may bn unknown lo us).
81 As it has been mentioned on the particle-inlerpretation of QM the particles in entangled states are 
described symmetrically; they have the same monadic properties and the same relational properties 
one to another. but they do not interfere with one another.
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On the other hand, if electrons are not named before the entanglement and we
know nothing about their histories, then we cannot begin referring (determinately) to 
them by "x" or "j/1 io the entanglement. We cannot point to one of the particles in the
entangled state first and name it "x", and point to another particle next and name it
"j/', the reason being that we are not able to distinguish this situation from another
situation in which we name the same particle twice. In order to name something
effectively we must be able to distinguish that something from other candidates to this 
name; i.e. we must be able - if requested - to tell or show which object we purport to
name. In the entangled state this is impossible. And if there is no information
concerning the histories of the particles prior to entanglement available, then we have 
no means of choosing one of the two absolutely indiscernible particles. So, it seems to
me that we cannot refer to either of them separately. Hence, the claim that the 
statement "x is the same electron as y" has no determinate truth value is a plausible
claim in this case, but the justification for it has nothing to do with ontic 
indeterminacy. This statement has no determinate truth value because "x" and
have no determinate reference. It is indeterminate whether we have succeeded in
naming two different particles or one particle has been named twice.82
7.7. The scattering of or-particles
What is important in Lowe's example is that it easily generalises. We need not 
consider absorption and emission of electrons. Every situation in which we have two 
indiscernible particles which enter a superposed state poses the same problem.
** One might argue however thal semantic indeterminacy in this case has an ontic source. But sec 
below section 3.3.2.
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consider absorption and emission of electrons. Every situation in which we have two 
indiscernible particles which enter a superposed state poses the same problem.
For instance, Feynman in his Lectures on Physics describes the following 
experiment.83 Let us consider the scattering of nuclei on other nuclei and let us start 
with a^-p3alin^i^lns (i.e. helium nuclei, He4) bombarding oxygen nuclei. We assume that 
the a.-particle and the oxygen nucleus have their velocities in opposite directions both 
before and after the collision. Suppose moreover that there is conservation of energy 
and that the collision energy is so low that neither particle is broken up or left in an 
excited state. Since both particles carry a positive charge they will deflect each other. 
The scatterings will happen at different angles with different probabilities and the 
experiment consists in measuring the probability of scattering in various directions. 
This can be done by means of two detectors, one of which is situated at the angle 0 to 
the line along which the particles move, while the other is situated at the opposite side 
at the angle (ti - 6).
83 Feynman (1965). p. 3-9, 3-10. 3-11.
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Now, assume flat fhe dhiyctort do not lisiinguish fhe particles - they just
count ihe preseich of some plrilple. If there is to bn ar oxygen in thr position 0, ihiai
must be an ea.-p1iticln In fhe position (ic - 0). Tius, if,/(0) is fhe amplitude for a-
splfiering through ihe angle 0, lien /(tt - 0) is ihr amplitude for oxygen scattyiing
through tin angle 0. So, lie probability of gifting some parficli in lie detector D| sf
aotif1on 1 Is J/C0)p + j/(n - 0)p. However, lie statr in which it Is ihe a-particli winch 
is in iii position 1 and the stain in whlcl it is tin oxygen particle which is in tint 
position ari distinguishable in principle. Wr may not want io distinguish ihem, bul
wi could. "Nature knows" as Feynx1i puls ii. Tin result: j/(0)p + J/(n - 0)p is 
coiiici for all cases in which we dnsl with distinguishable particlys. It Is nof correpl;
however, for tin case in whicl an a(^-^psr'lip1e boxbards an lc^t^liit:ip:1e. The reason is
thal ihian are two ways to gif sn a-particle Into lie 1ethptoi•: eilher by scsfiiiing ihi
bombarding particle at sn angle 0 or by spal1hrllg it at sn angle n - 0. There is no way 
we could tell which partip|y infered ihe defector. The state in wiicl it is fhi
bombarding a^-^a^s^it^iclh wiich ininaed into fhe counter and ihe siaii in which il is a
iargii particle which dll so air indistinguishable in principle. In facl, fhy probability 
of sn lc-^a^tllt"iclh al D] is |/(0) + /(tc - 0)p. If we could, even in principle, distinguish
which plriiplh went which way lien tie problnilliy would be as previously: |/(0)|p + 
J/(tc - 0)p. The yacl that ihr probsnillly result is quifi 'Iforint shows ilai the fwo 
1ltem1iives involving In1islligulsh1bly plriip1yt cninol, even in principle, be 
'istinguished. We could adapt Feyimsi: "n1fuir does not know".
This presumably cai be fakri to show thal ilere Is no fact o/ the matter 
whyfhyr ihe bnmnar1ilg a-psrticle eiiiael Dp Theae cannof be a fact of ihi matter
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that the particle entered D| and there cannot be a fact of the matter that it did not
enter Dp for if there were any such fact, we would get the wrong probability result.
In other words, the assumption that the two states can in principle be distinguished - 
i.e. the assumption that there is a fact of the matter which particle entered the detector 
- results in an incorrect probability measurement, which is inconsistent with the
empirical data.
3. AIRE QUANTUM PARTICLES VAGUE OBJECTS?
3,1. The three metaphysical alternatives
In the first part of this chapter we investigated three metaphysical alternatives
for quantum particles; they can be regarded either as transcendental individuals or as 
ephemerals or else as non-individuals. Lowe clearly intended his example to work for
particles regarded as individuals. The example can be constructed neither for non­
individuals nor for ephemerals. For non-individuals the question of vague identity 
does not arise at all."4 The situation described in Lowe's example does not arise for 
entities which cannot bear labels, for in such a case there is nothing for the names "a"
and "/?" to refer to.
The example is a case of identity over time. However, if quantum particles are
some kind of ephemerals, then they are not continuants and cannot be re-individuated.
As we have seen two ephemerals that enter a superposed state become one
"4 One theory which deals with "non-individual" objects is "quasi-set theory". This theory allows for 
the existence of certain kind of Urclcmcnts to which the concept of self-identity docs not apply. Sec 
French, Krause (1995). pp. 2.3nn.
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ephemeral. So, although we can distinguish between two particles before they enter 
the superposition state, as soon as they enter such a state they cease to exist, A new 
partless entity is created and is determinately different from both previous ones. At 
the very moment at which the entangled state ceases to exist two completely new
entities begin to exist. Thus, there are no ephemerals that would satisfy an
indeterminate diachronic-identity statement. It seems also that ephemerals cannot be 
indeterminately identical at a time. At every time at which they exist they are
distinguishable from every other object. Before the entanglement the ephemerals are
clearly two, while after the entanglement there is clearly one ephemeral. Hence, it
appears that there are no vague ephemerals.
Lowe's example can only be constructed for particles regarded as individuals.
As French, Redhead and Teller argue the only way for the particles to be individuals is 
to be transcendental individuals. The individuality of particles has to transcend all
their attributes. It follows that there must be a fact of the matter as to whether c = b.
If particles are transcendental individuals then two particles may be distinct and yet 
may be absolutely lodistioguishablP1 have the same intrinsic and state-dependent 
properties. Surely, on this account it may be indeterminate epislemically whether at 
two different times one has to do with two dilferent particles or with the same 
particle. The question remains whether the indeterminacy involved is ontic as well as 
ppistpmic,
Transcendental individuals have label transcendental individuality; their 
number is determinate. In virtue of having label transcendental individuality they also 
may have histories. So, it follows that throughout the whole period there are two 
distinct particles: one which has been captured and one which has been within the
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atom from the beginning. One of those particles has been emitted and one of them 
remained in the atom. There are no means to ascertain which particle suffered which
fate, but label transcendental individuality, obscure as it is, has to amount to 
something. If particles have label transcendental individuality then there must be 'a 
fact of the matter' concerning their identity, even though it is a 'deep, metaphysical 
fact' due to 'something known not whaf.8-
The problem arises of course how to reconcile transcendental identity with
empirical results concerning superposed states or the scatterings of c^c-^p^alI^t.iclns. As we
have seen the weak reading of the Indistinguishability Postulate, which says that non­
symmetric vectors do not represent states which ever physically occur, can get
transcendental individuality 'off the hook'. On the weak reading particles are subject to 
restrictions as to the set of possible states they can occupy. Thus, on this reading of
the Indistinguishability Postulate there is a conceptual possibility of the occurrence of
the states
(3) Particle a is in the state |r> and particle (3 is in the state |s> and
(4) Particle a is in the state js> and particle p is in the state |r>,
but such states are not physically possible. Fermions can only be in the anti-symmetric 
states and bosons - only in the symmetric states. The states such as (3) and (4) have
the wrong symmetry - they are non-symmetrical, and hence are not accessible for
quantum particles. However, the conceptual possibility of the occurrence of such 
states is enough to ensure the individuality of the quantum particles. Thus, provided 
one adopts the weak reading of the Indistinguishability Postulate, label transcendental 
individuality can be made consistent with quantum statistics.
85 Locke famously catted Ihc substraturn "something I know not what".
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So, the conceptual possibility is enough to allow us to claim that the state in
which a = b could be distinguished from the state in which it is not the case that a = b.
Thus, there is a fact of the matter as to their identity, but it is not a 'physical fact'
Nothing that could ever occur in our world can allow us to ascertain whether the 
identity between the captured particle and the emitted particle holds or not.
What about Feynman's scattering experiment? Can one say that it is
determinately the bombarding a^-^p>a^lt^ic^le or the target a^-r^al'ticle which entered the
detector Dj? It seems that the positive answer to this question would contradict
empirical data. As has been said if one could distinguish which particle went which
way, then one would obtain the wrong probability result. However, it seems that if a-
particles are transcendental individuals and have substrata, and French, Redhead and 
Teller are right about the weak reading of the Iodistioguishability Postulate, then one
might argue that there is a conceptual possibility of distinguishing the a-particles. 
Although in our world there is no possibility to distinguish them, they are 
conceptually distinguishable. There are certain states which are not accessible for 
quantum particles, but the mere (unrealised and unrealisable) possibility of the 
existence of such states means that they can be regarded as individuals. In other 
words, if the particles entered such states we would see the difference. Unfortunately 
they cannot enter them, because the states io question have the wrong symmetry. 
Thus, we will never see the difference; we will never be able to distinguish the 
particles. Therefore, one can still maintain that "nature does not know", because the 
principle of individuality - the substratum - is of a 'transcendental order'.
Hence, regarding the relevant 'fact of the matter' about the identity of quantum 
particles as a 'deep, metaphysical fact' concerning their substrata allows to avoid the
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charge of conla1liciing tie results of quantum sisllsllcs. Tie substrata, the underlying 
individuality of fhe particlys; do nof show up in lie stllisticS; so to speak.
Thus on this interprelatlor It ceases to be fin casr ihai fhere is no fact of the 
matter wlifier tie captury' electron Is i'eifical witl ihr exitin' one ail Il ceases io
bn tie case fhaf ihiri is no facl of fin naffer wirfher lie nomnlr'ing a-p1iiticle
ynfirid the deficior D i. Although thyre is sllll no 'physical facl of tin matter', fliai
ari rylevsnt ''hep, me1aphysic1l facts' concirnlig thy rylyvanf subslaata of ihr
particles. Particles nave namis Ir virtue of laving substrata.. In facl, oni could flink of 
naxes "a" and "/?" ss 1tts.chh' io substrata rathhr fisn partiples lhemtelvys. Thus, if
oni had fhe means to follow tie fair of 1 given tubtirlfum, oni would know tin
answer. But oni ^1^1 do such 1 1111., of course. Thus, In either case ii is
unknowable in principle whlcl of tie iwo slteri1tives has nyyl resllsyd. Il is
unknowable In prlicipln whitier or not a is Identical witl b and It is unknowable in
painp1p1y wiethir ihe nnxbardilg a^-t^^i*1^ip^le eifernd ihr lefncior Dj. However, it is
noi myiapnysipally or onilpslly Iiletyrxinalh wiethhr the relevait facts occur-. Hency,
one might argur flaf while regarding parllclrs as ti-1rscer1eii1al Individuals commits
oni to episiimic vagueness, It does not commit onr to ontic indeiiamlnac^)^.
3.2. Further objections to Lowe’s example
Il is worth pointing oul fist ilere air olher objections 1g1lnsl Lowe's 
argument, which can be raised quite Irlephrdertly from aiy ponsidersi1ont 
^1^1111. individuality. In whsl follows tin difficultlys concenting in1ivi'u1lily of 
quantum paallplhs are ignoael and it is fakin for gaanii' flat such plrtlples ari
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individuals in the sense of being distinct and persistent. It is argued that even granting 
all of this the nlnctrons-case does not furnish us with the example of ontic vagueness;.
3.2.1. Taking tense seifoussy
Recall that Noonan argues that there is an identity-free property, viz. "the
property of being such that it is indeterminate whether it is emitted from the atom at 
t2", which is possessed by a, but it is not possessed by h and so can distinguish
between these particles. Lowe replies that the property of being such that it was
indeterminate at t2 whether it had been emitted cannot serve to distinguish between
two particles because it is not determinately different from the property of being such 
that it was indeterminate at t, that it was going to be emitted. Lowe concludes that
"[consequently, a's possession of that 'first' property can provide no reason for
thinking that a determinately differs in at least one of its properties from A".86 It seems
however that a does differ in its properties from h, after all. The 'first' property can be 
ascribed to both a and /?, whereas the former only to one of them, a is such that it was
indeterminate at t, that it was going to be emitted and such that it is indeterminate at
t. whether it was emitted from the atom, h is such that it was indeterminate at t, that it
was going to be emitted hm is not such that it is indeterminate at t2 whether it was
emitted from the atom.
8(’ Lowe (1997). p. 90.
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-V (« = b)
at ti, captured at t:, emitted
at ti,Vemitted at ti1Vpmitted
at t2,VemItted at t7, ^'Vemitted
And it seems that this picture suggests that the property of being such that it
was indeterminate at t. whether it had been emitted is determinately different from the
property of being such that it was indeterminate at t, that it was going to be emitted.
After all only one particle, a, has both these properties - b has only one of them. It
seems that if the properties were not determinately distinct we could not argue that
one particle has both, while the other has only one. Hence, it appears that identity-free
but indeterminacy-involving propertie-s may be used to distinguish between the
p|pctrnns after ail.87
3.2.2. Indeterminacy vs. indeterminism
According to another - more radical - objection there is a flaw in the example 
itself. K. Hawley argues that we cannot ascribe b the property of being such that it is 
indeterminate at t, whether it will be emitted from the atom.8* All that quantum
mechanics tells us is that at t, it is undetermined whether b (or a) will be emitted; i.e.
neither the fact that b will be emitted nor the fact that b will not be emitted follows
from the laws of nature plus a total description of the situation up to the time of 
capture. This however does not amount to there being no fact of the matter whether b 
will be emitted. So there is nothing that would justify the indeterminacy. * **
87 biB Bui one can give up such an intermediate standpoint and adopt the liberal one on which the 
indeterminacy-involving properties do not count. Sec chapter II. section 3.3.
** Hav'ley (1998). p. 103.
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Ai first glancy il dors senn ihst we lo rot want io say fhaf everything that las 
not bent deieimiiel yet, Is indeihrxli1te. On fin otirr laid hownver, It might siem 
that wi do not wsnf lo be forced info adnltiing fhat h has st f, tie property of bring
such that at f, Il is 1eieamin1ie fhsl il will be ixiiinl. It would be lalhya sli'nige to
claim that although h is such tint it was urlefnaninnd at i, wnethea ii will be emitted,
neveaiheliss ii is such that ii was determinate sf 1, 1h1f it will be exliiid. After all,
whal its being undeiiaminn' at t, whether b will be rxlifed amounts to is fhe fact fhat
"lie laws of 111^1, together wilh a complete qn1lit1live description of thy sliuafion 
up lo tine t[,], entail niithii tlat b will bn nxltfel nor thal b will not bn emittyd."89
And what its being in'yfeiminaiy wieihir b will bn exitin' amounts to is iii fact tint
ihiri is no fact of ihe mattia as lo whethei b will bn enitind or not. So, if siims fhaf
it can be arguil thsi at i, ii is enth unletnaxliel snd iitdethixiisty wintiea b will be
ixittid.
However, Hawley gives also snolher argument 1.11^1 ihi fhysls flat b is nof
such fhaf al t, il is indyteixinsle wleflia It will be exittyd. Recall ihai I havi
distinguished iwo diffnreni iiiteiprelalioiis of Lown's example. On both in1erpret1iions 
fhyae are actually two iideleaxiiale-lderlily quhsilntts whicl may be justifiably asked. 
According io the inthapaetatiol (IntA) fhe elnclior a is captured and 'joins' 1ioihyi
y1ypfrnlt; c, weicl is alandy In fhy atom; later on an ileciioi is emitted; we call fhe
imitfed one Now we are faclig iwo questions: "Is a such list li is In'ifiimin1fi
whiinia ii Is Idinfical io /??" and "Is c suci thal it Is indytyaminaty wheihei il is
^11.1^1 io /??". Hawley - on bilaly of tin otitic ihenllst - snswias "Yes" io both
questions. She clsims ihat If we take otitic Iideteix1n1cy seriously, fhin we should
89 Hawley (1998). p. 103.
269
argue that b is neither determinately identical to a nor determinately identical to c. As 
in the two-slit experiment the particle that is recorded on a screen beyond the barrier 
having two open slits, has a property which it would not have had it passed 
determinately through either one slit or the other (namely the property of reaching a 
certain position % which is accessible merely for the particles such that it is 
indeterminate which slit they pass through), b can have (or lack) properties that 
neither a nor c have (or both a and c have). Hence, although both a and c are such
that it is indeterminate at t, whether they are emitted at t., b need not have that
property. It can be determinate at t, that b will be emitted at t2.90
It is clear however that - contrary to what I have promised at the beginning of
this section - this argument does depend on the metaphysical stance one accepts. First 
of all, one is explicitly claiming here that objects can be indeterminately identical even
though one of them has a property F indeterminately while the other has it 
determinately.91 Moreover, it seems to me that it is plausible only if one gives up the
thesis that particles are distinct and persistent individuals. As we have seen French,
Redhead and Teller argue that particles can be regarded as individuals only if we
consider them as transcendental individuals. However, the above solution is not an
option for a transcendental individuality theorist. On his view it cannot be the case
that the emerging particle is indeterminately identical to two other particles.
And indeed Lowe has suggested a new metaphysics for his example,.
3.3. The new versson of the example
90 There is also another objection in Hawley's paper. She complains that Lowe’s example forces us to 
accept that the fact that h has the property of being emitted is indeterminate at t| and "somehow 
becomes determinate" at H. She argues that "we have no reason to believe that a fact about h becomes 
determinate as time passes". Hawley (1998). p 104.
91 Hence. Hawley must accept a kind of liberal standpoint.
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3.3.1. Electrons as quasi-objects
Io The Possibility of Metaphysics Lowe considers a oew version of the
electrons example. He claims now that rlpctrnna are "quasi-objects"; although
sometimes they have determinate identity conditions, they do not possess such 
conditions across states of superposition. This seems to be the fourth metaphysical 
interpretation of what sort of objects electrons are, the previous three being; non­
individuals, ephemerals and transcendental individuals.
Quasi-objects are not non-individuals because they may have determinate 
identity conditions; they are not ephemerals since they are supposed to survive the
states of superposition; finally they are not transcendental individuals since - as I have 
tried to argue - transcendental individuals possess determinate identity conditions all 
the time. However, the difference between ephemerals and quasi-objects might be 
questioned. If quasi-objects do not possess determinate identity conditions across the 
states of superposition, then it seems they do not determinately survive superposition. 
And if it is not determinate that they survive superposition, then it is not determinate 
that they are not ephemerals. But I'll not go into this issue here.92
Recall that the manner io which Lowe presented his first version of the 
example was ambiguous between two ways of naming particles. Io The Possibility of 
Metaphysics he is more explicit; "a single free electron, which we could label "a", 
were to be captured [...] and subsequently a single electron which we could label "/?"
92 And of course, if quasi-objects are a kind of ephemerals. then they cannot satisfy any 
indeterminate identity-over time statement.
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were to be rel^aiedd".93 Moreover, similarly as in the previous version "there are 
precisely and determinately two electrons in the shell"9" of the atom throughout 
superposition. The claim is that there is no fact of the matter whether a is identical to 
h. So, here we are told that a is captured and b is released and that two electrons exist 
through superposition, but we are not told that these two electrons are a and b. So, it 
is my original interpretation (IntA) which is correct for this version of the example. 
However, now the claim is that at t, neither of a and b has the property of being such
that it is indeterminate whether it is captured (at t, one electron is just being captured
and the other is already inside the atom), while at t. they both have this property (the
reason being that "there is no fact of the matter as to which of the two entangled
electrons was the one which was captured at t,").95
?V (a = h)
at tH-iVcaptumd at t,, -iVcaptured
at t;,Vcaptured at t2, Vcaptured
Let us notice that the reason why at t, a does not have the property of being
such that it is indeterminate whether it was captured is that it is just being captured at
that time."6 So at t,, a has the property of being captured, while at t. it has the
property of being such that it is indeterminate whether it was captured.97 One can
93 On the other hand Lowe writes also "there is no fact of the matter as to which of the two entangled 
electrons [...1 was the one which was captured at tj and which was the one already present in the 
shell at tj - and, ex hypothesis a was one of those electrons, as was A" (Lowe (1998). p. 69). Since a 
was the captured electron, b must have been the one already present in the shell. But then we end up 
with the interpretation (IntB).
94 Lowe (1998). p. 62.
95 Lowe (1998). p. 69. Nfi With the new v • crsion of the example Lowe departures form our three 
standpoints on vague identity, for in this vcrsion there is no property that one of a and b possesses 
delerminalely. while the other indeterminately.
96 It is worth noticing that the reason why we ascribe a at t| the property Wc |i.c. of not being such 
that it is indeterminate whether it was captured] is that it has the property c [of being captured]. So 
we seem to assume that if c then -Vc. We do not want to accept the contraposition. howev er. We do 
not want Vc to entail -v Since both particles have the property Vc at t2. it would follow that at t2 
they are both such that they were not captured at t].
97 Analogous considerations concerning b and the property of being emitted lead us to the conclusion 
that b at t2 has the property of being emitted whereas at the time t, it has the property of being such
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claim that a could have changed from not being indeterminately such that it was 
captured to being indeterminately such that it was captured, just as someone can 
change from not being indeterminately fat (i.e. being fat) to being indeterminately fat.
However we are not talking about a changing merely from “’Vcaptured at ti to
Vcaptured at t2 (just as we say that Brown changed from being fat at t, to being
indeterminately fat at t7); we are talking about a changing from being at t, “'Vcaptured
at t, to being at t. Vcaptured at t, (as if we were to say that Brown at t, was fat at t,,
but at t: is indeterminately fat at t,). At first glance it seems absurd. If an object has
certain property at a certain time then no matter what happens to that object later, at 
any time at which it exists it should have the property of having that property at that
time.
So, what can be the reason of such a strange state of affairs? What can cause 
the change from a (determinately) having at the time t, the property of being captured 
at t| to a having at some later time the very same property only indeterminately? As I 
have mentioned, Lowe claims that electrons do not possess determinate identity 
'across' states of superposition9* He does not mean it as an explanation, however.
Nor does he try to justify this claim. He takes it simply as a plausible account of what 
is going on in the states of superposition.
One way in which one can understand the claim that io our example electrons 
'lose' their identity because of superposition is to assimilate this example to the two- 
slit experiment. We have already seen that K. Hawley uses the two-slit experiment to 
argue that b need not have the property of being such that it is indeterminate whether 98
that it is indelcrminale whether it is going to be emitted.
98 Lowe (1998), p. 62. Note that this claim cannot simply amount to the statement that electrons do 
not survive superpositions, for then this view would not be di ffcrent from the one that treats electrons 
as ephemerals and indeterminate identity over lime would not come into the picture at all.
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ii will be ymitty'. Recall that lea claim has bien tint since h is not diiiamlnafyly 
identical to a and is not 'iiianiiitaiily i'enflcsl to c (i.e. the ofher elicn-mt within fhe 
oulia shell of the atom); il can lave piopeatles thst nilfhei a nor c has. Similar 
argument can be made hire. As I hsvy argurl for all we know the situation is like 
inis: at i,, a is captury' and c is in ihe aion; al l7; onr electron which we 10^11 "7" is
ay1eltyd. Hency; insiiad of one inlethrminaie-ideitily slatymeni wr havr tie
following:
(a = c)
V f = /)), V (c = b)
On fhi other 1111, ii seexs that we also havr thy following:
a = b c = b.
Since time are only two hlhptanns for b io be, b has to bi elfiea a oa c.
However, bycaute the cIiIx Is fhaf fly situation here is lnl1ognut to teal in tie two-
slli experiment, ihi "yithya ... or..." may not be 1 classical ponnyclivy. In ihe
experiment the statement "the fiail eleclron eithha went ihaougl tie lower slit oa it 
winf througn ihe higher slit" cnriot be faken to mean tlat the election de1eamin1iyly 
wini ihaougl oni slit oa the othra. Ratier ii is iilhtyaminaty wiicl slit It went 
tnaough. So similarly lere: although b is eitina c oa a, ii is neither dyiyrmii1tyly c nor 
defermiii1lely a. Tie claim ihst ylypfrnnt lo rot possess deiiamlnaii Ideility across
tupyrposlfion can be understood ss saying lhal both "V(c/ = /?)" and "V (c = /?)" ary 
frui. Niltner a nor c dyiermin1ly1y 'c1iairs' Its Idyitily ilrough suaeaposlllon and as a 
consequence niithei is deiyamilathly ilnitical io ihe emerging particle.
Admittedly suci a picture Is quite compelling. Tie folxulsiinn of fhe example 
involving a, 7, and c has onr crucial fi1fuai, iownvna. Il lemoislaaies ihai in neither
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case it is ontic indeterminacy that we are talking about. The above indeterminacy 
statements clearly are not ontic indeterminacy statements, for there is two of them and
the assumption was that there are only two electrons. The indeterminacy statements
say that it is indeterminate whether h is identical to a and that it is indeterminate
whether b is identical to c. We do not have three electrons, a, /?, and u, however.
This shows that we are dealing with semantic indeterminacy. What the
statements V(a = b) and V(u = b) say io fact is that it is indeterminate whether "a"
refers to the same object as "b" aod it is indeterminate whether "u" refers to the same
object as "Zf'. We do not know to which of the particles "a" refers at t. and to which
of them "/?" refers at t,.
However, if semantic indeterminacy is involved, then we have no right to
claim that at t7, a has the property that it is such that it is indeterminate whether it was
captured (and that at t,, b has the property that it is such that it is not captured). Since
the electrons example has been nfferpd as an example of ontic indeterminacy, for this 
example to work the statements ascribing the properties to electrons should be
regarded as ascriptions de re. For instance, the claim that a is such that it is 
indeterminate whether it was captured, should be a claim de re, i.e. we purport to
claim of the referent of "a" that it is such that it is indeterminate whether it was
captured. In our case this property cannot be ascribed de re, however. In order to say 
anything of a we must know first what "cv" refers to. However, although we do know
what "a" refers to at t,, we do not know whether at t. "aa" refers to the electron that
remained io the atom or to the emitted electron. We cannot ascribe a any property at 
t., because we do not know which of the two electrons we are referring to. We have 
individuated a at t, but it is impossible in principle to know which of the two particles
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surviving the entanglement it is. Similar remarks apply to ascribing properties to b at 
t|. Hence, the only properties we are allowed to ascribe of a are the properties
ascribed at a time t,, whereas the only properties we are allowed to ascribe of b are
the properties ascribed at a time t.. These are the only properties we can ascribe de re.
In particular we cannot ascribe de re the indeterminacy-involving property of being
such that it is indeterminate whether it was captured to a at t., because its
indeterminacy stems from the fact that the reference of "a" at that time has not been
fixed.
Thus, it seems that the example has been wrongly constructed. It illegitimately 
attributes de re properties to the particles at the times at which to these particles no 
property can be attributed de re.
3.3.2. Semantic indeterminacy
In his recent reply to Katherine Hawley, Lowe acknowledges the semantic 
indeterminacy in the example. He concedes that he "misdescribed the example in 
supposing that "b" dnterminatnly designates a unique electron".99 He argues that since 
the entangled electrons, a and c, are not determinately distinct, there is no fact of the 
matter as to which of them has been emitted, and therefore "/?" fails to pick out a 
unique object. Lowe argues that this is not to say that the indeterminacy involved in 
the example is not ontic, however'. On the contrary, the fact that there is no 
determinate fact of the matter as to which electron is emitted constitutes, according to 
Lowe, "a perfectly coherent example of ontic indeterminacy of identity ...".l0°
99 Lowe (1999). p. 329.
1°° Ibid. Lowe's exact words arc "... there is no determinate fact of the matter as to whether a or |cj
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Lowe is aighf to clalx lhal fhe worry about ihe Iircoheaenci of ills example
dons nof aaisi, because ii is nof susceptible to Evans's 1agnmeitf. If "/?" is si inpaicise 
designator and does not lyteimlisiely designate a unique elypiron, thr laull of tie
1n'efyamin1fy-i'yni1ty stsiemert "V(<7 = /;)" assumed for reducUo does nof allow us
io usi paopeaty absiaaciion ail predicate anythlig of b. The sane applies to ihi 
sfafimeni yi1iuaing ihr 'escaiptlon "tie emitted nlecfioi" insii1d of'7?". So, Evans's
poniasdici1on cannot be derived.
Thiae is 1 problem coiceailng thr alleged semaltlp indiiirmln1cy of "/>", 
which - as Lowe arguns - dors nol deiyamin1iy1y 'esign1le 1 unique electron. In oadia
io faeai "/?" (which has neel intaoluced as a nann for the emitted electron) as
imprecise in this tense fhyay would lavr io exist at least two candidates foa "/?" fo
aefir fo. There would have to be iwo electrons emitted frox the atom such fhat "/?"
infers in'eiyamln1te1y to onr of flim. But clesrly this Is not so: only onr electron was 
nxifle'. Thus, unless oni is a temporal-parts ihhoaiti; 1 view tlat "/?" fails io pick out
1 unique plaiic1y; lisls to sasllo-1hmpoi'a1 coilpi1erch (i.e. io fhe claim tlat iwo
y1eptaont are at fhe sami spatio-temporal lncstlnn); whlcl is usually aegsalid as too 
absurd to bn 1ccipiid.
Recall nowever ihsl we have 1itlingulshed iwo sensis of semantic 
imprecthinn.10, According io tie slaidarl lppounl a designator Is ixprecise iff ii 
refers indi1iimin1ii1y to somitning and dors not anfia de1ermin1iely to anything. And
is emitted. Here we seem to have a perfectly coherent example of ontic indeterminacy of identity ...". 
But using the names "a" and "c" in this context must be a slip on Lowe's part. Lowe himself has 
argued that since a designator may cease to be precise, designation must be relativised to time: "we 
must ... relativise designation to times, saying that a name or description which determinately picks 
out a unique entity with respect to one time may fail to do so with respect to another" (ibid.). And it 
seems that after the entanglement "v" and "c" - as well as "the absorbed electron" (Cf. (1999), p. 
329) - do not determinately pick out a unique entity. So, by using "n" and "c" one can refer 
determinately only to the electrons at times prior to absorption.
101 See chapters li and 111.
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this is the account that Lowe seems to have in mind. But one can define another -
non-standard - sense of imprecision. According to such non-standard account a 
designator is imprecise iff it refers indeterminately to something. This sense allows for 
the case in which a designator refers determinately to a vague object and
indeterminately to an object which is indeterminately identical to that vague object. In 
order for "Z?" to be imprecise in this sense, there would have to be a vague object Z?, to
which "Z?" refers determinately and "another" object indeterminately identical to /?, to
which "Z?" refers indeterminately. It might be argued that this account fits our case.
One may claim that if it is indeterminate whether h is identical to a, then "Z?" refers 
determinately to the emitted electron, which is a temporally vague object, since it is
indeterminate whether it existed before the entanglement, and indeterminately to a. 
Thus, in the non-standard sense "Z?" may indeed be regarded as an imprecise 
designator. Such imprecision, however, is possible only in cases of indeterminate
identity. Thus, in order to argue that "Z?" is vague in this sense, one would have to 
prove first that there is something to which b is indeterminately identical.
Lowe argues that the identity-over-time statement "a = b" is indeterminate,
because of the ontic relation between the entangled electrons, i.e. between the 
electrons that before the entanglement bore names "a" and "c". His reasons for saying 
that the entangled electrons are ontically indeterminately identical seem to be that (i)
they are determinately two and yet (ii) they are not determinately distinct, because in 
the entanglement "no property can be determinately assigned to one of the electrons 
rather than to the other".102 However, the claim (ii) is too weak, for there is no
property which could be indeterminately assigned to one of the electrons rather than
00 Lowe (1999). p. 329.
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to the other, either. Lowe seems to take it that after the time of entanglement the 
property of having been absorbed by the atom cannot determinately be ascribed to 
either of the entangled electrons. But if either electron has a property of being such
that it is indeterminate whether it was absorbed by the atom, then so does the other
electron. If we accept Lowe's picture, there is no property whatsoever - not even an
indeterminacy-involving property - which could be ascribed to one electron and not
to the other. Not only are the entangled electrons determinately qualitatively distinct -
they are determinately qualitatively identical.
Moreover, if (i) is true, then it cannot be ontically indeterminate whether the
entangled electrons are identical. For - as has already been argued - what the claim 
that certain objects are ontically indeterminately identical amounts to is just that the 
number of those objects is indeterminate: it is indeterminate whether they are one and 
the same object or two distinct objects. Usually when one claims that certain objects,
a and /?, are indeterminately identical, one also maintains that their number is 
indeterminate: it is not determinate whether they are (determinately) one or two. 
Moreover, that latter indeterminacy seems to be a straightforward consequence of a 
and b being indeterminately identical. If they were determioately identical there would 
be determinately one of them, and if they were determinately distinct there would be 
determinately two of them. If it is ontically indeterminate whether certain objects are 
identical or not, it has to be also indeterminate whether they are one aod the same 
object or two distinct objects. Hence, their number has to be indeterminate. If one 
were to maintain that they are determinately two, one would have to give up the claim 
that it is ontic indeterminacy one is talking about. It is only epistemic or semantic 
indeterminacy which may be involved io such a situation.
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Thus, what the claims (i) and (ii) amount to is that there are two determinately
indiscernible electrons. Although the adherent of these claims is forced to reject the
Principle of the Identity of Indiscernibles, he has no reason whatsoever to believe in 
the ontic indeterminacy of identity between the entangled electrons. Therefore, Lowe 
has failed to justify the claim that his is an example of ontic indeterminacy.
So, since it has not been established that the entangled electrons are ontically
indeterminately identical, the claim that "Z?" is semantically vague because of ontic 
reasons is unjustified. To repeat, we are not saying that it is incoherent to suggest that 
a and h are vague. All we are arguing is that the claim that they are vague, is
unsupported.
4. CONCLUSION
Quantum particles are not good candidates for vague objects. They can be 
regarded either as individuals, ephemerals, quasi-objects or non-individuals. As
Huggett puts it: "[l]t is hard to wring metaphysics out of standard QM by itself'.’03 
We have several metaphysics to choose from, and quantum mechanics provides no 
grounds for choosing between these metaphysical alternatives. The particles-as- 
individuals view is highly problematic. The only way in which one may claim that 
particles having both intrinsic and extrinsic properties in common are nevertheless 
two distinct individuals is to insist that they have label transcendental individuality. It 
is utterly obscure in what label transcendental individuality consists. It seems that it is 
nothing more than a 'proclamation of faith'; since two particles entered the
103 Huggett (1997). p. 128.
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superposition state aod two particles left it then it seems 'reasonable' to insist that they 
existed all the time. Moreover, it should be noticed that 'entanglement' is never strictly 
absent - every quantum particle is involved with the state of every other quantum
particle of the same kind, in the universe. Our considerations are merely hypothetical,
for io fact superposition is always present. It follows that our individuals are capable 
not only of penetrating each other, but of being io several places at the same time as
well.
If such a notion of "individual" is too strange to be accepted then one may 
regard quantum particles as ephemerals. They are individuals in a much weaker sense:
they do not persist io time, hence the question of identity over time does not arise for
them. On the other hand, their identity at a time appms to be determined. Io a
superposition state there is only one ephemeral; the 'original' ephemerals that
constituted the new one, ceased to exist.
Yet another option is to treat particles as quasi-objects, i.e. object which are 
distinct and persistent as long as they do not enter superposition. Io a superposition 
state they 'lose' their (determinate) identity. The particles emerging from such state 
are not determinately identical to any of the particles existing before the entanglement. 
Hence, strictly speaking particles are individuals only outside superposition.
It has been argued that the particles-as-non-individuals view agrees well with 
the Fock space interpretation of quantum field theory, which is considered simple and 
empirically adequ^c.104 On such a view 'particles' are no longer particles: they are not
even self-identical.
104 See French, Krause (1995). p. 22: and Redhead. Teller (1992), pp. 217-18.
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Although Lowe's exanple can be slalel if particlns aay rygaa'id as individuals
if does noi ytilnl1th vague iderfliy. If 6? snd h sri individuals, fhi staliment "c/ = /?" is 
noi indyterminale; ii possesses a dyierminafe irulh value, which Is in palncipli
unknowable for us. Tie example cannot bn formulsted for ypnymyi'llS; because a
'efmiiyIy 'popped out' of nxislnnce before h 'popped Into' existence. On lie plriip1es-
1s-non-in'ividu1ls view Lowe's exampln cnriot bn ponsfrupiy', eltenr. Thiin sre no 
such flings as elictaons a and /?. We lave no mians io infer lo single particlys there.
On the psrficles-ls-quasi-objhctt view, since particles do rot possess lelyrminate
idenfily pon'iiiont across fhe superposed tfltht, the sisiymeit "a = /?" cannot bi 
regardi' as 'eierxln1ie in truth value. Putting ylep1rons into the category of quasi­
objects precludes ihe possibility teat fin capfuied nlictroi is 1etermli1te1y ideniipal io
fly emitted ylectrnl. However, Ii seems fhsl the cIiIx ihat our particlys a and h are 
qulti-objects is In fact iaitaxourt to the claim flaf a is In1y1erxli1te1y Ileilical io h. 
And if flis is so, ihsl claim should be argui' for, bhpause it is precisely whsl is at 
issui. One cnriot just staii ihai qusnium psalicles arr qulsi-objectS; such 1 claim 
should be justified. In order to argui ihat tie statement "a = /?" is 1111111x11111, one 
has eifhia io 'emonsirate ilsf a and b are vague objecls or else opt for 1 semantic 
indifeaminacy. As 1 have irlid io argue Lowe lid not succeed In arguing for lie first 
option. Thr lalier option is 1 viable option only for fhe fimporal parls ihnoiisis. A 
pyrson who believes in tempoi'al parts iss an easy sexarlic explication inaly: le can
claim fhaf "ui = /?" is irde1ermli1ly in truth value because fhe nsne "/?" refyrs
indyierminately io two four-1iinyiisioit1l objects: tin electron wiosr posf-emisslon 
stages ari outside fhi atom and whose pay-antnrpfinn stages are Iisl'e ihi atom, and
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the electron whose both pre-absorption and post-emission stages are outside the
atom.
One might be puzzled that here I am objecting to electrons being vague 
objects, while in chapter III we have acknowledged that watches and persons might 
be vague. However, the watches and persons will be vague only in certain particular 
cases in which due to some events their identity has become questionable. If such a 
puzzling case arose for electrons, then one might try to argue that they are vague as 
well. It will be possible only on the quasi-objects option (as it has been argued on the 
transcendental identity view indeterminacy of identity is impossible). So, in order to
argue that electrons are vague quasi-objects one would have to build up a case in 
which the identity over time of an electron becomes questionable. As I have tried to 
argue the example described by Lowe is not such a case.
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CONCLUSION
The main focus of this thesis is indeterminate identity and its relations to vague
objects and to imprecise designation.
In chapter 1 Evans's argument concerning indeterminate identity statements 
was presented and discussed. Evans's paper io which he formulated his argument is
one of the most frequently discussed papers concerning identity. As we have seen the
only fact upon which all the commentators agree is that Evans's paper is "over-brief, 
cryptic, aod often misunderstood" .' There are serious doubts concerning what Evans 
wanted to prove by his argument. Theorists have proposed two competing aod 
incompatible interpretations. According to some, Evans purposefully constructed an 
invalid argument in order to demonstrate that the vague objects view cannot diagnose 
the fallacy and is therefore untenable. According to others, Evans wanted to formulate 
a (valid) argument to the effect that there cannot be vague identity statements whose 
vagueness is due solely to the existence of vague objects. As 1 have argued, if it is the 
former interpretation which is correct, than the argument really is invalid, but it is 
doubtful whether it achieves its aim. It might be argued that "the vague objects view" 
it refutes is not the view that most vague objects theorists hold. The main part of the 
chapter was devoted to the second interpretation aod the discussions concerning the 
validity of the argument on this interpretation. In the first section each step of the 
proof was considered separately and the doubts concerning it were presented. It
* Lewis (1988). p. 128.
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appears that the vague objects theorist is in a position to object to the validity of every
single step.
There are two well-known arguments similar to Evans's; one was formulated
by Nathan Salmons and the other by David Wiggins. These arguments were briefly
discussed in the second section.
Chapter II was devoted to issues concerning vague objects, indeterminately 
identical objects and precise and imprecise designation.
Recall that one of the interpretations of Evans's argument takes it to prove that
the idea of indeterminate identity- statements composed exclusively of precise terms is 
incoherent. I have argued that - quite independently of Evans's argument - terms 
designating indeterminately identical objects cannot be precise designators. If my 
argument is correct, then it shows that terms referring to vaguely identical objects 
have to be imprecise in a sense that they refer to an indeterminate number of objects. I
also offered an argument to the effect that terms designating indeterminately identical 
objects are designators of a special kind, which refer both determinately and
indeterminately. The question arises whether such designators could be considered 
precise. After presenting the arguments for regarding them as precise, I have argued 
that it seems nevertheless more appropriate to call them imprecise. And, anyway, they 
are not 'precise enough' to run Evans's argument on them, for the use of property
abstraction is not justified in their case.
In the third section various accounts of what indeterminate identity between 
objects may consist in were discussed. There are at least four accounts of why the 
identity statement concerning objects a and h may be vague: (i) a and h may be vague
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objects, (li) properties of a and h may bn vagur, (iii) a's and /?'s having of aropyri1ys 
may be inlethaxliste and (lv) il xsy bn uilefiamiiel what counts ss s propiaty 
ailivani for the Identify claix. Posslbllllles (i) and (lv) wiry invhs1ig1tyd in delail.
In particular re (i) ihr lilations belwerr vagur objects and Iii'etyamin1te 
idinfify wiry consiliail. One possible account has it tlaf objecls aay vague if thiy ari 
indefiax1n1fi1y Iliilical. I lave discussed Mark Sslntbray's lifemats lo find a 
tunsilntivy tnisls of ontic vsgueirss (namely suci thesis that would sep1a1ie
genuinily (i.y. oniically) vague objecls form aiodynn (i.e. shmaitically) vague objects)
and in p1aticulaa his aagumeil io lie yffypi fhaf in'etyrmliiafy i'inilly csiiot be a
guide io vague objects, sincr ileai sir no objects which are in'itiaminstily idyntical.
I havi aigued io fin conta1iy tisl finie are objects whose ideitity is indyteixin1ie 
and flat such indytyaminapy Is ontic Ir tie sense list Ii concians i'iillly, 
indivi'u1iioi and spalio-tempoi'1l nourdsaies of objects. This kind of vsguenyss 
in'angias fhi very "objectlool" of objects and tius seexs more oniic tisr simntiic.
The issue of whether vague objects can be indyieaminalyly Ideiilcsl Is crucial 
foa Evans's arguminf. For if fhey calnol; tnin even If ihr aigumeil tuppye1s in 
proving that ihiai cninol be Iilelhamilaiely 111111^^1 objects, it does not concern 
vague objecis al all. Thiai is no common agaeyment as lo whither idiniiiy befwein 
vague objects cii bn vsgur or not (i.e. whelhhi ii car be vague whitier or noi the 
idenlity holds), and various possible st1n'poiiis were briefly sketchel.
Re (lv) thaii dlfferynt standpoints coiceriiig tie iileteaxirsih Ideility of 
objects were piesinfel: tie aa'lcal, the intiamiliafi and tie libiaal. Eaci of flise 
standpoints makes ceitaii assumptions concerning piopnafies and are1lcates and in 
this way circumscribis the application of ihr Coiii1positive of Leibniz's law, and is
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therefore able to escape Evans's argument. The radical standpoint on indeterminate 
identity can defend itself against the charge of inconsistency by formulating the 
definition of indeterminate identity in terms of properties and arguing that although a 
and b could be distinguished in terms of predicates, there are no properties which 
could differeotiate them. Thus, Evans's argument, which essentially appeals to the 
properties of a and /?, is invalid. The intermediate standpoint has to argue either that 
the indeterminate-identity involving properties cannot serve to distinguish between
objects whose identity allegedly is indeterminate, or else that the indeterminate- 
identity involving predicates do not correspond to any properties. Again, Evans's 
argument comes out as invalid. One may object to the lotrrmedlatp standpoint by 
pointing out that Evans-type arguments can be constructed without using any 
indeterminate-identity involving predicates. The last - liberal - standpoint is immune to 
this objection for it has it that no indeterminacy-involving property counts in 
determining the identity or distinctness of objects.
Chapter III was devoted to problems concerning vagueness and persistence. 
There are many identity-over-time puzzles concerning the identity between objects a
at ti and b at t2 to which the only intuitive answer is that there is no determinate 
answer as to whether a and b are identical. That is, in other words, the only plausible
answer seems to be that there is no fact of the matter as to whether a and b are
identical.
After an introductory first section, io the second section of this chapter general 
problems concerning identity over time were presented. The main challenge for any 
persistence theorist is to accommodate the phenomenon of change within his
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framework. There are two main theories of persistence; endurantism and 
perdurantism. Perdurantists have no problems with fitting change into their theory, 
but they do have problems with making their view look plausible and consistent with
our common 'pre-scientific' intuitions about the world. On the other hand, for
endurantists change is a real challenge, because they have to show that an object that 
changes its intrinsic properties can nevertheless retain its numerical identity; e.g. that a
tomato which is green all over at ti and a tomato which is red all over at l2 can in fact
be one and the same tomato. As we have seen, endurantists seem able to meet that
challenge.
In the third section questions concerning indeterminate identity and the 
diachronic-identity puzzles were considered. It appears that the indeterminate answer 
to the questions concerning identity over time in puzzling cases can be regarded as the 
correct response. The indeterminacy in diachronic identity in those cases is caused by 
the imprecision and the indeterminacy of persistence conditions. The persistence 
conditions are not specified sufficiently to completely determine answers to the 
identity questions. The objects whose persistence conditions are vague are vague 
objects in the sense that their temporal boundaries are not precisely delimited.
Perdurantists define persistence of objects in terms of relations holding 
between temporal parts of those objects. The relevant relations are relations of spatio­
temporal continuity, similarity and causal connectedness, but they are never relations 
of identity, for two non-coincident temporal parts can never be identical. Therefore, 
for perdurantists the whole vagueness of persistence conditions is a conceptual 
matter. One has to determine which relations are essential if a certain concept is to
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apply to a given collection of temporal parts. If the identity-over-time question has an 
indeterminate answer it is because the relations have not been specified sufficiently.
For endurantists persistence is a matter of identity. They read identity-over­
time questions as "Is there a single object such that it existed at ti and exists at t2?" 
and argue that because of the vagueness of persistence cooditions that question has no
determinate answer. I have tried to argue that endurantists should accept the existence
of vague indeterminately identical objects. Io every puzzle of identity over time a
question is asked of whether a certain object a is identical with a certain object h. And
if one wants to answer that it is indeterminate whether a is identical to /), then one has
to explain the source of this indeterminacy somehow. The easiest explanation is to say 
that "ui" and "6" are imprecise designators which do not refer determioately to 
anything. However, such an explanation leads endurantists directly to coincident 
entities (of the same kind). Instead of accepting coincidence they can argue that a and 
b are vague objects which are indeterminately identical, The vagueness of a at ti and
b at t2 is a kind of vagueness that deserves the name of "ontic vagueness".
If a and b are vague, their names, "a" aod "A\ are imprpciap in a sense that 
each will refer determinately to one object and indeterminately to "the other" object. 
Although imprpciaP1 they will refer determinately to some objects. Hence, I have 
argued that (contrary to Sainsbury) "v" and "/?" do succeed io individuating objects;.
In chapter IV the paradox of 1001 cats aod the problem of the many were 
discussed. I have argued that these problems are different problems aod the solutions
to one need not be solutions to the other. The main difference between these two
puzzles is that one is essentially connected with vagueness, while the other is not. I
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have maintained that the problem of the many arises because of the vagueness of the 
boundaries of macroobjects. In particular, I have attacked Mark Johnston's arguments 
that the problem arises independently of vagueness.
In the first section, I proposed a tentative solution to the paradox of 1001 cats, 
according to which nothing that is a part of an F can count as another F unless it
divides into /'s. Thus, in fact there is only one cat on the mat, and it is (constituted by) 
the biggest lump of feline tissue.
In the second section five different solutions given to the problem of the many
were reviewed: the "constituters" solution, the "vagueness in the world" solution, the 
supervaluationist solution, the "relative-identity" solution and the "almost-identity"
solution. In particular, I have argued that since the "almost-identity" solution works 
only if coupled with the supervaluationist solution, it is in fact redundant. A separate
sub-section was devoted to the "constituters" solution. The proponent of this solution
has argued that the relation of constitution is vague, but I have claimed that in fact he
must accept that it is the objects for which the problem of the many arises which are
themselves vague.
In the third section I put forward a solution according to which in each case in 
which the problem of the many arises there is - contrary to appearances - only one 
(vague) object present. The appearance of multiplicity arises because each such object 
can be precisified in many ways, but these precisifications have no ontological 
significance. The problem of the many can be solved if one acknowledges that there is 
vagueness in the world and that it is an important feature of this world. The original 
problem arose because in every situation of which we would usually say that it 
contained just one complex object there seemed to be many equally good candidates
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for constituting fhsl object. However, my claim is that these can1ida1yt are noi 
'equally good', since they lavr precise boundsi'lis, whiii1s tie 'eirulin' object is
fuzzy.
Fiisll), in the fourth sncllon, I proposed 1 new spporr1 of wist It takes for si
object to be vague. My account makes use of Prier van Inwaghn's polsideaalions 
^1^1111. vague existence. The insults obialnnd by van Inwsgin arr used In 'ifinlng 
1 suficiirl con'ilion for bring s vagur objecl.
Chapter V was devoted to iit'etyaxinath Ilertiiy in the domain of quanta. 
The first part iiives1ig1ihd fhi various pioblixs ^1^1111. Identify, inlividualily and 
individuation of quantum pllllples. This part is based mainly upon the works of 
Stiphin Faencn, Michsel Rnlinsd and Paul Teller. They consfauctid s fhyoiy
lppoad1ng io which paallcles csi bn aegsaded as taanspyn'en1a1 individuals. The 
consiquiices of fils view for tie possible ildyleaxinate Ideillly of quailum particles
wire investigated. Two other metaahysipal posslbllliiis wire xyntinne1, nsmely ihe 
account according fo wiich psatiples are non-indivl'u1ls and fhe view which takes 
p1aficlis fo be yahemell1s.
In ihe second pari Jonatlsi Lowe's exanple of alligid ir1eteixii1ly identify- 
ovia-ilme biiwiin nlectaois was discussed snd plitipised. I lave argui' flat quanta 
aae noi good cln1I1lfet for vague objects. If onr takes ihem to be nnn-indivi'ua1t; 
lien tin question of fhyir Ilertiiy over time does nof aaisi. If they are treated as 
eahemeaa1S; thyry arr no puzzling csses of diachronic Iliillf), since ss soon as iwo 
yanymeaals infra a supeaaote1 slain in whicl lie question of lleia iideleamlnale 
identify could laite; thyy crasi lo exist and become 1 single niw yphymeaal. Lowe has
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proposed a new metaphysical stance according to which quantum particles are quasi­
objects in the sense that they possess determinate identity conditions outside 
superposition, but not inside. It seems however, that if this is to be an argument for
the indeterminate identity between particles, then it should be justified somehow. The
conclusion is that nothing that Lowe says compel one to accept that quanta are vague
indeterminately identical objects.
Evans's argument is usually considered by people who do not believe in
vagueness in the world to be the main weapon against their opponents. However, as I
have tried to show, it is not a decisive argument against vague or indeterminately
identical objects. In order for it to work, certain additional - and by no means obvious 
- assumptions are needed and the vague objects theorist may well not agree to accept 
them. Without these assumptions the argument is not a proof that the vague objects 
view is incoherent. Therefore, the argument cannot be used as a quick and convenient 
way of disposing of that view once and for all.
Thus, there seem to be no principled reasons why one should not maintain that 
objects as well as linguistic expressions are vague. And it seems that at least objects of 
our common everyday experience really are vague objects. Vagueness in spatial and 
temporal boundaries is widespread phenomenon. Moreover often cases of apparent 
synchronic and diachronic identity between objects cannot be settled determinately. I 
have tried to argue that that kind of vagueness is ontic vagueness that infects the 
objects in the world. The assumption that objects are vague allows us to solve the 
problem of the many and also - although in a limited sense - some of the diachronic 
identity puzzles.
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One may object, however, that the fact that mountains, watches, ships and 
persons are vague does not show in itself that reality is vague. One might argue that it 
can only be said that vagueness is a feature of the world, if it is a necessary property 
of any true and complete description of it; io other words, if reality cannot be
described io a completely precise language. This is a much stronger thesis and 1 did 
not even attempt to justify it. Io my thesis 1 was concerned mainly with composite
material objects aod I have tried to argue that such objects are vague. On the other
hand, if one questions the existence of any complex material objects and argues, for
instance, that reality is a four-dlmpnsinnal differentiable manifold of spatio-temporal 
points and dpscribpa everything in terms of these points and their sets, then maybe 
absolute precision io description is attainable. Whether such a description will capture 
all that one would want a proper description of the world to capture, is a question for 
scientists. It seems to me, however, that as long as we are prepared to count deserts, 
tables and guinea-pigs among the worldly objects, vagueness should be regarded as a 
feature of the world itself as well as a feature of our rpprpsentatinns of it.
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